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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Regulation of Utilities
1. Rates
An approved method for allowing electric companies to recover extra
costs for increased fossil fuel expenses apparently was established in the
1976 case of State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Edmisten.1 With that
decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court permitted the addition of a
fossil fuel adjustment charge to the basic rate charged the customer each
month to allow the company to recover the additional costs attributable to
each customer's power needs. 2 While the validity of these charges was
being litigated, however, the state legislature passed a statute terminating
them fully as of September 1, 1975. 3 Thus, effective September 1, 1975,
new and higher basic rates were established to include the cost of fossil fuel
and it was contemplated that companies would recover for later increases in
fuel costs by seeking a general rate increase in lieu of separate monthly
additional fuel charges. Along with this basic rate increase, the Utilities
Commission approved a temporary surcharge to yield to the companies the
full expense incurred by them for fossil fuel burned in July and August
1975. 4 The companies argued that they needed this extra revenue to recover
money that would otherwise be lost to them as the result of a two month lag
between the time fuel expenses were incurred by them and the time such
costs were reflected on the customer's bill. However, a challenge by the
Attorney General to this temporary surcharge was upheld by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 1977.
5
In State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Edmisten,6 the court ruled that
imposition of the surcharge exceeded the Commission's authority because it
violated the clear statutory mandate that " '[a]ll monthly fuel adjustment
increases based solely upon the increased cost of fuel, as to each public
1. 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976).
2. For an analysis of this case, see Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976,
55 N.C.L. REV. 895, 901-03 (1977).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides that "[a]ll monthly fuel
adjustment rate increases based solely upon the increased cost of fuel, as to each public utility,
as presently approved by the Commission shall fully terminate effective September 1, 1975."
4. This surcharge was intended to be collected ratably over approximately ten months.
State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 451, 462, 232 S.E.2d 184, 191 (1977).
5. The Attorney General appealed from a court of appeals holding in favor of the
Commission. The lower court opinion is reported at 30 N.C. App. 459, 227 S.E.2d 593 (1976).
6. 291 N.C. 451, 232 S.E.2d 184 (1977). This case, which concerned Duke Power
Company, is a companion to two other cases with the same style concerning Virginia Electric
and Power Company, 291 N.C. 477, 232 S.E.2d 199 (1977), and Carolina Power and Light
Company, 291 N.C. 478, 232 S.E.2d 200 (1977).
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utility, as presently approved by the Commission shall fully terminate
effective September 1, 1975.' "-7 The court also rejected the argument that
as of September 1, 1975, there was an accumulation of money due the
companies under the approved fuel adjustment clause in addition to that
collectible through the companies' regular bills for service in prior months.
The clause was intended not to enable the "recovery" of past excess
expenditures for fuel but to provide a measure of the reasonably anticipated
costs of fuel used in generating power for the current billing month. 8 The
court also expressed concern that the temporary surcharge would require
future customers to pay for service used by past, and perhaps different,
customers. 9 The court ordered the companies to make the appropriate
refunds to their customers on account of the revenues unlawfully
collected. 10
Although, as the majority and dissent agreed, the language of the
Commission order establishing the fuel adjustment clause could have been
clearer, the mandate from the General Assembly that all such charges shall
fully terminate as of a specified date was clear and unambiguous; the
Commission was plainly in violation of the statute. The majority obviously
considered the surcharge an injustice to the consumer and presented a
persuasive argument in noting that it was inequitable to place the burden of
the cost of coal burned for summer uses on those customers who, as a result,
would be required to pay more for their electric power consumption during
the winter months.
7. 291 N.C. at 465, 232 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(e) (Cum. Supp.
1977)), (emphasis added by the court). The court added that because it was created by the
legislature, "the Commission has no authority to permit that which is forbidden by statute or to
extend a previously granted rate increase which the statute has declared terminated." Id. at
464, 232 S.E.2d at 192.
8. rd. at 468, 473, 232 S.E.2d at 194, 197. For example, at the time bills to reflect
December's usage were mailed in January, cost figures from November were employed be-
cause they were the most recent coal cost data available at the time.
9. The court distinguished this surcharge from the approved practice of allowing
companies to spread the expenses of depreciation and application for rate increase procedures
over a future period of service. The court explained that the latter long term expenditures are
properly recovered over the useful life of the service provided and should not be wholly
charged to the customers who use the service in the month of such expenditure. The cost of
coal burned in any particular month, however, is like a wage expense and should be borne by
the users of the service in the month in which the expense was incurred. Id. at 470-71, 232
S.E.2d at 195-96.
10. Chief Justice Sharp and Justices Copeland and Moore disagreed with the majority.
They construed the December 19, 1973, order of the Commission authorizing the fuel adjust-
ment clause to implement a two month lag in the recovery of increased actual costs and
concluded that the General Assembly never intended to deprive the companies of these
revenues. Id. at 475, 232 S.E.2d at 198 (Copeland, J., dissenting). For a copy of the Commis-
sion order in question, see id. They were also concerned that the refunds ordered would
produce financial benefits to individual members of the consuming public that would be "quite
small" in comparison with the burden cast upon the utilities in making the approriate refunds.
Id. at 476, 232 S.E.2d at 199.
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Customer surcharges for emergency natural gas purchased during the
winter of 1975-76 were also the subject of litigation in 1977. In State ex rel.
Utilities Commission v. Farmers Chemical Association,"I the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals overruled an order of the Utilities Commission that
required Farmers Chemical (FCA) to pay such a charge. FCA had agreed
with North Carolina Natural Gas that instead of purchasing emergency gas it
would temporarily suspend its operations when its allotment ran out.
12
However, the anticipated shutdown never occurred because the winter
proved milder than expected and additional gas was available from the
state's regular supplier. The court held that the Commission erred in disre-
garding evidence that FCA was neither served nor benefited by the emergen-
cy purchases. 13 The Farmers Chemical decision gives to any company that
can clearly show that it did not use particular, special supplies of natural gas
an argument that it should not have to subsidize the extra expenses incurred
by the supplier in making such purchases. The allowance of such an
exemption, however, seems illogical. The use of emergency gas by one
consumer has the direct effect of making more regular gas available to
another. It seems inevitable that approval of such an exemption will of
necessity be confined to the peculiar facts of the Farmers Chemical case:
use of the product as a raw material in the manufacturing process instead of
merely for heating purposes 14 and complete inability of the plant to operate
either without gas or with a supply of gas that is significantly below its total
requirements. 15
In a case involving a proposed rate increase for Nantahala Power
Company, 16 the Attorney General challenged a modification by the
Commission on its own motion of an earlier rate order. The Commission
increased the company's rates to permit it to earn 5.30%, instead of the
initially approved return of 3.72%, on the fair value of its properties "used
and useful" in rendering service in North Carolina. 17 The supreme court
I1. 33 N.C. App. 433, 235 S.E.2d 398, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 258, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977).
12. In recent years, there have been substantial curtailments in the amount of natural gas
available to North Carolina. In order to allocate the existing supply of gas, the Utilities
Commission adopted a system of priorities that applied to all customers. Residential custom-
ers, the highest priority, were not subject to curtailment, but industrial and commercial users
were. To benefit the latter groups, North Carolina Natural Gas arranged to purchase additional
emergency supplies of the product. See id. at 435, 438, 235 S.E.2d at 399, 401.
13. Id. at 445, 235 S.E.2d at 405.
14. FCA uses natural gas entirely for "feedstock" and "process" purposes, as a raw
material that is converted into nitrogen fertilizer and as a super heating fuel to effectuate this
conversion. Id. at 433, 235 S.E.2d at 398.
15. Apparently, alternate use of other fuels would not be of assistance to FCA. See id. at
434, 235 S.E.2d at 399.
16. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 575, 232 S.E.2d 177 (1977).
17. Id. at 583, 232 S.E.2d at 182. The standard used by the Utilities Commission in setting
rates is set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (1975), which requires the Commission to
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upheld the Commission, stating:
We find no error of law in the Commission's determination to
reconsider the matter prior to the expiration of the time allowed by
the statute for the taking of an appeal from its original order, or in
its revision of its original finding of fact as to the reasonableness of
allowing Nantahala to set rates sufficient to enable it to earn 5.30
per cent on the fair value of its properties used and useful in
rendering utility service in the State.'
8
The court added that the original order of the Commission was based in part
upon an error of law because in arriving at its first rate of return figure the
Commission took notice of the fact that Nantahala had no need to attract
new capital in the marketplace at that time. However, even though a utility
contemplates no substantial expansion and so presently does not anticipate
the issuance of either stocks or bonds, it is still "entitled to charge rates
sufficient to enable it to earn a fair rate of return."
19
This decision may prove to be of little precedential value because
Nantahala, as a wholly owned subsidiary of a large corporation, Aluminum
Company of America (ALCOA), from which it presently receives all of its
invested capital, 20 occupies a unique position in this state. The court noted
"[a]scertain the fair value of the public utility's property used and useful in providing the
service." Id. § 62-133(b)(1). The purpose of using this valuation is "to assure the utility of
earnings sufficient to attract capital and also . .. to limit its charges for service to levels
sufficient for that purpose." State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. General Tel. Co., 281 N.C. 318,
338, 189 S.E.2d 705, 718 (1972). In 1977 the legislature altered ratesetting procedures (effective
with respect to rate applications filed on and after July 1, 1979) to change the manner of
identifying the property that is "used and useful." In addition to plants that are already in
operation, the utility will be allowed to include as property "used and useful" facilities that are
currently under construction. See Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 691, §§ 2-4, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws
838. The effect of this change is to allow the utility to recover compensation from present
ratepayers as construction progresses but before the plant is generating revenues, thereby
accelerating the utility's cash flow. For a discussion favoring the alternative method of defer-
ring all compensation until plants are in service, see In re Communications Satellite Corp., 56
F.C.C.2d 1101, 1111 (1975).
18. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 575, 585, 232 S.E.2d 177, 183
(1977).
19. Id. at 586, 232 S.E.2d at 183.
In addition to private companies with the status of public utilities, some municipalities that
own or operate generating systems furnish electric service. In 1977 the legislature authorized a
constitutional amendment that would allow such municipalities to share ownership of power
facilities with private groups engaged in the generation, transmission or distribution of electrici-
ty for resale. Law of June 10, 1977, ch. 170, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 157. The amendment
also authorized the issuance of revenue bonds to finance the municipalities' share of the cost of
jointly owned facilities. This amendment was approved by the voters of North Carolina in
November 1977. A new statute was also passed that authorizes municipalities owning or
operating electric distribution systems to adopt peak load pricing and to place into effect service
devices that will temporarily curtail or cut off certain types of appliances "whenever an unusual
peak demand threatens to overload the electric system or economies would result." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160A-323 (Supp. 1977).
20. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 575, 583, 232 S.E.2d 177, 182
(1977).
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that Nantahala was granted rates that yielded it a lower rate of return than
other utilities in the state and indicated, without expressing an opinion, that
this was due to the company's special status as a subsidiary of ALCOA.
21
The principle set forth in the court's holding, however, is a fair one that
should be applied to all utilities: present expansion plans, or the lack
thereof, should have no bearing on the determination of the appropriate rate
of return to be earned on the property the utility currently employs to furnish
its service.
2. Communications
In North Carolina Utilities Commission v. Federal Communications
Commission,22 the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed a 1976 ruling upholding an
FCC decision that under the Communications Act of 193423 the FCC is
empowered to preempt conflicting state regulation of telephone terminal
equipment used for both interstate and local communications. 24 This deci-
sion resolved a continuing controversy25 over the authority of state commis-
sions to forbid or impair the interconnection of noncarrier-supplied terminal
equipment with telephone company facilities. 26 As a result, the FCC pro-
gram, which permits customers to use any terminal equipment registered
with the FCC by the manufacturer rather than rent an interface device from
the telephone company, will be given effect.27 Because customers will not
have to pay the telephone company a monthly charge for an interface device
for customer-purchased equipment, it is likely that more people will choose
to buy communications equipment directly from retailers than to continue
renting it from the telephone company. The court dismissed the importance
of arguments that significant revenue loss would be suffered by the utility
companies and that their ability to subsidize residential service through
higher charges for business service would be impaired. 28 In dissent, Judge
21. Id. at 585, 232 S.E.2d at 183.
22. 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 222 (1977).
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V. 1975).
24. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. F.C.C., 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1027 (1976).
25. 552 F.2d at 1042-44.
26. Terminal equipment is that which the customer has in his home or business. Examples
include residential telephones, key telephones, answering devices and computer terminals. Id.
at 1040.
27. The federal tariff in operation prior to this case permitted interconnection of custom-
er-owned terminal equipment so long as interface devices--equipment designed to protect
telephone company facilities and personnel from power surges and other damage from custom-
er-owned machinery to the utility's network-were installed. Id. at 1043.
28. Id. at 1052-56. The court also stressed that exemptions are available from the FCC's
interconnection policy whenever a carrier demonstrates that compliance with it" 'has already
resulted in or will result in direct, substantial and immediate economic injury to [the] telephone
system and detriment to the public interest.' "Id. at 1056 (quoting In re Mebane Home Tel. Co.,
53 F.C.C.2d 473, 480 (1975)) (emphasis added by court).
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Widener expressed his concern that the public interest would not be served
by the court's decision because there had not been sufficient investigation to
counterbalance the estimates supplied by the telephone industry of the high
cost to consumers that would result from the increased rates that would have
to be levied in compensation for revenues lost in decreased equipment
installation and rental revenues. He added that the "fundamental issue
involved here may well require resolution by Congress, rather than the FCC,
for Congress has determined that the public interest is better served in the
field of telephone service by a regulated monopoly than by competition.'"29
In facilitating the customer purchase of telephone equipment, the court took
a stand popular with many consumer groups. 30 However, it remains to be
seen whether consumers will actually benefit from this action or will instead
end up paying higher rates for local and long distance service. 31
29. Id. at 1060 (Widener, J., dissenting).
30. Telephone interview with Harry D. Barnes, Jr., Marketing Department, Southern Bell
Telephone Company, Charlotte, North Carolina (Feb. 22, 1978).
31. Because the registration program has not been fully implemented, it is difficult at this
point to predict its ultimate effect on the telephone companies. Id. However, the Fourth
Circuit's decision is indicative of a serious problem facing the telephone companies-that of
widespread administrative and court approval of the continuing erosion of their monopoly
status. From the companies' viewpoint, the most alarming evidence of this trend is the opinion
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in MCI Telecommunications
Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 781 (1978). In that decision,
the court reversed an FCC order that had prohibited Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI),
a private carrier selling long distance connections between 18 large cities, from expanding its
service to new customers. By concentrating its efforts in limited, lucrative markets, a private
carrier service, such as MCI, can charge rates considerably below those charged by the Bell
system. Interview with Harry D. Barnes, Jr., supra note 30. Telephone companies such as the
Bell Telephone Company contend that such a trend will have deleterious effects on subscribers
in states such as North Carolina for two reasons. Because the Bell system has traditionally used
its long distance revenues to subsidize low cost local residence rates, local rates will be
adversely affected and, in addition, to compete with private long distance carriers, the Bell
system will have to lower its long distance rates in those areas, thereby impairing its current
program of nationwide rate averaging, which provides below cost long distance service to less
densely populated areas of the country. The Bell system has continued to pursue this issue with
the FCC. AT&T Responds Quickly to Execunet Ruling, MGMT. INFORMATION BULL., Jan. 26,
1978, at I (Southern Bell); Court Denies Petition to Review Execunet, id., Jan. 20, 1978, at 1;
Execunet Service Jeopardizes Low Cost of Home Telephone Service, N.C. REP., Jan. 11, 1978,
at 3 (Southern Bell) (copies on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
This decision and that of the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC allow
private carriers to cream-skim-that is, to provide service in a particularly high profit area
and underprice the regulated common carrier, which is required to provide service in all areas,
The current trend by courts, and to a lesser extent by the FCC, in this field seems to favor
certain preferred customers and locales at the expense of other-usually residential and less
populated-areas.
Another issue arising in the context of communications involved a medical doctor who
provided radio communications services for compensation to 10 doctors in his county. In State
ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Simpson, 32 N.C. App. 543,232 S.E.2d 871, cert. granted, 292 N.C.
735, 235 S.E.2d 787 (1977), the court of appeals upheld a Commission ruling that the doctor
came under its jurisdiction because he was operating a "public" utility within the meaning of
the North Carolina statutes. The test applied by the court was whether a "significant part of the
public obtains the service offered or provided." Id. at 546-47, 232 S.E.2d at 873. Relying on
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3. Common Carriers
Two court decisions in 1977 dealing with a common carrier32 con-
cerned the standards used by the Utilities Commission in approving the
transfer of a franchise to serve an area from one trucking company to
another. The major issue pertained to whether a franchise sought to be
transferred was "dormant." If such a finding were made, the franchise
could not be transferred but would have to meet the more stringent test of
showing a public need for the service required of new applicants for
franchise authority. 3 In State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Estes Express
Lines,34 a case of first impression, the court of appeals concluded that G.S.
62-112(c), 35 the statute dealing with dormancy, means what it says-that no
activity by the franchise for thirty consecutive days is prima facie evidence
of dormancy-but the Commission may give consideration to other factors
in making a final decision. Thus, in the ExpreSs Lines case, the prima facie
presumption was rebutted by evidence "that transferor continuously adver-
tised its service, that it was ready, willing, and able to haul . . . commod-
ities under its franchise, and that it charged published tariff rates."
3 6
The dormancy question is a good example of the kind of issue that is
best left to the discretion of an expert body such as the Utilities Commis-
sion. The franchise in dispute in Express Lines was for the transport of
general commodities over irregular routes within Wake County, North
Carolina and between Wake County and certain Piedmont and Eastern
counties in the state.37 Because farm products, such as the tobacco which
furnishes a large part of transferor's business, 8 are seasonal, thirty days
cases from other jurisdictions applying the same test to taxicab and bus companies, Terminal
Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252 (1916); Surface Transp. Corp. v. Reservoir Bus Lines, Inc.,
271 App. Div. 556, 67 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1946), the court held that defendant met this test because
he served almost one-half of the radio communications market in the county. 32 N.C. App. at
547, 232 S.E.2d at 873-74. This decision should help to delineate the kinds of enterprises that are
subject to regulation by the Utilities Commission.
The General Assembly enacted a law designed to prevent telephone company customers
from improperly monitoring calls received or placed by them. The statute provides that "[n]o
public utility may offer or maintain telephone service to any subscriber" who installs monitor-
ing equipment unless "said subscriber shall agree that such equipment shall be used in confor-
mity with the standards for the use of such equipment adopted by the Commission." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 62-138(g) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
32. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Estes Express Lines, 33 N.C. App. 99, 234 S.E.2d
628 (1977); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Estes Express Lines, 33 N.C. App. 174,234 S.E.2d
624 (1977).
33. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-262(e)(1) (1975).
34. 33 N.C. App. 174, 234 S.E.2d 624 (1977).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-112(c) (1975).
36. 33 N.C. App. at 179, 234 S.E.2d at 627.
37. See id. at 175, 234 S.E.2d at 624.
38. Id. at 175-76, 234 S.E.2d at 626.
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seems too short a time in which to establish an irrebuttable presumption of
dormancy. Thus, it seems only fair to take into consideration extenuating
factors such as continuous efforts to serve the public within the narrow
contours of the authority granted. Furthermore, the transferor's revenues
from the franchise were approximately $28,000 for the six months prior to
the filing of the instant protest by Estes Express Lines. 39 Therefore, the
Commission exercised wisely its discretion in this case; it would have been
improper for the court to disturb the Commission's ruling since the evidence
found by the Commission in support of its decision was "competent,
material and substantial. "'4
B. Employment Regulation
In State ex rel. Employment Security Commission v. Paul's Young
Men's Shop, Inc. ,41 the court of appeals considered the question of how to
correct past errors in reporting and paying contributions to the State Unem-
ployment Insurance Fund. Defendant, owner of Paul's Young Men's Shop
and also trading as Ricky's, had reported and remitted all contributions due
on account of wages paid his employees for the entire period in question. In
addition, he reported and paid contributions under the same employer
account number for employees of three additional retail businesses owned
by him.4' Although this combined payment method had been used with the
39. Id. at 175, 234 S.E.2d at 626.
40. Id. at 178, 234 S.E.2d at 627.
Among other developments in this area, in an effort to achieve a stable rate structure in the
common carrier industry the General Assembly passed a statute allowing the Commission to
approve uniform rates for the same or similar services by carriers of the same class. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 62-152. (b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Carriers of the same class are those engaged in the same
kind of operations. For example, all air carriers are in the same class. The Commission must
make a finding that such rates will further the state transportation policy and if such a finding is
made, the parties to such agreements will be relieved from operation of the state antitrust laws
in regard to combinations in restraint of trade.
A major change in the manner in which the public is represented before the Utilities
Commission was made with the creation of a public staff empowered to make appropriate
recommendations to the Commission with regard to the reasonableness of proposed rates and
the quality of service rendered by any public utility. Id. § 62-15(a), (d)(l). The public staff is
also empowered to investigate complaints directed to the Commission and to make studies and
recommendations to the Commission with respect to standards, regulations, practices or
service of any public utility. Id. § 62-15(d)(2), (7). It is intended that the staff remain indepen-
dent of the Commission and it "shall not be subject to the supervision, direction, or control of
the commission, the chairman, or members of the commission." Id. § 62-15(b). The law
expressly preserves the power of the Attorney General to intervene, when he deems it advis-
able in the public interest, in proceedings before the Commission on behalf of the using and
consuming public. Id. § 62-20. Unless further action is taken by the General Assembly, the
public staff will terminate on August 31, 1981. Law of June 3, 1977, ch. 468, § 23, 1977 N.C.
Sess. Laws 488.
41. 32 N.C. App. 23, 231 S.E.2d 157, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 264, 233 S.E.2d 396 (1977).
42. The three corporations were Diamond Outlet, Inc., Gems, Inc., and Paul's Young
Men's Shop, Inc. Defendant and his immediate family were the sole stockholders of all four
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knowledge of the Commission since at least 1961, in 1973 the Chairman
ordered that under the applicable statutes all contributions erroneously paid
by Ricky's for the last five years be refunded and the other three corpora-
tions be assessed for back payments as though they had never made any
contribution. Upon approval of the opinion by the full Commission, defend-
ant appealed to the superior court.
Stating that "there is nothing in the Statutes to prohibit the Commis-
sion from going back and making a proper allocation of the contributions
erroneously paid by taxpayer to the proper employing units," the superior
court ordered that the Commission give credit to each corporation as if
separate accounts had always been in existence. 43 On appeal by the
Commission, the court of appeals agreed with the lower court and directed
the Commission retroactively to set up the separate accounts, compute the
correct rates of contribution that should have been paid by each separate
employing unit and make proper allocations of contributions and charges to
each unit. The court apparently accorded considerable significance to the
good faith exhibited by defendants44 and the fact that under prior law the
four corporations would have been considered a single employing unit.45
Moreover, the court noted that
the Commission is deliberately ignoring, as being without legal
significance, the fact that every penny of taxable wages paid to
every employee of each of the corporations was actually fully
reported to the Commission and contributions were paid to the
Commission on account of such wages, though the reporting and
payment was, by error, made under the account number of
Ricky's. We find nothing in the governing statutes which requires
such a harsh result.46
The court also relied on an earlier opinion by the North Carolina Supreme
Court that had sanctioned correction of a similar error and transfer of the
enterprises. Payments were made on behalf of the employees of Diamond Outlet and Gems for
the years 1967 and 1968 although neither corporation was liable for those years since neither
had in its employ four or more persons for twenty or more weeks during that time. The net
effect of reporting all employees of the three corporations and paying contributions on their
wages through a single account number was to build up the reserves in the account of Ricky's
and allow the three corporations the advantage of Ricky's lower rate of contribution. The rate
of contribution assigned.to Ricky's account reached a low of .5% whereas each corporation, if
paying separately, would have been required to pay at the standard rate of 2.7% until their
separate credit reserve ratios met statutory requirements so as to entitle them to reduced rates.
Id. at 24-25, 231 S.E.2d at 158.
43. Id. at 27, 231 S.E.2d at 59.
44. Defendants made extra payments not required by law. See note 42 supra.
45. See Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. City Ice & Coal Co., 216 N.C. 6, 3
S.E.2d 290 (1939).
46. 32 N.C. App. at 31, 231 S.E.2d at 162.
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account to the proper unit. 47 The Paul's holding indicates a willingness by
the North Carolina courts to give close scrutiny to decisions of the Commis-
sion reallocating past erroneous payments and to overrule such determina-
tions when the particular facts of each case and the interests of justice so
demand.
The Employment Security Commission was also affected by legislation
intended to expand coverage of the program to additional groups of work-
ers, 48 to establish new procedures for contesting decisions of the Commis-
sion, 49 to change the taxable wage base, 50 and to make other alterations in
the activities of the Commission to conform with federal requirements. 51
Among those covered for the first time are agricultural laborers, 52 domestic
workers, 53 state and local government personnel,5 4 and employees of non-
profit elementary and secondary schools. 55 In an effort to make jobs more
available to groups that have traditionally suffered discrimination in seeking
employment, the legislature passed the Equal Employment Practices Act 56
47. State ex rel. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Nissen, 227 N.C. 216, 41
S.E.2d 734 (1947). In Nissen, a reserve account was incorrectly listed in the name of a
mortgagee although it should have been credited to the account of the mortgagor, for whom the
mortgagee was acting simply as an agent in managing the mortgaged property. The Paul's court
emphasized that although the factual situation in Nissen was somewhat different from the
instant case, there was sufficient similarity between them because each case involved a reserve
account that had erroneously reported as its own employees persons who were employees of
another. 32 N.C. App. at 31-32, 231 S.E.2d at 162.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(5)(n)-(g) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
49. When a protest is made to an initial determination as to eligibility or disqualification
of a claimant, appeals may be taken through an informal conference, then to an appeals ref-
eree at a formal hearing, and finally to the Commission on appeal or on its own motion. Id.
§ 96-15(b)-(e).
50. Id. § 96-9(a)(5) changes the wage base from $4200 to the federally required tax base.
51. Id. § 96-19(b) authorizes the Employment Security Commission to suspend enforce-
ment, until the legislature next meets, of any section that is adjudged out of conformity with
federal law.
52. Employers covered are those who paid wages of $20,000 for agricultural labor or
employed at least 10 individuals in such work for at least 20 days, each day being in a different
calendar week. Id. § 96-8(5)(n).
53. Employers who paid during any calendar quarter wages of $1000 or more for domestic
services are required to contribute to the State Unemployment Insurance Fund. Id. § 96-8(5)(o).
54. Id. § 96-8(5)(p). Certain classes of workers are excluded such as elected officials and
employees hired during temporary emergencies. Id. § 96-8(6)(i).
55. Id. § 96-8(5)(q). Employees in various occupations who are excluded from coverage of
the law are listed in id. § 96-8(6) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
56. The statute states that it is the public policy of this state to "protect and safeguard the
right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain and hold employment without discrimination
or abridgment on account of race, religion, color, national origin, age, sex, or handicap by
employers which regularly employ 15 or more employees." Id. § 143-422.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Upon the forwarding of charges of discrimination to it by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the Human Relations Council in the Department of Administration is authorized
to investigate and resolve such allegations. It is uncertain what will result from such action
since the law specified that "the agency shall use its good offices to effect an amicable
resolution of the charges of discrimination" and this is the only remedy for discrimination
mentioned by the Act. Id. § 143-422.3.
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and created the Jobs for Veterans Committee.5 7 All of these measures should
provide much-needed protection to many of the groups that have not re-
ceived some of the advantages long taken for granted by the majority of
North Carolina's working populace.
58
C. Health Care Regulation
The General Assembly in 1977 enacted major legislation concerning
four areas of the health field. In an effort to strengthen community mental
health services, the General Assembly passed legislation revising current
procedures for providing local care for mental health, mental retardation and
drug dependency problems. 59 Area mental health programs will be adminis-
tered jointly by the Department of Human Resources, the Commission for
Mental Health Services, 6° Area Mental Health Authorities, and Area Mental
Health Boards. 61 Before these area programs were mandated, any county or
city with a population over 25,000 or any independent community agency
could be a local mental health authority. Under applicable law this oftei
resulted in a loss of state and federal funds. 62 Now, however, all counties
will be required to participate in state mental health programs, just as they
are required to furnish public health services.
63
57. The committee assumes the duties of the Governor's Jobs for Veterans Committee. It
consists of such members as the Governor shall appoint and is headed by a full time chairman
selected by the Secretary of Administration. The chairman's duties include acting as a liaison
between the Committee and state agencies and communities to ensure that veterans receive the
employment preferences to which they are legally entitled, evaluating existing programs and
assisting employers in implementing affirmative action plans for handicapped and Vietnam-era
veterans. Id. § 143B-420.
58. While these protections were being extended to certain groups of workers, short-term
employees of state government were being removed from the safeguards furnished by the State
Personnel Act. All employees of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor and state personnel
who had not been continuously employed by the goernment for the five immediately preced-
ing years will no longer be covered by the provisions generally applicable to state person-
nel in regard to hiring, firing, promotion, salary and appeals from personnel decisions. See id.
§ 126-4 to -5.
59. Id. §§ 122-35.35 to .57, 143B-147.
60. Id. § 143B-147 changed the name of this group to the Commission for Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Services. In so doing, the General Assembly sought to provide in-
creased budget support and representation for and public awareness of mental retardation
programs. The Commis'sion consists of fifteen members, two of whom are members of the
General Assembly and the remainder of whom are appointed by the Governor according to
criteria established by the statute. Id. § 143B-148(a).
61. In addition to setting forth the various working procedures to govern the activities of
these organizations, the Act establishes criteria for the selection of members of the local
authorities and boards and specifies the particular purposes for which federal, state and local
funds may be expended. Id. §§ 122-35.40, .42, .53 to .57.
62. Solberg, Proposed Health Legislation-1977, HEALTH L. BULL., No. 47, 1977, at 1, 4
(Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (copy on file in office of
North Carolina Law Review).
63. Interview with Patrice Solberg, Assistant Professor, Institute of Government, Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Feb. 15, 1978).
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New procedures have been established for adjudicating incompetency
in adults, 64 appointing their guardians and providing for the restoration of
their competency. Proceedings are held before the clerk of superior court,
and the prospective ward is entitled to a number of procedural safeguards,
including the right to a jury determination in a public hearing. 65 The clerk is
empowered to appoint a guardian for the ward under detailed criteria
established by the Act 66 and to retain continuing jurisdiction over the status
of the ward.67 This legislation was intended to bring North Carolina's adult
guardianship laws into full compliance with the United States Constitution
and to remedy specific problems with the previous statutes. 68 Although the
old law gave the guardian unlimited control over the ward's affairs, the clerk
now, based on the condition of the ward, may specify what the guardian's
powers are to be. In addition, by forcing certain public officials to act as
guardians when there is no other person available, the statute now ensures
that people needing such assistance will receive it.69 This legislation
achieves a significant improvement in guaranteeing that adults will be
informed, within their capabilities, of what is happening to them and in
ensuring that they will retain as much control over the management of their
affairs as is possible under the circumstances.
In addition, the legislature enacted a Nursing Home Patients' Bill of
Rights, 70 which includes such nonwaivable provisions as the assurance of
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-1.6 to .41 (Supp. 1977). This is the exclusive procedure
regarding incompetency in adults who are mentally retarded, epileptic, cerebral palsied or
autistic; it also provides an alternative procedure, in addition to those set forth in Chapter 35,
Article 2 of the General Statutes, id. §§ 35-2 to -9 (1976), for adjudicating mentally ill persons
incompetent and for appointing guardians for them. Id. § 35-1.8 (Supp. 1977).
65. Id. § 35-1.10 to .20 (Supp. 1977). Appeals from actions of the clerk shall be to the
superior court de novo and then to the court of appeals.
66. See id. §§ 35-1.28 to .39. The standard for appointing a guardian is that by the greater
weight of the evidence the person is incompetent. Id. § 35-1.16().
67. The legislature also sought to improve the procedures for involuntary commitment by
providing a special advocate paid by the state to represent the interests of the petitioner and the
community at large. The objective of this measure is to provide a balanced presentation of the
issues. State law has already provided for special counsel for the indigent respondent in
involuntary commitment proceedings. See id. § 122-58.7(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
68. For an excellent background discussion, see Comment, North Carolina Guardianship
Laws-The Need for Change, 54 N.C.L. REv. 389 (1976). For example, the procedure for
appointing a guardian under prior law did not require the clerk to give notice to anyone of the
pending hearing. And in the event notice was given, the statutes did not require the notice to
contain any information other than the date of hearing, nor did they require the potential ward
be given advance notice. Therefore, those provisions did not meet the due process require-
ments of adequate and timely notice. Id. at 392. Also, no due process protections were granted
with regard to issuance of certificates of lunacy or prior to commitment to an institution for the
mentally retarded. Id. at 405.
69. Interview with Patrice Solberg, supra note 63. Formerly, it was a common occurrence
for persons in nursing homes in need of an operation to be prevented from undergoing the
required medical treatment because of the absence of any authorized individual to give consent
on behalf of the patient. Id.
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130-264 to -277 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The legislature stated that its
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privacy in one's own room and of the freedom to associate with others,
freedom from abuse and the opportunity to present grievances to various
groups including the Department of Human Resources. These rights may be
enforced by a civil action for injunctive relief by any patient or by the
Department acting in the patient's behalf. 71 Although this enactment may
initially appear to be beneficial to nursing home patients, when considered
in context it provides, at best, only an insignificant degree of assistance.
With the exception of about a dozen nursing homes, all other homes in
North Carolina are already subject to several bills of rights mandated by the
federal government for those homes participating in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.72 Because the North Carolina and federal bills are not
identical, the new Act has created a confusing situation for both adminis-
trators and patients. In addition, the penalties imposed for violation of the
Act-revocation of the home's license and a fine of ten dollars per day per
patient-have been criticized as being too low to effectively deter homes
from infringing patients' rights. As a result, this legislation was unfavorably
reviewed by at least one scholarly publication in the field, which stated:
It is somewhat shocking that the General Assembly has valued
a nursing home patient's rights at only $10 per day. Moreover, the
statutes do not specify whether the act applies to minors who are
now being admitted to nursing homes. If so, it grants minors rights
they would not otherwise have, such as the right to consent to
experimental research and to enter into contracts. Finally, when a
nursing home must comply with from four to six different and
conflicting patients' rights acts, the patients' rights movement will
surely suffer.7
3
Protection is given nursing home residents by another new statute
requiring state inspections of these facilities without prior notice and
categorizing as a misdemeanor the unauthorized divulgence of such notice
by anyone acting under the authority of the Commission for Health Services
or the Department of Human Resources. 74 Violations of this provision are
punishable by a fine of up to five hundred dollars and/or imprisonment for
intention in passing this statute was to ensure that "every patient's civil and religious liberties,
including the right to independent personal decisions and knowledge of available choices, shall
not be infringed and that the facility shall encourage and assist the patient in the fullest possible
exercise of these rights." Id. § 130-264.
71. Id. §§ 130-272 to -273. Also, effective March 1, 1979, each nursing home, as a
condition to its licensing, must be served by an independent community advisory committee
charged with the duty of working with the home for the best interests of its residents. Id. § 130-
9(e)(7).
72. Interview with Patrice Solberg, supra note 63.
73. 1977 Legislation, HEALTH L. BULL., No. 48, July 1977, at 1, 5 (Institute of Govern-
ment, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (copy on file in office of North Carolina
Law Review).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-9(e)(1), (3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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up to thirty days. 75 In light of the insignificant fine imposed on nursing
homes for denial of patients' rights, this penalty has been criticized as being
too harsh. 76 In addition, this provision, like the patients' bill of rights
statute, does not apply to homes for the aged, which are custodial rather than
treatment facilities. 77 As patients are as subject to abuse in custodial
facilities as in nursing ones, it seems that any protections extended to
patients in one kind of home should be similarly provided for residents of
the other.
In response to public recognition of the dangerous and inadequate
accommodations obtaining in some day care facilities, the General Assem-
bly passed several statutes designed to ameliorate or eliminate substandard
operations. 78 The Department of Human Resources is empowered to inspect
and license all child care institutions79 except those subject to three
enumerated exceptions;8 0 prior law authorized the Department to supervise
only private institutions.8 1 More demanding standards were enacted to
govern the qualifications of personnel in licensed child care facilities;8 2 in
addition, the category of facilities required to be licensed was expanded to
operations that do not receive payment for their services.8 3 Therefore, any
arrangement that provides day care on a regular basis for more than four
hours per day for more than five children is subject to supervision by the
Child Day Care Licensing Board.84 Certain operations, such as public
schools, are excluded from this requirement.85 Finally, an additional rem-
75. Id. § 130-9(e)(3).
76. 1977 Legislation, supra note 73. Additionally, since these inspections are made with-
out a search warrant, their constitutionality is unclear in light of such past decisions as See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (businessman could not be convicted for failure to consent to
warrantless search of his locked warehouse by fire inspector), and Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967) (tenant could not be convicted for failure to consent to warrantless search
of his apartment by building inspector). The United States Supreme Court has held that before
an OSHA inspection can be conducted over the objection of the owner of the premises, an
administrative search warrant must be obtained. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 4483
(May 23, 1978).
77. Interview with Patrice Solberg, supra note 63.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-78, 110-86(2) to (4), -90.1 to -98.1, -102, -104 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
79. Id. § 108-78.
80. Id. § 108-78(c).
81. Law of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 170, § 3, 1868 N.C. Pub. Laws 415 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-78 (1975)).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-90.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). No day care plan shall be registered if
anyone who works in it has been convicted of child-related crimes or crimes involving moral
turpitude, habitually uses alcohol to excess, illegally uses drugs or is mentally impaired to the
extent that he may be injurious to children. Id.
83. Id. § 110-86(2), (3).
84. Id. § 110-86. Existence of a day care facility was also made easier to prove. Id. § 110-
98.1, states that operating on two or more consecutive days is prima facie evidence of the
existence of such an enterprise.
85. Id. § 110-86(3).
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edy, injunctive relief, was made available to halt immediately the operation
of any facility when it is operating without a license or when there is a
violation that threatens serious harm.86 Although the 1977 improvements in
the law should do much to upgrade day care facility operations, additional
reforms are needed. A larger staff is needed within the Division of Social
Services to review carefully license applications and to enforce operating
standards. Also, group homes serving less than six children are not subject
to current licensing requirements;87 children who are being cared for in such
facilities need some form of state protection, even if the standards are
different from those applied to larger facilities.
88
D. Open Meetings Law
"Government in the sunshine"-this phrase has been used to describe
the philosophy underlying passage of open meetings laws in several states.
89
The basic purpose of these acts is to provide public access to the decision-
making process of governmental bodies so that the public will know how
and why decisions are made.90 These laws further allow the public to
influence directly this decisionmaking process by its presence at such
governmental meetings. 91 In 1971 North Carolina enacted its own sunshine
86. Id. § 110-104.
87. The definition of a "day care facility" encompasses only arrangements that provide
day care "for more than five children." Id. § 110-86(3). Smaller institutions are not currently
subject to licensing requirements.
88. See N.C. UNITED WAY, POSITION STATEMENTS RE: AREAS OF SOCIAL CONCERN 19, 20
(1976) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
The General Assembly also enacted the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1977,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57A-1 to -29 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which requires persons seeking to operate
such a program to obtain authorization from the Commissioner of Insurance. A health mainte-
nance organization is defined as "any person who undertakes to provide or arrange for one or
more health care plans." Id. § 57A-2(g). A health care plan is "any arrangement whereby any
person undertakes to provide, arrange for, pay for, or reimburse any part of the cost of any
health care services . . .as distinguished from mere indemnification against the cost of such
services on a prepaid basis through insurance or otherwise." Id. § 57A-2(e). Detailed provisions
concerning the plan's organization, directors and financial status must be set forth in the
certificate of authority. Id. § 57A-3(c). In addition to the approval required of the Commission-
er, the Secretary of Ijuman Resources must also approve the quality of health services that the
plan proposes to provide. Id. § 57A-4. Important elements of the Act designed to protect those
enrolled in the plan include a system for the receipt of enrollee complaints, id. § 57A-12, the
establishment of economically conservative guidelines on approved investments for the organi-
zation, id. § 57A-13, protective measures for enrollees in the event of the plan's insolvency, id.
§ 57A-14, a provision forbidding cancellation of an individual's policy solely because of
deteriorating health and prohibitions against misleading marketing of the plan's services, id. §
57A-15. The Commissioner is empowered to issue cease and desist orders and to suspend or
revoke a certificate of authority. Id. §§ 57A-22, -24.
89. R. PLESSER & P. PETKAS, GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE OPEN RECORDS/OPEN MEET-
INGS EMPHASIS: NORTH CAROLINA 4 (Southern Regional Council, 1975).
90. D. LAWRENCE, OPEN MEETINGS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA I
(Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1976).
91. Id.
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law92 embodying the basic policy that as "governing and governmental
bodies which administer the legislative and executive functions of this State
. . . exist solely to conduct the people's business, it is the public policy of
this State that the hearings, deliberations, and actions of said bodies be
conducted openly." 93 The statute goes on to provide that
[a]ll official meetings of the governing and governmental bodies of
this State and its political subdivisions, including all State, county,
city and municipal commissions, committees, boards, authorities,
and councils and any subdivision, subcommittee, or other sub-
sidiary or component part thereof which have or claim authority to
conduct hearings, deliberate or act as bodies politic and in the
public interest shall be open to the public. 94
Several exceptions to the application of this requirement are recognized by
the statute, covering, among other matters, discussions of particular em-
ployees or officers under the jurisdiction of the governing body and student
disciplinary cases being considered by any "board of education or govern-
ing body of any public educational institution." 95 Notwithstanding such
exceptions, the General Assembly in enacting the Open Meetings Law
clearly sought to provide the public comprehensive access to governmental
meetings. 96 Unfortunately, the North Carolina Supreme Court undermined
this intent of the General Assembly as well as the thrust of the Open
Meetings Law in the recent case of Student Bar Association v. Byrd.
97
Following passage of the law, several members of the Student Bar
Association Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina School
of Law attempted to attend a general faculty meeting. 98 After Robert G.
Byrd, Dean of the Law School, refused to admit them,99 plaintiffs sought
preliminary and permanent injunctions to enjoin defendants from holding
closed meetings. These injunctions were granted by the trial court, 100 which
also required that posted written notice be given by Dean Byrd at least six
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-318.1 to .7 (1974).
93. Id. § 143-318.1.
94. Id. § 143-318.2.
95. Id. § 143-318.3(b). See also Lawrence, Interpreting North Carolina's Open-Meetings
Law, 54 N.C.L. REV. 777, 797-803 (1976). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(a) (1974) also provides
that a body under § 143-318.2 may, upon a majority vote, hold an executive session to consider
property purchases and sales, public employment, hospital matters, privileged relationships and
litigation in which the body is a party.
96. See text accompanying notes 132-36 infra.
97. 293 N.C. 594, 239 S.E.2d 415 (1977). In addition to University of North Carolina
School of Law Dean Robert Byrd, also named as defendants were UNC officials Chancellor
Ferebee Taylor, President William L. Friday, Board of Trustees Chairman Walter R. Davis and
Board of Governors Chairman William A. Dees, all in their official capacities.
98. Id. at 595, 239 S.E.2d at 417.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 596, 239 S.E.2d at 417.
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hours prior to each meeting. 101 The court of appeals affirmed, 10"2 finding that
the General Assembly intended that the Open Meetings Law be given a
broad scope. 103 The court held that the Law School faculty exercises power,
delegated by the Board of Governors of the University, 104 to conduct public
business and that, therefore, it is subject to the Open Meetings Law.1
0 5
The state supreme court reversed, 10 6 holding essentially that the use of
the term "body politic" denoted an intent by the General Assembly to
restrict the application of the Open Meetings Law to meetings of governing
and governmental bodies that exercise some sovereign powers not exercis-
able by private concerns. 107 The court further found that the term "govern-
ing and governmental" was to be read in the conjunctive; therefore, a body
had to be both governing and governmental to be within the purview of the
Act.108 The court held that the Law School faculty was not the governing
body of the Law School because its decisions were subject to review by the
Board of Governors which, the court stated, was the true governing body of
101. Id. The supreme court reversed this requirement of notice, finding that the statute
does not expressly require notice. Id. at 596,239 S.E.2d at 418. Justice Exum concurred on this
issue. Id. at 616, 239 S.E.2d at 429 (Exum, J., dissenting). In an earlier case, the court of
appeals held that the Open Meetings Law would be meaningless unless reasonable notice were
given since otherwise the public would be unaware of the existence of the meeting. News &
Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim Bd. of Educ., 29 N.C. App. 37, 51, 223 S.E.2d 580, 589
(1976). This latter principle was also stated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in construing that
state's open meetings law, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (1977), which is also devoid of any
notice requirement. Sullivan v. Credit River Township, 299 Minn. 170, 174, 217 N.W.2d 502,
505-06 (1974). See also Lawrence, supra note 95, at 786.
102. 32 N.C. App. 530, 232 S.E.2d 855 (1977).
103. Id. at 535, 232 S.E.2d at 858. The court of appeals noted that the language of the
general provisions in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974) is broad while the exemptions in id. §
143-318.4 are drawn quite narrowly.
104. 32 N.C. App. at 533, 232 S.E.2d at 857 (1977). A major point noted by the court of
appeals and the dissent in the supreme court opinion, but ignored by the majority supreme court
opinion, was that in failing to answer the complaint, defendants admitted plaintiffs' allegations.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d). Thus, whether the Board of Governors had delegated powers to the faculty
was a question of fact that was, in effect, admitted by defendants. 32 N.C. App. at 533, 232
S.E.2d at 857 (1977).
105. 32 N.C. App. at 536, 232 S.E.2d at 859 (1977). The court also felt that the stated
intention of the General Assembly to have the people's business conducted in public would be
frustrated if public access were limited to only the highest level and denied at the point at which
decisions are actually made. Id.
106. 293 N.C. at 594, 239 S.E.2d at 415. The court first noted that if the statute is read to
include the Law School faculty meetings, it would also include strategy sessions of the
University's football coaching staff. Id. at 598, 239 S.E.2d at 418-19.
The court also noted that discussions concerning particular students in the course of open
meetings might violate federal law. Id. at 598-99, 239 S.E.2d at 419. The Buckley Amendment,
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975), cuts off federal funds for any school that maintains a
practice of disclosing information about a student without that student's consent. The court
stated that although this statute could not shed light on the prior intent of the General Assembly
in enacting the Open Meetings Law, it was a factor to be considered in construing the law. 293
N.C. at 599, 239 S.E.2d at 419.
107. 293 N.C. at 601, 239 S.E.2d at 420.
108. Id.
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the Law School. 1°9 The court then concluded that, although the faculty of
the School of Law was a component part of the University, it was not a
component part of the Board of Governors but was rather a "group of
employees of the Board." 110 Finally, the court held that even if the faculty
were a component part of the Board of Governors, the Board itself was not a
"governing and governmental" body as required by the Open Meetings
Law."' "Governmental" requires that the body in question exercise some
powers exclusive to a sovereign political entity; 112 accordingly, the opera-
tion of an educational institution is not a governmental power because it can
also be carried out by private concerns.1 3 The court reasoned that as the
Board of Governors possessed no governmental powers, it was not a
"governmental body" and thus the faculty, even if it were a component part
of the Board of Governors, was not a component part of a "governing and
governmental" body' 14 within the meaning of G.S. 143-318.2."15 Thus the
supreme court placed a tight rein on the Open Meetings Law by limiting its
application to those bodies exercising powers held exclusively by the gov-
ernment as sovereign.
In his dissent, Justice Exum took issue with the majority's narrow
approach, stating that the legislative intent was to be gleaned from " 'the
language of the statute, the spirit of the act, and what the act seeks to
accomplish.' "116 As the Act was written to ensure that the public's business
is conducted in the public's view, and because the Law School faculty
conducts the public's business, the Law School faculty meetings were to be
109. Id. at 602, 239 S.E.2d at 421.
110. Id. at 602-03, 239 S.E.2d at 421.
111. Id. at 603, 239 S.E.2d at 422.
112. Id. at 603, 239 S.E.2d at 421. But see Raton Pub. Serv. Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535,
417 P.2d 32 (1966), in which the court stated that "governmental" as used in the corresponding
New Mexico statute, Law of Mar. 30, 1959, ch. 120, 1959 N.M. Laws 306 (repealed 1974,
current version at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-6-23 to -26 (Supp. 1975)), was not used in the usual
sense of distinguishing between proprietary and sovereign functions. The North Carolina
Supreme Court distinguished this case, however, concluding that the New Mexico open
meetings law was written much more broadly than that of North Carolina. 293 N.C. at 606, 239
S.E.2d at 423.
113. 293 N.C. at 603, 239 S.E.2d at 421-22.
114. Id. at 603-04, 239 S.E.2d at 422; see text accompanying notes 93 & 94 supra. The court
further found that the exception relating to student disciplinary cases was included "simply to
remove any possibility that a board of education, a governing body of a public educational
institution or a court could believe the Open Meetings Law requires a public hearing of such
disciplinary matters." 293 N.C. at 604, 239 S.E.2d at 422. The supreme court went on to state
that the provision of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(c) (1974), allowing a board of education to
hold private sessions in case of a riot, was likewise "inserted out of an abundance of caution so
as to prevent members of such board from being afraid to act promptly in such emergency."
293 N.C. at 604, 239 S.E.2d at 422.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (1974).
116. 293 N.C. at 607,239 S.E.2d at 424 (Exum, J., dissenting) (quoting Stevenson v. City of
Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)).
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covered by the Open Meetings Law. 17 Exum also criticized the majority's
analysis concerning the "governmental" aspect of the Board of Governors.
After noting that in G.S. 116-3 the Board of Governors is designated as a
"body politic and corporate," '18 he declared that, inasmuch as a "body
politic is a governmental body and vice versa," the Board of Governors is a
governmental body within the purview of the law.'1 9 The questions for
Justice Exum then became whether the Law School faculty is a component
part of the Board of Governors and whether it is a body politic-both of
which, Exum submitted, are questions of fact. 120 Since defendants had
admitted that the faculty is a component part of the Board and a body politic,
the Law School faculty meetings were intended to be covered.' 21 Exum
further noted that even if the decisions made by the faculty were subject to
review by the Board of Governors, the intent of the statute was to cover the
entire decisionmaking process, not just formal approval of a decision
reached in private. 1
22
In attempting to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly in enact-
ing the Open Meetings Law, the courts were understandably hampered by
the dearth of pertinent legislative history.' 23 Furthermore, prior North
Carolina cases construing the law are not particularly enlightening in the
present situation. 124 Courts in two other states have, however, dealt with the
issue whether a law school faculty is within the purview of a sunshine law.
In Fain v. Faculty of the College of Law ,125 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
held that committees composed of faculty members are not governing
bodies within the intent of the Tennessee Open Meetings Law because they
117. Id. at 607-08, 239 S.E.2d at 424. Exum noted that the Law School is not just an
institution of higher education, but is a publicly-owned institution and thus conducts the
public's business. Id. at 608, 239 S.E.2d at 424.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-3 (1975).
119. 293 N.C. at 610, 239 S.E.2d at 426 (Exum, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 612, 239 S.E.2d at 426-27. Exum stated that the "majority mistakenly treats
them as questions of law . . . .In my view the answers. . . must lie. . . in what in fact the
faculty does and how in fact it is related to the Board of Governors." Id. at 612, 239 S.E.2d at
427.
121. Id. at 612-13, 239 S.E.2d at 427; see note 104 supra.
122. 293 N.C. at 614, 239 S.E.2d at 428 (Exum, J., dissenting). Exum also found that the
exception as to disciplinary cases provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3(b) (1974) indicates
that these educational bodies are covered by the Law. 293 N.C. at 615, 239 S.E.2d at 428-29
(Exum, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the majority's treatment of this provision, see note
114 supra.
123. For some insight into the legislative process and a suggested mode of interpreting the
Open Meetings Law, see Lawrence, supra note 95, at 777-81.
124. In News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Interim Bd. of Educ., 29 N.C. App. 37, 223
S.E.2d 580 (1976), the court of appeals held that the exceptions to the Open Meetings Law are
to be strictly construed and that therefore a committee of the whole of a board of education
does not come within the exception. See also Lewis v. White, 287 N.C. 625, 216 S.E.2d 134
(1975); Eggimann v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 22 N.C. App. 459, 206 S.E.2d 754 (1974).
125. 552 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).
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are formed solely at the will of the law school dean and have only the power
to make recommendations to the dean. This case is distinguishable from
Byrd, however, since the trial court in Byrd found that the faculty of the
University of North Carolina School of Law exercises various decision-
making powers.126 In Cathcart v. Andersen,l27 the Washington Supreme
Court was faced with the identical issue as that presented in Byrd: whether
the law school faculty at a public law school is a "governing body" within
the intent of the Washington statute.128 The Cathcart court found that the
faculty there concerned exercises certain de facto powers delegated by the
board of regents 129 and held that even though its decisions are subject to
review, the faculty is a governing body within the intent of the Act. 130
Although the Washington statute differs from the North Carolina Open
Meetings Law, the Cathcart decision and the analysis are applicable to the
present case.
131
As pointed out by Justice Exum in his dissent, the supreme court "has
made unnecessarily confusing what is, in fact and in law, a relatively simple
case." 132 Any construction of the Open Meetings Law should begin with the
prefatory statement of policy-the people's business must be conducted
openly. 133 Following this statement is a broad requirement of open access
134
limited only by narrow exceptions.' 35 The format of the statute itself sug-
gests a legislative intent to extend the Open Meetings Law to any gathering
wherein any public business is conducted. Yet the majority in Byrd adopted
126. See the findings of fact as enumerated in the court of appeals decision, 32 N.C. App.
at 534-35, 232 S.E.2d at 857-58 (1977). Among other powers, the faculty may make final
decisions concerning the enrollment level of the Law School, the formula for admissions, the
curriculum and the rules for readmission.
127. 85 Wash. 2d 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975).
128. WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 42.30.030 (1972)\requires meetings of the governing bodies
of a public agency to be open. "Public agency" is defined to include an educational institution.
Id. § 42.30.020(l)(a).
129. 85 Wash. 2d at 106, 530 P.2d at 316. These powers related to curriculum decisions,
scholastic policy, approval of candidates for graduation and rules regarding faculty appoint-
ment and promotion. Id. at 107, 530 P.2d at 316.
130. Id. at 107, 530 P.2d at 316. In an earlier Georgia case, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that committees of faculty and students that reviewed allocations of student funds are not
within the comparable Georgia statute because they are not bodies authorized to make deci-
sions and to act for the state. McLarty v. Board of Regents, 231 Ga. 22, 200 S.E.2d 117 (1973)
(construing GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (1972)).
131. 293 N.C. at 615-16, 239 S.E.2d at 429 (Exum, J., dissenting). The majority distin-
guished this case based on the differences between the two statutes. Id. at 605, 239 S.E.2d at
423. The true issue in Cathcart, however, was whether the faculty was a governing body and
this was decided upon the facts, not the language of the statute. 85 Wash. 2d at 107,530 P.2d at
316. Similar facts were present in Byrd but the majority in that case determined that the faculty
was not a governing body as a matter of law. 293 N.C. at 604, 239 S.E.2d at 422.
132. 293 N.C. at 607, 239 S.E.2d at 423 (Exum, J., dissenting).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 (1974).
134. Id. § 143-318.2; see text accompanying note 94 supra.
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.3, .4 (1974).
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
a superficial and literal interpretation of the statute without giving credence
to the spirit and intent of the Open Meetings Law. 136 As one authority
forewarned, this law could easily be thwarted by a literal interpretation of it
that would end in "results that appear irrational." 1 37 It is apparent that the
decision in Byrd has rendered such a result.
Regardless of whether the North Carolina Supreme Court was justified
in removing the faculty meetings of the School of Law from the application
of this statute, the Byrd holding has considerably curtailed the scope and
effect of the Open Meetings Law. If this law only covers governing bodies
(not subject to review) and governmental bodies (exercising sovereign
powers), then the North Carolina "sunshine law" has been substantially
eclipsed. For example, under the court's rationale a county board of educa-
tion meeting would not be within the purview of the law unless that board
exercises some governmental power because private institutions also operate
primary and secondary schoolst'3 -yet there could be few matters that are of
greater concern to the public than the education of its children. The supreme
court has gone far beyond excluding merely law school faculty meetings
from the scope of the Open Meetings Law. Now the decision rests, once
again, with the General Assembly-to allow the supreme court's interpreta-
tion to stand or to revise the Open Meetings Law to require more sunshine
on public decisionmaking in North Carolina. 1
39
E. State Government"4
In 1977 North Carolina joined the growing list of states that have
136. Furthermore, as explained by Justice Exum, the majority opinion ignores the statutory
definition of the Board of Governors as a "body politic and corporate." See text accompanying
notes 118 & 119 supra. If the court insists upon taking a purely literal approach, it should at
least take cognizance of other pertinent statutory provisions.
137. Lawrence, supra note 95, at 820-21.
138. It has also been suggested that other governmental bodies such as planning commit-
tees, committees of city commissioners and the Board of Governors of the University of North
Carolina are not covered by the Open Meetings Law under the supreme court's interpretation.
Christensen, Panel Seeking to Fix Loopholes in Meeting Law, Raleigh, N.C., News & Obser-
ver, Feb. 18, 1978, at 19, col. 4.
139. There are indications that the General Assembly is interested in revising the law. It has
been suggested that "and" be changed to "or" in "governing and governmental." Raleigh,
N.C., News & Observer, Feb. 12, 1978, § IV, at 5, col. 5. The North Carolina League of
Municipalities lobbyist predicts that a notice requirement for special meetings will be written
into the Open Meetings Law. Id. Feb. 13, 1978, at 7, col. 1.
140. The General Assembly enacted 13 laws dealing with various aspects of the electoral
process in North Carolina. All of these laws are included in Chapter 163 of the General Statutes
with the exception of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-60(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). One new provision
changes the time of the primary election from August to the "Tuesday next after the first
Monday in May." Id. § 163-1(b) (Supp. 1977). Candidates for the primary are required to file
for their offices between twelve o'clock noon on the first Monday in January and twelve
o'clock noon on the first Monday in February preceding the primary. Id. § 163-106(c). The new
law also provides for a presidential preference primary to be held on the same date every four
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
enacted sunset legislation.141 The North Carolina law provides for the
automatic termination of approximately one hundred agencies and programs
after specified dates, the earliest of which is July 1, 1979, unless the
legislature expressly continues or reestablishes the program.142 A temporary
state commission will conduct a performance evaluation of each program
scheduled for termination under the Act. 143 The legislative goal is an
admirable one-to continue "productive, efficient and active programs
years beginning in 1980. Id. § 163-213.2. The purposes of this change are to attract more
national attention to North Carolina's presidential primary by scheduling it at an earlier-and
more critical-time of the year and to encourage better voter participation. The third Tuesday
in August had been criticized because it was an inconvenient time for agricultural workers and
because it fell during the period when many families took summer vacations. Interview with
Rep. Patricia Hunt, member of N.C. House of Representatives, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 16,
1978). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-213.2 (Supp. 1977) was amended to authorize those otherwise
qualified voters who, though not 18 years old at the time of the primary, will have reached that
age by the time of the general election to register and vote in the presidential preference primary
conducted in that year.
A sweeping revision of the legislation governing absentee balloting was enacted, id. §§ 163-
226 to -239; also, provisions regarding eligibility of voters and procedures governing many
phases of the process were altered. Absentee ballot voting is permitted only to those persons
who expect to be absent from the county where they are registered during the entire election
period, those who are prevented from voting by sickness, misdemeanants incarcerated at the
time, and employees of the county board of elections whose official duties will prevent them
from having an opportunity to vote on election day. Id. § 163-226. The law states that the
county board shall approve the application of a voter if he is found to be a qualified voter of the
county, is registered in the precinct stated in his application, if the assertions in his application
are true and if his application is in proper form. Id. § 163-230. Absentee voting for any
municipal election is allowed provided the election is conducted by the county board of
elections and the balloting is authorized by a resolution of the municipal governing body. Id. §
163-302. "One-stop" voting, an arrangement by which the voter requests and completes his
application for absentee ballots, casts his votes and returns them in a sealed envelope-all in
one visit to his county elections board-was authorized as an alternate procedure for absentee
voting. Id. § 163-227.2. Military and other persons covered by Chapter 163, Article 21 may
personally cast their votes at their county board of elections until six o'clock p.m. the day
before the election; voting in person on election day by those eligible to cast absentee ballots
under Article 21 is also made possible for the first time. Id. §§ 163-254 to -256.
County boards were authorized to determine those qualified to vote in referenda relating to
annexations of new territory by existing cities or special districts. Id. § 163-288.2. The board
may certify voters either by employing existing registration records or conducting a special
registration for the particular election. Id. § 163-288.2(a).
Financial aspects of office-seeking were also addressed: political advertisers must not be
charged higher rates or denied discounts available to other advertisers under comparable
conditions. Id. § 163-278.18. In addition new disclosure provisions apply to political loans and
to funds expended for political purposes in behalf of an elected official during his term of
office. Id. §§ 163-278.8(g), .1 l(a)(3), .36. The new law requires the disclosure of the amount,
source, period, rate of interest, security pledged if any and the names of all makers and
endorsers of loans obtained for or by political candidates and committees. Id. §§ 163-278.8(g),
.11(a)(3).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-34.10 to .21 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
142. The schedules for termination are set out at id. §§ 143-34.11 to .13. Public hearings are
mandated prior to any action by the legislature that terminates, continues or reestablishes any
such program or function.
143. For a list of criteria the Governmental Evaluation Commission is required to consider
in evaluating each program, see id. § 143-34.17.
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which are in the public interest," to eliminate inactive programs and to
consolidate or eliminate "overlapping or duplicating programs."
144
Beginning in 1976, a number of states began enacting sunset laws in an
effort to reestablish control over burgeoning state bureaucracies. The
concept has been criticized by commentators who feel it is only a 'gim-
mick' which all too often appeals . . . as a facile solution to complex
problems." 45 It is unclear whether, given the massive task imposed on the
Commission and the General Assembly by this Act and the high level of
expertise required for review of these programs, any review other than a
perfunctory one will result. In making the final determination, the General
Assembly will also be subject to political pressures that may make it
difficult for the Assembly to terminate agencies and programs, even though
they are no longer engaged in worthwhile or productive activities.
In addition, 1977 brought a number of organizational changes to state
government in North Carolina. 146 In a comprehensive restructuring, the
144. Id. § 143-34.19.
145. Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Third Century, 29 AD. L. REv. 291, 294 (1977).
146. One of the most massive restructurings resulted in the transfer of a number of existing
law enforcement and emergency services agencies into the newly created Department of Crime
Control and Public Safety. The groups transferred to the department include the National
Guard, Office of Civil Preparedness and State Civil Air Patrol, formerly in the Department of
Military and Veterans Affairs; the State Board of Alcoholic Control Enforcement Division,
formerly in the Department of Commerce; the State Highway Patrol, formerly in the Depart-
ment of Transportation; and the Governor's Crime Commission, the Crime Control Division,
the Criminal Justice Information System Board and the Criminal Justice Information System
Security and Privacy Board, all formerly in the Department of Natural and Economic Re-
sources. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-475 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The Department of Crime Control
and Public Safety is authorized to provide assigned law enforcement and emergency services,
to ensure maximum cooperation between state and local law enforcement agencies in fighting
crime, and to serve as the state's chief coordinating agency to control crime. Id. § 143B-474.
Included in this department are two organizations established in 1977, the State Fire
Commission and the revised Governor's Crime Commission. Id. §§ 143B-257.35 to .39, -334 to
-340, -478, -481. The Fire Commission is empowered to formally adopt a State Fire Education
and Training Plan and a State Master Plan for Fire Prevention and Control, to increase the skills
of fire-fighting personnel, to make studies and recommendations for the improvement of fire
control implementation and education programs, and to be the single agency responsible for
carrying out all state duties with respect to all grants from the National Fire Prevention and
Control Administration of the United States Department of Commerce. Id. § 143B-482. An
important function of this legislation is to require all fire departments to cooperate with state
investigations into the causes of suspicious fires. Among its new powers, the Governor's Crime
Commission is charged "(1) to serve as the chief advisory board to the Governor on the criminal
justice system, (2) to develop a statewide plan for improvement of the criminal justice system,
and (3) to set objectives and priorities for improvement of the system." The Crime Commission
will be the single state agency responsible for planning and administering Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration grants. N.C. United Way, 6 Legislative Newsletter, No. 4, at 2 (Feb.
9, 1977) (copy on file in office of North Carolina Law Review).
Other important innovations in the criminal justice area were the establishment of a State
Coordinator of Services for Victims of Sexual Assault, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-394.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1977), and a reorganization of the Parole Commission, id. § 143B-267. One purpose of
this reorganization was to enable the Governor to place people on the Commission who would
parole more of the prisoners who could be better helped by other rehabilitative programs. This
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Department of Natural and Economic Resources was redesignated the De-
partment of Natural Resources and Community Development.147 The De-
partment was given several new responsibilities, the most important of
which include the administration of job training and employment programs
under the direction of the newly established North Carolina Employment
and Training Council. 14 The Department of Human Resources also ac-
quired a significant function in being assigned primary responsibility for the
development of community-based juvenile services. 149 By emphasizing the
establishment of such services, the legislature expressed its preference for
local programs for the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents to the more
traditional training school approach.1
50
effort has resulted in part from federal pressure on the state to reduce its prison and training
school populations. Currently, North Carolina has the highest percentage of its citizens incar-
cerated of any state in the nation. Interview with Rep. Patricia Hunt, supra note 140.
147. The Department is to undertake redefined duties, including the obligation to provide
for the management and protection of the state's natural resources and environment, to
promote and assist in the orderly development of North Carolina's counties and communities
and to provide job training and promote employment for economically disadvantaged persons.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-276 (Cur. Supp. 1977). For a list of the boards and commissions now
included in the Department, see id. § 143B-279.
148. Id. § 143B-340. The Council replaces the State Manpower Services Council, which
was in the Department of Administration until its abolition. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 771, § 14,
1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1008. One of the most important duties of the Council is to review the
programs of state and local agencies operating federally funded programs related to employ-
ment and training and to make recommendations regarding the effective planning, delivery and
coordination of these services throughout the state.
149. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-207 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This legislation sought to eradicate
the state's previously fragmented approach to this program by eliminating the Commission of
Youth Services and the Technical Advisory Committee on Delinquency Prevention and Youth
Services in the Department of Corrections.
150. The purpose is to remove "status offenders," those juveniles who have committed an
act whici"if, they were adults, would not be considered a crime, from the training schools into a
community environment that will assist them in making a proper adjustment to society. For a
list of the wide variety of local programs contemplated, see N.C. UNITED WAY, supra note 88,
at 6.
Duties of the Department's newly created Youth Services Advisory Committee include
researching findings concerning juvenile delinquency and making recommendations regarding
programs which will provide effective treatment and rehabilitation for children in institutions
and community-based programs, encouraging local private groups to establish programs to
meet local needs, making recommendations to the Secretary for use in developing a comprehen-
sive plan for juvenile justice and reviewing for the Secretary any applications for federal funds
for such programs. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-207 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
The General Assembly also enacted legislation establishing a North Carolina Officials
Qualification Board, which is charged with the responsibility of licensing building code enforce-
ment officials throughout the state. Id. §§ 143-151.8 to .20. The statute provides that after July
1, 1977, no person may engage in code enforcement unless he possesses a valid certificate,
which must be renewed yearly. Standard certificates will be issued only to those individuals
who have passed an examination based on the North Carolina Building Code and the adminis-
trative procedures required to enforce the Code. Id. § 143-151.13. Grounds for revocatibn-of
the certificate include signing an inspection report if no inspection has been made by the official
and willful misconduct, gross negligence or gross incompetence. Id. § 143-151.17. Cities and
counties may establish joint inspection programs; a schedule of applicable dates by which time
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F. Professional Responsibility15' and Administration of Justice152
In North Carolina State Bar v. Hall ,153 the North Carolina Supreme
Court confronted the issue whether an attorney's plea of nolo contendere to
criminal charges in federal district court entitled the State Bar to summary
judgment authorizing disciplinary action against the attorney in a subsequent
state court proceeding in which the attorney denied the criminal charges.
The court held that the nolo contendere plea did not entitle the State Bar to
judgment as a matter of law, for denial of the charge raised a genuine issue
of material fact in the Bar's action against the attorney. 154 The court
discussed the "double implication" from the nolo contendere plea, stating
that the court's acceptance of such a plea authorizes judgment against the
defendant in the immediate case but that "so far as the defendant is
concerned, he is at liberty in all other proceedings, civil and criminal, to
assert his innocence." 155 The court then stated that the federal district
court's judgment of guilt and conviction on the plea did not put the attorney
beyond the aegis of this general rule.156
local inspection programs are to be in operation is set forth on a sliding scale based on
population. See id. §§ 153A-351; id. § 160A-411 (Supp. 1977). This statute should be of great
assistance in bringing about more uniform enforcement of the law in an area in which local
efforts have been extremely varied. It is anticipated that the activities of the Board will do much
to ensure that housing throughout the state meets the standards of the North Carolina Building
Code.
Other significant changes included the transfer of the Commission on Indian Affairs to the
Department of Administration, id. § 1438-404 to -411 (Cum. Supp. 1977), establishment of a
State Indian Housing Authority, Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 1112, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1400,
and reorganization of the Energy Division and Energy Policy Council under the Department of
Commerce, N.C. GEM. STAT. § 1438-448 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition, new legislation
narrowing the review of rules promulgated by agencies and boards of state government was
adopted. A new Administrative Rules Review Committee was created to scrutinize each agency
enactment to determine whether the agency has acted within its statutory authority; appeals of
negative rulings will be allowed to the Legislative Research Commission. This procedure is
outlined in id. 88 120-30.26 to .35. There are, however, exceptions to the application of the law
including provisions excepting the Industrial and Utilities Commissions, state political subdivi-
sions and their agencies, and the University of North Carolina from coverage. Id. § 120-
30.24(l). This law is scheduled to expire June 30, 1979. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 915, § 10, 1977
N.C. Sess. Laws 1238.
151. Professional responsibility is an administrative law matter under North Carolina
statutory law. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-15 (1975) makes the North Carolina State Bar "an agency
of the State" for certain designated purposes. Undertaking disciplinary action against members
of the North Carolina bar is one of its assigned duties as a state agency. See id. §§ 84-28 to -32
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
152. For developments not treated in text, see id. §§ 7A-146, -170 to -172 (Cum. Supp.
1977) (salary classification and training plan for magistrates); id. § 7A-16 (number of North
Carolina Court of Appeals judges increased from nine to twelve).
153. 293 N.C. 539, 238 S.E.2d 521 (1977), rev'g 31 N.C. App. 166, 229 S.E.2d 39 (1976).
154. Id. at 545, 238 S.E.2d at 525.
155. Id. at 541, 238 S.E.2d at 522.
156. Id. at 543, 238 S.E.2d at 523; cf. United States v. Reisfeld, 188 F. Supp. 631 (D. Md.
1960) (court amended judgment on nolo contendere plea by striking out adjudication of guilt and
conviction entered on printed form).
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The court's holding in Hall is consistent with the established rule in
this state 157 and other jurisdictions. 58 It is a theoretically sound rule,
regardless of the nature of the subsequent proceeding, since the nolo conten-
dere plea is of only limited effect in the case in which it is entered: "[t]he
plea itself does not constitute a conviction nor hence a 'determination of
guilt' " and does not dispose of the case.
159
The court also refined the state's judicial disciplinary procedure. 160 In
re Stuh1161 and In re Nowell1 62 both involved a recommendation under G.S.
7A-376163 by the Judicial Standards Commission (JSC) that a North Caro-
lina district court judge be censured by the supreme court for entering
judgments in traffic court cases without the knowledge or consent of the
prosecuting attorney. The court in both cases found that the judge's failure
to accord the prosecutor the right to participate in the traffic cases violated
North Carolina Rule of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(4) and censured the
judge for his misconduct. In Stuhl and Nowell, the court resolved constitu-
tional questions engendered by the JSC plan, provided a useful interpreta-
tion of the statutory framework for the disciplinary procedure and estab-
lished both the quantum of proof required in the proceedings and the
supreme court's scope of review with regard to JSC findings.
In Stuhl, the court interpreted the language in G.S. 7A-376 that
describes the misconduct that would make a judge subject to the sanctions
provided under the statute. "[Wlilful misconduct in office," 164 the court
stated, denotes intentional, knowing, bad faith improprieties committed by a
judge acting in his official capacity.'16  " 'It is more than a mere error of
157. See, e.g., In re Stiers, 204 N.C. 48, 167 S.E. 382 (1933).
158. See, e.g., Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892
(1957); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Connolly, 206 La. 883, 20 So. 2d 168 (1944).
159. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961). At most, the plea of nolo contendere
when accepted by the court becomes merely an "implied confession of guilt." United States v.
Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930).
160. This procedure is provided in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-375 to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
For a discussion of the procedure and its constitutionality under both the Constitution of North
Carolina and the Constitution of the United States, see Note, Judicial Discipline-The North
Carolina Commission System, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1074 (1976).
Briefly, the statutes authorize the Judicial Standards Commission to investigate charges of
judicial misconduct. After a hearing in which the accused judge must be afforded due process
rights, the Commission may recommend that the North Carolina Supreme Court censure or
remove the judge from office "for wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to
perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disre-
pute." N.C. GEM. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1977). A judge may also be removed under the
same procedure for mental or physical incapacity. Id.
161. 292 N.C. 379, 233 S.E.2d 562 (1977).
162. 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
164. Id; see note 160 supra.
165. 292 N.C. at 389, 233 S.E.2d at 568.
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judgment or an act of negligence. While the term would encompass conduct
involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption, these elements need
not necessarily be present.' "166 "[C]onduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute"' 167 refers to
conduct undertaken in good faith by the judge that would nevertheless
appear to the objective observer to be " 'unjudicial' " and " 'prejudicial to
public esteem for the judicial office.' "168 Citing his dissenting opinion in In
re Crutchfield,169 Justice Lake dissented in Stuhl, reiterating his view that
the disciplinary procedure is unconstitutional.1 70 The procedure, according
to Justice Lake in Crutchfield, denies accused judges their due process and
equal protection rights under both the Constitution of North Carolina and the
Constitution of the United States.
171
The supreme court addressed an important JSC due process issue in
Nowell and found no merit in the argument that, because of its inquisitorial
nature, the procedure denied the charged party his right to due process:
Respondent's contention that Article 30 [G.S. 7A-375 to
-377172], which allows the Commission to conduct a preliminary
investigation, find facts, and make a recommendation to the Su-
preme Court, denied him the impartial tribunal which is an essential
of due process has been rejected by all jurisdictions which have
considered it. It is well settled by both federal and state court
decisions that a combination of investigative and judicial functions
within an agency does not violate due process. An agency which
has only the power to recommend penalties is not required to
establish an independent investigatory and adjudicatory staff.
173
The court also declared that the quantum of proof required in proceedings
before the JSC is proof by clear and convincing evidence-'"a burden
greater than that of proof of a preponderance of the evidence and less than
that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 174 Finally, the court held that its
scope of review in a JSC proceeding should entail an independent evaluation
166. Id. (quoting In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305, 226 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1976)).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-376 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
168. 292 N.C. at 389, 233 S.E.2d at 568 (quoting Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifi-
cations, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 284, 515 P.2d 1, 9, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201,209 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
932 (1974)).
169. 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975). This case is discussed in Survey of Developments
in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REv. 895, 898-99 (1977), and Note, supra note 160.
170. 292 N.C. at 390, 233 S.E.2d at 569 (Lake, J., dissenting).
171. See 289 N.C. at 605-12, 223 S.E.2d at 827-31 (Lake, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Justice Lake's objections and an explanation of how the same contentions have been effective-
ly refuted elsewhere, see Note, supra note 160, at 1078-81.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-375 to -377 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
173. 293 N.C. at 244, 237 S.E.2d at 252 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 247, 237 S.E.2d at 254. This standard was previously adopted for judicial
disciplinary proceedings in Alaska, Louisiana, Maryland and California. See id.
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of the evidence adduced below, 175 citing the Supreme Court of Texas'
determination under similar circumstances that" '[t]his court's constitution-
al responsibility cannot be abandoned by the delegation of the fact-finding
power to an administrative agency.' "9176
The most significant aspect of the JSC cases consists in the court's
holding in Nowell that the procedure comports with due process require-
ments. In a noncriminal disciplinary proceeding, "minimum due process,"
with emphasis on notice and the right to be heard, is the standard normally
applied. 177 The weight of authority holds that an administrative body can act
as judge, jury and prosecutor.178 Indeed, "[t]he judge-jury-prosecutor due
process objection has been rejected in every jurisdiction in which the issue
was raised in a judicial commission context." ' 179 It is fortunate that the
supreme court followed these precedents from other states with regard to
this issue since the alternative and more traditional methods of judicial
discipline-address and impeachment-are cumbersome180 and have been
used only infrequently. 181
WILLIAM JOSEPH AUSTIN, JR.




In Brondum v. Cox' the state supreme court decided a jurisdictional
issue of first impression in North Carolina when it held that a judgment
purporting to establish the paternity of a child cannot be rendered by a court
having only in rem jurisdiction. The court's holding came in a challenge by
175. Id. This standard was previously adopted for judicial disciplinary proceedings in
California, Texas, Florida and Alaska. See id. at 245-47, 237 S.E.2d at 253-54.
176. Id. at 246, 237 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. 1974)).
177. Allen v. City of Greensboro, 452 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1971), cited in Note, supra
note 160, at 1080 n.5.
178. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.02 (1958), cited in Note, supra note
160, at 1079 n.49.
179. Note, supra note 160, at 1079-80 n.49 (citing In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alas.
1975)).
180. Id. at 1075.
181. Id. at 1075 n.7.
1. 292 N.C. 192, 232 S.E.2d 687 (1977). See also this Survey, Domestic Relations:
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
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the putative father to the award of full faith and credit to the judgment of a
Hawaii court that did not have in personam jurisdiction over him when it
rendered the judgment. The judgment granted his former wife, who was
domiciled in Hawaii, a divorce and custody of her minor child and "ad-
judged" the child to be the "child of the parties." 2 When the wife filed a
claim for support under the provisions of the Hawaii Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act,3 her complaint, with the earlier divorce decree
attached, was forwarded to the district court in Guilford County, North
Carolina, and a summons was served on the husband. He filed an answer
denying paternity of the child and moved that the court order a blood
grouping test and grant him a jury trial on the issue of paternity. 4 The district
court judge concluded that the Hawaii court had in rem jurisdiction to enter
the divorce decree and to determine custody of the child. He also concluded
that "because the issue of paternity was inextricably bound up in determina-
tion of those items," the Hawaii court had jurisdiction to determine that
issue as well. 5 Based on this conclusion, the district judge held that defend-
ant was bound by the findings of the Hawaii court and denied his motion
seeking to relitigate the issue of paternity.
6
Writing for the North Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Lake rejected
the trial court's determination that the Hawaii court had jurisdiction to
establish the paternity of the child. According to the court, the ultimate
effects of this type of determination are such that a court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the putative father before it may render
a paternity decree.7 The determination of paternity "fixes upon the
2. Id. at 194, 232 S.E.2d at 688. The summons, complaint and other papers in the wife's
divorce suit were served on defendant in North Carolina by sending them to him by registered
mail. He did not respond or appear in the Hawaii divorce proceeding. Id. at 193, 232 S.E.2d at
688. Under the applicable Hawaii statute it was clear that the court never had jurisdiction over
the person of defendant despite this service of process on him by mail because he was not a
domiciliary of Hawaii "(1) at the time that the cause of action which is the subject of the
proceeding arose or (2) at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, or (3) at the time of
service." HAW. REv. STAT. § 580-3.5 (1976). Because he had notice of the proceeding, he
would, however, be bound by a determination of the Hawaii court on "all issuable matters
contained in the pleadings" that the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate, including plaintiff's
entitlement to a divorce and custody of the child. See Bruton v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
217 N.C. 1, 6 S.E.2d 822 (1940).
3. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 576-1 to -41 (1976).
4. 292 N.C. at 195, 232 S.E.2d at 688-89.
5. Id. at 195-96, 232 S.E.2d at 689.
6. Id.
7. The use of in rem jurisdiction to determine the nonexistence of a parent-child relation-
ship would arguably present a different situation. See Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d
447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956). Such an exercise of in rem jurisdiction would be limited essentially to a
determination of the status of a domiciliary of the state seeking to exercise it. The state would
only be seeking to "insulate its domiciliary from a relationship with one not within its juris-
diction." Id. at 454, 304 P.2d at 5 (citing Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L.
REv. 427, 429 (1929)). It would not, under the guise of determining status alone, also be
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adjudicated father a personal obligation for the support of the minor child.' '8
Although it does not determine the actual amount of the father's liability for
support, a determination that clearly requires a court to have in personam
jurisdiction, a judgment of paternity does determine that such a personal
obligation exists and would, if given effect, prevent relitigation of thejbasic
premise on which the amount of the obligation of support rests. 9 Thus, a
state seeking to exercise in rem jurisdiction in such a situation is not merely
determining the status of a domiciliary but is also attempting "to reach out
and fasten a relationship upon a person over whom it has no jurisdiction."1 0
The decision in Brondum, although in the context of enforcement of
the judgment of a foreign court, clearly establishes that in North Carolina
courts as well, in rem jurisdiction is alone insufficient to determine the
existence of a parent-child relationship.' 1 The court's holding is in agree-
ment with the majority of the courts of other states that have considered the
issue, and its opinion drew heavily on them. 12
In Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp.,13 the North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the state's long-arm jurisdiction statute14 in the face of a
serious constitutional challenge. While living in South Carolina, plaintiff
Dillon was offered employment by defendant, a New York corporation.
After he had terminated his employment relationship in South Carolina but
before he had moved to New York, he was informed by defendant that the
position he had been offered was no longer available. He then moved to
North Carolina, settled in Greensboro, and found other employment. He
subsequently instigated a civil action in North Carolina against defendant
attempting to impose the personal obligation that necessarily follows from a determination that
a parent-child relationship exists in a person over whom it did not have personal jurisdiction. A
determination that a parent-child relationship does not exist would be an analogous action to a
court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage although it does not have personal
jurisdiction over one of the parties to the marriage. Id. at 453-54, 304 P.2d at 4-5.
8. 292 N.C. at 202, 232 S.E.2d at 693.
9. Id.
10. Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 454, 304 P.2d 1, 5 (1956).
II. The holding of the court was "that such judgment is one in personam and can be
rendered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant." 292 N.C. at 202,
232 S.E.2d at 693. The conclusion that the judgment of the Hawaii court on the paternity issue
was not entitled to full faith and credit because it was based on in rem jurisdiction should apply
equally to a North Carolina court issuing such a judgment on the same jurisdictional basis.
12. Id. at 201, 232 S.E.2d at 692 (citing In re Hindi, 71 Ariz. 17,222 P.2d 991 (1950); Neill
v. Ridner, 153 Ind. App. 149, 286 N.E.2d 427 (1972)); see Developments in the Law, State Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
13. 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969). Section 1-75.4 (1) of the long-arm statute authorizes
the assertion of personal jurisdiction by a court with jurisdiction of the subject matter "[uin any
action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a claim is asserted against
a party who when service of process is made upon such party . . . is engaged in substantial
activity within this State." Id. § 1-75.4(1)(d).
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seeking damages for breach of the contract of employment. Defendant
responded with a motion to dismiss, alleging its contacts with the state were
insufficient to provide a basis for the court's assertion of personal juris-
diction. The trial judge denied the motion. 15 Citing the lack of connection
between plaintiff's claim and the activities of defendant within North Caroli-
na, the relatively insubstantial nature of those activities, and the fact that
plaintiff's claim arose outside the state, the court of appeals held that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendant in this case would be a
violation of due process. 16 In reversing the court of appeals in Dillon and
determining that the statute was constitutionally applied under the criteria
set out by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,17 the North Carolina Supreme Court focused on two con-
siderations: the fairness to plaintiff in permitting the suit to be maintained in
the state of his residence 18 and the quality and nature of defendant's ac-
tivities within the state.19
On the issue of fairness to plaintiff, the court observed that to require
him to litigate elsewhere would be to impose a "large burden" upon him
and "could possibly preclude [him] from asserting his claim." 20 Analyzing
the nature and quality of defendant's activities, which had included solicita-
tion of orders, mass mailings and sales of some $50,000,21 with the fairness
to the plaintiff concept in mind, the supreme court found that "defendant's
15. 291 N.C. at 675, 231 S.E.2d at 630.
16. 29 N.C. App. 513, 225 S.E.2d 137 (1976), rev'd, 291 N.C. 674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977).
In Byrum v. Register's Truck & Equip. Co., 32 N.C. App. 135, 231 S.E.2d 39 (1977), the court
of appeals subsequently upheld the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction under two other subsec-
tions of the statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4)(b), (5)(c) (1969), whose application had been
challenged on due process grounds similar to those raised in Dillon.
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
18. 291 N.C. at 678, 231 S.E.2d at 632. North Carolina precedent for the court's approach
of considering "the interests of and fairness to both the plaintiff and the defendant," id., was
found in Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619, 133 S.E.2d 492 (1963). The court also relied on the
following recent Fourth Circuit decisions that support this approach: O'Neil v. Hicks Bro-
kerage Co., 537 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1976); Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1973); Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1971).
19. 291 N.C. at 677, 679, 231 S.E.2d at 631-32. The court found defendant's activities
within the state to be as follows:
Defendant, a corporation, has actively solicited orders for its coins from residents of
this State on a regular basis during a period of approximately twenty-one months.
During this time, it has made several mass mailings to North Carolinians and has sold
coins with a value in excess of $50,000 to some 27 different citizens in 142 separate
transactions. In each transaction, defendant employed an invoice which stated: "TI-
TLE TO THE ABOVE MERCHANDISE DOES NOT PASS UNTIL ALL OF THE
ABOVE MERCHANDISE IS PAID IN FULL." These invoices ranged from $13.50
up to $9,400 and represented sales in all sections of North Carolina. In addition,
defendant sent a representative to visit a resident of Burlington, North Carolina, to
appraise her coin collection and thereafter sold her coins valued at more than $21,000.
Id. at 679, 231 S.E.2d at 632.
20. Id. at 679, 231 S.E.2d at 632.
21. See note 19 supra.
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contacts with the State [were] sufficient to satisfy due process require-
ments. "22
The court's decision in Dillon upheld the reach of the state's long-arm
statute in a situation in which the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise
within the state, the cause of action was not related to the defendant's
activities within the state, and the quality and nature of those activities were
arguably insufficient to meet the minimum contacts test. 23 The court in so
doing transmuted the essentially negative factor of forum shopping into the
positive element of considering fairness to the plaintiff in allowing him to
bring suit where he resides.24 By endorsing the consideration of that ele-
ment, the North Carolina Supreme Court has both provided resident plain-
tiffs with a strorig basis to resist challenges to the assertion of jurisdiction
under the state's long-arm statute that are based on a claim of insufficient
contacts with the state and again given its support to the exercise under the
long-arm statute of "the full jurisdictional powers permissible under due
process. "25
In Sugg v. Pollard,26 decided in 1922, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that an action to enforce a laborers' or materialmen's lien need
not be brought in the county in which the land to be encumbered by the lien
is situated. In Ridge Community Investors, Inc. v. Berry,27 a 1977 case,
plaintiffs contended that amendments to the laborers' and materialmen's
liens statute28 enacted since the decision in Sugg required that Sugg be
reversed. In 1974 defendant Berry had performed labor for and supplied
materials to the then owner of property in Wautaga County, Mill Ridge
Developers, Inc. When compensation for his work was not forthcoming, he
filed a notice and claim of lien against the Wautaga property in the office of
22. 291 N.C. at 680, 231 S.E.2d at 633.
23. See O'Neal v. Hicks Brokerage Co., 537 F.2d 1266, 1268(4th Cir. 1976) ("[e]manating
from [previous decisions of the Fourth Circuit] is the rule that the sufficiency of contacts
threshold is elevated when the cause of action does not arise in the forum state or
derive from the foreign corporation's transactions in the state"); cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952) (corporate activity within state held "so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities" (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 318-
19)). With the exception of an even lower level of activity within the state, only had he been a
nonresident of North Carolina could plaintiff's case in Dillon been appreciably weaker.
24. Fairness to the plaintiff is a factor that has been considered by other courts. See, e.g.,
Lee v. Walworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1973); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 12.30, at 661 (2d ed. 1977). Indeed, the genesis of long-arm jurisdiction lies in the
consideration of fairness to the plaintiff seeking to sue in his resident forum. Dillon can be read
as merely an extension of that principle to counteract factors in the case that worked against
allowing the court to exercise in personam jurisdiction over defendant.
25. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285 N.C. 700, 705, 208 S.E.2d 676, 679 (1974).
26. 184 N.C. 494, 115 S.E. 153 (1922).
27. 293 N.C. 688, 239 S.E.2d 566 (1977).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-7 to -24 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
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the clerk of Watauga superior court as required by statute. 29 He subse-
quently brought an action in Mecklenburg County superior court to enforce
the lien and secured a default judgment ordering execution against the
Watauga property of Mill Ridge Developers, Inc. 30 Meanwhile, the holder
of a note given by Mill Ridge Developers and secured by a deed of trust on
the Watauga property brought a foreclosure action pursuant to which por-
tions of the property were purchased at sale by plaintiffs. 3 1 Upon learning of
the lien on their property held by defendant Berry, plaintiffs brought an
action to have the judgment of the Mecklenburg court declared null and
void, contending that the court that rendered it had been without jurisdiction
to enforce the lien on the Watauga County property.
Plaintiffs' contention was based on G.S. 44A-13(a), a segment of a
1969 amendment to the statutory scheme for enforcement of laborers' and
materialmen's liens that provides: "An action to enforce the lien created by
this Article may be instituted in any county in which the lien is filed.' '32
Plaintiffs argued that as a lien against real property must be filed in the
county where such property is located,33 only the courts of such county have
jurisdiction to enforce the lien. In rejecting this construction of G.S. 44A-
13(a) and reaffirming its prior holding, the supreme court held that the
legislature's failure to create explicitly a jurisdictional requirement that an
action to foreclose a lien be brought in the county where the lien was filed by
using clear language to that effect was evidence of its lack of intent to do
so.34 Furthermore, the court held that the legislature's passage of another
amendment to G.S. 44A-1335 during the 1977 session clarified its intent
with respect to the 1969 amendment. 36 The 1977 amendment provides that
29. 293 N.C. at 690-91, 239 S.E.2d at 567. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(a) (1976) requires
that "[a]ll claims of lien against any real property must be filed in the office of the clerk of
superior court in each county wherein the real property subject to the claim of lien is located."
30. 293 N.C. at 690, 239 S.E.2d at 567-68.
31. Id. at 690, 239 S.E.2d at 568.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13(a) (1976).
33. See note 29 supra.
34. 293 N.C. at 695, 239 S.E.2d at 570. Even if the court had construed the 1969
amendment to § 44A-13(a) as requiring that an action to enforce a laborers' or materialmen's
lien must be brought in the county wherein the real property subject to the lien is located, it is
likely that the court would have found such requirement to be one of venue rather than
jurisdiction. In construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-76 (1976) which requires that certain actions
must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action is situated, the court has held that
the statute imposes a venue rather than a jurisdictional requirement and that failure to object
when the action is not brought in the proper county results in a waiver of the requirement. See
Thompson v. Horrel, 272 N.C. 503, 158 S.E.2d 633 (1968). If the 1969 amendment to § 44A-
13(a) had been held to create only a venue requirement, the failure of defendants in Berry to
object to the improper venue would thereby have precluded a later challenge to the judgment of
the Mecklenburg court grounded on improper venue.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13(c) (Supp. 1977).
36. 293 N.C. at 694-95, 239 S.E.2d at 570.
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unless a labor and material lien is enforced by a court in the county where
the lien was filed, a purchaser of the property at a sale to foreclose the lien
will not take title good against the claims of persons filed or arising after the
first furnishing of labor or material unless a notice of lis pendens is filed in
the county where the real property subject to the lien is located within 180
days of the last furnishing of labor and materials." The court reasoned that a
statute so protecting "purchasers and examiners of title no matter where the
action to enforce the lien is located" would not have been necessary if G.S.
44A-13(a) required that an action to enforce the lien be brought in the
county where the land to be encumbered by the lien is located. 38 Therefore,
the enactment of the 1977 amendment providing such protection was,
according to the court, indicative of the legislature's lack of intent in its
earlier passage of G.S. 44A-13(a) to create a jurisdictional requisite for
actions brought to enforce a lien.
The effect of the court's decision is to continue to treat problems under
G.S. 44A-13 as ones of venue. When an action is brought to enforce a
laborers' or materialmen's lien elsewhere than in the county where the real
property encumbered by the lien is located, the defendant may move for a
change of venue and, in the proper circumstances, will be granted such a
change. 39 The court's reliance on the 1977 amendment to G.S. 44A-13 was
appropriate as that amendment clearly contemplates that actions to enforce a
laborers' or materialmen's lien may be brought in any county. 40 Any
potential danger in the court's decision from lack of notice to persons
examining titles was also eliminated by the provisions of the 1977 amend-
ment that will compel the holder of a lien who chooses to bring an action to
enforce it elsewhere to file a notice of lis pendens in the county wherein the
real property subject to the lien is located. 4
1
B. Notice and Service of Process
In Lewis Clarke Associates v. Tobler42 an out-of-state defendant had
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-13(c) (Supp. 1977).
38. 293 N.C. at 695, 239 S.E.2d at 570.
39. An action to have a laborers' or materialmen's lien enforced is a local action and
arguably may be subject to the venue requirement of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-76 (1976) (actions for
determination of interest in real property must be tried in county in which subject of action is
situated). See Penland v. Red Hill Methodist Church, 226 N.C. 171, 37 S.E.2d 177 (1946); 1 A.
MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 778 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1970).
Whether subject to that provision or to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-82 (1976) (providing for venue in all
actions where not otherwise provided) such an action would be subject to a motion for change
of venue under id. § 1-83.
40. The clear intent of § 44A-13(c) is to protect persons examining titles by affording them
notice of a pending action when the party seeking to enforce a lien has chosen to do so in a
county other than the county wherein the property subject to the lien is located. 293 N.C. at
695, 239 S.E.2d at 570.
41. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
42. 32 N.C. App. 435, 232 S.E.2d 458, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 641, 235 S.E.2d 60 (1977).
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been served with process by registered mail. Defendant contended, how-
ever, that rule 4(j)(9)(b), authorizing service by registered or certified mail
upon out-of-state defendants, 43 required that the complaint and summons be
delivered to him personally and that therefore service upon him was invalid
because it was signed for and received by a person other than himself.
44
The court of appeals rejected defendant's contention, holding that
although it does not expressly so provide, "[t]he provision in rule 4(j)(9)
(b) . . .contemplates merely that the registered or certified mail be de-
livered to the address of the party to be served and that a person of
reasonable age and discretion receive the mail and sign the return receipt on
behalf of the addressee." 45 The court's holding comports with the intent of
the drafters of the rules46 and avoids the attempt to graft a technical
requirement onto the well-designed provisions for service of process on out-
of-state defendants by registered or certified mail.
The decision in Lewis Clarke Associates was subsequently codified by
legislative amendment of rule 4(j)(9)(b). The amended version of the rule
provides that, together with the required affidavit, the signed return receipt
"raises a rebuttable presumption that the person who received the mail and
signed the receipt was an agent of the addressee authorized by appointment
or by law to be served or to accept service of process or was a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in the defendant's dwelling, house, or
usual place of abode."
47
C. Pleadings and Motions
Prior to the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure in North
Carolina, the supreme court had consistently held that the doctrine of last
clear chance must be pleaded by the plaintiff before the issue could be
submitted to the jury. 48 After the new rules were adopted, plaintiffs, relying
43. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(9)(b), N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977), provided at the
time for service upon out-of-state defendants as follows:
Any party subject to service of process under this subsection (9) may be served by
mailing a copy of the summons and complaint, registered or certified mail, return
receipt requested, addressed to the party to be served. Service shall be complete on
the day the summons and complaint are delivered to the addressee ....
44. 32 N.C. App. at 437, 232 S.E.2d at 459.
45. Id. at 438, 232 S.E.2d at 459.
46. The court was careful to point out that its holding was supported by the conclusions in
an article by Professor Louis, principal author of North Carolina's rule 40)(9). Id. at 437, 232
S.E.2d at 459; see Louis, Modem Statutory Approaches to Service of Process Outside the
State-Comparing the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure with the Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act, 49 N.C.L. REV. 235, 255-56 (1971).
47. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j)(9)(b).
48. E.g., Exum v. Boyles, 272 N.C. 567, 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968); Wooten v. Cagle, 268
N.C. 366, 150 S.E.2d 738 (1966); Phillips v. North Carolina R.R., 257 N.C. 239, 125 S.E.2d 603
(1962); Gunter v. Winders, 256 N.C. 263, 123 S.E.2d 475 (1962).
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on the earlier case law, continued to plead the theory, 49 usually in a reply for
which permission to file had to be obtained from the court under rule 7(a). 50
The inconvenience of this requirement led to the recent adoption of an
amendment to rule 7(a) that permits the serving of a reply alleging last clear
chance without leave of court.5" Confronted with this background, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Vernon v. Crist52 reaffirmed its earlier decisions
that held that last clear chance must be pleaded before the issue may be
proved and submitted to the jury.
53
Plaintiff Vernon sought recovery of damages from defendant for per-
sonal injuries allegedly caused by defendant's negligence. Defendant filed
an answer alleging contributory negligence. 54 Plaintiff chose not to file a
reply and later sought to prove and have submitted to the jury the doctrine of
last clear chance in avoidance of the allegation of contributory negligence.
Denying plaintiff's repeated motions to amend his complaint to allege last
clear chance specifically, the trial court refused to submit the issue to the
jury.
55
In upholding the trial court's holding that last clear chance must be
specifically pleaded, the supreme court relied primarily on the interaction of
rules 7(a) and 8(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil ProcedureA 6 Rule
8(d) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]verments in a pleading to which no
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as denied or
49. Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 651, 231 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1977). There was apparently
no requirement that they do so. N.C.R. Civ. P. 7(a) sets out the required and permissive
pleadings. At the time the rules were adopted in North Carolina, rule 7(a) was an exact
counterpart of FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a) and did not require a reply when the defendant alleged
contributory negligence in his answer. Most federal courts had held that so long as a reply was
not required under federal rule 7(a) any allegations in a defendant's answer were to be deemed
denied or avoided, and the plaintiff was allowed to proceed at trial as if a reply so denying or
avoiding them had been filed. E.g., Crain v. Bluegrass Stockyards Co., 399 F.2d 868 (6th Cir.
1968); Neeff v. Emery Transp. Co., 284 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1960). For a decision holding
specifically that last clear chance need not be pleaded as a condition to the plaintiff's seeking to
prove the issue at trial, see Kline v. McCorkle, 330 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Va. 1971).
50. Vernon v. Crist, 291 N.C. 646, 651, 231 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1977).
51. The amendment added the following provision to N.C.R. Civ. P. 7(a): "If the answer
alleges contributory negligence, a party may serve a reply alleging last clear chance."
52. 291 N.C. 646, 231 S.E.2d 591 (1977); see this Survey, Torts: Negligence.
53. See cases cited note 48 supra.
54. Plaintiff, defendant and several friends had been engaging in horseplay in or about
defendant's car. Shortly before he was injured, plaintiff had been leaning against the trunk of
defendant's stopped car. His evidence tended to show that defendant entered the car without
plaintiff's becoming aware of that fact. He also alleged that defendant, aware that plaintiff did
not know he had entered the car, subsequently started it, accelerated forward quickly and
negligently caused plaintiff to fall backwards and strike his head. Plaintiff's attempt to prove
last clear chance was based on his allegation that defendant knew of the perilous situation
plaintiff had placed himself in by leaning against the car and, despite that awareness, failed to
take steps to avoid injuring plaintiff. 291 N.C. at 655, 231 S.E.2d at 596.
55. Id. at 656, 231 S.E.2d at 596.
56. Id. at 651-52, 231 S.E.2d at 594.
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avoided." 57 The recent amendment to rule 7(a) permits a reply alleging last
clear chance to be filed when a defendant alleges contributory negligence in
his answer. 58 As a reply alleging last clear chance is now permitted under
rule 7(a), a defendant's allegations of a plaintiff's contributory negligence
are not automatically deemed avoided by rule 8(d). 59 By implication, there-
fore, that rule requires that before a plaintiff can seek to prove last clear
chance and have the issue submitted to the jury in avoidance of a defend-
ant's allegation of contributory negligence, he must specifically plead it.
The court limited its holding, however, by stating that a plaintiff need
only plead the facts making the doctrine applicable and need not plead last
clear chance by name. 6° The court also held that a reply under rule 7(a) is
not the exclusive means of pleading such facts and that they may just as
readily be pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint.61 On the strength of that
holding and in adherence to the concept of notice pleading, 62 the court found
that the facts making last clear chance applicable were sufficiently pleaded
in plaintiff's complaint in Vernon, and that the trial judge should have
submitted the issue to the jury.
63
Although there appears to be no particular policy justification for
requiring that last clear chance be specifically pleaded, the court in Vernon
was faced with little choice, given the clearly applicable provisions of
amended rule 7(a) and rule 8(d). The court's decision is therefore more a
result of the unintended effect of the amendment to rule 7(a) than a decision
57. N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d).
58. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
59. 291 N.C. at 652, 231 S.E.2d at 594.
60. Id. The court found precedent for its holding in this respect in Exum v. Boyles, 272
N.C. 567, 158 S.E.2d 845 (1968).
61. 291 N.C. at 652, 231 S.E.2d at 594.
62. Id. at 652-53, 231 S.E.2d at 594-95. The court's holding was based on the similarity in
language between N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(a) governing the pleading of a claim for relief and id. 8(b),
which provides, "a party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim
asserted." Because of this similarity, the court applied the literal test of notice pleading as set
out in Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970), to determine whether plaintiff's
complaint met the requirements of N.C.R. Civ. P. 8(d). See Bell v. Traders & Mechanics Ins.
Co., 16 N.C. App. 591, 192 S.E.2d 711 (1972).
63. Although acknowledging that the complaint was less than artfully drawn, the court
observed:
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was in a position that he could not properly
protect himself; that the defendant either saw or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have seen that it was necessary for him to take action to avoid injuring the
plaintiff; that the defendant had ample opportunity to act to avoid injury to the
plaintiff; that the defendant was negligent in failing to act, specifically in failing to
warn the plaintiff before moving the car forward; and that defendant's negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident.
291 N.C. at 653, 231 S.E.2d at 595. The court also found that the one element of the last clear
chance doctrine not alleged in the complaint-that plaintiff's own negligence put him in his
perilous position-was supplied by the allegation of contributory negligence in defendant's
answer. Id. at 653-54, 231 S.E.2d at 595.
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based on any policy considerations. Vernon does, however, clarify the
confusion that has long surrounded this issue. Although the decision creates
a potential trap for the unwary plaintiff, the court wisely sought to prevent
that possibility by permitting an extremely flexible method of pleading last
clear chance.
64
In 1974 the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Simms v. Mason's
Stores65 that the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived
when a party makes a "general appearance" in an action before raising the
defense either by motion under rule 12(b)66 or in his answer. The court held
that by making a motion for extension of time within which to file an answer
defendant had made a "general appearance" and was barred from raising
the defense in a subsequent motion or answer.67 The holding in Simms was
based on the provisions of G.S. 1-75.7, which provided at the time that "a
court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may, without
serving a summons upon him exercise jurisdiction in an action over a
person: (1) Who makes a general appearance in an action . ... 68 The
court, in support of its holding, argued that it would be both detrimental to
the judicial process and unjust to the opposing party to allow the defendant
to assert the defense after he has made a voluntary appearance "by seeking
some affirmative relief at the hands of the court, or by utilizing the facilities
of the court in some other manner inconsistent with the defense that the
court has no jurisdiction over him.' '69 The holding of Simms, that when a
party makes a motion for an extension of time within which to file an answer
he has made a "general appearance" within the meaning of G.S. 1-75.7,
64. Although the court found it unnecessary to consider whether the trial judge erred in
denying plaintiff's repeated motions to amend his complaint to allege last clear chance, it did in
dictum note that "leave to amend should be 'freely given when justice so requires' and that the
burden is on the party objecting to the amendment to show that he would be prejudiced
thereby." Id. at 654, 231 S.E.2d at 595 (quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a)). This liberal approach to
the amendment of pleadings could also serve to rescue the unwary plaintiff who neglects to
plead last clear chance in a reply.
65. 285 N.C. 145, 203 S.E.2d 769 (1974).
66. N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b).
67. 285 N.C. at 158, 203 S.E.2d at 778.
68. Law of June 27, 1967, ch. 954, § 2, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1274 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.7(1) (1969)) (amended 1977). Indicative of the court's reliance on the
statute is the following observation in the opinion: "In G.S. 1-75.7 the Legislature made the
policy decision that any act which constitutes a general appearance obviates the necessity of
service of summons." 285 N.C. at 157, 203 S.E.2d at 777.
69. 285 N.C. at 156, 203 S.E.2d at 776. Noting that there are sound reasons for the policy
adopted by the legislature in § 1-75.7, the court concluded that
[i~n addition to the fact that courts should conserve judicial time and effort by
disposing of preliminary defenses relating to personal jurisdiction before considering
the merits of a controversy, to allow a party to delay raising the defense of insufficien-
cy of service of process by securing an extension to plead may permit the statute of
limitations to bar a claim for relief by a plaintiff who, through no fault of his own, is
ignorant of the defense.
Id. at 157-58, 203 S.E.2d at 777-78.
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was subsequently overruled by statutory amendment. 70 The broader holding
of the case-that by making a "general appearance" in an action a defend-
ant waives his right to assert the defense of lack of jurisdiction-remains in
effect, however, and the policy considerations relied on by the court retain
their force.
In the 1977 case of Smith v. Pacific Intermountain Express, Co. ,71 the
court of appeals, faced with the issue whether subsequent to his timely
raising of a jurisdictional defense either by motion or answer, conduct by the
defendant that constitutes a "general appearance" under G.S. 1-75.7 results
in a waiver of the defense, 72 distinguished Simms and held that the defense
was not waived. 73 In response to plaintiff's initiation of suit, defendant,
Pacific Intermountain Express Co., had filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction alleging insufficiency of service of process. 74 Before
the court ruled on that motion over four months later, 75 defendant engaged
in the following conduct: it filed an answer denying the allegations of the
complaint and asserting a compulsory counterclaim in which it explicitly
stated that it did not intend thereby to waive the defense raised by the initial
motion; it directed interrogatories to plaintiffs; when the answers to the
interrogatories were returned to defendant unverified, it made a motion to
the court that plaintiffs be required to give answers to them under oath; and
defendant consented to a notice of dismissal. 76 When defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was finally heard by the court, the court
entered an order in which it concluded that service of process had indeed
been insufficient. 77 But defendant's motion was denied on grounds that its
70. Section 1-75.7 now provides:
A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter may, without serving a
summons upon him, exercise jurisdiction in an action over a person: (1) Who makes a
general appearance in an action; provided, that obtaining an extension of time within
which to answer or otherwise plead shall not be considered a general appearance
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
71. 34 N.C. App. 694, 239 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
72. The issue was also dealt with by the court of appeals in a decision rendered earlier this
year. Wiles v. Welparnel Constr. Co., 34 N.C. App. 157, 237 S.E.2d 297, cert. granted, 293
N.C. 743, 241 S.E.2d 515 (1977) (No. 70 PC). The court there held that by proceeding to take
plaintiff's deposition, defendant had not waived the defense of lack of jurisdiction that he had
raised by motion as his first action in response to plaintiff's suit. The supreme court, by order
entered December 6, 1977, granted discretionary review of Wiles.
73. 34 N.C. App. at 697-98, 239 S.E.2d at 617.
74. Id. at 695, 239 S.E.2d at 615.
75. Plaintiff's suit was filed on June 17, 1976. On July 19 in that same year, defendant filed
a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The motion was first heard by the trial
court in late November 1976, at which time plaintiffs indicated to the court that they intended to
take a voluntary dismissal of the action. They subsequently reversed their position and defend-
ant's motion was heard again and ruled on by the court on December 3, 1976. Id. at 695-96, 239
S.E.2d at 615-16.
76. Id. at 695, 239 S.E.2d at 615.
77. Id. at 696, 239 S.E.2d at 616.
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conduct subsequent to filing constituted a "general appearance" 78 and
therefore resulted in waiver of the defense.
79
The court of appeals ruled that "[t]he term 'general appearance' as
used in G.S. 1-75.7 should be held to refer generally to appearances made
either before the filing of jurisdictional motions under rule 12(b) before
pleading or, if no such motions are filed, the appearances made before the
defense is raised in responsive pleadings.''80 On the strength of that in-
terpretation, the court reversed the trial judge's denial of the motion and
held that defendant had not waived the defense of lack of jurisdiction by its
conduct during the period between its filing of the motion raising the
defense and the court's subsequent ruling on it.81
In so interpreting G.S. 1-75.7, the court of appeals noted that the two
major policy considerations of unfair prejudice to the opposing party and
waste of judicial energy that were relied on in Simms are satisfied8 2 when
the defendant, as it did here, raises lack of jurisdiction as a defense by
motion or answer as his initial action in response to the complaint. In such a
case, both the opposing party and the court are alerted to the possibility that
the defendant may prevail on that defense and can respond accordingly.8 3
The opposing party can then take steps to correct the defective basis of
jurisdiction and the court can expedite its determination of the defendant's
claim.
Although G.S. 1-75.7 would by a literal reading appear to require that
a court reach the same result in this case as was reached in Simms, the
limitation imposed on the statute's operation by the court of appeals is
sound. To hold otherwise would be, in effect, to reinstate the requirement
that a defendant enter a special appearance to challenge the jurisdiction of
the court." 4 It also would "require a defendant either to abandon a valid
78. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
79. 34 N.C. App. at 696, 239 S.E.2d at 616. The court of appeals noted that the trial judge
relied on § 1-75.7 and Simms in his denial of the motion. Id. at 697-98, 239 S.E.2d at 617-18.
80. Id. at 699, 239 S.E.2d at 617 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 699, 239 S.E.2d at 617-18.
82. See text accompanying note 69 supra. That the court of appeals was well aware of the
policy considerations relied on in Simms is evidenced by the court's observation:
The reasons behind the rule [of Simms] are well founded. A party should not be
allowed to use the court's time on the merits of a controversy and then, at a later time,
unveil a jurisdictional defense. Such conduct not only wastes the court's time but may
unnecessarily mislead and prejudice an opponent who, through no fault of his own,
remains ignorant of the defense.
34 N.C. App. at 698, 239 S.E.2d at 617.
83. 34 N.C. App. at 698, 239 S.E.2d at 617. The court went on to say, "His opponent can
then attempt to correct the jurisdictional difficulty or assume the consequences of his failure to
do so. He is not misled and cannot thereafter be unfairly prejudiced by allowing defendant to
proceed with prudent preparation for trial." Id.
84. The Simms court observed that
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jurisdictional defense he has appropriately raised or to ignore the lawsuit and
thereby forfeit the use of many legitimate tools of defense, including
discovery for the preparation of responsive pleadings and trial as well as the
preservation of testimony." 85 The court's holding in Smith thus preserves a
proper balance between the rights of both plaintiffs and defendants when a
defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the court as a preliminary defense.
D. Parties8 6
The court of appeals made a novel application of the rule 1787 real party
in interest requirement in Reliance Insurance Co. v. Walker.8 8 The issue
arose in a declaratory action brought by Reliance Insurance against three
defendants: Kenneth Lewis, the holder of an automobile liability policy
issued by Reliance; James Walker, who had been injured while preparing to
step into a truck owned by Lewis; and Aetna Insurance Company, the issuer
of a homeowner's policy held by Lewis. Reliance sought to resolve the
question whether any potential liability of Lewis that might arise as a result
of a judgment against him in a separate action brought by Walker to recover
for his injuries was covered by its liability policy and/or by the policy issued
by Aetna. 89 The trial court held that the policy issued by Reliance would
provide coverage for any potential liability but that the Aetna policy would
not. 90 Defendant Walker sought to appeal that part of the decision holding
that Aetna's policy would not provide coverage.
91
[i]n 1951 the enactment of G.S. 1-134.1 eliminated the necessity for special appear-
ances by permitting the objection that the court had "no jurisdiction over the person
or property of the defendant" to be presented either by motion or answer. The making
of other motions or the pleading of other defenses simultaneously with the juris-
dictional objection was declared not to be a waiver of it, but the statute provided "that
the making of any motion or the filing of any answer prior to the presentation of such
objection shall waive it."
285 N.C. at 151, 203 S.E.2d at 773-74. This was the law in North Carolina until former § 1-134.1,
Law of Mar. 13, 1951, ch. 245, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 202, was repealed in 1967.
85. 34 N.C. App. 698-99, 239 S.E.2d at 617.
86. In Heath v. Board of Comm'rs, 292 N.C. 369, 233 S.E.2d 889 (1977), the supreme
court considered the effect on indemnification law of the authorization of impleader in N.C.R.
Civ. P. 14. The court held that the rule's authorization to a defendant to implead "a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him" has the effect of accelerating the accrual of the defendant's claim for indemnification. 292
N.C. at 376, 233 S.E.2d at 893. The substantive law prior to the adoption of the rules that a
cause of action for indemnification did not arise until the defendant had satisfied a judgment
against him on which his claim was based, American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 260 N.C. 681,
133 S.E.2d 669 (1963), has been overridden for procedural purposes by the rules.
87. N.C.R. Civ. P. 17.
88. 33 N.C. App. 15, 234 S.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 159, 236 S.E.2d 704 (1977).
89. Id. at 16-17, 234 S.E.2d at 207-08.
90. Id. at 17, 234 S.E.2d at 208.
91. Id. Walker's appeal may have been prompted by a desire to avoid a result similar to
that in Mayo v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 282 N.C. 346, 192 S.E.2d 828 (1972). Plaintiff in
Mayo brought an action for losses suffered when a building he owned was destroyed by fire.
He brought the action against both the agent who had agreed to write a binder insuring the
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The court held that Walker's appeal was barred by the rule 17 require-
ment that " '[e]very claim shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest .... , ,92 In reaching this result, the court first stated that rule
17, which by its terms applies only to plaintiffs, should apply to defendants
as well. 93 The holding that Walker's appeal was barred by the real party in
interest rule was based on the contingency of his claim for liability against
Lewis. Although Walker's interest in establishing in this action that Aetna's
policy provided coverage was evident, his right to bring a claim against
Aetna asserting coverage by Aetna's policy would not normally arise until
he had established in his separate action that Lewis was liable to him for the
injuries he had suffered. 94 Therefore, because he did not yet have "the legal
right to enforce the claim in question"-a basic requirement of the real
party in interest rule-his appeal was dismissed. 95
As the injured party in the transaction that gave rise to the declaratory
action, Walker was a proper, if not a necessary, party.96 Whether he should
building and the insurance company that the agent informed plaintiff had agreed to assume
coverage. He asserted that either the insurance company was liable under the binder for the
amount of his loss or the agent was liable for negligently failing to secure coverage after
assuring plaintiff that he would. At the trial court level the insurance company was absolved,
but the agent was held liable on the negligence theory. On appeal by the agent, the supreme
court reversed the finding of liability as to the agent, but let stand that part of the judgment
finding nonliability of the insurance company. Id. at 356, 192 S.E.2d at 834. By failing to take
an appeal from the trial court's ruling on nonliability of the insurance company, plaintiff thus
lost any rights to compensation from either of the defendants. Id.
In Reliance, plaintiff filed notice of intent to appeal the finding that its policy provided
coverage for any potential liability of Lewis. 33 N.C. App. at 17, 234 S.E.2d at 208. Unless the
trial court's finding that the policy issued by Aetna did not provide coverage was also appealed,
the danger existed that Reliance would succeed on appeal and both insurance companies would
be absolved of liability. Of course, if defendant Walker is not bound by the determination that
codefendant Aetna's policy does not provide coverage, he may relitigate that issue in a
subsequent action on any judgment he might secure against Lewis. See note 97 infra.
92. 33 N.C. App. at 18, 234 S.E.2d at 209 (quoting N.C.R. Civ. P. 17(a)). The insured,
Lewis, also gave notice of appeal with respect to the trial court's finding of noncoverage by
Aetna's policy. He failed to file a brief or further to prosecute his appeal, however, and on
motion by Aetna, his appeal was dismissed. Id. at 18, 234 S.E.2d at 208-09.
93. Id. at 18, 234 S.E.2d at 209. In support of this holding, the court cited 3A MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTCE 17.07, at 17.76 to .77 (2d ed. 1977) and federal cases cited therein,
94. Under North Carolina law, when the policy is an agreement to indemnify the insured
against loss, the insured must sustain a loss before the insurer's liability arises. Ingram v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 638, 129 S.E.2d 222, 227 (1963); Clark v. Bonsai &
Co., 157 N.C. 270, 272, 72 S.E. 954, 955 (1911). No action against the insurer can be maintained
by one who has a claim against the insured until such claimant has secured a judgment against
the insured that has been returned unexecuted. See Griffin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
265 N.C. 443, 144 S.E.2d 201 (1965); Newton v. Seely, 177 N.C. 528, 99 S.E. 201 (1919). When
the policy provides for coverage for the legal liability of the insured, the claimant still may not
proceed against the insurer until he establishes the liability of the insured in a separate action in
which the insurer is not a proper party. See Taylor v. Green, 242 N.C. 156, 87 S.E.2d 11 (1955).
95. 33 N.C. App. at 19, 234 S.E.2d at 209.
96. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Consumers Fin. Serv., 101 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1938) (injured
parties in automobile accident and insured parties under policy covering involved motor vehicle
are necessary and proper parties to action by insurance company seeking to be relieved of
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have been allowed to appeal the court's determination of noncoverage by the
policy issued by Aetna should have been resolved, however, by deciding
under the usual rules of appellate procedure whether he was "a party
aggrieved" by the court's holding. 97 Applying the real party in interest rule
to deny his appeal is a misapplication of the policy considerations that
underlie the rule. 98 When a defendant in Walker's position is denied the
right to appeal on grounds that he is not "a party aggrieved" or by
misapplication of the real party in interest rule, the denial has two potential-
ly unsatisfactory effects. Upon later securing a judgment establishing liabili-
ty against Lewis, Walker may find it necessary to bring an action against
Aetna with the object of again asserting that Aetna's policy provides
coverage. 99 Not only will this perhaps result in wasteful relitigation of the
issue, but it will also raise the possibility of inconsistent results on this same
issue should the court find in this potential second action that Aetna's policy
provides coverage. Nevertheless, it may not be possible to avoid such
duplicative litigation. Defendants Aetna and Walker were not adversarial
liability). See also Updike Inv. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 128 Neb. 295, 258
N.W.2d 470 (1935); Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 723, 747 (1960).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-271 (1969) provides in relevant part: "[A]ny party aggrieved may
appeal in the cases prescribed in this chapter." Whether Walker was a party aggrieved should
be resolved by determining whether he was "one whose right has been directly and injuriously
affected by the action of the court." 2 A. MCINToSH, supra note 39, § 1781, at 201 (2d ed. 1956).
Once he has secured a judgment against Lewis, Walker could, if necessary, bring a separate
action against Aetna and relitigate the issue of whether its policy provides coverage. See F.
JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 24, § 9.11, at 419. Collateral estoppel would not appear to bar
Walker since that principle operates to bar relitigation of an issue litigated by parties in a
previous action only when the parties appeared as adversaries in that action. Id. § 11.24;
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (1942). If Walker is indeed free to relitigate the issue in a
subsequent action, the effect of the court's decision on his interest is effectively minimized. He
will be "aggrieved" only to the extent he bears the expense of the relitigation.
98. The real party in interest requirement has as its purpose compelling an action to be
"prosecuted in the name of the party, who by the substantive law, has the right to be enforced."
6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 93, 117.02, at 17.13. "[A] principal objective of the
provision was to enable the assignee of a chose in action to sue in his own name." F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, supra note 24, § 9.3, at 397. It was never intended to be applied in determining
whether a proper party to an action should have the right to appeal a determination by the court.
If, as the court held, Walker was not a real party in interest for purposes of appeal because his
claim against Lewis was only contingent, Walker would similarly appear to be an improper
party to the action altogether as his interest in establishing that coverage exists under the policy
issued by Reliance is no greater than his interest in establishing that coverage exists under the
policy issued by Aetna. Yet Walker was clearly a proper party in the declaratory action brought
by Reliance. See cases cited note 96 supra.
99. As the court of appeals upheld the trial court's determination that Reliance would be
liable to indemnify Lewis should he be held liable for this accident, the possibility of a
subsequent action by Walker against Aetna is relatively remote. However, should Walker
obtain a judgment against Lewis in excess of the limits on coverage under the policy issued by
Reliance and be unable to get satisfaction of the excess from Lewis, he would undoubtedly seek
to prove that Aetna's policy provided coverage for the excess. Had Reliance established its
nonliability on appeal, a subsequent action by Walker against Aetna would have been almost
inevitable once he had established the liability of Lewis.
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parties in the declaratory action and, because of the noncompulsory nature
of crossclaims, 1° they could not have been required to align themselves as
such. Therefore, it is unlikely that either of them would be bound by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel in a subsequent attempt to relitigate this
issue. 101 Thus, although it would have been desirable to have a complete and
binding determination of the rights of the parties in this one declaratory
action, such a result may not have been attainable.
E. Discovery
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Tennessee-Carolina Transpor-
tation, Inc. v. Strick Corp.1°2 held that the mere fact that a party seeks to
take a deposition after the date set in an order issued by the court fixing the
time within which the parties must complete their discovery does not
constitute the "good cause shown" required by rule 26103 as grounds for the
issuance of a protective order prohibiting the taking of the deposition. The
decision came in the fourth episode at the supreme court level in a breach of
warranty of merchantability litigation between the parties. 104 Shortly before
the second trial on the issue, the trial judge issued an order providing for no
further discovery "unless by the consent of the parties." 10 5 After the second
100. N.C.R. Civ. P. 13(g) provides in part: "A pleading may state as a crossclaim any claim
by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is
the subject matter of the original action." Id. (emphasis added); see W. SHUFORD, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE § 13-10 (1975). A counterclaim by defendant Walker
would likely be barred anyway by the prohibition in North Carolina on a direct action by an
injured party against the insurer prior to securing a judgment against the tortfeasor. See note 94
supra.
101. See note 97 supra. Even if Walker were allowed to appeal the court's determination of
Aetna's noncoverage, it is unlikely that a court would find they had been adversarial parties in
the declaratory action. In Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118 (1960), however, the
supreme court held that although no crossclaim had been asserted, collateral estoppel barred a
subsequent suit by a party against his codefendant in a prior tort action when the party sought to
relitigate an issue that had been decided adversely to him in that earlier action. The decision in
Pack was widely criticized, however, as an unwarranted failure to follow the traditional
adversary requirement. See, e.g., Note, Collateral Estoppel: Application to Actions Between
Former Codefendants, 1961 DUKE L.J. 167.
102. 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977).
103. N.C.R. Civ. P. 26.
104. The case concerns trailers that were manufactured under contract for plaintiff, Ten-
nessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc., in 1967. Shortly thereafter, structural defects began to
manifest themselves. Plaintiff brought suit in 1970 alleging that the damages to the trailers were
the result of improper design and manufacture. Plaintiff won on the initial trial of the suit, but
the supreme court reversed that decision on appeal. 283 N.C. 423, 196 S.E.2d 711 (1973). On
remand, plaintiff secured another favorable judgment, but again the supreme court found
reversible error on appeal and remanded for a third trial. 286 N.C. 235,210 S.E.2d 181 (1974). It
was at this stage, just prior to the third trial on the issue, that the present controversy arose and
was considered by the supreme court twice. 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346 (1976); 291 N.C. 618,
231 S.E.2d 597 (1977).




decision was overturned on appeal and the case was remanded for a third
trial, defendant unsuccessfully moved for additional time to conduct dis-
covery. 1°6 Subsequently, defendant gave notice that it intended to take the
deposition of a metallurgist who had conducted tests for plaintiff and whose
existence defendant had become aware of during the course of the second
trial.107 In its notice, defendant stated that its purpose was merely to obtain
his testimony for use as evidence at the third trial.108 Plaintiff moved under
rule 26 for a protective order prohibiting the taking of the deposition.
Finding that taking the deposition would constitute discovery because de-
fendant did not know what the testimony of the witness would be and citing
the earlier orders limiting discovery and denying defendant's motion for an
extension of time in which to conduct discovery, the trial judge issued a
protective order. 1 9 In its initial decision on defendant's appeal of the
judge's ruling, the supreme court held that it was not appealable and that,
even if it were appealable, abuse of discretion, the only grounds for over-
turning the grant or denial of a protective order, had not been shown. 110 On
rehearing, however, the court found that the ruling was appealable and
reconsidered its holding with respect to the discretion of the trial judge in
issuing a protective order in this instance.
Observing that the right to take a deposition under'rule 30(a) 1 is
unqualified but for the provisions of rule 26(c)112 authorizing the court to
issue protective orders "for good cause shown," the court proceeded to
examine the basis for issuance of the protective order in this case. Because
the record indicated no support for the ruling on the protective order other
than the existence of the previous orders limiting discovery, the court held
that "even if the purpose had been mere discovery" rather than "to obtain
evidence for introduction at the trial," issuing the protective order was an
106. 291 N.C. at 620, 231 S.E.2d at 598.
107. At the same time, defendant gave notice of intent to depose another individual whose
testimony was also sought for use as evidence at the third trial. The trial court denied plaintiff's
motion for a protective order prohibiting the taking of this deposition. It noted that defendant
already knew essentially what the testimony of the individual sought to be deposed would be,
and that the taking of his deposition would not, therefore, violate the court's earlier orders
denying further discovery. Id. at 620-21, 231 S.E.2d at 599. The court's denial of a protective
order with respect to this individual was not at issue on appeal. In light of the decision on appeal
finding an abuse of discretion in the court's grant of a protective order prohibiting the taking of
the other deposition, the court's action allowing the taking of this individual's deposition to
proceed appears correct.
108. Id. at 620, 231 S.E.2d at 599.
109. Id. at 627, 231 S.E.2d at 602.
110. 289 N.C. 587, 591, 231 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 291 N.C. 618, 231
S.E.2d 597 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 229-35 infra.
11. N.C.R. Civ. P. 30(a).
112. Id. 26(c).
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abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 113 The court's holding requires instead
that there be support in the record for the proposition that allowing the
deposition to be taken, be it for purposes of obtaining evidence for use at
trial or for discovery, would result in such harm to the party seeking a
protective order as delay of the trial or other undue burden or expense.
Under this rule, trial courts will still be able to limit the time period within
which discovery must be completed, 1 4 but a party will be allowed to take a
deposition after that period has expired unless on a motion for a protective
order the other party makes a sufficient showing of potential harm.
The court's reversal of its earlier holding that no abuse of discretion by
the trial judge had been shown preserves the proper balance between the
inherent authority of the court to limit the time for discovery and the parties'
occasional need to take depositions for use as evidence at trial or for
discovery purposes after the time set by the court has expired." 5 When
allowing a party to take a deposition after such time limit has expired would
cause harm to the other party by delaying trial or otherwise, the court has a
legitimate basis for issuing a protective order.116 A refusal to allow the
taking of a deposition after the time limit has expired on the basis of that fact
alone without consideration of existing circumstances would, however,
sacrifice the legitimate needs of litigants to the inviolability of the court's
discovery limitation order. 117
113. 291 N.C. at 626-27,231 S.E.2d at 602. The court also relied for support on N.C.R. Civ.
P. 26(d), which applies specifically to the sequence and timing of discovery. 291 N.C. at 626-27,
231 S.E.2d at 602. The pertinent part of that rule provides:
Any order or rule of court setting the time within which discovery must be completed
shall be construed to fix the date after which the pendency of discovery will not be
allowed to delay trial . . . but shall not be construed to prevent any party from
utilizing any procedures afforded under Rules 26 through 36 so long as trial. . . is not
thereby delayed.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 26(d).
114. There is clear authority for such a time limitation in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1968) (upholding federal district court's
power to provide by local rule for approximately 100 days for discovery). N.C.R. Civ. P. 26
also contemplates the promulgation of an order limiting the time period for discovery. See note
113 supra.
115. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2038 (1970) and
cases cited therein.
116. Harm to the other party should not, however, be the exclusive grounds for denying the
right to take a deposition. If a party seeks to take a deposition after the time set by the court for
discovery has expired and its need to do so is a result of its own lack of diligence during the
period set for discovery, the court should have the authority to prohibit its taking to protect the
integrity of its order limiting the time for discovery. See Tennessee Elec, Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
117. For example, during the period set for discovery in one action, counsel for one party
may have been required unexpectedly to devote his time to pursuing other litigation on appeal
and been unable to conduct his discovery adequately. Study by counsel of material derived
from discovery conducted during the period set by the court may reveal unanswered questions,
the answers to which can only be obtained by conducting further discovery. See generally
Freehill v. Lewis, 355 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1966) (in setting aside order barring further discovery,
court discussed proper role of order limiting time for discovery).
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In another development under the discovery rules, the legislature
passed an amendment to rule 30 in 1977 that obviates the need to secure an
order from the court authorizing the recording of testimony at a deposition
"by methods other than stenographic means, including videotape." 118 New
subsection (b)(4) to rule 30 requires that the notice of intent to take a
deposition state the method by which it is proposed to be recorded. It also
provides that when the deposition is to be taken by videotape, the deposing
party, upon request by any other party, shall provide for the transcribing of
the testimony. Depositions used as evidence at trial are generally thought to
be more useful to the trier of fact when they are recorded by audio-visual
devices than when they are read into evidence from a transcript; this
amendment should facilitate their use.
1 19
F. Default Judgment
In Roland v. W & L Motor Lines, Inc.120 plaintiff filed a claim against
his former employer for amounts allegedly owed him from the period of
their employment relationship. Defendant, rather than filing a formal an-
swer, wrote a letter to plaintiff's attorney, a copy of which he sent to the
clerk of court, in which he disclosed the substance of a potential right to set-
off. 21 After the time for filing an answer had elapsed, plaintiff moved for
entry of default, and subsequently for judgment by default; both motions
were granted immediately by the clerk. 122 On appeal, defendant contended
that the letter satisfied the requirements for an answer and therefore that both
the entry of default and the judgment by default were improperly granted.1
23
The court of appeals declined to decide whether defendant's letter was
a sufficient answer, for it considered the judgment to be void because the
118. N.C.R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4). In conjunction with this amendment, the legislature also
amended rule 32(a)(4) to allow the use at trial of the deposition of "an expert witness whose
testimony has been procured by videotape as provided for under Rule 30(b)(4)." N.C.R. Civ. P.
32(a)(4).
119. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2115. Prior to 1970, the federal rules
provided that testimony in depositions was to be recorded stenographically and the courts were
reluctant to allow recordation by other means. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. United
States, 43 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In 1970, FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) was amended to allow
recordation by other methods when approved by order of the court. Federal courts have
subsequently allowed recording by videotape and other nonstenographic means much more
readily. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 69 F.R.D. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Carson v. Burlington N., Inc.,
52 F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971). But see Perry v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 63 F.R.D. 603 (D.S.C.
1974). For an excellent discussion of the advantages of using videotaped depositions at trial, see
Kornbum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 9 (1972).
120. 32 N.C. App. 288, 231 S.E.2d 685 (1977).
121. Id. at 288, 231 S.E.2d at 686.
122. Id. at 288-89, 231 S.E.2d at 686.
123. Id. at 289, 231 S.E.2d at 686-87.
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clerk had acted outside of his narrowly defined powers to enter judgment by
default.1 24 The court noted that rule 55(b)(1) 125 imposes three conditions on
the valid exercise of the clerk's power to enter judgment by default: (1) the
claim must be for a sum certain or for a sum that by computation can be
made certain; (2) the defendant must have been defaulted for failure to
appear; and (3) the defendant must not be an infant or incompetent per-
son. 126 The court concluded that the second of these had not been met-that
defendant had in fact appeared in the action-and that therefore default
judgment could only be entered by the court pursuant to rule 55(b)(2).1
27
Furthermore, the other procedural requirement under rule 55 that is trig-
gered by an appearance-three days written notice of a hearing on the
application for default-had not been complied with. 1 28 These defects were
necessarily fatal to the judgment entered by the clerk.
The technical requirements in rule 55 are designed to safeguard a party
from an automatic and possibly unwarranted denial of a trial on the merits
after such party has already given some initial indication of a desire to
defend the suit. 129 By providing the "appearing" defendant notice and a
hearing before a judge prior to entry of final judgment, a judicial determina-
tion of the propriety of default judgment is assured and an opportunity is
given the judge to exercise his discretion to direct the parties to proceed to
trial despite the technical default. 130 The term "appearance" in rule 55
should thus be read in light of the policy against entering judgments by
default except when clearly justified. Accordingly, it has been stated that the
primary test for determining whether there has been an appearance is
whether the party has "indicated to the moving party a clear purpose to
defend the suit. "131 While an answer is always an appearance, 13 2 consistent
with this interpretation, it is not necessary that a submission be made to the
court in order for the party to have appeared. 133 Rather, such things as
negotiations between parties looking towards either settlement or suit134 or
124. Id. at 291, 231 S.E.2d at 688.
125. N.C.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
126. See id.
127. 32 N.C. App. at 290, 231 S.E.2d at 688.
128. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
129. See North Am. Acceptance Corp. v. Samuels, I1 N.C. App. 504, 181 S.E.2d 794
(1971); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2683, at 259-60 (1973).
130. Whaley v. Rhodes, 10 N.C. App. 109, 177 S.E.2d 735 (1970); see N.C.R. Civ. P. 55,
Comment.
131. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
132. Quaker Furniture House, Inc. v. Ball, 31 N.C. App. 140, 228 S.E.2d 475 (1976).
133. Roland v. W & L Motor Lines, Inc., 32 N.C. App. at 289, 231 S.E.2d at 687.
134. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Taylor v. Triangle Porsche-Audi, Inc., 27 N.C. App. 711, 220 S.E.2d 806 (1975).
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an agreement between the parties extending the time within which to an-
swer135 have been held sufficient to trigger the notice requirements and to
vest exclusive power to enter judgment by default in the judge. Clearly, in
Roland, even if the letter did not constitute a sufficient answer, 136 it was
such an emphatic indication of intent to defend the suit that its status as an
"appearance" cannot be questioned.
G. Summary Judgment
137
In Parker v. Bennett, 138 a case involving allegedly fraudulent represen-
tations made by a seller in connection with a land transaction, the court of
appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant seller.
The court stated its ruling as follows: "[I]n actions such as the case at bar,
where motives, intent, subjective feelings and reactions, consciousness and
conscience, are to be searched, the issues njay not be disposed of on
summary judgment."1 39 Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that the rule
adopted by the court in Parker should not be read as an absolute bar to
135. Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966).
136. The question left undecided by the court, whether the letter was a sufficient answer, is
the more interesting one. Although the letter clearly failed to comply with directives in N.C.R.
Civ. P. 10 respecting the proper form for captions and the means of setting out the claim in
separate paragraphs, such defects may generally be remedied by amendment. 5 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 1321, at 469 (1969).
In addition, certain important formal requirements were met in that the letter referred to
the suit by file number and was signed by the answering party. Substantively, although not
copied from a form book, the letter effectively disclosed a defense or counterclaim for set-off,
admitted certain allegations in the complaint and specifically denied others. Certainly, less
artful pleadings have been sustained. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
Presented with such a document it would not seem a clerk could justifiably enter default.
137. The court of appeals in Biddix v. Kellar Constr. Corp., 32 N.C. App. 120, 230 S.E.2d
796 (1977), held that summary judgment had been improperly granted by the court below
because, among other reasons, issues of fact had been raised by the materials defendant
submitted along with its motion. Id. at 125, 230 S.E.2d at 800. The trial judge, in rendering
judgment, had improperly resolved these factual disputes by making findings of fact in addition
to his conclusions of law. See note 269 infra. The court of appeals has admonished against this
practice on numerous occasions, including at least twice this past year. Reid v. Reid, 32 N.C.
App. 750, 752, 233 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1977); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Peace Broadcasting
Corp., 32 N.C. App. 655, 657, 233 S.E.2d 687, 688-89, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 734, 235 S.E.2d
788 (1977). The role of the judge in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is not to act as a
fact finder but rather to determine whether on the basis of the materials offered in support of
and in opposition to the motion it appears that a material issue of disputed fact exists requiring
resolution at trial. E.g., Lee v. Shor, 10 N.C. App. 231, 178 S.E.2d 101 (1970). However, once
it is decided that summary judgment should be granted, it is then appropriate, in order to
facilitate appellate review, for the trial court to make a summary of the facts that are considered
not to be in dispute. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Peace Broadcasting Corp., 32 N.C. App. at
658, 233 S.E.2d at 689. Similarly, when the motion is denied, the court may, for the purpose of
expediting the rest of the litigation, summarize those facts about which there is no dispute. See
N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(d).
138. 32 N.C. App. 46, 231 S.E.2d 10, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 264, 233 S.E.2d 393 (1977).
139. Id. at 54, 231 S.E.2d at 15. See Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 224
F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1955), for the origin of this statement. As there employed, the rule apparently
was not intended to be a complete bar to summary adjudication in such cases. See id.
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disposition by summary judgment of cases involving states of mind. To the
contrary, as noted by the federal commentators, there is no exception in rule
56 precluding summary judgment in cases involving issues of state of mind;
rather, the question presented by the motion is always the same: whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists. 140 The rule stated by the court of
appeals simply reflects the fact that in state of mind cases it is rare that the
movant will be able to show such an absence of disputed material fact and
that therefore "summary judgment is likely to be inappropriate when issues
of motive, intent and other subjective feelings and reactions are mate-
rial. "'
14 1
State of mind cases are inherently less suitable for summary adjudica-
tion largely because the proof is often peculiarly within the knowledge of
one of the parties and frequently provable only through adverse witnesses
testifying to their own states of mind. Consequently, the credibility of the
witnesses is especially at issue and the need for "demeanor" evidence
correspondingly great. 142 Moreover, summary judgment is even less likely
in such suits because proof of state of mind largely depends upon infer-
ence.14 3 The directive to judges hearing motions under rule 56 to draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion144 and
against drawing inferences that are favorable to the movant, 145 necessarily
precludes summary judgment in many such cases. Thus, it might generally
be expected that in such cases a nonmoving party will have little problem
showing the existence either of a genuine issue of fact or of grounds under
rule 56(f)146 why summary judgment should not be granted pending further
discovery.
Courts have been easily disposed towards finding an issue of credibility
necessitating trial when the evidence is in the exclusive control of the
140. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 99, at 493 (3d ed.
1976). N.C.R. Civ. P. 56 and its federal counterpart are practically the same; consequently, the
state courts look to federal precedent for guidance in applying the rule. E.g., Page v. Sloan, 281
N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972); Singleton v. Stewart, 280 N.C. 460, 186 S.E.2d 400 (1972).
141. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 93, pt. 2, 56.17, at 930 (1976). See also
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
142. See Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970).
143. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2730, at 584 (1973).
144. E.g., Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972); accord, Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
145. E.g., Page v. Sloan, 281 N.C. 697, 190 S.E.2d 189 (1972); accord, Cochran v. United
States, 123 F. Supp. 362 (D. Conn. 1954).
146. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
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moving party, as is frequently the case in fraud suits. 47 Even when the
nonmoving party fails to oppose the motion or justify his failure to do so
under rule 56(f), the moving party in order to prevail still must show that
summary judgment is "appropriate" within the meaning of rule 56(e).
148
Because one party generally has exclusive access to critical facts and
demeanor evidence is of peculiar relevance, this showing frequently cannot
be made in cases of this kind. 149 Nevertheless, in theory and in practice,
summary judgment can be as appropriate in state of mind cases as in any
other. 1SO
In North Carolina, summary judgment might properly be entered in
state of mind cases in which the movant meets the standards set out in Kidd
v. Early'5' for determining when judgment can be granted on the basis of
testimonial evidence.152 In the unusual case in which the movant's unop-
posed and unimpeached evidence as to his state of mind, if true, establishes
the lack of a triable issue, then under Kidd credibility might be assigned the
movant's evidence as a matter of law. 153 To receive such treatment the
movant's evidence would have to be internally consistent, apparently com-
plete and give rise to no conflicting inferences or circumstantial suspicion
147. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2726, at 524 (1973); see, e.g., Colby v.
Klune, 178 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1949).
148. N.C.R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides in pertinent part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Id. (emphasis added).
149. E.g., Cross v. United States, 336 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1964).
150. 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 93, pt. 2, 56.17 [41.-I], at 930-32 (1976)
and cases cited at id. nn.2 & 3.
When the motion asserts the existence of a certain state of mind of the nonmovant the
considerations are somewhat different, but a case for summary judgment might nevertheless be
made. Certain factors suggest the movant could never carry its burden: specifically, the
movant's dependence on circumstantial proof and his corollary inability to have direct knowl-
edge of the facts he is asserting would usually stand in the way of his making the overwhelming
showing required, particularly when the opposing party asserts the contrary respecting his own
state of mind of which he does have direct knowledge. On the other hand, if the nonmovant
fails to come forward with contradictory facts respecting his own state of mind, the only
permissible inference from the movant's evidence might well be that the nonmovant's state of
mind is as it is alleged to be. Cf. SEC v. Geyser Minerals Corp., 452 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971)
(failure of party with peculiar access to facts to oppose movant's assertions respecting nonmov-
ant's activities taken into consideration in affirming grant of summary judgment; state of mind
of nonmovant not germane to lawsuit, however).
151. 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E.2d 392 (1976), noted in 55 N.C.L. REV. 232 (1976).
152. In Kidd the crucial issue resolved was whether credibility might in the proper case be
assigned as a matter of law to a movant's testimonial evidence, thereby permitting summary
adjudication. In that the issue of credibility concerns an affiant's state of mind, that is, whether
his statements are consistent with what he knows to be the truth, Kidd arguably established that
state of mind can be summarily adjudicated in the proper case in North Carolina.
153. See 289 N.C. at 370, 222 S.E.2d at 410.
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apart from the movant's interest and exclusive access to the facts. The
particularly acute issue of credibility raised in state of mind cases suggests
that even when the movant fails to oppose the motion, 154 if summary
judgment is to be appropriate there should perhaps be certain facts in the
case that peculiarly suggest that the nonmovant will not be able to adduce
facts in support of his claim. Thus, as in Kidd for instance, when the
movant's assertions are strongly corroborated by the surrounding circum-
stances in the case and the nonmovant has not come forward with contrary
or impeaching facts, a good case for summary judgment might be made. 155
Alternatively, if there are no facts from which an inference contrary to the
movant's position can be drawn and the nonmovant has admitted his lack of
contrary evidence, 156 or plainly has not been able to establish any factual
basis for his assertions despite employment of the discovery rules, 157 sum-
mary judgment might be indicated.
The court of appeals decision in Parker, apart from the breadth of the
language employed, does not undermine these observations. There, sum-
mary judgment arguably was not proper simply because there was plainly
conflicting evidence respecting representations made by defendant concern-
ing the dimensions of the tract conveyed.158 Moreover, even without oppos-
ing evidence, summary judgment probably was not appropriate because, in
addition to defendant's interest and exclusive access to his own state of
mind, defendant's assertions did not fully negate the inference from the
undisputed facts that something may well have been misrepresented in
connection with the transaction. Consequently, defendant's evidence was
circumstantially suspicious and in need of fuller development. 159 Therefore,
the court in Parker appears to have reached the correct result.
154. State of mind cases that, in granting summary judgment, stress the nonmovant's
failure to oppose the motion may be found in 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, §
2740, at 729 n.23 (1973).
155. In Kidd the supreme court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the issue of their
"willingness" to perform the contract. Plaintiffs' direct assertions as to their willingness to
perform and other evidence going to prove the same were uncontradicted and unimpeached by
defendants. Despite the fact that the evidence was interested and exclusively within plaintiffs'
knowledge because pertaining to their states of mind, summary judgment in their favor was
allowed. In the course of affirming the judgment, the supreme court noted that in addition to
being persuasive on its own, plaintiffs' evidence of their readiness and willingness to perform
the contract was corroborated by the mere fact of bringing the suit for its enforcement.
Moreover, the surrounding circumstances in Kidd were devoid of anything suggesting that the
facts differed from those alleged by plaintiffs.
156. Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
157. Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1970).
158. See 32 N.C. App. at 47, 231 S.E.2d at 11.
159. See Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. at 370, 222 S.E.2d at 410.
In another case before the court of appeals last year, Five Star Enterprises, Inc. v. Russell,
34 N.C. App. 275, 237 S.E.2d 859 (1977), the court of appeals purported to affirm the
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H. Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict
In two cases decided this past year the North Carolina Supreme Court
had occasion to call attention to certain time and energy wasting pitfalls
lurking within the complicated rule 50 procedure.16° Each case involved a
missed opportunity to avoid a second trial through appropriate use of the
motion for judgment n.o.v. The opportunities arose, however, at different
stages of the proceedings.
In Manganello v. Permastone, Inc. ,161 a suit involving an alleged
breach by the owner and operator of a recreational lake of his duty to protect
his invitees from injury caused by the negligent or intentional acts of others,
the trial judge granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close
of plaintiff's evidence. 162 Although the court of appeals affirmed, 163 the
supreme court reversed, ruling that plaintiff had raised an issue for the jury
as to whether defendant's negligence had proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries. 164
On appeal, before considering the central issue of the legal sufficiency
of plaintiff's evidence, Justice Copeland pointed out that when the question
on a motion for directed verdict is a close one, the better practice is for the
trial judge to refrain from allowing the motion and to permit the case to go to
the jury.165 Then, if the jury returns a verdict in favor of the movant, 166 the
nonmoving party might not appeal and an end would be had to the litigation.
By contrast, when the judge grants the motion prior to verdict instead of
awaiting the jury's decision, the nonmovant will often appeal the determina-
tion that his evidence was not legally sufficient to go to the jury.
Time is also potentially saved by deferring the ruling on the motion
when the verdict goes against the movant. In such a case, if the judge
determination of the trial court that no material issue of fact existed in respect of defendant-
movant's "knowledge" of an alleged scheme to defraud. Although the case therefore seemingly
endorsed employment of summary judgment in state of mind cases, in substance it appears that
plaintiff simply failed to raise an issue as to the existence of the scheme to defraud. Id. at 279,
237 S.E.2d at 862.
160. N.C.R. Civ. P. 50.
161. 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977).
162. Id. at 669, 231 S.E.2d at 680.
163. 30 N.C. App. 696, 228 S.E.2d 627 (1976), rev'd, 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E.2d 678 (1977).
164. 291 N.C. at 673, 231 S.E.2d at 682.
165. Id. at 669-70, 231 S.E.2d at 680; cf. Neasham v. Day, 34 N.C. App. 53, 237 S.E.2d 287
(1977) (noting that a similar restraint is desirable with respect to motions for involuntary
dismissal under N.C.R. Civ. P. 41(b)). In the involuntary dismissal situation, of course, when
the judge acts as the finder of fact the additional consideration cautioning restraint would seem
to be that the fact finding function is best performed when all the evidence can be considered.
See Steffen, The Prima Facie Case in Non-Jury Trials, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 94 (1959).
166. The jury should so find if the judge's tentative assessment of the legal insufficiency of
nonmovant's evidence is well founded.
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remains convinced that the directed verdict should have been granted, he
may set aside the verdict and enter judgment n.o.v.167 If on appeal the
appellate court concludes that the motion for judgment n.o.v. was improvi-
dently granted, then it may simply reverse and reinstate the verdict handed
down by the jury in the nonmovant's favor. If the case is not permitted to go
to the jury, however, it is clear that, should the appellate court conclude that
the allowance of the motion for directed verdict was in error, its only option
is to reverse and order a retrial.
While failing to defer the ruling on the motion for directed verdict can
result in an unnecessary second trial in such circumstances, failure to rule on
the challenge to the evidence after verdict and before reaching the appellate
stage can similarly result in a pointless second trial. This twist in rule 50,
embodied in subsection (b)(2), was well illustrated and explained in the
supreme court's opinion in Britt v. Allen. 16s Britt was an action involving
an alleged breach of a contract to sell land. At trial, defendant made motions
for directed verdict both at the close of plaintiff's case and at the close of all
the evidence. Both motions were denied. 169 After the jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff, defendant did not move that judgment be entered in accordance
with his motion for directed verdict. 170 Rather, defendant moved to set aside
the verdict as contrary to the evidence and for unspecified errors of law. The
trial judge granted this motion for a new trial on the grounds requested.' 71
167. Technically, the judge enters judgment in accordance with the motion for directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence. See N.C.R. Ctv. P. 50(b)(1).
168. 291 N.C. 630, 231 S.E.2d 607 (1977).
169. Id. at 632-33, 231 S.E.2d at 610.
170. rd. at 633, 231 S.E.2d at 611.
171. Id. at 633-34, 231 S.E.2d at 611. Plaintiff-appellant argued that the court erred in
ordering the new trial in that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and that no
errors of law were committed. Id. at 634, 231 S.E.2d at 611. Chief Justice Sharp rejected this
contention as without merit on the ground that the decision to grant a new trial, being within the
judge's discretionary authority, is reviewable only on a showing of abuse, which the appellant
had not made. Id. at 634-35, 231 S.E.2d at 611. The Chief Justice maintained that the fact that
the judge, in addition to basing his ruling on a determination that the verdict was "contrary to
the evidence," also acknowledged committing unspecified errors of law, "detracted not one
whit from the effect of his discretionary authority." Id. at 635, 231 S.E.2d at 612.
Of course, when the trial judge orders a new trial as a matter of law, specifying his grounds
therefor (and not solely as a matter of discretion), his order is reviewable on appeal as is any
conclusion of law. 2 A. MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 1594 (2d ed. 1956). The proposition is
unassailable, however, that when the judge invokes his discretionary authority to order a new
trial, an additional legal basis, although erroneous, would not permit setting aside the order
because of legal error. It is also established in North Carolina, however, that the judge cannot
protect his order from legal review simply by reciting that he is acting "in his discretion" when
it is clear that in fact he is basing his order on legal grounds. Selph v. Selph, 267 N.C. 635, 148
S.E.2d 574 (1966). Nevertheless, in light of the broad discretionary authority in North Carolina
to set aside verdicts because "contrary to justice," e.g., Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N.C. 488, 489,
42 S.E. 936, 936-37 (1902), it would seem that a mere recital of a discretionary ground would
ordinarily be sufficient, and only when it clearly appears on the record that the judge relied
solely on a legal basis would the order be subject to scrutiny for legal error.
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On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the order for a new trial but
remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendant.
172
The supreme court first noted that, since new trial awards are review-
able only for abuse of discretion, the court of appeals erred in reversing on
grounds of legal error the trial judge's order of a new trial. 173 While the
court was certainly correct in so ruling, the real fault in the proceedings that
rendered defendant's verdict invalid was a failure to comply with rule
50(b)(2).174 The court of appeals was not purporting to overrule the grant of
the new trial for legal error, but instead was seeking to correct what it
thought was an erroneous denial of defendant's motion for directed ver-
dict. 175 This, however, it could not do for the reason that rule 50(b)(2)
imposes a waiver of the opportunity to be awarded judgment in accordance
with the motion for directed verdict unless a motion for judgment n.o.v. is
made after verdict. 176 Thus, had the defendant coupled his motion for a new
trial with one for judgment n.o.v. and had the court granted the former and
denied the latter, the court of appeals would have been within its power to
grant judgment in accordance with defendant's motion for directed ver-
dict. 177 As the defendant moved only for a new trial, however, the court of
appeals was barred from entering judgment for defendant and was bound
either to permit the new trial to proceed or to reinstate the verdict for
plaintiff. This case makes clear that in order to take advantage of the
benefits that rule 50 confers, its directives must be scrupulously followed.
I. Enforcement of Judgment
North Carolina's body execution statute, G.S. 1-311,178 a provision
that permits the arrest and imprisonment of some civil judgment debtors as a
means of coercing payment of the judgment, 179 was revised in 1977 to
incorporate new procedures mandated by a federal three-judge panel earlier
172. 27 N.C. App. 122, 218 S.E.2d 218 (1975), rev'd, 291 N.C. 630, 231 S.E.2d 607 (1977).
173. 291 N.C. at 635, 231 S.E.2d at 611.
174. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(b)(2), which provides:
An appellate court, on finding that a trial judge should have granted a motion for
directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence, may not direct entry of judgment
in accordance with the motion unless the party who made the motion for a directed
verdict also moved for judgment in accordance with Rule 50(b)(1) or the trial judge on
his own motion granted, denied or redenied the motion for a directed verdict in
accordance with Rule 50(b)(1).
175. See Britt v. Allen, 27 N.C. App. 122, 126, 218 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1975).
176. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(b)(2), quoted in note 174 supra.
177. See Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967) (interpreting F.R. Civ.
P. 50, the federal counterpart of N.C.R. Civ. P. 50).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-311 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
179. The body execution procedure escapes the constitutional proscription of imprison-
ment for debt contained in N.C. CONsr. art. I, § 28 due to the explicit exception therefrom of
cases of fraud.
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in that year. In the federal suit, Grimes v. Miller,'80 plaintiff charged that
his arrest and imprisonment pursuant to G.S. 1-311 deprived him of his due
process and equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment, in
addition to subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the eighth amendment to the federal constitution.181 Although the court
formally rejected plaintiff's challenge on all grounds, it nevertheless im-
posed a radical new construction on the statute that in its view was com-
pelled by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 18 2 The newly
articulated procedures, later incorporated into the statute, 183 significantly
limit the circumstances in which civil arrest may be ordered and place novel
controls on the detention, release and legal representation of incarcerated
debtors.
184
Under the former statutory scheme,1 85 a civil judgment debtor could be
arrested if an execution against his property had been returned unsatisfied
and if it was found as a fact by the judge or jury that he had committed one
or more offenses against his creditor that involved, in general, malice, fraud
or moral turpitude. 186 The incarceration that followed continued until the
judgment debtor paid the debt or was released according to law. 87 Release
could be secured under the "Discharge of Insolvent Debtors" provisions 188
by taking an oath of insolvency 89 and by giving twenty days notice to
creditors of the hearing on the debtor's bona fide insolvency. 190 It is plain
that this former scheme, while authorizing arrest in circumstances that
perhaps-had some relation to the trustworthiness of the defendant, was a
heavy-handed measure that worked imprisonment of debtors without regard
to their ability to satisfy a judgment' 9 ' and irrespective of any demonstrated
intent to avoid payment of the judgment.
180. 429 F. Supp. 1350 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd mem., 98 S. Ct. 600 (1977).
181. Id. at 1355.
182. Id. at 1356.
183. The following statutes incorporate the changes wrought by the Grimes decision: N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-311, -313, -413, 7A-451, 23-30.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
184. 429 F. Supp. at 1356-59.
185. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 260 (1868) (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
'STAT. § 1-311 (1969)) (amended 1977).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-410 (1969). This statutory scheme reflects the origins of body
execution in the common law writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, see Ford, Imprisonment for
Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 27-28 (1926), which, beginning about the thirteenth century, was
available in any action in which the writ of capias ad respondendum, the progenitor of modern
prejudgment arrest statutes, was or might have been issued. V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 75 (1964).
187. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 261 (1868) (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-313(3) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1976)) (amended 1977).
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 23-23 to -38 (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
189. Id. § 23-23 (1965).
190. Id. § 23-32.
191. Imprisonment of a debtor for a debt that he is unable to pay may violate several
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The three-judge panel, speaking through the late Judge Craven, 192
obviously sought to remedy these shortcomings by requiring that before
arrest could be ordered it must be found that the debtor "(a) is about to flee
the jurisdiction to prevent paying his creditors, (b) has concealed or diverted
assets in fraud of his creditors, or (c) will do so unless immediately
detained." 193 In addition, the court mandated that an arrested defendant be
given the opportunity to secure his provisional release within three days
after arrest, subject to being returned to jail later if his creditors offer proof
of fraud within twenty days. 194 Moreover, an indigent defendant is to be
given notice of his statutory right to appointed counsel either at trial, or, in
the case of judgment by default, when arrested. 195 These new procedural
features were incorporated by the General Assembly into the statutes almost
precisely as set forth in the opinion. 196
Although summarily affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court 197 the
Grimes holding arguably falls short of constitutional requirements. In the
first place, it is not clear that a determination of debtors' solvency, seem-
ingly a condition precedent to constitutionally valid coercive imprison-
ment, 198 is in all cases required prior to arrest. 199 Second, even though the
provisions of the federal constitution. It is suggested in Grimes that imprisonment solely on the
basis of the debtor's commission of a particular offense is a violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment without the full "protections that surround one accused of
crime." 429 F. Supp. at 1356. Moreover, one federal court has concluded that imprisonment
without regard to ability to pay violates federal equal protection principles enunciated in Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971), and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Abbit v. Bernier, 387
F. Supp. 57 (D. Conn. 1974). It has also been suggested that civil arrest constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Note, Imprisonment for Debt and the Constitution, 1970 LAW & Soc.
ORD. 659, 666-67.
192. J. Braxton Craven, Jr., judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit until
his death on May 3, 1977. Volume 56, No. 2 of North Carolina Law Review is dedicated in
honor of Judge Craven.
193. 429 F. Supp. at 1356.
194. See id. at 1357-58.
195. Id. at 1358-59.
196. See statutes cited note 183 supra.
197. The Court has taken different positions on the dispute about the precedential value to
be accorded summary affirmances in the "appeal" process. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S.
173 (1977) (per curiam) (summary affirmances prevent lower court from reaching contrary
conclusions on precise issues presented in jurisdictional statement). But see Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (summary affirmances do not have same precedential value as
full opinions). Even if the rule according summary affirmances greatest weight is the prevailing
one, only the issues of entitlement to a hearing on solvency and appointed counsel might be
considered foreclosed by the Court's disposition.
198. See note 191 supra.
199. Although a finding that the debtor has concealed or diverted assets in fraud of his
creditors, or will do so unless immediately detained, arguably encompasses a finding that the
debtor possesses assets to apply against the judgment, a mere finding that the debtor is about to
flee the jurisdiction to avoid paying his creditors does not necessarily reach the issue of the
debtor's solvency. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-311 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In that North Carolina
makes the issue of the debtor's solvency ultimately determinative in the decision to imprison
the debtor, see id. § 23-34, -36, -37 (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1977), exclusion of that issue from
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existence of grounds justifying arrest may be established at trial, the ques-
tion remains whether the hearing has been afforded at a meaningful time
2°°
since arrest can occur a significant period of time after trial. 20 1 Lastly, the
provisions for affording legal counsel to indigents, in failing to guarantee
representation at trial when the crucial facts are determined that provide the
justification for arrest, might deprive defendants of their sixth amendment
right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings. 202
Repeal of the body execution provisions could be justified on the single
ground that the procedure seems unduly harsh and repressive in today's
world. Indeed, the probable reason for the careful preservation of body
execution is that it is an effective means of squeezing financial aid out of
friends and relatives of imperiled debtors. Of greater significance, however,
is that it is unlikely the procedure is needed to serve legitimate purposes
since the interests of creditors appear to be sufficiently protected by North
Carolina's strengthened supplemental proceedings 20 3 and by the old cred-
itor's bill. 2°4 These observations, seen in light of the constitutional problems
consideration in the hearing prior to arrest could violate federal procedural due process
principles expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See also Yoder v. County of Cumberland,
278 A.2d 379 (Me. 1971).
200. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (opportunity to be heard must be
afforded at meaningful time).
201. In Grimes, for instance, arrest was not effected until more than six months after trial.
See 429 F. Supp. at 1353. The better procedure would perhaps be to hold a pre-arrest hearing in
the nature of the show-cause hearing required before contempt may issue. At such a hearing the
debtor would have the opportunity to show a change in circumstances since trial that rendered
arrest no longer justified or to make some other explanation for not paying the judgment,
perhaps for the first time if judgment had been by default. In addition to accommodating more
appropriately the debtor's interest in not being erroneously deprived of his liberty, this proce-
dure has an historical and theoretical justification. While the judgment for a certain sum of
money is merely an in rem decree, the imprisoned debtor is being coercively imprisoned for his
failure to perform the act of payment. Consequently, it would seem that an in personam decree
ordering the defendant to pay should be required before the court may arrest and imprison the
debtor for failure to make payment.
202. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
Although the court in Grimes declined to answer the question whether a constitutional right
to counsel attaches in these proceedings, 429 F. Supp. at 1358, a number of courts have so held.
See, e.g., Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alas. 1974) (civil contempt for nonsupport); In re
Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968) (prejudgment civil arrest). See also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (support for proposition that it is possibility of loss of
liberty, and not label attached to proceeding, that is crucial factor in determining when right to
counsel attaches).
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352 to -368 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977). The provisions in this
article permit the judgment creditor to compel his debtor to appear and answer concerning the
debtor's property. Disobedience of a court order pursuant to this article subjects the debtor to
punishment as for contempt. Id. § 1-368 (1969).
204. The creditor's bill, or suit, is a traditionally equitable remedy available to the judgment
creditor as a means of reaching property of the debtor not subject to execution at law. See
generally, Note, Execution-Supplemental Proceedings or Creditor's Bill in North Carolina, 35
N.C. L. REv. 414 (1957).
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provoked by body execution, suggest that retention of the procedure can no
longer be justified.
J. Appeal and Error205
1. Interlocutory Appeals
In Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc. ,206 decided by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in 1976, it was held that the limitation to
final judgments of appealable orders under rule 54(b)207 does not restrict the
ability to appeal interlocutory orders under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-
27(d). 20 8 The ramifications of the concurrent operation of these somewhat
205. In several cases before the court of appeals this past year the court exhibited its
intention to insist upon rigid observance of the time schedule set out in the North Carolina
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellants in Byrd v. Alexander, 32 N.C. App. 782, 233 S.E.2d
654 (1977), and White v. Lawrence, 33 N.C. App. 631, 236 S.E.2d 30 (1977), failed to file the
record on appeal with the clerk of the court of appeals within 10 days after certification of the
record on appeal as required by N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(a). In neither case does it appear that
appellants were so dilatory as to exceed the maximum period of 150 days following the taking of
appeal within which rule 12(a) permits the record to be filed in the appellate court. Neverthe-
less, the court dismissed the appeals, and in doing so restated its observations made in prior
cases to the effect that the rules are mandatory but contain liberal provisions for extension of
time when counsel can show good cause. 33 N.C. App. at 632, 236 S.E.2d at 31; 32 N.C. App. at
783, 233 S.E.2d at 655 (both citing In re Allen, 31 N.C. App. 597, 230 S.E.2d 423 (1976);
Ledwell v. County of Randolph, 31 N.C. App. 522, 229 S.E.2d 836 (1976)). In the same spirit
the court dismissed appellant's appeal in Indian Trace Co. v. Sanders, 33 N.C. App. 386, 235
S.E.2d 91, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 253, 237 S.E.2d 535 (1977), in which the record on appeal was
filed with the clerk 156 days after he took appeal-more than the 150 days allowed for that
purpose by rule 12(a). See id. at 387-88, 235 S.E.2d at 92.
In Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 234 S.E.2d 748 (1977), the supreme court
affirmed the general rule that an appeal removes a case from the jurisdiction of the trial court,
subject to the exceptions that jurisdiction is retained to settle the case on appeal and during the
session of court, and subject to the qualification that the trial judge may adjudge the appeal to
have been adandoned. Id. at 635-36, 234 S.E.2d at 749. The court held, placing principal
reliance on Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971), that the mere filing of a
motion directed at an order or judgment from which an appeal has been taken, and the
appearance at a hearing on the same, does not constitute an abandonment of the appeal. In so
holding, the court attempted to distinguish Sink v. Easter, 288 N.C. 183, 217 S.E.2d 532 (1975).
See Note, Civil Procedure-Bowen v. Hodge Motor Co.: Abandonment of Appeal in North
Carolina, 56 N.C.L. REV. 573 (1978).
206. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
207. N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may enter a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only if there is no just reason for delay and it is so determined in the
judgment. Such judgment shall then be subject to review by appeal or as otherwise
provided by these rules or other statutes. In the absence of entry of such a final
judgment, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and shall not then be subject
to review either by appeal or otherwise except as expressly provided by these rules or
other statutes. Similarly, in the absence of entry of such a final judgment, any order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277, 7A-27(d) (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977) permit an appeal to be
taken from a judicial order or determination that "affects a substantial right."
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incongruous appeal provisions remains to be worked out in North Caroli-
na. 2°9 It is clear, though, that holding the interlocutory appeal provisions
fully effective in rule 54(b) situations has the potential for disrupting the
orderly scheme of trial court discretionary control over piecemeal appeals
envisioned by rule 54(b).2t0 This fact is illustrated by the 1977 case of
Wachovia Realty Investments v. Housing, Inc. ,211 in which the supreme
court invoked the interlocutory appeals statutes to entertain an appeal from a
judgment that the trial judge failed to designate final under rule 54(b).
The action in Wachovia Realty was for a deficiency due after foreclo-
sure on a deed of trust securing a note made by defendant to plaintiff.
212
Defendants alleged certain facts entitling them to a set-off of approximately
the same amount plaintiff claimed remained due. 213 The trial judge granted
summary judgment to plaintiff and adjudged plaintiff entitled to recover the
full amount due as alleged in the complaint; however, the court retained the
case for the purpose of determining in what amount defendant was entitled
to set off plaintiff's judgment. 214 Nevertheless, execution issued on the
judgment.
215
The court of appeals dismissed defendant's appeal because the judg-
ment was not certified for appeal by the trial judge in accordance with rule
54(b).216 The supreme court took a different view, holding that even though
the judgment was not final under rule 54(b), it clearly affected a substantial
right of defendant and therefore was appealable under G.S. 1-277.2 17 Spe-
cifically, the court held that a substantial right of defendant was affected due
to the "substantial expense" defendant would be forced to incur in seeking
a stay of execution 2 SM-the minimum response to the judgment rendered
against it.
209. While N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b) is substantially similar to and adapted from FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b), see Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. at 122-23, 225 S.E.2d at 800-01,
there is no comparable provision in federal practice authorizing the appeal of interlocutory
orders simply on the basis that a substantial right is affected.
210. Because of the potential scope and complexity of actions under the liberal joinder
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 54(b) was adopted, according to a federal
commentator, "to avoid the possible injustice of a delay in entering judgment on a distinctly
separate claim or as to fewer than all of the parties until the final adjudication of the entire case
by making an immediate appeal available." 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2654,
at 32 (1973).
211. 292 N.C. 93, 232 S.E.2d 667 (1977).
212. Id. at 95-96, 232 S.E.2d at 669-70.
213. Id. at 96, 232 S.E.2d at 670.
214. Id. at 97, 232 S.E.2d at 670.
215. Id. at 97-98, 232 S.E.2d at 670-71.
216. 28 N.C. App. 385, 221 S.E.2d 381 (1976).
217. 292 N.C. at 98-99, 232 S.E.2d at 671-72. The court first held that summary judgment
on the issue of damages was erroneous because defendant's right to set-off was disputed.
Summary judgment could have been appropriate at most only on the issue of liability.
218. Id. at 99-100, 232 S.E.2d at 671-72.
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The court's holding permitting the appeal should be read in light of the
fact that, as a rule, a final judgment is a prerequisite for the issuance of an
execution. 219 Therefore, in proper practice under rule 54(b), any judgment
on which execution has issued is also appealable because the judge has
necessarily entered a final judgment upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay. 220 The court in Wachovia Investments may
have been of the view that this fact justified, if not compelled, hearing the
appeal on the merits.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the better practice in such circum-
stances would be to dismiss the appeal with a directive to the trial court to
make a new determination on certification in light of the necessity for
certification if execution is to issue.221 This approach is in line with what
generally would be a desirable policy of restraint when presented with
appeals asserting that uncertified orders affect substantial rights. Failure to
certify presumably represents a determination that awaiting a later stage of
the litigation before permitting appeal would better serve the ends of justice
and judicial economy. Consequently, entertaining the appeal in the absence
of certification can operate to frustrate the trial judge's attempt to serve these
ends by imposing controls on appeals from orders and decisions that do not
dispose of the entire suit.
222
The applicability of this policy to the Wachovia Investments situation
is complicated by the fact that the judge's erroneous authorization of
execution on an uncertified order was ambiguous with regard to the desira-
bility of certification. 223 Neyertheless, rather than hearing the appeal solely
because the execution affects a substantial right, the better course in such
circumstances would generally be to dismiss the appeal, direct vacation of
the execution and force the trial judge to make an independent determination
on certification. 224 The desirability of present execution would then be only
219. 6 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 93, pt. 1, 54.42, at 816 (1976). In North
Carolina only a final judgment can constitute a lien on property. McCaskill v. Graham, 121
N.C. 190, 28 S.E. 264 (1897); see 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2661, at 90
(1973).
220. See N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b).
221. Ideally, the adversely affected party will have made a motion in the trial court to set
aside the execution, the denial of which may then be reviewed on appeal. When no such motion
has been made and denied, presumably the appellate court may, in the exercise of its supervis-
ory powers, see generally I A. MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 75 (Supp. 1970), direct vacation of
the execution.
222. For instance, if a later appeal might bring some of the same issues before the appellate
court, or later developments in the trial court could moot the appeal, rule 54(b) certification
should perhaps be withheld. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2659, at 78-79
(1973).
223. On the one hand, the judge withheld certification; on the other, he issued execution,
apparently an implicit determination that there is no just reason for delay.
224. See N.C.R. Clv. P. 54(b), quoted in note 207 supra.
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one of the factors to weigh in making the decision whether to certify. 225 The
existence of a factually related, unadjudicated counterclaim, as in Wachovia
Investments,226 should then weigh heavily against certification because the
claimant's right to recover on the basis of the particular transaction is still in
dispute.
227
If a judge declines to designate an order final either because in his
judgment it is not final or because of the inappropriateness of the collateral
effects of finality,228 his decision should be accorded considerable respect.
Accordingly, appeals under G.S. 1-277 and G.S. 7A-27(d) in cases to
which rule 54(b) applies should only be permitted in circumstances of
clearest need.
A case involving a question of first impression229 in the area of
interlocutory appeals is Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v. Strick
Corp. 230 In that case the supreme court heard an appeal from the denial by a
superior court judge of defendant's request for discovery. At issue was
defendant's right to take a deposition after discovery had been ordered
terminated by the court. The deposition sought was that of an expert who
had conducted experiments at plaintiff's request relevant to the subject
matter of the lawsuit. Because plaintiff had not offered the expert's tes-
timony into evidence at trial, defendant suspected that the evidence might
well be damaging to plaintiff's case. The expert, however, was beyond the
subpoena power of the court and consequently denial of discovery effective-
ly precluded defendant from admitting the expert's testimony into evi-
dence. 2
31
Overruling its earlier disposition denying appeal, 232 the court held that
the appeal was permissible because the issuance of the protective order
affected a substantial right of plaintiff. 233 As the court noted, it would be
impractical to send the case back for trial only to have it appealed again on
225. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1975); 6
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 87, pt. 1, 1 54.41[3], at 746-47 (1976); note 222 and
accompanying text supra.
226. Although defendant labeled its averments establishing the right to set-off a "defense,"
the trial court obviously treated that part of defendant's answer as a counterclaim.
227. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 1975);
10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2659, at 82 (1973); Note, Civil Procedure- Trial
Court Discretion in Rule 54(b) Certification: Extension of the Panichella Requirement of an
Infrequent, Harsh Case, 54 N.C.L. REv. 1265 (1976).
228. See note 222 supra.
229. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 289 N.C. 587, 590, 223 S.E.2d
346, 349 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977).
230. 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977).
231. Id. at 619-25, 231 S.E.2d 598-601.
232. Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 289 N.C. 587, 223 S.E.2d 346
(1976), rev'd on rehearing, 291 N.C. 618, 231 S.E.2d 597 (1977).
233. 291 N.C. at 625, 231 S.E.2d at 601-02.
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the precise ground then before the court.234 Plainly, permitting the appeal
might well obviate the additional trial that could result if it was later
determined that the request was improperly denied. Because in this case the
denial of the request for discovery effectively precluded defendants from
presenting the expert's evidence such a retrial was a good possibility.
The court's holding in Strick represents a reasoned approach to the
question of when an interlocutory order should be appealable. When an
order is made that is destined to affect significantly the later conduct of the
trial and that could form the basis for awarding the adversely affected party a
new trial, the more economical course to take might well be immediate
resolution of the question in the appellate courts.
235
2. Partial New Trials
The rule governing the grant of partial new trials in North Carolina,
whether by appellate or trial courts, 236 is that it is permitted when the
" 'issue to be tried is distinct and separable from the other issues, and that
the new trial can be had without danger of complications with other mat-
ters.' "237 While various portions of a suit might be retried alone, probably
the most common partial new trials are those limited to the issue of
damages. 238 Frequently, however, it will be improper to order such a new
trial, even though the error directly relates only to the issue of damages,
because the question of damages will be closely interwoven with that of
liability. 239
234. Id.
235. See Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1949) (appeals from
orders denying motions to strike allegations from pleadings proper on grounds that permitting
pleadings containing "irrelevant or impertinent" elements to be read to jury "might impair or
imperil the rights of the adversary party"). But cf. Knight v. Duke Power Co., 34 N.C. App.
218, 237 S.E.2d 574 (1977) (pretrail order ruling certain evidence inadmissable at trial did not
affect substantial right because order was subject to later modification in trial judge's discre-
tion).
236. While the quoted rule, see text accompanying note 237 infra, suggesting the test is the
same regardless of whether the issue of the propriety of a grant of a partial new trial is before
the trial or appellate courts, was stated before the adoption of N.C.R. Civ. P. 59, the former
practice of making no distinction dependent on which court is considering the question should
be expected to continue. See 2 A. MCINTosH, supra note 39, § 1597(3) (Supp. 1970). Compare
Table Rock Lumber Co. v. Branch, 158 N.C. 251,73 S.E. 164 (1911), with Jarrett v. High Point
Trunk & Bag Co., 144 N.C. 299, 56 S.E. 937 (1907).
237. Robertson v. Stanley, 285 N.C. 561, 568-69, 206 S.E.2d 190, 195 (1974) (quoting 58
Am. JUR. 2d New Trial § 25, at 210 (1971)).
238. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2814, at 93 (1973); e.g., Paris v.
Carolina Portable Aggregates, Inc., 271 N.C. 471, 157 S.E.2d 131 (1967); Jenkins v. Harvey C.
Hines Co., 264 N.C. 83, 141 S.E.2d 1 (1965).
239. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931). In a tort case, for
instance, retrial on damages alone may be inappropriate if there is reason to think the verdict
was a compromise between jurors with different views on liability. I I C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 115, § 2814, at 10 (Supp. 1977).
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In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Godwin Building Supply Co. ,240 the North
Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a partial new trial on damages alone was
inappropriate in a contract action in which claimant asserted several differ-
ent breaches of duty and it was not ascertainable from the jury's verdict
which breach or breaches were found by it to have occurred. 241 As breaches
of different promises in the contract could have given rise to varying
amounts of damage, the question of breach was necessarily resubmitted
along with the question of damages lest "confusion and uncertainty and
. .injustice" result to one or both parties. 242 As the court suggested,
effective use of the pretrial conference in framing the issues more precisely
with respect to the breaches alleged might have saved the parties a full
second trial. 243 Of course, even had the precise breach or breaches been
specified in the jury's verdict, it may nevertheless have been necessary to
resubmit the issue of breach along with that of damages if the extent of
breach would still require determination.
244
K. Superior Court Judges
1. Proceedings Outside the County in Which the Action is Filed
The rules governing the temporal and territorial limitations on the
powers of the superior courts and their judges in North Carolina are much in
need of clarification. This is particularly so in respect of the effects the 1962
constitutional abolition of formal court "terms" 245 and the advent of the
new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure246 have had in liberalizing
some of the historical restrictions. 247 These relatively recent developments
240. 292 N.C. 557, 234 S.E.2d 605 (1977).
241. Id. at 558, 234 S.E.2d at 606.
242. Id. at 564-66, 234 S.E.2d at 609-10.
243. Id. at 566, 234 S.E.2d at 610.
244. See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423,438-39, 196
S.E.2d 711, 721 (1973) ("Of necessity, a new trial on the issue of damages also requires a new
trial on the issue as to breach of warranty because the jury that assesses damages should be the
same jury that determines whether, and to what extent, the fitness warranty was breached.").
245. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9(2).
246. N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(c) provides:
The period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is
not affected or limited by the continued existence or expiration of a session of court.
The continued existence or expiration of a session of court in no way affects the power
of a court to do any act or take any proceeding, but no issue of fact shall be submitted
to a jury out of session.
247. See A. MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 107 (Supp. 1970). The historical limitations are
described in id. §§ 124-126 (2d ed. 1956). Under N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(c) all matters and proceedings
provided for by the rules, except those requiring a jury, may now be heard and disposed of by
the court without regard to the existence or expiration of a session of court. Presumably,
therefore, all such matters now fall within the traditionally designated "in chambers" and "in
vacation" jurisdiction of the courts, see A. McIrrosH, supra § 125 (2d ed. 1956), as do those
proceedings that are still specifically authorized by statute to be so conducted, e.g., N.C. GEN.
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pertain most directly to the temporal aspects of the powers of superior court
judges. It might be expected, therefore, that the traditional territorial limita-
tions on their powers have not been altered.2"8
Thus, in House of Style Furniture Corp. v. Scronce249 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals reaffirmed the old rule that
in this State a judge of the Superior Court has no authority to hear a
cause or to make an order substantially affecting the rights of the
parties outside of the county in which the action is pending unless
authorized so to do by statute, or by consent of the parties.
250
The rule was invoked in Scronce to hold invalid a default judgment entered
against plaintiff pursuant to a hearing conducted in Iredell County in an
action filed in Alexander County. Although as resident judge of the twenty-
second judicial district, which includes both Iredell and Alexander counties,
the judge entering the judgment was a proper authority to hear the motion,251
the order and entry of default were invalid because the parties had not
consented to the hearing and no statute specifically authorized hearing the
matter out of county. 2
In Towne v. Cope," however, which came before the court of appeals
earlier last year, the court took no notice of the fact that the motion for
summary judgment, on which judgment later was entered, was, heard out-
side of the county in which the action was filed. Instead the court addressed
only the related issue of the resident judge's temporal power to hear the
motion out of session. 254 If Scronce is correct, however, in asserting the
STAT. § 1-440.5 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (power to order attachment). The judge who is assigned in
regular succession to hold the courts of the district is empowered to hear all "in chambers"
matters arising in the district, Shepard v. Leonard, 223 N.C. 110, 113, 25 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1943),
and the resident judge of the district and any special judge residing in the district share this
power with the regular judge by virtue of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-47.1 (1969). Emergency judges
also share this power during the period of their assignment. See id. § 7A-48.
248. See McNeil v. Hodges, 99 N.C. 248, 6 S.E. 127 (1888) (rejecting contention that
statutorily conferred power to conduct proceeding for settlement of guardianship out of "term"
empowered judge to act out of county).
249. 33 N.C. App. 365, 235 S.E.2d 258 (1977).
250. Id. at 368, 235 S.E.2d at 260 (quoting Patterson v. Patterson, 230 N.C. 481, 484, 53
S.E.2d 658, 661 (1949)); accord, A. MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 126, at 72-73 (2d ed. 1956). The
rule and its convenience rationale were stated as early as 1888 in McNeil v. Hodges, 99 N.C.
248, 6 S.E. 127 (1888). It is apparently a judge-made rule. See A Survey of the Decisions of the
North Carolina Supreme Court for the Spring and Fall Terms of 1953,32 N.C. L. REv. 379,414
n.1 (1954).
251. See note 254 infra.
252. 33 N.C. App. at 369, 235 S.E.2d at 261.
253. 32 N.C. App. 660, 233 S.E.2d 624 (1977).
254. Id. at 665-66, 233 S.E.2d at 628. The court resolved this issue by citing N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-47.1 (1969), which confers on the resident judge of the district concurrent "juris-
diction" with the judge regularly assigned in all matters not requiring a jury or in which a jury
has been waived. For this reason, and in light of N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(c), see note 247 supra, the
authority of either the regular or resident judge to hear a motion for summary judgment "in
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continued vitality of territorial limitations on superior court judges' power,
either statutory authorization or the consent of the parties should have been
required before the judge could validly hear the motion out of county.
Although there clearly was no express statutory authorization for the
action, the court in Towne may have implicitly found that under North
Carolina precedent sufficient consent appeared of record to validate the
judgment. 255 Both parties appeared at the hearing and submitted memoranda
and affidavits in support of their positions and the appellant stated in his
brief on appeal that the parties had "stipulated and agreed" to hear the
matter out of the county in which the action was filed.256 It can be suggest-
ed, nonetheless, that in not treating the issue the court followed what would
be the better rule; although the rule limiting proceedings in superior court to
the county in which the action is pending apparently has not been abolished
in North Carolina, it may be doubted whether its retention can be justified.
Certainly the concern that inconvenience and hardship would result without
the rule, pointed to in McNeil v. Hodges257 as the underlying policy, is a
less compelling consideration now than it was in the early days of the rule
when travel was a much more difficult proposition and the circuits of the
judges were more wide ranging. A more logical and flexible rule would
permit a matter to be heard anywhere within the district in which the action
is filed, for that is the area in which the resident, regular and special judges
have concurrent jurisdiction in matters not requiring a jury. 258 Indeed, the
modern statutes prescribing the powers of district courts provide for the
conduct of motions and other proceedings anywhere in the district, 259
suggesting that the rule relating to superior court judges has been retained
more out of neglect than considered policy.
2. Successive Motions for Summary Judgment
It is a well-established rule in North Carolina that "ordinarily one
[Superior Court] judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of
chambers" or "in vacation" should not be in doubt. See generally W. SHUFORD, supra note
100, § 6-6, at 52.
255. Compare Menzel v. Menzel, 254 N.C. 353, 119 S.E.2d 147 (1961) (appearance and
participation at hearing on motion in the cause by guardian ad litem would constitute waiver of
any objection to hearing motion before particular judge), with Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404,
408, 75 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1953) (consent found where both parties appeared and joined issue at
hearing on motion for child custody and record on appeal contained stipulation that " 'court
was properly organized and . . . the parties were duly before the court' ").
256. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 6.
257. 99 N.C. 248, 250, 6 S.E. 127, 128 (1888).
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-47.1 (1969); see note 247 supra.
259. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-191 (1969).
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another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action." 260 The
court of appeals invoked this rule in Biddix v. Kellar Construction Corp. 261
to invalidate the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
defendant because defendant had previously moved for summary judgment
in the same action and had his motion denied by a different superior court
judge. 262 The case should not, however, be broadly construed to bar all
successive motions for summary judgment when made before different
judges; rather, it should be read to prohibit such multiple motions only when
they are based on the same grounds.
The Biddix suit involved a breach by defendant construction company
of a contract to build a house for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that they were
entitled to recover damages they suffered as the result of the late completion
date. 263 Defendant admitted the contract but raised as one defense the
execution of a release that purportedly exonerated it from all liability to
plaintiffs arising out of the contract. 264 The validity of this release was
denied by plaintiffs. 265 Each party then made a motion for summary judg-
ment, supported by affidavits and other documents; both motions were
denied by Judge Winner. 266 When the case came on for trial before Judge
Kirby, defendant "moved to dismiss";267 the judge thereupon heard oral
arguments from counsel, examined the documentary evidence2 68 and en-
tered judgment for defendant.269
Apparently because of some uncertainty as to the nature of the judg-
ment rendered by the judge, the parties submitted a stipulation to the court
of appeals stating that the judgment was based on the "plea in bar raised by
the third defense in defendants' answer" (the release).270 The court of
appeals concluded that the case had been disposed of without a trial on the
merits, although the effect of the "plea in bar" under the new rules re-
mained to be determined. 271 In reaching this conclusion, the court endorsed
260. Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972); State v.
Neas, 278 N.C. 506, 180 S.E.2d 12 (1971).
261. 32 N.C. App. 120, 230 S.E.2d 796 (1977).
262. Id. at 124-25, 230 S.E.2d at 799.
263. Id. at 121, 230 S.E.2d at 797.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 121, 230 S.E.2d at 797-98.
266. Id. at 121, 230 S.E.2d at 798.
267. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 5.
268. Id.
269. 32 N.C. App. at 122-23, 230 S.E.2d at 798-99. It seems likely that the judge thought he
was conducting a trial without a jury because he rendered judgment based on findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
270. Id. at 123, 230 S.E.2d at 799. The plea in bar was under common law pleading the
defendant's response to the plaintiff's declaration that went to the merits of the plaintiff's
claim. G. CLARK, COMMON LAW PLEADING 154 (1931).
271. 32 N.C. App. at 123, 230 S.E.2d at 799.
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the suggestion of Professor Moore that a defense or objection improperly
denominated a plea, demurrer, or some other challenge abolished by rule
7(c) 272 should be examined for its substance and accorded the treatment of
its functional equivalent under rule 12.273 Thus, as defendant sought disposi-
tion of the case on the merits of its affirmative defense raised in the answer,
the motion was on its face one for judgment on the pleadings. 274 As the
motion was supported by matters outside the pleadings, however, under rule
12(c) it was to be treated as one for summary judgment under rule 56.275
Having thus characterized the motion, the court of appeals ruled that
because a prior summary judgment motion of defendant had been denied by
Judge Winner, the allowance of the later one by Judge Kirby could not be
sustained.
276
The same result as that in Biddix should not be reached in all cases in
which multiple motions for summary judgment are made. There is federal
precedent to the effect that, at least when a subsequent motion is grounded
on different matters than those before the court on a prior motion, denial of
the earlier motion does not preclude allowing the subsequent one. 277 Prior
North Carolina decisions in analogous areas also support this result. In
Fleming v. Mann,278 the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the
denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim made pursuant to
rule 12(b)(6) did not prevent another judge from ruling on a subsequent
motion under the same provision after the complaint had been amended.
This course of action was permissible, according to the court, because the
later motion did not present "the precise question" decided on the earlier
motion.279 In addition, in Alltop v. .C. Penney Co. ,280 the court of appeals
held that a denial of a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) does not bar a
later motion for summary judgment. The simple reason for this result is that
the two motions are analytically discrete: while a motion under rule 12(b)(6)
challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the court on a rule 56
motion goes behind the pleadings to determine whether there exists a
272. N.C.R. Civ. P. 7(c) provides: "Demurrers, pleas, etc., abolished.-Demurrers, pleas,
and exceptions for insufficiency shall not be used."
273. See N.C. App. at 124, 230 S.E.2d at 799 (quoting 2A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 93, 7.06, at 1550 (1975)).
274. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 1369 for a comparison of the motion
for judgment on the pleadings to other rule 12 motions.
275. 32 N.C. App. at 124, 230 S.E.2d at 799.
276. Id.
277. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 115, § 2713, at 400 (1973); see, e.g., Middle
At. Util. Co. v. S.M.W. Dev. Corp., 392 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1968); Allstate Fin. Corp. v.
Zimmerman, 296 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1961).
278. 23 N.C. App. 418, 209 S.E.2d 366 (1974).
279. Id. at 423, 209 S.E.2d at 369.
280. 10 N.C. App. 694, 179 S.E.2d 885 (1971).
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material issue of fact necessitating trial.28 By way of analogy, it is clear that
successive motions for summary judgment in the same action can rest on
entirely different grounds. 282 In such a case, an order allowing summary
judgment on the second motion would clearly not "modify, overrule, or
change the judgment ' 28 3 of the other judge and consequently would not
offend the considerations of "orderly procedure, courtesy and comity" on
which the rule in question is based. 2 4
The inference that might be drawn from the decision in Biddix, that
successive motions for summary judgment may never be brought before
different judges, is therefore too broad. In fact, the result reached in Biddix
is consistent with the narrower reading, for the successive motions there
were indistinguishable. 28 5 It remains to be clarified, however, to what extent




JAMES DICKSON PHILLIPS III
Im. COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Uniform Commercial Code
1. Warranties for Prescription Drugs
In Batiste v. American Home Products Corp. I the court of appeals held
for the first time in North Carolina that a prescribing physician is not a
merchant under the Uniform Commercial Code and that the issuance of a
prescription is not a sale. A sale is defined by the Code as "the passing of
281. Id. at 695, 179 S.E.2d at 887.
282. An example would be distinct affirmative defenses, each of which could constitute a
complete bar to the plaintiff's action.
283. Biddix v. Kellar Constr. Corp., 32 N.C. App. at 124, 230 S.E.2d at 799.
284. Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 504, 189 S.E.2d 484, 490 (1972).
285. It appears from the record on appeal that no new matter was presented to the court on
the "motion to dismiss."
286. In Moore v. WOOW Inc., 250 N.C. 695, 110 S.E.2d 311 (1959), however, the court
affirmed an order granting a second motion to set aside a default judgment. The second motion
was based on evidence that was not available at the time the first motion was made. The opinion
can be read to condition allowing the second motion on the unavailability of the evidence at the
time of the earlier motion. It is possible that the court would adopt such an attitude towards
successive motions for summary judgment and require that the movant present all grounds then
available to him in each such motion, or later be barred.
1. 32 N.C. App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 466, 233 S.E.2d 921 (1977).
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title from the seller to the buyer for a price." 2 A merchant is "a person who
deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in
the transaction." 3 These issues were important in the context of the case
because plaintiff's claim was based upon a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability and only sellers who are merchants are subject to the
implied warranty of merchantability set out in G.S. 25-2-314. 4 Courts in
several jurisdictions, when faced with these issues, have held that the
transfer of a drug or medical device during treatment can constitute a sale of
goods under the Uniform Commercial Code.5 Other courts have taken the
position that such transfers are merely incidental to the physician's main
business of providing professional services. As the sale of services is not
covered by the Code, these courts have held that a physician is neither a
merchant nor seller for Code purposes.
6
Plaintiff in Batiste sued her doctor for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability and fitness for use after he prescribed an oral contraceptive
that allegedly caused a stroke. She also sued the retail druggist who filled
the prescription and the manufacturer. After the trial court dismissed the
warranty claims against the physician and druggist, plaintiff appealed.
7
Although the physician merely prescribed the drug sold, plaintiff ar-
gued that he was a "seller" within the meaning of the statute.8 She based
her argument on the role played by physicians in the distribution of drugs.
Because a physician's consent is required for any drug to be legally sold,
manufacturers spend large sums educating physicians as to their products.
These expenditures, plaintiff argued, are aimed at encouraging doctors to
prescribe or "sell" particular drugs. 9 Although recognizing the ingenuity of
plaintiff's arguments, the court of appeals upheld the dismissal, ruling that
the issuance of a prescription does not pass title to the drugs prescribed and
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-106(i) (1965).
3. Id. § 25-2-104(1).
4. Id. § 25-2-314(1).
5. See, e.g., Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Vt. 1970) (administra-
tion of anesthesia to hospital patient involves primarily a rendering of service, but fact that sale
of anesthesia is a minimal element does not mean a sale is not involved). A similar problem
arises as to whether the sale of blood incident to a blood transfusion is a sale under the Code.
Forty-seven states, including North Carolina, have enacted statutes providing that implied
warranties are not applicable to the sale of blood. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-220.10 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974);
Cheshire v. Southampton Hosp. Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 355, 278 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1967);
Foster v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 219 S.E.2d 916 (W,. Va. 1975).
7. 32 N.C. App. at 2-4, 231 S.E.2d at 270-72.
8. Id. at 5, 231 S.E.2d at 272.
9. Id. at 5-6, 231 S.E.2d at 272.
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that the essence of the relationship between physician and patient is the sale
of professional services, not goods.
10
As a matter of both statutory interpretation and public policy, the
court's decision is sound. As defendant physician did not transfer any goods
as part of his services, his actions clearly fall outside the scope of Article 2
of the Code. Even if he had sold the drug as part of his treatment, there
would still be support for the court's position. The Code is intended to deal
primarily with commercial transactions between professional businessmen
and between such businessmen and their customers. Its focus is upon the
goods sold. When a physician dispenses a drug or medical device to a
patient, on the other hand, the "sale of goods" is subordinate to the exercise
of his professional judgment. It is primarily for the exercise of that judgment
and not for the sale of a good that the patient is paying the physician.
Holding physicians to commercial standards also seems unwise because
their training and activities are not appropriately evaluated in the merchant
context. The better solution is an action for negligence or malpractice in
which the physician can be judged according to the standards of his own
profession.
Plaintiff also alleged that the retail druggist who filled the prescription
breached implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose. The basis of her complaint was that the drug caused a number of
side effects, including severe strokes, and was therefore unreasonably
dangerous and unfit for human use.1 1 G.S. 25-2-31412 implies a warranty of
merchantability when the seller is a merchant with respect to the goods sold,
which the druggist unquestionably was. For goods to satisfy this warranty,
they must, among other things, be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used." 13 In deciding whether the drug was merchantable, the
court of appeals was confronted with two conflicting lines of authority. In a
number of jurisdictions, courts have upheld suits against manufacturers for
injuries caused by the use of oral contraceptives. 14 While none of these
courts has yet affirmed a judgment in favor of a consumer, they have ruled
that such allegations state a cause of action. This line of authority rejects the
notion that a contraceptive is "fit for use" simply because it prevents
conception. Because retailers are liable under the warranty provisions of the
10. Id. at 6-7, 231 S.E.2d at 272-73.
11. Id. at 3, 231 S.E.2d at 271.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-314 (1965).
13. Id. § 25-2-314(c).
14. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 II. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974). For the difficulties
encountered in bringing such suits, see Frey, The Pill and the Code, 15 J. FAM. L. 1 (1976).
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Code to the same extent as manufacturers, the rationale of these cases might
have been applied here.
Other courts have held for the manufacturer on a number of grounds,
including merchantability. 15 Even with dangerous side effects, a drug may
be held merchantable under the theory that a product conforming to the
quality of similar goods in the market meets standards of merchantability. 16
Under this theory a product that meets the manufacturer's specifications and
that does not differ significantly from other goods in the market will be held
merchantable. In upholding the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals applied this traditional rule to oral contracep-
tives. There being no allegation that the drugs contained any "poisonous"
substance or that defendant druggist failed to comply with the instructions in
the prescription, the goods were deemed merchantable. 17
2. Statute of Frauds
In Turner v. Atlantic Mortgage & Investment Co. ,18 the North Caroli-
na Court of Appeals was confronted with a defense based on the Code
version of the Statute of Frauds. 19 Plaintiff, who had been hired by defend-
ant as an investment banker, entered into an oral contract entitling him to
certain commissions and giving him an option to use the commissions to
purchase stock in the company. 20 After he was dismissed by defendant, he
brought suit to collect the commissions or, in the alternative, the stock. At
the end of the trial, he elected to take the commissions. Defendant argued on
appeal that the contract was barred by the Statute of Frauds, G.S. 25-8-
319,21 because it was a contract for the sale of securities. 22
The agreement between the parties would seem at first glance to
present a classic example of a so-called mixed transaction.23 When a
performance by one party lies partially within the Code and partially with-
out, the courts must decide whether Code rules apply. Under Article 8 a
sale of securities is governed by Code regulations, including the Statute of
15. See, e.g., Nichols v. Eli Lilly & Co., 501 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1973); Allen v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
16. J. WHITE & R. SUMM4ERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-7, at 293 (1972).
17. 32 N.C. App. at 12, 231 S.E.2d at 276.
18. 32 N.C. App. 565, 233 S.E.2d 80, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 735,235 S.E.2d 788 (1977).
19. Statute of Frauds provisions appear in the Code at both N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-201
(1965) (sale of goods) and id. § 25-8-319 (sale of securities).
20. 32 N.C. App. at 567, 233 S.E.2d at 81.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-319 (1965).
22. 32 N.C. App. at 567, 233 S.E.2d at 81.
23. See, e.g., Spiering v. Fairmont Foods Co., 424 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1970) (sale of service
contract held sale of product distributed under the contract); Dehann v. Innes, 356 A.2d 711
(Me. 1976) (Code applicable when contract involves both sale of goods and realty).
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Frauds.24 A party who contracts for the sale of his services, however, is not
governed by the Code.
The court of appeals avoided both the mixed transaction problem and
the Statute of Frauds defense, however, by finding the contract between the
parties to be divisible. 25 That is, the court found two contracts: one for the
sale of plaintiff's services and the other giving him an option to purchase
stock. The court found that plaintiff was to receive the commissions in
consideration for remaining with the company. These commissions were to
be used in turn as consideration for the purchase of stock. As plaintiff was
suing only to recover the commissions and not to enforce the stock purchase
agreement, the court reasoned, his claim was distinguishable from those in
which a single consideration is used to support multiple promises, 26 and thus
fell outside the Code.
3. Secured Transactions
Under G.S. 25-9-504 a secured party may dispose of collateral in any
"commercially reasonable" manner.27 The disposition may be by public or
private sale. 28 If the sale is made publicly in accordance with statutory
procedures, a conclusive presumption of commercial reasonableness arises
under an apparently unique North Carolina addition to the Code.29 If the sale
is made privately, it may still be commercially reasonable, but the statutory
presumption does not apply.
In First Union National Bank v. Tectamar, Inc. ,3o plaintiff-creditor
brought an action to collect the deficiency on a note after conducting a
private sale of secured property. In opposition to plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, defendant testified that a higher price could have been
obtained for the collateral. The court of appeals held that this testimony
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-319 (1965).
25. 32 N.C. App. at 570, 233 S.E.2d at 83. The test for divisibility cited by the court is set
out in Mebane Lumber Co. v. Avery & Bullock Builders, Inc., 270 N.C. 337, 341, 154 S.E.2d
665, 668 (1967).
26. 32 N.C. App. at 571,233 S.E.2d at 84. When a single consideration exists, the contract
is not divisible. Id.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-504 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Id. §
25-9-504(3). If the secured party either sells the collateral in the usual manner in any recognized
market or if he sells at the price current in that market, he has sold in a commercially reasonable
manner. Id. § 25-9-507(2).
28. Id. § 25-9-504(3).
29. Id. §§ 25-9-601 to -607 (Cum. Supp. 1977). If the secured creditor disposes of the
collateral in "substantial compliance" with the public sale procedures, a conclusive presump-
tion of commercial reasonableness arises. ITT-Indus. Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C.
App. 450, 456-57, 229 S.E.2d 814, 819 (1976).
30. 33 N.C. App. 604, 235 S.E.2d 894 (1977).
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raised no genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the sale.31 In
support of its finding the court pointed to G.S. 25-9-507, which provides
that evidence that a "better price could have been obtained . . . is not of
itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
reasonable manner. "32 As the statute prevents a debtor from enjoining a sale
or collecting damages when the only evidence he presents relates to the
adequacy of the price, 33 the court by analogy might fairly conclude that
summary disposition in favor of the creditor is appropriate when the only
evidence presented by the defendant involves price. Such a conclusion is in
accord with the Code policy of allowing creditors maximum discretion in
their disposition of secured property.' 4
If the court's interpretation is correct, it carves a very narrow exception
to the general rule that commercial reasonableness is a question of fact to be
determined in the light of the relevant circumstances of each case. 35 Gener-
ally, once a creditor has made a prima facie showing of commercial
reasonableness, the debtor may be required to put forward some evidence to
avoid a directed verdict. However, once the debtor has carried his burden of
going forward, most courts have held that an issue is raised for the trier of
fact. 36 In T-Industrial Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co. ,3 for example,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned a directed verdict for a
plaintiff-creditor because of insufficient evidence as to the manner of dis-
position and notice provided. In the absence of the conclusive presumption
established for public sales by G.S. 25-9-601,38 the court held that a proper
issue was raised for the jury as to whether the sale was commercially
reasonable. 39 Citing the greater weight of authority, the court also held that
31. Id. at 606, 235 S.E.2d at 896.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-507(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This section states a "limited
negative rule" that the fact that a better price could have been obtained does not by itself prove
that a sale is commercially unreasonable. A disposition that is a fraction of the original price,
however, may raise an issue of fact. Hogan & Coogan, The Secured Party and Default
Proceedings, in I BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 8.04, at 903 (1976); see,
e.g., Central Budget Corp. v. Garrett, 78 Misc. 2d 485, 361 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct. 1974). In
addition, price is relevant in determining commercial reasonableness when combined with other
factors. See, e.g., Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-507(l) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
34. As has been noted, there "is a remarkable absence of stringent requirements for
mandatory public sales, detailed public notices, or other specific prohibitions." Hogan &
Coogan, supra note 32, § 8.01, at 865.
35. See, e.g., California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1969); Clark
Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975).
36. Clark Leasirig Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 454, 535 P.2d
1077, 1080 (1975).
37. 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814 (1976).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-601 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
39. 31 N.C. App. at 458, 229 S.E.2d at 820.
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the burden of proving reasonableness is upon the creditor.4° If the court's
decision in Tectamar is to be read consistently with the decision in Milo
Concrete, it goes only so far as to hold that some evidence in addition to
evidence of a better price must be presented to avoid summary disposition.
4. Negotiable Instruments
Several 1977 North Carolina cases dealt with the negotiable instru-
ments provisions of the Code. In Booker v. Everhart,41 plaintiff attorneys
were the assignees of a promissory note executed by defendant and assigned
to them by defendant's former wife for legal services rendered. On appeal,
defendant argued that the assignment was void because it was based on an
illegal fee arrangement between the attorneys and his former wife. 42 In
upholding a directed verdict for plaintiffs, the court of appeals correctly
applied the Code policy of excluding most jus tertii defenses.43 The suit
before the lower court was, one between the maker of a negotiable instru-
ment (defendant) and its holder (plaintiffs). Except for defenses based on
theft, the claims of third persons to a negotiable instrument are not available
as a defense to the maker unless the person himself intervenes.' As the
defendant's former wife did not intervene in the lawsuit, the illegal agree-
ment defense was properly held unavailable to defendant.
The basic form of litigation contemplated by Article 3 of the Code is a
suit by the holder of a note against the maker/drawee or a previous indorser.
When an instrument is paid on a forged indorsement, however, the Code
also allows a suit for conversion. 45 Such an action treats the negotiable
instrument as if it were a stolen chattel and allows the true owner to recover
40. Id.
41. 33 N.C. App. 1, 234 S.E.2d 46, rev'd, 294 N.C. 146, 240 S.E.2d 360 (1978) (supreme
court reversed court of appeals on ground that because promise to pay in note conditional,
instrument not negotiable; therefore, because former wife made only partial assignment of
note, she was necessary party to lawsuit).
42. Id. at 10, 234 S.E.2d at 53.
43. Id. at 10-11, 234 S.E.2d at 53-54. Ajus tertii defense is a defense based on the rights of
third parties. As negotiable instruments are commercial documents, the Code policy is to
encourage ease of transfer and reliability whenever possible. Thus, a holder in due course takes
free of all claims to the instrument and free of most defenses. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-305
(Cum. Supp. 1977). If the holder is not in due course, he takes subject to the defenses that
would be available in an action on a simple contract. Id. § 25-3-306(b) (1965). He still, however,
takes free of defenses raised by third persons other than theft. Id. § 25-3-306(d). This policy
encourages negotiability while allowing third parties with valid claims to intervene and assert
claims on their own behalf.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-306(d) (1965). As the Official Comment points out, "[t]he
contract of the obligor is to pay the holder of the instrument, and the claims of other persons
against the holder are generally not his concern. . . . The provision includes all claims for
recission of a negotiation, whether based on incapacity, fraud, duress, mistake, illegality,
breach of trust or duty or any other reason." Id. § 25-3-306, Official Comment (emphasis
added).
45. Id. § 25-3-419(l)(c).
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its value even though he is not technically a holder. 46 G.S. 25-3-419, 47
which provides this remedy, presents a number of interpretive problems
because it does not clearly specify either the parties who can sue or the
persons to be sued. The one situation clearly foreseen by the draftsmen is a
suit by the payee whose signature is forged against the drawee. 48 This was
precisely the situation facing the North Carolina Court of Appeals in North
Carolina National Bank v. McCarley & Co.49 Plaintiff represented the
estate of a woman whose husband had forged her signature on certain stock
certificates and then forged her indorsement on the draft received from his
stock broker in payment. Plaintiff, as representative of the rightful owner,
brought suit against the stockbroker/drawee for conversion. 50 Applying
G.S. 25-3-419, the court of appeals held that the broker had converted the
instrument. 51 The court also noted that suit against him for conversion was
consistent with prior North Carolina law. Under traditional negotiable in-
struments law, a drawee bank is expected to pay an instrument only upon the
drawer's authorized signature. Even before enactment of the Code, the
North Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that a payee also has a right to
expect the drawee to pay an instrument according to its terms. 52 When the
drawee pays on a forged indorsement, it has exercised rights of ownership
inconsistent with the interests of the payee and is guilty of conversion.53
Plaintiff alleged a conversion not only of the draft but also of the
securities themselves. G.S. 25-8-31154 allows the true owner of securities
that have been transferred on a forged indorsement remedies against both the
issuer and the ultimate purchaser. It does not, however, provide any right of
action against the broker who participated in the transaction. Applying the
principle that complementary common law rules can be read into the
Code,55 the court of appeals nevertheless upheld a right of action against the
broker. It based this holding on the common law rule that makes a broker
liable in conversion when he sells personal property on behalf of a principal
46. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 15.4, at 499.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-419 (1965).
48. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 15-4, at 500.
49. 34 N.C. App. 689, 239 S.E.2d 583 (1977).
50. In most instances the drawer of an instrument and the drawee will be separate entities.
.In this case, however, the draft executed by the stockbroker was made "payable through" a
bank. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-120 (1965), such instruments designate the bank as a
collecting bank to make presentment but do not authorize the bank to pay the instrument as
drawee. Defendant broker was therefore both the maker of the draft and the drawee responsi-
ble for payment.
51. 34 N.C. App. at 692-93, 239 S.E.2d at 586-87.
52. Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co., 266 N.C. 648, 655, 147
S.E.2d 37, 43 (1966).
53. Id. at 653, 147 S.E.2d at 41.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-311 (1965).
55. Id. § 25-1-103.
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who has no title. Some of the language and authorities cited by the court
56
suggest that a broker might be liable even when he acts in good faith. It
appears, however, that such a result would be in conflict with the Code.
G.S. 25-8-318, also cited by the court, clearly prevents a broker from being
sued for conversion if he has acted in good faith and according to reasonable
commercial standards.
57
The court's decision clarifies the nature of a stockbroker's liability
when he has transferred fraudulently indorsed securities. The broker may be
held liable both as a drawee who has disobeyed the instructions of his
drawer and as a fiduciary who has violated obligations to the rightful owner
of the instrument. In the first instance, the broker may be held liable despite
the fact that he has acted reasonably and in good faith. In the second, he will
be liable only if the plaintiff can show bad faith. In most cases, of course, a
bank and not the broker will be the drawee on the instrument used for
payment. The true owner will thus ordinarily be able to recover for conver-
sion only if he can prove that the broker transferred the fraudulent security in
bad faith and in violation of reasonable commercial standards.
5. Warehouse Receipts
In Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Gill, 58 the North Carolina Supreme
Court reconsidered its former decision59 in this complicated case involving
the state's warehousing system. Plaintiff bank held warehouse receipts6° to
secure notes executed by Southeastern Farmers Grain Association. The
notes had been issued to Southeastern by the local manager of the state's
warehousing system who was also a Southeastern employee. The employee
induced the bank to surrender sixteen valid warehouse receipts and substi-
tute for them thirteen new receipts. The new receipts were fraudulent in that
the state grain elevator received no grain in exchange for issuing them. In an
56. 34 N.C. App. at 691, 239 S.E.2d at 585 (citing Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1973); Patterson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 266 N.C. 489, 146 S.E.2d 390 (1966); 12 AM. JUR. 2d Brokers § 105
(1964)).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-318 (1965) provides:
An agent or bailee who in good faith (including observance of reasonable commer-
cial standards if he is in the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing with
securities) has received securities and sold, pledged or delivered them according to the
instructions of his principal is not liable for conversion or for participation in breach of
fiduciary duty although the principal had no right to dispose of them.
58. 293 N.C. 164, 237 S.E.2d 21 (1977).
59. 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975), decision withdrawn, 293 N.C. 164,237 S.E.2d 21
(1977).
60. A warehouse receipt is a document of title issued by a warehouse on receiving goods
stored. A person storing goods in a warehouse can transfer title to the goods simply by
transferring the warehouse receipts covering them. He can also pledge the receipts as security
for a loan. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 16, § 20-1, at 667.
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action to recover the value of the grain represented by the receipts, the bank
sued, among others, the local manager and Southeastern employee who
issued the receipts, his surety and the custodian of the State Indemnity and
Guaranty Fund.61 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants,
finding that the bank had not acted in good faith and was not a holder by due
negotiation. 62 The supreme court, speaking through Justice Lake, re-
versed. 63 On rehearing, the court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice
Sharp, withdrew its former decision and affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. 64
The court in both decisions rejected the bank's claim that it had
acquired the receipts through "due negotiation. " 65 If the bank had proved
that status, it would have been entitled to recover on the receipts under G.S.
25-7-50266 despite the fact that its transferor obtained them through fraud. In
transferring the receipts to the bank, however, Southeastern had failed to
properly indorse the instruments. Before the bank had an opportunity to
compel the missing indorsements under G.S. 25-7-506,67 it learned of the
fraud. Because the bank had notice of this defense before the receipts were
indorsed, it did not take the documents by "due negotiation.' '68 It was
therefore only a "transferee" of the instruments and under G.S. 25-7-50469
would ordinarily acquire only the rights and title of its transferor. Here the
transferor was Southeastern, which had fraudulently obtained the receipts
and thus had no rights against the elevator issuing the documents. 70
61. The State Guaranty and Indemnity Fund, the provisions of which are set out in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 106-435 (1975), is designed to "provide the financial backing which is essential to
make the warehouse receipt universally acceptable as collateral." Id. It sets up a "special
guarantee or indemnifying fund to safeguard the State warehouse system against any loss not
otherwise covered." Id.
62. 293 N.C. at 175-76, 231 S.E.2d at 27-28.
63. 286 N.C. 342, 211 S.E.2d 327 (1975).
64. 293 N.C. 164, 237 S.E.2d 21 (1977).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7-501 (1965). A negotiable document of title is "duly
negotiated" when it is "negotiated in the manner stated in this section to a holder who
purchases it in good faith without notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person." Id. § 25-7-501(4).
66. Id. § 25-7-502. Under this provision, the holder of a negotiable document of title that
has been duly negotiated acquires in part: "(a) title to the document; (b) title to the goods;. ..
(d) the direct obligation of the issuer to hold or deliver the goods according to the terms of the
document free of any defense or claim."
67. Id. § 25-7-506.
68. A document of title can be "negotiated" only by "indorsement and delivery." Id. §
25-7-501(1).
69. Id. § 25-7-504. Under § 25-7-504(1), a "transferee of a document, whether negotiable
or nonnegotiable, to whom the document has been delivered but not duly negotiated, acquires
the title and rights which his transferor had or had actual authority to convey." Id. § 25-7-
504(1).
70. 293 N.C. at 179, 237 S.E.2d at 29-30.
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The supreme court, in its first opinion, nevertheless allowed the bank
to proceed against the warehouse on the theory of ratification. According to
Justice Lake, the state elevator ratified the new receipts by accepting the
benefit caused by cancellation of the valid receipts and substitution of the
fraudulent documents in their place. 71 It was therefore estopped to deny their
validity in the hands of the bank. 72 As defendants noted in their petition for
rehearing, such a reading seems to be inconsistent with the doctrine behind
G.S. 25-7-50411 because it clearly enlarges the rights of the transferee
beyond those of his transferor. 74 As the comments to the section point out,
the "doctrine of equitable estoppel" should not be used to increase the
rights of the transferee beyond those provided by the section itself.75
On rehearing, the court "displaced" 76 the doctrine of ratification relied
on in its first opinion and turned instead to an analysis of G.S. 25-7-203, 77 a
Code provision that all parties had overlooked on the first appeal. This
provision protects purchasers of warehouse receipts by holding the ware-
housemen liable when either he or his agent fraudulently or mistakenly
issues receipts for nonexistent goods. 78 According to the court, it is this
provision and not those dealing with negotiability that should govern when
receipts have been issued for nonexistent goods. 79 G.S. 25-7-502 and G.S.
25-7-504, by contrast, are intended to deal primarily with competing claims
"to valid documents and goods actually stored in a warehouse. "80 Unlike
the negotiability sections, G.S. 25-7-203 does not require that the purchaser
hold by "due negotiation." 81 Instead, it is enough that he be a purchaser
"for value in good faith of a document of title" 8 2 whether negotiable or
nonnegotiable. Here the bank gave value for the receipts by cancelling the
old notes. If it had also proved good faith, it would have been entitled to
recover on the receipts under G.S. 25-7-203 despite the fact that it did not
hold by due negotiation and thus possessed only the title of its fraudulent
transferor. The Code defines good faith as meaning "honesty in fact.''83
71. 286 N.C. 342, 359-60, 211 S.E.2d 327, 339 (1975).
72. Id.
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7-504 (1965); see note 69 supra.
74. 293 N.C. at 192, 237 S.E.2d at 38 (Lake, J., dissenting).
75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7-504, Official Comment (1965).
76. 293 N.C. at 181, 237 S.E.2d at 31.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7-203 (1965). This section provides in part that a "party to or
purchaser for value in good faith of a document of title other than a bill of lading relying in
either case upon the description therein of the goods may recover from the issuer damages
caused by the non-receipt or misdescription of the goods."
78. 293 N.C. at 180-81, 237 S.E.2d at 31.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 179, 237 S.E.2d at 30.
81. See note 65 supra.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-7-203 (1965).
83. Id. § 25-1-201(19).
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The supreme court held, however, that this definition does not permit the
parties to "intentionally keep themselves in ignorance of facts which, if
known, would defeat their rights.' '" The court found from the evidence that
the bank had willfully failed to look into the transaction for fear that it would
discover the fraudulent nature of the receipts. 85 Concluding that the bank
had acted in bad faith, the court withdrew its prior decision and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court in favor of defendants.
B. Retail Installment Sales Act
In 1975 the North Carolina legislature adopted the Retail Installment
Sales Act,86 thereby greatly expanding the protection offered consumers in
consumer credit sales. Among other things, the Act limits the amount of
interest that can be charged for credit installment sales contracts8 7 and the
kinds of property in which the seller can take a security interest. 88
The 1977 General Assembly amended the Act in a number of important
respects. The greatest problem in the area of consumer credit has been
caused by sellers who arrange for financing through the use of negotiable
promissory notes. Under these arrangements, the seller either provides
financing or takes the note himself and discounts it to an affiliated corpora-
tion. When the goods prove defective and the customer attempts to stop
payment, he discovers that his defenses against the seller are invalid against
the holder of the note. One approach to this problem is to make holders of
the instrument subject to the buyer's defenses as a matter of law. This
approach is taken by the Retail Installment Sales Act and preserved under
the recent amendments.8 9 The former version of the Act allowed the buyer
to waive his defenses against an assignee of the seller in certain limited
circumstances. If the buyer received notice of an intended assignment and
failed to notify the assignee of any defense available against the original
seller within thirty days, he was considered to have waived his defenses. 90
The 1977 amendments strengthen the statute by eliminating waivers al-
together.
91
84. 293 N.C. at 189, 237 S.E.2d at 36.
85. Id.
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25A-1 to -45 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
87. Id. § 25A-15.
88. Id. § 25A-23. One amendment enacted by the legislature in 1977 allows the seller to
take a security interest in property "used for agricultural purposes, if the property sold is to be
used in the operation of an agricultural business." Id. § 25A-22(a)(6).
89. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 921, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1247 (effective June 30, 1978, to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25).
90. Law of July 8, 1971, ch. 796, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1028 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25A-25 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
91. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 921, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1247.
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The problem of lost defenses can also be approached contractually.
Under the Federal Trade Commission regulations, for example, a seller is
guilty of an unfair trade practice if he fails to include in any consumer credit
contract language subjecting holders of the contract to defenses available
against the original seller.92 Under the 1977 amendments to the Retail
Installment Sales Act, this language will also be required as a matter of state
law. 93 A holder of a consumer credit contract will thus be subject to the
consumer's defenses as a matter of both substantive law and contractual
agreement.
C. Savings and Loan Associations
In 1977 the General Assembly made a number of changes in the laws
governing state-chartered savings and loan associations. It expanded the
scope of permissible investments by allowing investment of up to 1% of
assets in corporations providing data processing services94 and permitted for
the first time the establishment of off-premises automated teller machines.
95
The legislature also expanded the power of the Administrator of the Savings
and Loan Commission by giving him strict control over mutual deposit
guaranty associations 96 as to "conduct, organization, management, business
practices, reserve requirements and . . . financial and fiscal matters."
97
The administrator is also given the power to have any director, officer or
employee of these associations discharged if he finds him to be dishonest or
incompetent.
98
The legislature also paved the way for a new form of financial institu-
tion in North Carolina: the "stock-owned" savings and loan association.
99
The main difference between these associations and the mutual institutions
previously permitted is the manner of initial capitalization. In a mutual
92. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1977). The FTC regulation makes it an unfair or deceptive act for
a seller to take a consumer credit contract that fails to contain the following provision:
Notice
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses
which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant
hereto or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed
amounts paid by the debtor hereunder. Id.
93. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 921, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1247.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-33.3(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
95. Id. § 54-33.3(4).
96. These associations are organizations consisting of 10 or more building and loan
institutions, savings and loan institutions or credit unions formed to assure the liquidity of
member institutions, guarantee member deposits, loan money to member institutions and
invest. Id. §§ 54-44.1 to .14 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
97. Id. § 54-44.10 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Other duties and powers of the Administrator in
regard to cooperative organizations are set forth in id. §§ 54-24 to -33.2 (1975 & Cum. Supp.
1977).
98. Id. § 54-44.14 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
99. Id. §§ 54A-1 to -27.
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savings and loan institution the capital with which the association conducts
its business is loaned to the corporation by its customers in the form of
savings accounts. In a capital stock corporation, shareholders contribute
permanent capital in exchange for ownership interests. 100 In order to incor-
porate under the new statute a proposed corporation must obtain subscrip-
tions for capital stock of at least $350,000 and must also set aside an
equivalent amount for permanent capital reserves. All initial stockholders
must be North Carolina residents, and no stockholder can hold over 10% of
the capital stock. 10 Finally, the corporations are made subject to the statutes
and regulations governing mutual associations and private corporations and




The legislature made a number of changes in the state's usury laws.
One amendment fills a gap in existing law by applying the statutory limita-
tions on interest to commitments for loans as well as the loans them-
selves.' 0 3 Another provides aid for charitable organizations by limiting the
interest that can be charged on loans under $100,000 to 9% when the loan is
secured by charity-owned property. 1' 4 Finally, a significant change was
made in the statute governing contract rates on home loans secured by first
mortgages. Under previous versions of the statute, the parties to a home loan
could contract for any rate of interest they agreed upon. 105 Under the
amended version, this rule still applies to loans in excess of $10,000.106 For
loans under that amount, however, it applies only if the lender falls into one
of the three categories of approved lenders set out in the statute. 107 Other-
wise, the parties cannot contract for payment of interest in excess of 10%. 108
100. ABA COMM. ON SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING
& BUSINESS LAW, HANDBOOK OF SAVINGS AND LOAN LAW 12-13 (1973). The stock-owned form
may offer a number of advantages over the mutual form including attraction of additional
capital, availability of stock options and increased ease of merger. Liebold & Wilfand, The
Conversion Process: Mutual to Stock Savings and Loan Associations, 30 Bus. LAW. 129 (1974).
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54A-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
102. Id. § 54A-2 to -3.
103. Id. § 24-1.1.
104. Id. § 24-1.1B.
105. Law of April 3, 1974, ch. 1119, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 150 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A (Cum. Supp. 1975)).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.IA(l) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
107. Id. § 24-1.IA(a)(2). The three categories of approved lenders are those either:
(i) approved as a mortgagee by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment, the Federal Housing Administration, the Veterans Administration, a national
mortgage association or any federal agency; or (ii) a local or foreign bank, savings
and loan association or service corporation wholly owned by one or more savings and
loan associations and permitted by law to make home loans, credit union or insurance
company; or (iii) a State or federal agency.
Id.




1. Breach of Contract
Plaintiffs in Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc. 1°9 undertook to build a
motel and sought a construction loan from Central Carolina Bank for that
purpose. The bank required plaintiffs to secure a commitment for a perma-
nent loan before the temporary construction loan would be approved. 110
Plaintiffs subsequently applied to defendant, Thomas & Hill, Inc., for a
permanent loan.' Defendant, a mortgage broker, was in the business of
arranging permanent loans for builders with other lending institutions but
did not itself make permanent commercial construction loans. 112 The loan
application did not, however, indicate that defendant would not be the actual
lender. 113 Thomas & Hill's assistant vice president and manager of their
North Carolina office assured the bank that defendant would provide a
permanent loan on or before September 1, 1974.114 On the basis of these
representations, the bank issued a construction loan to plaintiffs, and they
began work. 15 In August 1974, defendant denied any commitment to make
the permanent loan. On and after October 1, 1974, the bank made interim
loans to plaintiffs at a fluctuating rate of interest. 116 On these facts, the trial
court found that defendant had made and breached a contract to supply a
permanent loan 117 and awarded damages for that breach.
The evidence indicated that on October 1, 1974, the "going" commer-
cial rate of interest was 10 1/2% but that money was not available for motel
financing." 8 In computing the damages that plaintiffs should receive for
breach of a contract to lend money, the court of appeals permitted recovery
for additional expenses incurred by them in their attempt to secure a
109. 33 N.C. App. 710, 236 S.E.2d 725, cert. granted, 293 N.C. 361, 238 S.E.2d 149 (1977)
(No. 39 PC).
110. Id. at 712, 236 S.E.2d at 727-28.
111. The loan sought was in the amount of $1,162,500 payable over 25 yeats at 91I2%
interest. Id. at 713, 236 S.E.2d at 728.
112. Id. at 712, 236 S.E.2d at 728.
113. Id. at 713, 236 S.E.2d at 728.
114. Id. at 714, 236 S.E.2d at 729. The loan commitment date was later changed to October
1, 1974. Id.
115. Id. at 714, 236 S.E.2d at 728-29.
116. The floating rate of interest on the demand note was initially equal to the prime rate
plus 2%; later the rate became the prime rate plus 3%. Plaintiffs paid $184,619.49 in interest
between October 1, 1974, and the time of trial, but they had paid nothing on the principal.
Plaintiffs were unable to secure other permanent financing. Id. at 715, 236 S.E.2d at 729.
117. Id. See text accompanying notes 239-45 infra for a discussion of the authority of
defendant's agent to bind defendant to this contract.
118. 33 N.C. App. at 715, 236 S.E.2d at 729. October 1, 1974, was chosen because that was
the date on which the bank supplied the interim loan. Id.
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permanent loan, the interest paid on the interim loans until the time the trial
began, and the difference between the interest calculated at 10 1/2% for
twenty-five years from the date of trial and the interest calculated at 9 1/2%
for twenty-five years from October 1, 1974, discounted to present value. 
119
This award of damages is unsatisfactory, chiefly because of the uncertainty
surrounding the calculations. The choice of the 10 1/2% interest rate is
difficult to justify because this rate was not available to plaintiffs at the time
of the breach. Moreover, the 10 1/2% calculation was made from the time of
trial, a date chosen to avoid granting a "double" recovery of interest for the
period of time between the breach and the trial, as the interest on the interim
loans for this time period had been recovered separately. There was no
showing, however, that a rate of 10 1/2% had any significance at the time
the trial began as a measure of the cost of securing the type of financing
sought by plaintiffs. In addition, while the trial court reduced the discounted
difference in interest rates by more than $20,000 as an adjustment for the
likelihood of early payment, the court of appeals rejected this reduction
because there was no evidence that plaintiffs intended to make early pay-
ment. 120 The trial court's reduction appears warranted, however, as the
evidence indicated that early repayment of this type of loan is common. 
121
Despite all these problems with the damages awarded, a better alternative
may not exist. Plaintiffs built their motel in reliance on receiving a perma-
nent loan from defendant. They have paid a larger amount of interest since
the breach than they would have paid with a permanent loan, and they could
face foreclosure on the interim loan from the bank, which is unpaid. The
award of damages, restructured by the court of appeals, while imprecise, at
least has the virtue of achieving a rough sort of equity in a difficult situation.
119. Id. at 721-22, 236 S.E.2d at 732-33. The award of expenses incurred to obtain other
financing is not unusual. See Fischman v. Schultz, 55 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932);
Price v. Van Lint, 46 N.M. 58, 68, 120 P.2d 611,617 (1941). Plaintiffs have also been allowed to
recover the difference in interest rates when another loan was obtained. See Columbian Mut.
Life Assurance Soc'y v. Whitehead, 193 Ark. 598,599-600, 101 S.W.2d 455, 456 (1937); Bank of
N.M. v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 177,429 P.2d 368, 375 (1967). In Pipkin, however, another loan was
not obtained. When other financing is unavailable, the breaching lender has been held in other
jurisdictions to have reasonably foreseen foreclosure as a result of the failure to lend money
and has been required to pay any deficiency judgment lodged against the borrower. See Stanish
v. Polish Roman Catholic Union, 484 F.2d 713, 724-25 (7th Cir. 1973) (noting that the borrower
did not seek the usual measure of damages, "the increased cost of borrowing from another
source," because there was no substitute loan). See also St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufac-
turers Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 250, 278 A.2d 12, 40, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971).
Another possible remedy, specific performance, was not available in Pipkin; defendant was
capitalized in excess of one million dollars and had lines of credit with lending institutions for
several millions more, but the lines of credit were limited to use in financing residential
construction. 33 N.C. App. at 712-13, 236 S.E.2d at 728.




In Whitley's Electric Service, Inc. v. Sherrod,122 the transactions
between plaintiff and defendant (plaintiff had furnished goods and services
to defendant from 1958 to 197112) constituted a current or running ac-
count. 12 4 On May 14, 1971, defendant made a payment; on October 23,
1973, plaintiff brought suit for the outstanding balance, 125 and defendant
pleaded the three year statute of limitations on contract claims. 12 6 The court
of appeals decided that the May payment revived only that part of the debt
accruing three years before the payment,127 but the supreme court reversed,
holding that when the circumstances surrounding a payment on a current
account show that the debtor intended to acknowledge the entire account by
making a payment, 128 the entire amount is revived. 12 9 The purpose of
statutory limitations of actions is to protect the defendant from stale
claims. 13° If the defendant makes a partial payment and recognizes his
obligation to pay the balance, his need of protection is not as compelling.
Thus, as the court recognized, a new promise to pay should be implied from
each voluntary acknowledgment of the debt.131
Under G.S. 44A-18(1), 132 a first-tier subcontractor who furnishes labor
or materials at the site of an improvement is entitled to a lien on funds owed
by the owner to the contractor. 133 In Lewis-Brady Builders Supply, Inc. v.
Bedros , 134 plaintiff, a subcontractor who had supplied materials to a
122. 293 N.C. 498, 238 S.E.2d 607 (1977).
123. Id. at 500, 238 S.E.2d at 609.
124. Id. at 503, 238 S.E.2d at 611. A current or running account exists "where the parties
intend that the individual transactions are to be considered a connected series rather than as
independent of each other, a balance is kept by adjustment of debits and credits, and further
dealings between the parties are contemplated." Id. Plaintiff's evidence showed that he had
furnished the goods and services to defendant for various construction jobs. In 1967 defendant
executed a note to be applied to the debt then owed to plaintiff in order to allow further
extension of credit. From the long course of dealing and the borrowing to pay the debt, the
court inferred a connected series of transactions with further dealings contemplated in the
future. Id. at 503-04, 238 S.E.2d at 611.
125. Id. at 499, 238 S.E.2d at 609.
126. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1969).
127. Whitley's Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Sherrod, 32 N.C. App. 338,342-43,232 S.E.2d 223,226,
rev'd, 293 N.C. 498, 238 S.E.2d 607 (1977).
128. The payments made by defendant on the note he executed to refinance his account
were held sufficient by the court to support a finding that he acknowledged the debt. In addition
the court relied on evidence that showed that after the payment was made defendant discussed
the account with plaintiff and promised to pay the balance. 293 N.C. at 506, 238 S.E.2d at 612-
13.
129. Id. at 507, 238 S.E.2d at 613.
130. See Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 371, 98 S.E.2d 508,514 (1957); Butler v. Bell, 181
N.C. 85, 90, 106 S.E. 217, 220 (1921).
131. 293 N.C. at 505, 238 S.E.2d at 612.
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-18(1) (1976).
133. A contractor is a person who contracts with an owner to improve real property. A
first-tier subcontractor contracts with the contractor. Id. § 44A-17(1), (2).
134. 32 N.C. App. 209, 231 S.E.2d 199 (1977).
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contractor for the construction of the owner's residence, sought a lien. 135
The contractor had breached th6 contract with the owner, and the damages
to the owner were in excess of any funds that might have otherwise become
due to the contractor. 136 Under these facts, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court and reasoned that no funds were "owed" by the owner to which
the subcontractor's lien could attach. 137 Though the result reached seems
harsh to the subcontractor, it appears to be correct. 138 The statute does not
make the owner personally liable unless he fails, after notice from the
subcontractor, to retain funds owed to the contractor. 139
2. Contractor-Subcontractor Agreements
In RGK, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,140 the supreme
court held that in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in a
subcontractor's suit on a prime contractor's payment bond,141 the complaint
need not set forth the prime contract. 142 The majority, however, went
beyond finding a sufficient claim to discuss what effect a breach by the
owner of the prime contract 43 would have on the subcontractor's right to
recover on the payment bond and concluded that such a breach would not as
a matter of law bar the subcontractor's claim. 1"4 The concurring justices
responded by calling this conclusion "premature" and "obiter dictum"145
and argued that the question of the effect of a breach of the prime contract
required consideration of the terms of the prime contract itself. 146 These two
135. Id. at 209-10, 231 S.E.2d at 199.
136. Id. at 213, 231 S.E.2d at 201.
137. A progress payment to the contractor had been approved by the architect who
retrieved and withheld the approval after learning that the contractor had failed to pay the
subcontractors in accordance with the terms of the main contract. Id. at 211-12, 231 S.E.2d at
200-01.
138. The subcontractor provisions, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-17 to -23 (1976), were enacted
in 1971, but there has been very little case law interpretation.
139. Id. § 44A-20; see Urban & Miles, Mechanics' Liens for the Improvement of Real
Property: Recent Developments in Perfection, Enforcement, and Priority, 12 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 283, 356, 368-70 (1976).
140. 292 N.C. 668, 235 S.E.2d 234 (1977).
141. The payment bond required the surety (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.) and
the principal (the general contractor) to pay all claimants for labor and materials. A subcontrac-
tor is included in the definition of claimants. Id. at 671, 235 S.E.2d at 236.
142. Id. at 676, 235 S.E.2d at 238. The prime contract is the contract between the owner
and the general contractor. In RGK the general contractor agreed to build an apartment
complex on the owner's land. RGK, the subcontractor, agreed to clear and grade the land and
install storm sewers. Id. at 676, 235 S.E.2d at 239.
143. There was some indication of a default by the owner in making payments to the
general contractor (the bond's principal). Id. at 687, 235 S.E.2d at 245 (Exum, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 678, 235 S.E.2d at 240.
145. Id. at 690, 235 S.E.2d at 247 (Exum, J., concurring).
146. Id.
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opinions reflect the conflict between two lines of authority in the construc-
tion of surety contracts.1 47
The prime contract in RGK was incorporated by reference into the
bond; nevertheless, the majority of the court concluded that the contract
should be looked to only in the construction of ambiguous language in the
bond. The majority, characterizing the bond as a "clear, direct, unambigu-
ous undertaking to pay laborers and materialmen," 1 48 rejected the surety's
contention that it was not liable for payments to subcontractors on the bond
because the owner had defaulted on the prime contract. 149 The majority
grounded its rejection of this claim on the failure of the bond to state that
performance by the owner was a condition to the surety's obligation to pay
claimants. 150 The concurring justices, by contrast, maintained that as the
prime contract was incorporated by reference, the nature of the surety's
obligation to the subcontractor (which is either conditioned on owner's
payments or unconditional) cannot be determined without reference to the
prime contract.
51
Neither view is strongly supported by prior North Carolina case law. 
152
It would seem, however, that the liberal construction in favor of the
subcontractor adopted by the majority is justifiable because the surety has
the capability of investigating the credit-worthiness of the parties and setting
its premium to reflect the risks it is willing to undertake. 153 Moreover, such
an approach would not require the surety to assume unconditional liability.
To condition liability upon payment being made by the owner, the surety
need only state the condition "in plain English" on its bond. 154
Plaintiff in Interstate Equipment Co. v. Smith'55 leased machinery to a
subcontractor for an excavation job. The lease agreement provided for the
subcontractor to be liable for excess wear on the equipment. The subcon-
147. See Koch, Surety's Obligation to Pay Subcontractor Where Owner Fails to Pay Under
Contract, 11 FORUM 1212, 1213-25, 1228 (1976).
148. 292 N.C. at 679, 235 S.E.2d at 241.
149. Id. at 680, 235 S.E.2d at 241.
150. Id. at 680-81, 235 S.E.2d at 241-42. The majority distinguished Carolina Builders
Corp. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 236 N.C. 513, 73 S.E.2d 155 (1952), which required the
bond to be read in light of the prime contract, on the ground that the bond in Carolina Builders
stated on its face that the owner's rights had priority over the rights of laborers and mate-
rialmen. 292 N.C. at 685-86, 235 S.E.2d at 244-45. The effect of the RGK majority's interpreta-
tion of the relation of the prime contract to the payment bond is to make it easier for the
subcontractor to recover on the bond.
151. 292 N.C. at 689, 235 S.E.2d at 246 (Exum, J., concurring, joined by Sharp, C.J.).
152. The majority opinion relies primarily on the opinions of courts in other jurisdictions,
see id. at 681-83, 235 S.E.2d at 24243, and the concurrence relies exclusively on cases decided
in other jurisdictions, see id. at 688-89, 235 S.E.2d at 246 (Exum, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 680-81, 235 S.E.2d at 241.42.
154. Id. at 681, 235 S.E.2d at 241.42 (1977).
155. 292 N.C. 592, 234 S.E.2d 599 (1977).
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tractor had furnished a bond to his contractor to assure payments to persons
supplying labor and materials to the subcontractor. The subcontractor de-
faulted, and the lessor brought suit claiming that the surety of the bond was
liable for the unpaid balance on the lease and for the cost of damages and
repairs to the machines."5 6 The surety contended that it was not liable
because the claims were not for labor or materials. 157 The state supreme
court concluded that, as the leased machinery was essentially a substitute for
labor, the unpaid rental payments for the equipment were covered by the
bond158 and any amounts that plaintiff proved were caused by abnormal
wear could also be recovered. 159 Under the court's interpretation, the surety
was charged with knowledge of the subcontractor's financial status and
equipment and of the provisions of the contract between the subcontractor
and plaintiff 160 that required the subcontractor to pay for abnormal wear.
This analysis is consistent with the generally accepted policy of liberal
construction of bonds for the protection of those supplying labor and
materials to the bond's principal.161
F. Trade Regulation
1. Unfair Trade Practices
In State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co.,162 the supreme court
narrowly construed former G.S. 75-1.1163 (making unlawful "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" 16) as
applying only to acts and practices "involved in the bargain, sale, barter,
exchange, or traffic"' 165 between sellers and buyers' 66 and not to the debt
collection practices involved in the case. 167 The court noted that if this
interpretation were incorrect, the "General Assembly may amend the stat-
ute. '"168 In response, the General Assembly enacted the Consumer Pro-
156. Id. at 594, 234 S.E.2d at 600. The lease term was six months; the machines remained
on the job site throughout the lease period. Id.
157. Id. at 595, 234 S.E.2d at 601.
158. Id. at 598, 234 S.E.2d at 602.
159. Id. at 601, 234 S.E.2d at 604.
160. Id. at 597, 234 S.E.2d at 602. The court rejected a distinction, recognized in some
jurisdictions, between public and private bonds. Id. at 598-99, 234 S.E.2d 602-03.
161. See Wiseman v. Lacy, 193 N.C. 751, 753, 138 S.E. 121, 123 (1927). The commercial
surety is compensated for carrying the risk that the principal will default. An individual laborer
or materialman is often unable to carry this risk. See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 800, at 177
(1951).
162. 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
163. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975)).
164. Id.
165. 292 N.C. at 316-17, 233 S.E.2d at 899.
166. Id. at 317, 233 S.E.2d at 899.




tection Act of 1977.169 The amended G.S. 75-1.1 adopts the language of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FT7C) Act, 170 thus generally
broadening the scope of G.S. 75-1.1 although creating a specific exemption
for "professional services rendered by a member of a learned profes-
sion." 171 G.S. 75-15.2 was also amended to allow the Attorney General to
seek civil penalties for violations of G.S. 75-1.1 when the violations are
"specifically prohibited by a court order or knowingly violative of a stat-
ute." 172 A new article was added specifically to regulate debt collection
practices. 173 Five categories1 74 of debt collection practices are prohibited:
threats and coercion, 175 harassment, 176 unreasonable publication, 177 decep-
tive representation 178 and unconscionable means. 179 The remedies, how-
ever, are limited. Civil penalties may not exceed-$1,000, and neither treble
damages nor attorneys' fees may be awarded.
180
In Love v. Pressley,181 a case to which the amendments did not
apply, 182 the court of appeals made an unusual application of the Penney
construction of former G.S. 75-1.1.183 In Love, defendant-landlord's tres-
pass and conversion 184 against plaintiff-tenants was held to constitute an
unfair trade practice by defendant under G.S. 75-1.1185 and to entitle
plaintiffs to treble damages. 186 In finding defendant's activities to be within
the supreme court's interpretation of former G.S. 75-1.1 in Penney, the
court of appeals held that the lease was a sale of an interest in real estate. 187
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, -15,2, -50 to -56 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See generally
Comment, Trade Regulation-The North Carolina Consumer Protection Act of 1977,56 N.C.L.
REv. 547 (1978).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Id.
171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
172. Id. § 75-15.2.
173. Id. §9 75-50 to -56.
174. Specifically prohibited conduct is listed within each category, but the lists are not
exclusive.
175. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-51 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
176. Id. § 75-52.
177. Id. § 75-53.
178. Id. § 75-54.
179. Id. § 75-55.
180. Id. § 75-56.
181. 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 441 (1978).
182. Id. at 515-16, 239 S.E.2d at 582.
183. See text accompanying notes 162-67 supra.
184. Plaintiffs claimed that a "clean up" man employed by defendant had entered their
leased house and removed personal property belonging to Mrs. Love. 34 N.C. App. at 505,239
S.E.2d at 576.
185. Id. at 517, 239 S.E.2d at 583.
186. Id. The treble damage provision is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
187. 34 N.C. App. at 516, 239 S.E.2d at 582-83 (citing Bragg Inv. Co. v. Cumberland
County, 245 N.C. 492, 495-96, 96 S.E.2d 341, 344 (1957), for the proposition that a lease is a
"species of intangible personal property").
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Under this approach, the rental of residential housing fell within the Penney
definition of trade or commerce; defendant's misconduct thus constituted
unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 18 8 To buttress this conclusion, the court
cited Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc.,189 a Pennsylvania
case construing a statute' 9° identical to pre-1977 G.S. 75-1.1 as covering
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the lease of housing. 191 The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, however, did not find the language differences
between the FTC Act and its statute to be important,192 while these language
changes were crucial to the Penney decision. 193 Moreover, Monumental
Properties concerned statements and omissions in standard lease forms that
the Commonwealth maintained were deceptive. 194 Statements in leases are
clearly related to the broad scope of landlord-tenant trade practices; a single
instance of trespass and conversion is not. As debt collection activities were
deemed to be separate from the buyer-seller relationship, 195 this trespass and
conversion would seem likewise separable. 1
96
2. Anti-Boycott Legislation
The 1977 General Assembly enacted other regulatory legislation aimed
at curtailing the participation of North Carolina businesses in foreign trade
boycotts. 197 The new statute makes it unlawful for any person doing busi-
ness in or for North Carolina to agree not to do business in the state with any
other person who is domiciled or has a usual place of business in North
Carolina because of that person's "race, color, creed, religion, sex, national
origin, or foreign trade relationships."' 9 8 Firing or failing to hire or promote
another person who is domiciled or has a usual place of business in the state
as a result of such an agreement is also unlawful. 199 Agreements with
188. Id. at 516-17, 239 S.E.2d at 582-83.
189. 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
190. Law of Dec. 17, 1968, no. 387, § 3, 1968 Pa. Laws 1225 (current version at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73, § 201-3 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
191. 459 Pa. at 478, 329 A.2d at 826.
192. "[I]n all relevant aspects the language of section 3 of the Consumer Protection Law
and section 5 of the FTC Act is identical." Id. at 462, 329 A.2d at 818 (footnotes omitted).
Arguably, the Pennsylvania court's lower threshold of concern with wording would indicate a
tendency toward a more expansive definition of "trade or commerce."
193. 292 N.C. at 316-17, 233 S.E.2d at 898-99.
194. 459 Pa. at 454-55, 329 A.2d at 814.
195. State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. at 317, 233 S.E.2d at 899.
196. Residential leases should, however, be covered under the amended version of § 75-1.1
as it is identical to § 5 of the FTC Act. See note 171 and accompanying text supra. In an amicus
curiae brief filed in Monumental Properties, the FTC claimed that residential leases were
covered by the broad prohibition against unfair practices. 459 Pa. at 463-66, 329 A.2d at 818.20.
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75B-1 to -7 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
198. Id. § 75B-2(l) to (3).
199. Id. § 75B-2(4).
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members of international organizations to grant preference to the citizens or
products of the members are not, however, prohibited by the statute.
2°°
The Attorney General may sue to prevent or restrain violations of the
statute, and any person injured may seek an injunction, damages or both.
201
Treble damages with costs and attorneys' fees may be awarded for willful
violations. 202 The availability of these actions does not restrict the applica-
bility of state antitrust or antidiscrimination laws to the prohibited
conduct.
203
A potential major difficulty with the new statute is the requirement of
an "agreement, contract, arrangement, combination, or understanding
'2°4
between the participant in the boycott and the foreign government, person or
organization generating the boycott. Proof of such an agreement could be
difficult because this type of boycott is generally implemented by "silent
acquiescence" to the blacklisting.20 5 Moreover, whether or not participation
"coerced" by a foreign government is unlawful is not clear; therefore, a




3. Sale of Business Opportunities
In order to stem fraudulent and deceptive practices in the sale of
business opportunities, a new statute regulating that practice was enacted. 207
The sale of a business opportunity is defined as the sale or lease of products
or services to allow the purchaser to start a business in which the seller will
do one of the following: offer to help the buyer find locations for machines
or displays; 20 s agree to purchase the product made; 2°9 guarantee a certain
income or offer a refund if the buyer is not satisfied; 210 or, for a fee greater
than fifty dollars, provide a sales program guaranteeing the buyer an income
greater than the price paid.211 The statute requires disclosure by the seller of
name, address, current financial status, training provided and services
performed.212 If the seller makes any statement concerning expected earn-
ings, facts about other sales of this business opportunity within three years
200. Id. § 75B-3(2).
201. Id. § 75B-4.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 75B-7.
204. Id. § 75B-2(1).
205. See Schwartz, The Arab Boycott and American Responses: Antitrust Law or Execu-
tive Discretion, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1260, 1272 (1976).
206. Id. at 1274-77.
207. N.C. GEN. STAT. 99 66-94 to -100 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
208. Id. § 66-94(l).
209. Id. § 66-94(2).
210. Id. § 66-94(3).
211. Id. § 66-94(4). One sale of an ongoing business by the owner is not subject to these
provisions. Id. § 66-94.
212. Id. § 66-95(1) to (10).
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must be disclosed213 and a surety bond obtained.214 Representations about
potential earnings may not be made unless documented 215 and the contracts




In Ray v. United Family Life Insurance Co.,218 involving alleged
monopolization of the burial insurance business, the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina concluded that the fact that
defendant was an insurance company regulated under the insurance stat-
utes,219 under which the Commissioner of Insurance determines whether
insurers have engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair or decep-
tive trade practices, 220 did not preclude plaintiff from seeking treble dam-
ages under the general prohibition against such practices in former G.S. 75-
1.1 221 While the state insurance statutes do override federal antitrust laws to
the extent allowed by the McCarran-Ferguson Act2 22 by regulating the
insurance industry, the court held that they were not intended to exempt the
insurance business from other North Carolina regulation.223 The effect of the
decision will be to allow suits under G.S. 75-1.1 in which the injured
plaintiff can recover for his damages, instead of allowing only a cease and
desist order to be sought by the Commissioner. 224
213. Id. § 66-95(10).
214. Id. § 66-96.
215. Id. § 66-98(1).
216. Id. § 66-99.
217. In Thomas v. Petro-Wash, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 808 (M.D.N.C. 1977), an agreement
tying the sale of gasoline to the sale of certain car wash equipment was claimed to violate state
antitrust provisions. The federal district court held that the statute of limitations did not bar any
claim for damages occurring one year before the suit was commenced. Id. at 813. Defendant's
claim that the statute ran from the time the agreement was signed in 1968 was rejected because
each sale of gas under the agreement would trigger the statute from that date. Id. at 811-12. This
conclusion is consistent with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-8 (1975), which provides that with continu-
ous antitrust violations each week constitutes a separate offense.
218. 430 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
219. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-54.1 to .13 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
220. Id. § 58-54.5 (1975).
221. Law of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 930 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975)). Amendments were added to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) in 1977. Ray arose prior to the amendment, but the availability of the private action
should be unchanged.
222. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
223. 430 F. Supp. at 1356.
224. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.7 (1975). Effective enforcement of the prohibition
against unfair or deceptive practices will be enhanced by the availability of private actions and
treble damages. This result appears to be consistent' with the provision that neither a cease and
desist order from the Commissioner nor a court order enforcing it "shall in any way relieve or
absolve any person affected by such order from any liability under any other laws of this
State." Id. § 58-54.8(d).
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G. Business Associations
1. Officers and Directors
225
The General Assembly in 1977 enacted expanded legislation concern-
ing the indemnification of officers and directors of nonprofit corpora-
tions.226 The new statute is a parallel of the indemnification provisions of the
Business Corporation Act.227 It makes indemnification mandatory in actions
by outsiders against the director, officer, agent or employee if a defense on
the merits is successful.228 If the defense is successful other than on the
merits, the corporation may agree to pay such expenses that the board of
directors (including interested directors) shall deem reasonable. 229 If the
defense is unsuccessful, indemnification is permitted by a vote of a majority
of disinterested members in a nonprofit corporation with members, or by a
majority of a quorum of disinterested directors230 upon a determination that
the person seeking indemnification acted in good faith, 231 or by the district
court. 232 Indemnity in corporate actions when dereliction of duty is alleged
may be made by the court only if a defense is successful or if the conduct
was honest and reasonable. 233 The general provisions allowing indemnifica-
tion under bylaw, agreement and vote of the board of directors have been
retained. 234 This is in stark contrast to the business corporation provision
that invalidates any bylaw granting indemnification unless permitted by
statute. 235 The policy underlying this distinction is presumably to encourage
acceptance of management positions in nonprofit corporations by assuaging
fears of personal liability.
Furthermore, a nonprofit corporation may purchase liability insurance
for its officers, directors, employees and agents to cover any liability
asserted against them whether or not the corporation would have the power
225. The criminal sanctions for misapplications of corporate funds by corporate officers
and agents were strengthened by the General Assembly in 1977. The former requirement that
the embezzlement or misapplication be committed with intent to defraud any officer of the
corporation, Law of Mar. 9, 1903, ch. 275, § 15, 1903 N.C. Pub. Laws 473 (formerly codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-254 (1969)), has been changed to commission with the
intent to defraud any person, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-254 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This represents a
substantial broadening of potential liability.
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. 88 55A-15, -17.1 to .3 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
227. Id. § 55-19 to -21 (1975). See generally R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 15-I to -9 (2d ed. 1974).
228. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17.2(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
229. Id. § 55A-17.2(a)(2).
230. Id. § 55A-17.2(a)(3)(a).
231. Id. § 55A-17.2(a)(3)(b).
232. Id. § 55A-17.2(a)(3)(c).
233. Id. § 55A-17.3.
234. Id. § 55A-17.1(a).
235. Id. § 55-19(a) (1975).
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to indemnify them. 236 In the business corporation context, insurance provi-
sions have been severely criticized for going too far in protecting officers
and directors from the consequences of their breaches of duty. 237 This
criticism has validity in the nonprofit corporation context also. The policy of
encouraging citizens to perform as officers and directors of nonprofit corpo-
rations should not override the policy of requiring officers and directors to
exercise their duties of good faith and due care. In light of the liberal
indemnification provisions, the availability of insurance for nonindemnifi-
able breaches of duty seems unnecessary and unwise as it tends to go too far
in relieving officers and directors of their responsibilities.
238
2. Officers as Agents
In Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc.,239 plaintiffs applied to Thomas &
Hill for a permanent loan for the construction of a motel. The assistant vice
president and manager of the North Carolina office of Thomas & Hill
assured the bank that made the construction loan to plaintiffs that a perma-
nent loan was forthcoming. 24 Thomas & Hill later denied any commitment
to make a loan because its manager had no authority to make a permanent
loan.2 4 ' Plaintiffs, unable to find another permanent loan, brought suit. The
court of appeals upheld the trial court's conclusion that, although defend-
ant's manager had no actual authority to make loans, he did possess the
apparent authority to make them and that the existence of this apparent
authority bound defendant to the contract to make the loan.2 42 Apparent
authority is " 'that authority which the principal has held the agent out as
possessing or which he has permitted the agent to represent that he pos-
sesses.' "243 The agent's high position in Thomas & Hill was considered by
the court to be evidence of this apparent authority. His authorization to
execute loan applications that indicated that defendant was committed to
236. Id. § 55A-17.1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
237. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1086-1103 (1968).
238. In a separate provision nonprofit hospital corporations were specifically authorized to
purchase liability insurance for officers and directors against suits alleging negligence or breach
of duty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-15(a)(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The criticism against providing
insurance in the hospital context is not as strong because the importance of compensation of the
victim outweighs any danger that the existence of insurance will increase negligent actions. See-
Bishop, supra note 237, at 1093-94.
239. 33 N.C. App. 710, 236 S.E.2d 725, cert. granted, 293 N.C. 361, 238 S.E.2d 149 (1977)
(No. 39 PC). The issue of the damages to which plaintiffs were entitled is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 109-21 supra.
240. See text accompanying notes 112-15 supra.
241. 33 N.C. App. at 713-15, 236 S.E.2d at 728-29.
242. Id. at 716-17, 236 S.E.2d at 730.
243. Id. at 716, 236 S.E.2d at 729-30 (quoting Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 24,
31, 209 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1974)). See also R. ROBINSON, supra note 227, § 13-8.
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make the loan once the application was accepted was further evidence of
authority. 244 Given these indicia of the power to bind, the determination that
apparent authority existed seems justified as plaintiffs were unaware of any
restrictions on the agent's power.
245
3. Business Trusts
Prior to the adoption of G.S. 39-44 to -4724 in 1977, North Carolina
had no statutory recognition of business trusts. 247 The statute defines a
business trust as any unincorporated association doing business under a
written declaration of trust under which the beneficial interest is divided into
shares. 248 It authorizes the trust to acquire, hold249 and convey250 real estate
provided the conveyance is accompanied by a recordation of the declaration
of trust in the county where the land lies.25' All prior conveyances that
conform to the statute are validated.352 The new statute is aimed at allowing
the operation of a real estate investment trust, an entity that is afforded
certain federal income tax advantages.
253
H. Securities Regulation
In 1977 the General Assembly enacted the Tender Offer Disclosure
Act, 25 4 thus joining a majority of states that now have tender offer legis-
244. 33 N.C. App. at 716-17, 236 S.E.2d at 730.
245. Id. at 713, 236 S.E.2d at 728. A related case, Whitten v. Bob King's AMC/Jeep, Inc.,
292 N.C. 84, 231 S.E.2d 891 (1977), concerned the ability of the corporation's promoter (who
later became its president and general manager) to bind the corporation in a contract made prior
to incorporation. Id. at 89, 231 S.E.2d at 894. The court of appeals had upheld an entry of
summary judgment in favor of the corporation on the theory that the corporation's promoter
had no authority to make the contract. 30 N.C. App. 161, 164, 226 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1976). The
supreme court reversed. 292 N.C. at 92, 231 S.E.2d at 896. A corporation cannot ratify a
contract made prior to its incorporation, but it becomes bound if the benefits of the contract are
accepted with knowledge of its provisions. Id. at 90, 231 S.E.2d at 894; see R. ROBINSON, supra
note 227, § 2-4. The corporate defendant did use money advanced by plaintiff; although
knowledge of a promoter is not imputed to the corporation, there may be an exception where,
as here, the promoter becomes a director and stockholder. 292 N.C. at 91, 231 S.E.2d at 895
(citing 18 Am. JUR. 2d Corporations § 123 (1965)). In North Carolina, notice to the president of a
corporation is notice to the corporation. Id. at 91, 231 S.E.2d at 895.
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-44 to -47 (Supp. 1977).
247. See R. ROBINSON, supra note 227, § 1-5. In 1930 the supreme court left undecided
whether "such a trust is unlawful as contrary to public policy." Roberts v. Aberdeen-Southern
Pines Syndicate, 198 N.C. 381, 384, 151 S.E. 865, 867 (1930).
248. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-44 (Supp. 1977).
249. Id. § 39-45.
250. Id. § 39-46.
251. Id.
252. Id. § 39-47.
253. I.R.C. §§ 856-858 afford real estate investment trusts the same tax treatment that
regulated investment companies receive under id. §§ 851-855. See R. ROBINSON, supra note
227, § 1-5; Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Associations, RealEstate
Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAW. 900 (1961).
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -I1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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lation.255 The North Carolina statute applies to any nonexempt offer256 to
purchase an amount of any class of equity securities257 of a subject
company258 that will make the offeror the owner of more than five percent
of the class. 259 The scope of application is basically the same as that under
the federal Williams Act, 260 but, like many state tender offer statutes, offers
made by the subject (target) company to purchase its own securities or those
of a subsidiary are exempt.
261
Under the statutes, tender offers are irrevocable for twenty-one days
after they are made; an offeree may withdraw his acceptance or deposit up to
three business days before the tender offer ends and may withdraw any
unpurchased securities sixty days after the tender offer is made. 262 If the
offer is for less than the number of securities tendered, the statute provides
for pro rata acceptance, 263 and, if the offering price is increased before the
tender offer ends, all offerees whose securities are purchased receive the
higher price.
264
255. See R. ROBINSON, supra note 227, § 7-12 (Supp. 1977). State tender offer statutes have
been attacked on constitutional grounds because of the undue burden on interstate commerce
that their antitakeover bias is claimed to cause and because federal legislation may have
preempted the field. See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 241-57 (1977).
256. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-2(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977) states that an exempt offer means:
a. An offer made by the subject company or any issuer of equity securities to
purchase its own equity securities or equity securities of its subsidiary;
b. Offers to purchase equity securities from not more than 25 offerees within a
twelve-month period;
c. An offer, if the acquisition of any equity security pursuant to the offer, together
with all other acquisitions by the offeror and his associates of securities of the
same class during the preceding 12 months, would not exceed two percent (2%) of
the outstanding securities of such class;
d. An offer to purchase equity securities of a class not registered pursuant to section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
e. An offer that is subject to approval by the shareholders of the subject company at
a meeting for which proxies have been solicited pursuant to section 14 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or
f. Bids made by a registered broker-dealer in the ordinary course of his business and
not with the purpose of changing the control of an issuer of equity securities.
257. Equity securities are defined as either voting stocks and bonds or securities conver-
tible into voting stocks and bonds. Id. § 78B-2(5).
258. The subject company must be organized under the laws of North Carolina or have its
principal place of business and substantial assets in North Carolina. Id. § 78B-2(12). If the
subject company is incorporated in another state that has tender offer regulations, the offeror is
likely to be subject to the provisions of both. See R. ROBINSON, supra note 227, § 7-12, at 15
(Supp. 1977); Langevoort, supra note 255, at 223.
259. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-2(14) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
260. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d) (West Cum. Supp. Pamphlet No. 4 1977); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)
(1976); see R. ROBINSON, supra note 227, § 7-12, at 14 (Supp. 1977).
261. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-2(7)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 256 supra. This
reflects the bias in favor of incumbent management. See Langevoort, supra note 255, at 225;
note 268 infra.
262. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-3(l) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
263. Id. § 78B-3(2).
264. Id. § 78B-3(3).
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A "waiting period" of thirty days is required:2 65 the offeror must make
all the required disclosures 266 (essentially the same information as is re-
quired under the Williams Act267) to the target company thirty days prior to
making the tender offer. Many state statutes have such waiting period
provisions although a twenty day waiting period under the federal regula-
tions was considered and rejected. 268 The North Carolina statute also
contains a general antifraud provision prohibiting deceptive acts or practices






In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,' re-
spondent commission sought an injunction against the enforcement of a
North Carolina statute prohibiting the display of Washington State apple
grades on closed cartons of apples shipped into North Carolina.2 The United
States Supreme Court unanimously rejected petitioner's assertion that the
statute was a valid exercise of the police power to protect North Carolina
citizens from deceptive marketing practices. The Court found that the statute
raised the costs of doing business in North Carolina for out-of-state growers
and deprived Washington producers of the competitive advantage they had
achieved through use of their expensive grading systems. 3 At the same time
265. Id. § 78B-4(a).
266. Id. § 78B-4(b).
267. See R. ROBINSON, supra note 227, § 7-12, at 16 (Supp. 1977).
268. See Langevoort, supra note 255, at 228-29. One of the chief criticisms of the state
statutes, that thdy are antitakeover, arises from this type of provision, for the waiting period
clearly favors incumbent management. Id. at 227-29. The waiting period allows the target
company to make certain moves such as issuing additional shares, arranging a "friendly"
merger or making its own offer which is exempt from these provisions.
269. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
270. Id. § 78B-6.
271. Id. § 78B-8.
1. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-189.1 (1973) required that closed containers of apples bear the
United States Department of Agriculture grade or none at all. The statute forced Washington
growers to devise costly special handling procedures for apples destined for North Carolina.
432 U.S. at 337-38.
3. 432 U.S. at 349-53.
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the statute benefited local apple growers by requiring Washington State
apples to be marketed under inferior United States Department of Agricul-
ture (U.S.D.A.) grades.4 The Court held that even if the statute were
enacted for its alleged consumer protection purpose, 5 the State had failed to
meet its burden of establishing that sufficient consumer benefits were
derived from the statute and that no nondiscriminatory alternatives to the
ban of Washington State's grades existed. 6 Consequently, the statute was
found to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. This deci-
sion, similar to past cases concerning access of foreign sellers to local
markets, 7 is indicative of the Court's continued determination to strike down
such thinly veiled economic regulations.
B. First Amendment
1. Speech
In 1977 the North Carolina General Assembly enacted several statutes
concerning the regulation and sale of sexually oriented materials. A new
section, G.S. 14-202.11,s provides that no building may contain more than
one "adult establishment," defined to include adult book stores, adult
theatres and massage parlors. In addition, no building in which sexually
oriented devices are sold may house any adult establishment. 9 A violation of
this section is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.' 0
This new law recently was declared unconstitutional in two federal district
court cases, Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten1I and U. T. Inc. v. Edmis-
ten. 12 Plaintiffs in U. T. Inc. contended that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague and that it bans protected first amendment expression in an appropri-
ate place. The State stressed that the statute does not prohibit any activities,
but merely requires that they not be located in the same building.
The State also contended that the North Carolina statute is less prohibi-
4. In most instances the Washington State grades are superior to corresponding
U.S.D.A. grades. Id. at 351-52.
5. The Court found it "somewhat suspect that North Carolina singled out only closed
containers of apples, the very means by which apples are transported in commerce, to effec-
tuate the statute's ostensible consumer protection purpose when apples are not generally sold at
retail in their shipping containers." Id. at 352.
6. Id. at 353-54.
7. See, e.g., Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v, City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
9. "Adult establishment" and "sexually oriented devices" are defined in id. § 14-202.10,
10. Id. § 14-202.12.
I1. No. 77-387-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C., Apr. 12, 1978).
12. No. CC-77-0365 (W.D.N.C., Feb. 14, 1978) (mem.). At the time of this writing neither
the opinion in Hart Book Stores nor the opinion in U.T. Inc. had been published.
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tive than a Detroit ordinance recently upheld in Young v. American
MiniTheatres, Inc. 13 In that case, the ordinance provided that adult theatres
could not be located within one thousand feet of any two other regulated
uses, including bars, hotels, pawnshops, pool halls and other adult theatres.
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, found the
ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city's zoning power designed to
stabilize neighborhoods and help prevent decay of the inner city. The Court
stressed that the ordinance did not limit the content of any films or signifi-
cantly restrict the public's freedom to see them, so that the first amendment
right of expression was only secondarily affected. 14
The North Carolina statute, although modeled after the Detroit ordi'
nance, differs from the ordinance in that it is phrased as an exercise of the
police power rather than specifically as a zoning provision, and it is aimed at
preventing the establishment of "sex shops" rather than the decay of
neighborhoods. In addition, because the statute is intended to discourage sex
shops, it is somewhat more oriented toward regulating the activities of
members of the public who patronize such establishments, and is aimed at
sexual materials only. Apparently based on these and possibly other distinc-
tions, the district court in U. T. Inc. found the North Carolina statute to be
an unconstitutional restraint on free speech, a prior restraint on the dissemi-
nation of arguably nonobscene material and a denial of equal protection to
sellers of sexually oriented matter as compared with sellers of primarily
nonsexual books, magazines and films. 15
At the heart of the court's analysis should be consideration of the
question whether the selling of sexual literature, films and devices in the
same location transforms the establishment into something radically differ-
ent from stores selling the same categories of items individually-that is,
whether the nature of such an establishment is to be viewed as more than the
sum of its parts. In Young v. American MiniTheatres, the Supreme Court
found that without the Detroit ordinance the zoned neighborhoods risked
becoming "skid rows" rather than ordinary neighborhoods that happen to
be characterized by an abundance of pool halls, bars or pawn shops.' 6
Logically, if a store selling more than one type of sexual matter is transform-
ed into a "sex shop," the North Carolina provision, if sufficiently related to
the elimination of that risk, should have been similarly sustained.
One major concern is the extent to which the statute will restrict
dissemination of constitutionally protected sexually oriented materials. If
13. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
14. Id. at 62, 71-72.
15. No. CC-77-0365, slip op. at 1.
16. 427 U.S. at 71 & n.34.
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the economics of the businesses is such that restricting a seller to one type of
sexual material will lead to the closing of many businesses, or if one type of
protected expression is so inherently less profitable that sellers will choose
not to sell it alone, then the availability to the public of such material will be
restricted to a degree that outweighs the state's interest in promoting health
and morality. 17 A second concern is the relationship between the purpose of
the statute and the effects resulting from it. The purpose of the Act was to
eliminate "sex shops," yet the effect is somewhat broader: as plaintiff
noted, a druggist who sold a few magazines that were primarily sexually
oriented could not sell contraceptives, and a newsstand selling primarily
sexually oriented magazines at one end of a large shopping mall would
prevent the sale of contraceptives in a drug store at the other end of the
mall. 18
The North Carolina General Assembly, effective August 1, 1977,
amended the North Carolina nuisance law to include within the definition of
nuisance "illegal possession or sale of obscene or lewd matter." 19 In
addition, all buildings and personal property used or received in connection
with an obscene film or publication are declared nuisances.20 The Attorney
General or a district attorney may bring a civil action in superior court to
compel abatement 2' and may obtain a temporary restraining order on a
showing of good cause to restrain removal of property or materials pending
a hearing. After a hearing, a preliminary injunction may be issued restrain-
ing defendant from continuing the alleged nuisance. 22 Finally, after a trial
on the merits, final judgment may permanently enjoin "maintaining the
nuisance," and "[s]uch order may also require the effectual closing of the
place against its use thereafter for the purpose of conducting any such
nuisance.' '23
In a recent declaratory judgment action, Fehlhaber v. State,24 section
19-5, the final judgment provision that restrains future conduct of "any such
nuisance," was declared an unconstitutional prior restraint. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina rejected
plaintiff's contentions that the temporary restraining order provision and the
17. See generally Young v. American MiniTheatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 62-63.
18. Brief for plaintiff at 19-20, 22, U.T. Inc. v. Edmisten, No. CC-77-0365 (W.D.N.C.
Feb. 14, 1978).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (amending Law of Mar. 11, 1913, ch.
761, § 25, 1913 N.C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1563 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
19-1(a) (1975))).
20. Id. §§ 19-1.2,-.3.
21. Id. § 19-2.1. For nuisances other than possession or sale of obscene matter a private
citizen of the county may also maintain an action for abatement. Id.
22. Id. 99 19-2.2 to .5.
23. Id. § 19-5.
24. No. 77-0043-CIV-3 (E.D.N.C., Jan. 4, 1978) (mem.).
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requirement that an inventory be kept after issuance of the order constituted
prior restraints. The court found that "the First Amendment right of the
public to receive information is unaffected by the temporary restraining
order, and the parallel right of the distributors to dispense the information is
not discernibly chilled." 5 With respect to section 19-5, however, the court
found that the section could only be read as authorizing the enjoining of
distribution of all arguably obscene books or films rather than only those
books or films already declared obscene in an abatement proceeding.2 6 In a
careful and well-reasoned opinion, the district court then held that such a
statute constituted an overbroad prior restraint of free speech under Near v.
Minnesota ,27 which stands for the principle that the first amendment 1ro-
hibits prior restraints on publication and distribution of material even when
civil or criminal liability may befall the seller after distribution. Fehlhaber
succinctly summarized the Near opinion as holding that "it is unconstitu-
tional to enjoin the dissemination of future issues of a publication because its
past issues have been found offensive.' '28 Section 19-5, when read in its
entirety, clearly purports to do just that, and therefore was correctly adjudg-
ed unconstitutional. 29
25. Id., slip op. at 5.
26. In making this determination, the court looked to the last paragraph of the section,
which states that if obscene matter does not make up the regular business of a defendant then
only the matter actually judged obscene in a nuisance action could be enjoined. Id., slip op. at 8
(citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-5 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). As the court noted, this exception
demonstrates that the rest of the section was aimed at enjoining all obscene matter, even films
and publications not previously determined to be obscene in a proceeding for abatement. Id.
27. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
28. Fehlhaber v. State, No. 77-0043-CIV-3, slip op. at 9.
29. The General Assembly also revised N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
That section now allows criminal prosecutions for violations of obscenity laws relating to
minors and nonconsenting adults even when the material involved has not previously been
judicially determined to be obscene or sexually oriented. This revision arguably does not run
afoul of the first amendment as an unconstitutional prior restraint because the violation
involved is criminal rather than civil and thus the presumption against prior restraint is not as
strong. See Southeastern Prods., Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-62 (1975).
In another free speech case, United States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359
(W.D.N.C. 1977), plaintiff Labor Party was prohibited from passing out handbills and soliciting
donations in the parking lot of Mecklenburg County Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) stores
because of a 1975 resolution by the Mecklenburg ABC Board prohibiting "handbilling, solicit-
ing or loitering on the premises." Mecklenburg ABC Board Resolution of Nov. 25, 1975, quoted
in 430 F. Supp. at 1360. Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) to enjoin
enforcement of the resolution as it applied to free-standing ABC stores after conceding the
validity of enforcement at stores that were part of privately owned shopping centers. See
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The
district court noted that plaintiff's right of free speech in a public place could be restricted only
by "reasonable regulations," narrowly drawn, to protect the public interest in order and
efficiency." 430 F. Supp. at 1362. The court held that because the Board's blanket prohibition
was more onerous than other possible methods of avoiding congestion near entrances and exits
of the stores, the resolution as applied to free-standing stores effected an unconstitutional ban
of free speech. Id.
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2. Privacy
Another first amendment case, Ensminger v. Commissioner, 30 ar-
gued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
May 1978, involves a challenge to the North Carolina cohabitation law.
3'
Appellant in Ensminger claimed as a dependent on his 1974 federal income
tax return a female friend with whom he was living. The Commissioner
disallowed the exemption deduction under section 152(b)(5) of the Internal
Revenue Code32 after concluding that the couple's relationship violated the
North Carolina cohabitation statute. The tax court found for the Commis-
sioner33 and taxpayer appealed. Before the Fourth Circuit, appellant's cen-
tral argument34 is that the North Carolina provision infringes his constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy in the absence of any compelling state
interest to justify such infringement. Appellant contends that the Supreme
Court has implicitly stated in several privacy decisions35 that the right to
privacy of the home extends to sexual matters between unmarried persons.
36
Furthermore, the state cannot claim that the statute serves a compelling
interest in requiring marriage, preventing promiscuity or promoting stable
family relationships because it is not the least intrusive or most effective
means of achieving those goals. 37 Appellant also contends that the govern-
ment has the burden of proving the illegality of taxpayer's relationship
because no criminal proceeding against taxpayer has been initiated by the
30. 36 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 934 (CCH) (1977), appealfiled, No. 77-2302 (4th Cir. Sept. 12,
1977).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1969) provides: "If any man and woman, not being married
to each other, shall lewdly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together, they shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
32. I.R.C. § 152(b)(5).
33. 36 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. at 934.
34. Appellant also challenges the North Carolina law as being unconstitutionally vague
and maintains that, even if the law is constitutional, the Commissioner has failed to prove the
habitual sexual intercourse necessary to establish a violation of the statute. Brief for Appellant
at 5-7, 15-18, Ensminger v. Commissioner, 36 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 934 (CCH) (1977).
35. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion of nonviable fetus by
unmarried woman); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US. 438 (1972) (state statute may not deny
contraceptives to unmarried persons while allowing married persons access to contraceptives);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possession of obscene materials within privacy
of own home).
36. Brief for Appellant at 7-11; Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-7.
37. The statute covers only couples who engage in habitual sexual relations and thus does
iot reach those who live together without having sex or those who do not habitually confine
sexual activity to the same partner. Brief for Appellant at 11-15; Reply Brief for Appellant at 9-
14, see, e.g., State v. Kleiman, 241 N.C. 277, 85 S.E.2d 148 (1954); State v. Davenport, 225
N.C. 13, 33 S.E.2d 136 (1945); State v. McDuffie, 107 N.C. 885, 12 S.E. 83 (1890). Appellant
also note that there have been only nine appellate decisions concerning convictions under the
statute in this century, demonstrating that the provision is largely unenforced. Brief for
Appellant at 3.
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state for a violation of the cohabitation statute and thus the Commissioner's
finding of illegality was arbitrary and irrational.
38
The Commissioner maintains that the inference of illegal cohabitation
arising from taxpayer's living arrangement is not arbitrary and therefore that
taxpayer has the burden of proving the legality of his relationship. 39 In
addition, the government asserts that sexual relations betweem consenting
adults are not among the fundamental privacy interests protected by the
Constitution, 4 and that even if such rights are protected, the state has a
compelling interest in preserving morality and the orderly family unit.41
Finally, the Commissioner states that even if the North Carolina cohabita-
tion statute is unconstitutional, Congress intended to deny dependency
deductions for such extramarital relationships.
42
If appellant is to be successful in his constitutional challenge, the
Fourth Circuit must read into the Supreme Court's privacy decisions43 an
implicit holding that unmarried individuals enjoy a constitutionally protect-
ed right to be free of governmental interference in sexual matters between
consenting adults. Although such a reading of these cases is not unwarrant-
ed, none of the decisions compels that conclusion.
44
38. Brief for Apellant at 3-4.
39. Brief for Appellee at 5-6, 17-18.
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at 22-24.
42. Id. at 15-16.
43. See, e.g., cases cited note 35 supra.
44. In a 1977 case concerning freedom of association, the Student Government at The
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill challenged the constitutionality of a statute that
prohibited closed panel prepaid legal services. Student Government v. Council, North Carolina
State Bar, No. C-C-76-346 (W.D.N.C., Aug. 17, 1977). Pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-23.1
(Cum. Supp. 1977), plaintiff Student Government submitted its legal services plan to defendant
Council for its required approval. Under the plan the student recipient of prepaid service could
only receive the benefits of the service by selecting an attorney from the staff of the plan. The
Council rejected the plan, claiming the statute by its terms prohibited it; plaintiff then filed an
action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The district court
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that § 84-23.1 (b),
(e), "violates the right of plaintiffs to freely associate for the purpose . . . of obtaining and
delivering legal services, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." No. C-C-76-
346, slip op. at 3-4. The court also found the statute unconstitutional as "a prior restraint on the
First Amendment rights of Plaintiffs." Id. at 4. Plaintiff was awarded reasonable attorneys'
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) and was granted a permanent injunction against defendant,
enjoining enforcement of the statute to interfere with plaintiff's closed panel plan. Although the
Supreme Court has not specifically declared statutes outlawing closed panel plans unconstitu-
tional, the Court's vigor in defending prepaid legal service plans in general indicates that the
district court correctly disallowed the exclusion of closed panel plans. As the Supreme Court
noted in United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971): "At issue is the basic right to
group legal action . . . . [ihat right would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associa-
tions of workers or others the means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal
representation." Id. at 585-86; see UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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3. Religion
In Smith v. Board of Governors, 5 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed without opinion a three-judge district court decision upholding the
constitutionality of three North Carolina statutes 46 extending scholarship aid
to students attending church-related colleges. Plaintiff contended that state
aid to students at Belmont Abbey College and Pfeiffer College violated the
first amendment requirement that government "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."'47 The district court applied the guidelines
specified in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,48 a 1976 United States
Supreme Court decision, and concluded that the two colleges were not
"pervasively sectarian." 49 In reaching its decision the district court relied
heavily on the factual similarity between Roemer and Smith. 0 In Roemer
the Supreme Court had applied the three part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman
(Lemon I),5 1 which requires "that state aid such as this have a secular
purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and no
tendency to entangle the State excessively in church affairs." 52
Using the Roemer-Lemon analysis, the district court in Smith ex-
amined the form and purpose of the North Carolina student aid program and
the character of the aided institutions. The court found first that by the terms
of the three North Carolina statutes the funds were to be used only for
secular purposes.5 3 Additionally, the two colleges involved were relatively
45. 98 S. Ct. 39, aff'g mem. 429 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-19 (1975); Law of June 26, 1975, ch. 875, §§ 30, 36, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1283.
47. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
48. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
49. 429 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 39 (1977).
50. Roemer involved a challenge to a Maryland statute that authorized state subsidies for
private colleges upon the condition that no funds be used for sectarian purposes and that
recipient schools submit yearly reports showing how the funds were spent. The Court
concluded that the statute as written and applied kept the state in a sufficiently neutral position.
426 U.S. at 762-67. In one respect, indicated by the fact that Justice Stewart sided with the
majority in affirming Smith rather than dissenting as he had done in Roemer, the Smith
situation is more compelling than that of Roemer because the courses in religion taught at the
two North Carolina colleges are apparently more academic in nature. See Smith v. Board of
Governors, 98 S. Ct. at 39; Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. at 773-75 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Smith v. Board of Governors, 429 F. Supp. 871, 875, 876-77 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 98
S. Ct. 39 (1977).
51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
52. 426 U.S. at 745 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
53. 429 F. Supp. 871, 878 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 98 S. Ct. 39 (1977). The court recognized that
'in aiding a religious institution to perform a secular task, the State frees the institution's
resources to be put to sectarian ends,' " id. (quoting Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S.
at 747), but held that "[it is enough that the state does not directly aid the sectarian activities
and purposes." Id.
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independent of their respective churches, mandatory religious courses only
supplemented a broad liberal arts curriculum, student admission and faculty
hiring were not based on religion, and there was no school policy encourag-
ing classroom prayer. The court also noted that by the terms of the three
statutes the funds were to be used only for secular purposes. 54 Finally, the
statutory requirements of occasional reports and audits to trace the use of the
funds constituted only a minimal amount of state entanglement with reli-
gion. Consequently, the district court found the statutes as applied to
Belmont Abbey and Pfeiffer "unassailable under the First Amendment."
55
C. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection
1. Racial Discrimination
In United States v. North Carolina,56 a three-judge district court
withdrew and vacated its earlier decision 57 that North Carolina's use of
minimum cut-off scores on the National Teachers Exam (NTE) for teacher
certification, without proof by the State that the cut-off point was not
arbitrary, constituted a violation of equal protection58 because of the NTE's
discriminatory impact on Blacks. The federal government was joined in the
initial suit by twenty-four black teachers who alleged that the requirement of
achieving minimum scores as a condition of certification was a violation of
portions of the Civil Rights Act, 59 the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 60 and the fourteenth amendment. 61 The court declared the state
practice unconstitutional because of defendant's failure to demonstrate that
the cut-off score was rationally related to the alleged purpose of certifying
only qualified teachers. 62 Subsequent to this decision, however, the United
States Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis,63 in which the Court
held that a state practice is not unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact. In addition, the Washington Court de-
clared the practice must reflect a discriminatory purpose before the state will
be forced to bear the burden of proving nonarbitrariness to avoid having the
practice invalidated. 64
54. Id. at 877-78.
55. Id. at 879.
56. 425 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
57. 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
58. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
61. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; see 400 F. Supp. 343, 346 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
62. 400 F. Supp. 343, 350-51 (E.D.N.C. 1975).
63. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
64. rd. at 247-48.
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In light of Washington, defendant moved for relief from judgment. 65
The district court found that no showing of discriminatory intent had been
made and therefore vacated its earlier decision and extended discovery in
preparation for reargument. 66 Because of a recent decision by the Supreme
Court, National Education Association v. South Carolina ,67 the outcome of
United States v. North Carolina will in all likelihood conclude in a judg-
ment in favor of the State. In National Education Association the Court
affirmed without opinion a federal district court finding6 that South
Carolina's use of comparable minimum scores from the same exam (the
NTE) for the same purpose (teacher certification) did not show knowledge
by the State of the ensuing discriminatory impact on Blacks or an intent to
discriminate, and therefore was not unconstitutional. The district court also
held, in regard to plaintiffs' statutory cause of action under Title VII, 69 that a
South Carolina study validating the use of its minimum score requirements
satisfied the State's burden of proving that the requirements were not
arbitrary and were rationally related to the legitimate objective of certifying
only qualified teachers. 70 If a recently completed North Carolina study71
compares favorably with the South Carolina one, the result should again be
the same.
Plaintiffs in Uzzell v. Friday,72 students at the University of North
Carolina, challenged student funding of the Black Student Movement
(BSM) and minority representation requirements for the Campus Governing
Council (CGC) and Student Honor Court (SHC). The district court granted
summary judgment for defendant University on all three claims73 and
plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court on the
question of funding of the BSM through student activities fees, finding the
issue moot because the BSM constitution had been amended to allow
membership by students of all races74---hence discrimination was no longer
involved.75 Concerning the requirements of minority representation on the
65. Defendant relied primarily on FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The court chose, however, to
revise its prior judgment under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 425 F. Supp. at 791-92.
66. 425 F. Supp. at 792-94.
67. 98 S. Ct. 756 (1978) (mem.).
68. United States v. South Carolina, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1196, 1206 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff'd mem. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 98 S. Ct. 756 (1978).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
70. United States v. South Carolina, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1196, 1214-16 (D.S.C. 1977),
aff'd mem. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 98 S. Ct. 736 (1978).
71. See 425 F. Supp. at 791.
72. 547 F.2d 801 (4th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 558 F.2d 727 (1977).
73. 401 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C. 1975).





CGC and the SHC, 76 however, the court reversed the district court's find-
ing77 of no actual case or controversy. The Fourth Circuit held both require-
ments to be selection on the basis of race without a compelling interest,
which "blatantly fouls the letter and the spirit of both the Civil Rights Acts
and the Fourteenth Amendment.' '8
Whether or not the court was correct in finding a violation of the Civil
Rights Acts, it was wrong in applying the same analysis to find a fourteenth
amendment violation. Washington v. Davis79 established that although a
discriminatory effect alone may show a violation of the Civil Rights Act, a
constitutional violation may only be shown by an additional finding of
arbitrariness or discriminatory purpose.80 It seems doubtful that such a
purpose is indicated by the minority representation requirements; the CGC
provision does not displace any white representatives and the SHC provi-
sions are invoked only at the request of a student defendant and are equally
applicable to majority and minority defendants.
8'
2. Religious Discrimination
In Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank,82 the Fourth Circuit
considered whether a potential employer's refusal to promise plaintiff that
she would never have to work on her Sabbath constituted an unlawful
employment practice under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 8 3 Plaintiff in Jordan
was a Seventh Day Adventist who, upon applying for a position with
defendant NCNB, informed defendant that she could never work on Satur-
day. Although Saturday work was seldom if ever required, defendant
refused to guarantee plaintiff that she would never have to work that day.
Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII and under a corresponding provision of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations that requires
76. The student constitution provided that the CGC "shall include at least two Councillors
of a minority race." If two were not elected, the student body president was empowered to
appoint minority members with the consent of the CGC. The CGC was also required to include
two males and two females. Id. at 804. The Instrument of Student Judicial Governance of
1974 provided that, when requested by a minority defendant before the SHC, "at least four of
the seven members of the trial court shall not be of the majority race." Similar provisions
existed for defendants of the majority race and of each sex. Id. at 804 n.6.
77. Uzzell v. Friday, 401 F. Supp. 775, 780-82 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
78. 547 F.2d at 804. The Fourth Circuit ordered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs
even though plaintiffs had requested only that the court remand for a trial on the merits. This
grant sua sponte of final judgment is criticized in a dissenting opinion. 558 F.2d at 728 (Winter,
J., concurring and dissenting).
79. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
80. Id. at 247-48; see text accompanying note 63 supra.
81. See note 76 supra.
82. 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970) provides that discrimination by an employer against
an employee or prospective employee because of religion is an unlawful employment practice.
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an employer "to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of
employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be
made without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."
8 4
The district court found that defendant had not made "reasonable
accommodations" and granted judgment for plaintiff. 85 The Fourth Circuit
reversed and entered final judgment for defendant, after finding that an
employee's demand of a guarantee "could not be 'reasonably' accom-
modated by her prospective employer at all and certainly not 'without undue
hardship.' "86 The dissent argued that the employee's demand of a guaran-
tee was merely the beginning rather than the end of the case. From there the
court should have inquired whether, in light of that demand, defendant made
a reasonable effort to determine if any vacancy was available for which
plaintiff was qualified and which required no Saturday work whatsoever.
8 7
Ironically, both the majority and the dissent based their arguments on a
recent United States Supreme Court case, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison,8S in which the Court held that requiring an employer to bear more
than a de minimis cost in making accommodations to an employee's reli-
gious beliefs would constitute an undue hardship and thus would require no
further action by the employer.89 In one sense the difference of opinion
apparent in Jordan is a factual one-the majority assuming that defendant
could not guarantee against Saturday employment in any of its positions,
and the dissent assuming that defendant could have found an appropriate job
for plaintiff but that it made no effort to do so. The majority opinion can be
read, however, as indicating that a demand for a guarantee against Saturday
work by any potential employee from any employer is unreasonable per
se. 9° If the opinion does stand for that proposition, it clearly misconstrues
Hardison and the EEOC regulation. At the very least a requirement that the
employer make "reasonable accommodations" must necessarily mean that
the reasonableness of his efforts is to be examined under the circumstances
of each case. In any event, Jordan certainly suggests that the Hardison
decision did little to alleviate the disagreement that persists among lower
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1977).
85. 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975), rev'd, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
86. 565 F.2d at 74 (citing Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)).
87. Id. at 77 (Winter, J., dissenting).
88. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The employee in Hardison similarly refused Saturday work for
religious reasons and was dismissed after the employer discussed possible solutions with him
and attempted without success to find another worker with whom he could trade shifts. For a
detailed analysis of this case, see Note, Civil Rights-Title VII and the Religious Employee:
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison Retrenches on the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement,
56 N.C.L. REV. 356 (1978).
89. 432 U.S. at 84 & n.15.
90. 565 F.2d at 74, 76.
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courts regarding the application of the reasonable accommodations require-
ment. 91
3. Discrimination Against the Criminally Insane
In State ex rel. Dorothea Dix Hospital v. Davis,92 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a criminally insane person could be charged the
cost of his care in a state mental hospital. Defendant in Davis spent five
years in Dix, the mental hospital, before being declared competent to stand
trial for the murder of his wife. At trial defendant was found not guilty by
reason of insanity and was recommitted to Dix. Approximately nine months
later he was declared sane but was not unconditionally released until four-
teen months later. 93 The State then brought suit to recover the cost of
defendant's care for the entire period of his commitment. 94
The supreme court first decided that section 143-117, which requires
"[a]ll persons admitted to Dorothea Dix Hospital. . . to pay the actual cost
of their care, treatment, training and maintenance," 95 applied to the crimi-
nally insane. 96 The court then rejected defendant's contention that to charge
him for costs during commitment while not charging a prisoner for costs
during incarceration denied defendant equal protection of the laws. The
supreme court reasoned that in both pre- and post-trial commitment defend-
ant was in no sense a prisoner because he had not been found guilty of any
crime; thus he was confined merely for the protection of himself and
society. 97 As a result, the court reasoned, defendant's situation was more
like that of a civilly committed individual than a criminal. In addition, the
court held that requiring payment was not a deprivation of property without
due process because defendant was paying for services actually rendered
and received. 98 Judicial decisions concerning the collection of costs from the
91. See Note, supra note 88, at 362.
92. 292 N.C. 147, 232 S.E.2d 698 (1977).
93. Id. at 150, 232 S.E.2d at 701.
94. Id. at 149, 232 S.E.2d at 700. The superior court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, 27 N.C. App. 479, 219
S.E.2d 660 (1975).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-117 (1974).
96. 292 N.C. at 151-52, 232 S.E.2d at 702.
97. Id. at 152-54, 232 S.E.2d at 702-03. The court also said in dictum that requiring
defendant to pay the costs of care after he was declared sane in a judicial hearing did not
constitute illegal confinement because his mental ailment had been found "in remission" rather
than permanently cured. Id. at 154-55, 232 S.E.2d at 704. North Carolina courts follow the
practice of giving the hearing judge broad discretion in determining when a committed patient
should be released. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Ecker, 479 F.2d 1206, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
State v. Hesse, 117 N.H. -, -, 373 A.2d 345, 347 (1977); State v. Cook, 66 Wis. 2d 25, 31,224
N.W.2d 194, 196-97 (1974).
98. Id. at 156, 232 S.E.2d at 704-05. Defendant's final contentions were that N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-118.1, -120 (1974) effected improper delegations of legislative authority to the
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criminally insane normally turn on the interpretation of state statutes analo-
gous to section 143-117. Although such statutes vary widely from state to
state, the opinion in Davis apparently coincides with decisions of other
courts ruling on similar provisions.
99
4. Summary Ejectment
Plaintiff in Usher v. Waters Insurance & Realty Co.100 challenged the
constitutionality of North Carolina's summary ejectment proceedings. After
a judgment of ejectment was rendered by a magistrate against plaintiff,
allegedly for noise disturbance, plaintiff filed notice of appeal to district
court and at the same time sought a stay of eviction pending appeal. Because
G.S. 42-34(b)0 1 required that summary ejectment appellants post three
months' rent to obtain a stay of eviction, an amount plaintiff alleged she
could not pay, plaintiff's tender of one month's rent was rejected by the
clerk of the district court. Plaintiff then filed suit in federal district court,
which granted her request for a temporary order and a preliminary injunction
restraining her eviction. 102
The United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina held portions of sections 42-34(b), 42-32,103 and North Carolina
Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a),104 to be violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of equal protection. Because the appeal followed a nonjury
proceeding before a magistrate the court found that the three months' rent
bond effectively denied poor tenants a jury trial since none could afford the
cash outlay to stay eviction pending appeal to state district court.105 In
addition, the rigid three months' rent bond figure was not rationally related
to the landlord's potential loss pending final judgment because the appeal to
district court could take anywhere from one to twelve months-not neces-
board of trustees or directors of the hospital, and that he had been denied due process in not
having been given a hearing before the board to challenge the amount charged as "actual
costs." The court found that the statutes set forth sufficient guidelines for the board and that
defendant's opportunity to assert a defense at trial based on the amount charged satisfied his
right to be heard. Id. at 157-59, 232 S.E.2d at 705-06.
99. Compare In re Sargent, 116 N.H. 77, 354 A.2d 404 (1976) (per curiam); In re Estate of
Schneider, 50 III. 2d 152, 277 N.E.2d 870 (1971), and State v. Kosiorek, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 542,
259 A.2d 151 (1969), with Robb v. Estate of Brown, 518 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), and
Ollerton v. Diamenti, 521 P.2d 899 (Utah 1974). See Developments in the Law-Civil Commit-
ment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1365-69 (1974).
100. 438 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D.N.C. 1977). For an additional discussion of this case, dealing
with its possible effects on landlord-tenant law, see this Survey, Property: Landlord-Tenant.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-34(b) (1976).
102. 438 F. Supp. at 1216.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-32 (1976).
104. N.C.R. Civ. P. 62(a).
105. 438 F. Supp. at 1218.
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sarily three. 1°6 The double rent penalty required in case the appeal was
found to be frivolous had the effect of discouraging meritorious as well as
frivolous appeals by poor tenants while it failed to prevent frivolous appeals
by well-to-do tenants. 10 7 Finally, the provision prescribing a ten day waiting
period before execution of all judgments other than those in ejectment-
while allowing immediate execution of summary ejectment decisions-was
held to be arbitrary and a violation of equal protection. 108
Throughout its opinion the court relied heavily on Lindsey v. Nor-
met, 1°9 which involved a challenge to the Oregon Forcible Entry and
Wrongful Detainer Statute. 110 In that case the United States Supreme Court
noted that "[t]he objective of achieving rapid and peaceful settlement of
possessory disputes between landlord and tenant has ample historical expla-
nation and support. It is not beyond the State's power to implement that
purpose by enacting special provisions applicable only to possessory dis-
putes between landlord and tenant." 111 The Lindsey Court found, however,
that a provision requiring a tenant to post a double rent bond as a condition
upon the right to appeal arbitrarily discriminated against tenants who ap-
pealed adverse decisions and was not rationally related to the state's purpose
of protecting the landlord from financial loss.112 Although the district
court's findings in Usher seem correct, the decision extends Lindsey with-
out acknowledging that fact. The Lindsey Court held that once the state
provides a right of appeal, that right cannot be conditioned on posting a
bond unrelated to the landlord's potential loss.' 1 3 The North Carolina provi-
sions are distinguishable in that they did not restrict the right to appeal but
only the right to stay eviction pending appeal. In practical terms, admitted-
ly, this restriction has the same effect as the Oregon statute because few
tenants will pursue their right to appeal when they have already moved to
other quarters following eviction. Thus it seems the district court was
correct in ruling the North Carolina provisions unconstitutional; the court
should, however, have noted the novel context in which it was applying the
Lindsey principle.1
1 4
106. Id. at 1218-19.
107. Id. at 1219.
108. Id.
109. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
110. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 105.105-.160 (1953).
I1i. 405 U.S. at 72.
112. Id. at 76-77.
113. Id. at 78.
114. In other equal protection cases, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Town of
Tayorsville v. Modem Cleaners, 34 N.C. App. 146, 237 S.E.2d 484 (1977), noted that "the
statutory authority of a city to fix and enforce rates for its services and to classify its customers
is not a license to discriminate among customers of essentially the same character and serv-
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D. Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process
1. Property Interest in Employment
In Faulkner v. North Carolina Department of Corrections, 115 a federal
district court found that a North Carolina statute prohibiting the firing of a
permanent state employee without just cause, written charges, and opportu-
nity to appeal1 16 created a property interest in continued employment within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Plaintiff in Faulkner, a former
permanent state employee, filed suit in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983117 alleging that his dismissal"18 without a hearing deprived
him of liberty and property without due process of law; 1 9 plaintiff then
asked for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held
that, because G.S. 126-35120 provides that no permanent employee may be
discharged or suspended except for just cause, the statute created "a rea-
sonable expectation of continued employment and a property interest within
the meaning of the due process clause."'121 In addition, the court found that
the supervisor's published comments attacking plaintiff's honesty hampered
plaintiff's ability to find other employment, thereby "infringing a constitu-
ices." Id. at 149, 237 S.E.2d at 486. The court then held that Taylorsville could not charge
defendant, a sewer-only user, a higher rate for sewer service than it charged its sewer and water
customers for comparable service. Because the higher charge was found to bear "no rational
relation to the cost of service or any other relevant factor," it was declared arbitrary and
discriminatory. Id. In MacDonald v. Newsome, 437 F. Supp. 796 (E.D.N.C. 1977), a surfing
enthusiast launched a freewheeling attack on the constitutionality of a Carteret County, North
Carolina, ordinance that prohibited surfboard riding off private, posted areas and within 500
feet of fishing piers. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
held that surfing was not a constitutionally protected right under the first amendment, an
exchange of commodities or commercial intercourse under the commerce clause, or a property
or liberty interest under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 798-99, The
court then rejected the idea that surfers were a suspect classification for purposes of the equal
protection clause and found the ordinance rationally related to the purpose of protecting
swimmers from surfers and surfers from fishermen. Id. at 799-800.
115. 428 F. Supp. 100 (W.D.N.C. 1977).
116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
118. The alleged grounds for dismissal were that plaintiff had been working at a second job
in violation of department rules and had been using a state car for personal purposes. Plaintiff
was not given a hearing by the director of his department or by the State Personnel Committee.
428 F. Supp. at 101.
119. Plaintiff also asserted that his suspension and dismissal were racially motivated, thus
denying him equal protection of the laws. Id. The court did not address that issue.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-35 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
121. 428 F. Supp. at 103. In support of its finding, the court cited Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). In that decision the Court stated: "To have a property interest in a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than




tionally protected liberty interest." ' 122 Defendants were ordered to reinstate
plaintiff until he was afforded a hearing or until a final decision was reached
on the merits of the case. 123 The court did not award back pay, however,
thus avoiding any decision on whether the eleventh amendment barred an
award by a federal court of back pay that must be paid out of a state
treasury.
124
The court's summary treatment of the issue of property rights in
continued employment fails to reflect the fact that the question is a very
close one. In Bishop v. Wood, 125 a case construing a Marion, North
Carolina ordinance, the United States Supreme Court implied that a statute
"merely conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with certain
specified procedures" 126 would not create a property right for fourteenth
amendment purposes. Because G.S. 126-35 could be readily viewed as such
a statute, the district court should have addressed that issue before ruling on
the case. Recent appellate court cases construing similar statutes, however,
have found a property interest created when the statute in question provides
for removal for cause upon written charges, accompanied by an opportunity
for appellate review.
127
In a case similar to Faulkner, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite result in construing G.S. 115-
142(m)(2) ,128 which provides that no probationary teacher may be denied
reemployment for arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory reasons. Plaintiff
in Sigmon v. Poe129 contended that the statute created a property interest in
her continued employment as a teacher. The Fourth Circuit, after noting that
the construction of the statute was a matter of state law, 130 held that the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Crisp131 established
that G.S. 115-142(m)(2) was merely advisory and therefore plaintiff could
not claim a property interest for fourteenth amendment purposes. 132 In
reaching its decision, however, the Sigmon court clearly misconstrued
122. 428 F. Supp. at 103.
123. Id. at 104.
124. Id. at 103-04. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1973), the Supreme Court declared
that "the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must
be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at
663.
125. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
126. Id. at 345.
127. See, e.g., Olshock v. Village of Skokie, 541 F.2d 1254, 1256-58 (7th Cir. 1976).
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-142(m)(2) (1975).
129. 564 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1977).
130. Id. at 1096; see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. at 344.
131. 286 N.C. 488, 212 S.E.2d 381 (1975).
132. 564 F.2d at 1096.
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Taylor. In that case the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether a
board of education may deny reemployment to a probationary teacher when
the superintendent had recommended rehiring. The supreme court held that
the superintendent's recommendation was advisory-not that the statute
itself was advisory. 133 Thus, even if the Fourth Circuit reached the proper
result in Sigmon, 134 it did so for the wrong reason. 131
2. Involuntary Commitment
Plaintiff in French v. Blackburnt36 launched a broad attack on the
133. Although the supreme court stated that "we hold that Section (m)(2) is advisory
only," this conclusion followed an extensive discussion confined solely to whether the legisla-
ture intended the superintendent's recommendation to be mandatory. The court also stated:
"The manifest purpose of G.S. § 115-142 was to provide teachers of proven ability for the
children of this State by protecting such teachers from dismissal for political, personal,
arbitrary or discriminatory reasons." 286 N.C. at 494-96, 212 S.E.2d at 386. The case does not
rule out the possibility that a property interest was created by the statute.
134. Accord, Siler v. Brady Indep. School Dist., 553 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1977); Ryan v.
Aurora City Bd. of Educ., 540 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
135. In another due process case, Grimes v. Miller, 429 F. Supp. 1350 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd
mem., 98 S. Ct. 600 (1977), the United States Supreme Court affirmed without opinion a three-
judge district court decision upholding North Carolina's body execution statute under a limited
reading that the statute is applicable only when there is probable cause to believe the debtor
"(a) is about to flee the jurisdiction to prevent paying his creditors, (b) has concealed or
diverted assets in fraud of his creditors, or (c) will do so unless immediately detained." 429 F.
Supp. at 1356. The court did, however, strike down a statute that required an imprisoned debtor
to give 20 days' notice to his creditor before a hearing may be held to determine his insolvency,
holding instead that the debtor need give only reasonable notice of the hearing date and his
petition for discharge. 429 F. Supp. at 1357. For a more complete discussion of this case, see
this Survey, Civil Procedure: Enforcement of Judgment.
In State v. Graham, 32 N.C. App. 601, 233 S.E.2d 615 (1977), defendant appealed a
conviction under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977) for felonious larceny in the
unauthorized use of complainant's motorcycle. Defendant, the manager of a trailer court, had
removed the motorcycle from a lot vacated by complainant. Complainant returned for the
motorcycle but defendant refused to return it until complainant paid rent owed by his former
roommate. The court of appeals found the unauthorized use statute unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. The sections of the statute were inconsistent with each other, the court held,
because it was unclear whether the proscribed conduct was actual use of a vehicle or merely the
temporary exercise of control over it. 32 N.C. App. at 605, 233 S.E.2d at 619. In addition some
sections of the statute were limited to motor-propelled conveyances while others were not. Id.
at 606, 233 S.E.2d at 619. As a result, § 14-72.2 was held to violate "constitutional due process
standards of certainty." rd. at 607, 233 S.E.2d at 620.
In another "vagueness" case, State v. Covington, 34 N.C. App. 457, 238 S.E.2d 794
(1977), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 294 N.C. 184,241 S.E.2d 519 (1978), the court of appeals
rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Law of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1084, § 1, 1951 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1087 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 89 (1975)) (recodified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. ch. 89c (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed effective July 1, 1979, Law of June 23, 1977, ch.
712, § 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 901), which requires that a person be licensed to practice
professional engineering and prescribes licensing procedures. The court held that the defendant
in that case had failed to carry his burden of establishing that § 89-2(6), (7), which define
"practice of professional engineering" and "professional engineer," were overly broad and
vague in describing the conduct covered by the chapter. 34 N.C. App. at 460-61, 238 S.E.2d at
797.
136. 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
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constitutionality of North Carolina's involuntary commitment statute. 137 A
three-judge district court found that requiring plaintiff to remain in custody
ten days before receiving a final commitment hearing was not unreasonable
because some time was required for evaluation of his mental condition. 138 In
addition, the notice given plaintiff met due process requirements because it
was "reasonably calculated" to inform him of the time, place and nature of
the hearing and of his right to be represented by counsel; it also allowed him
sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.1 39 The court also saw no problem
in allowing plaintiff's counsel, with court permission, to waive the presence
of plaintiff at the hearing.in4 The court found that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply in a commitment proceeding' 4' and that the
necessity for commitment need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' 42
137. Law of May 23, 1973, ch. 726, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1074 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 to .8 (1974)). In 1977 the General Assembly revised and added to
these sections. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 to .21 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
138. 428 F. Supp. at 1355-56.
139. Id. at 1356-57. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that proper notice must also
indicate the basis for detention, the standard of proof to be employed, and the names of
witnesses to be called at the hearing. rd.
140. The court found it reasonable to assume that counsel and the hearing judge would act
in the patient's best interest, allowing waiver only when it would benefit his mental or physical
state. Id. at 1357-58. Most courts have been less trusting of the bar and more specific in their
requirements. See, e.g., Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 515 (D. Neb. 1975) (counsel may
waive patient's presence only after showing of incompetence); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.
Supp. 1039, 1051 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 119 (1977) (waiver of
presence allowed only upon finding that patient is too ill to attend); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378, 388 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (waiver by counsel allowed upon finding that patient is too ill to
attend).
141. "[T]he purpose and effect of these proceedings are not the finding of facts upon which
a finding of criminal guilt might be based, but treatment; therefore, the privilege does not
apply." 428 F. Supp. at 1359 (citing Dower v. Boslow, 539 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1976); Tippett v.
Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. withdrawn as improvidently granted sub nom.
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
142. The court noted the current split of authority on the burden of proof question but
chose to follow the Fourth Circuit's position on this issue. 428 F. Supp. at 1359-60 & 1359 n. 16.
Compare Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 449 (S.D. Iowa 1976), Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509, 516-17 (D. Neb. 1975), Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974),
and State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 126-27 (W. Va. 1974), with United States ex
rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), rn re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 653-59 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), and Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132 (D. Hawaii 1976). Courts that
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt stress the importance of the patient's liberty interest
and the stigma attached to commitment for mental illness. Other courts, employing the clear
and convincing evidence standard, point to the difficulty of obtaining proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, given the inexact nature of medical science, and to the fact that although a
patient is deprived of liberty he is being aided through treatment.
N.C. GEM. STAT. § 122-58.7(i) (Cum. Supp. 1977) allows commitment only when there is
"clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and
imminently dangerous to himself or others." In two recent decisions, In re Hatley, 291 N.C.
693, 231 S.E.2d 633 (1977), and In re Hogan, 32 N.C. App. 429, 232 S.E.2d 492 (1977), the
North Carolina Supreme Court and North Carolina Court of Appeals, respectively, held that
commitment is justified only upon a clear finding that the patient is imminently dangerous to
himself or others. In Hatley the supreme court found that first hand testimony of erratic driving
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Finally, the district court held that requiring a jury trial in lunacy proceed-
ings while prohibiting a jury trial in commitment proceedings did not
constitute a violation of equal protection.143
Institutionalizing an individual against his will necessarily involves a
finding that his need for treatment and society's need for protection out-
weigh the individual's liberty interest; in depriving him of that interest the
state must afford the individual due process. t44 Thus far the United States
Supreme Court has offered little guidance concerning the due process
standards that must be fulfilled in this unique judicial proceeding; as a
result, state laws vary widely in their procedural requirements. Although the
North Carolina provisions are biased against the rights of the individual,
they do compare favorably with those of most other jurisdictions. 145 The
court's decision in French is in accordance with the majority of the cases on
the subject. 146
3. Disbarment
The court of appeals in In re Palmer 47 considered whether a trial judge
could disbar an attorney for his misconduct during a trial without giving the
attorney notice of the subject of the disbarment hearing. Respondent al-
legedly advised his client, the driver of a truck involved in a hit-and-run
accident, to let his codefendant, a passenger in the truck, take the blame for
the accident. After the jury left for deliberations in the ensuing manslaughter
trial, the alleged misconduct was discovered and a hearing was held at
which respondent's client testified about respondent's conduct. Respondent
was given the opportunity to cross-examine his client but had no prior notice
and previous confinements to mental institutions, along with secondhand testimony of threats
of aggression against others, did not constitute clear and convincing proof that respondent was
imminently dangerous under the statute. 291 N.C. at 696-99, 231 S.E.2d at 635-37. The court of
appeals followed in Hogan with a finding that medical testimony of respondent's frequent
sermonizing on public streets, together with an opinion that future sermons might provoke
aggression by passers-by against respondent, failed to establish that the patient herself was
dangerous. 32 N.C. App. at 434, 232 S.E.2d at 495.
143. The court reasoned that commitment hearings involved a determination of the mental
state of the respondent, a decision beyond the "practical wisdom of the jury." In addition, a
nonjury proceeding allowed more informality and better protection of the privacy of the
respondent. 428 F. Supp. at 1361. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill, supra note 99, at 1294. Cf. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394-95, (M.D. Ala.
1974) (allowing jury trial to consider release after commitment but not prior to commitment
violates equal protection).
144. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, supra note 99, at
1193, 1236-40.
145. See id. at 1203-05.
146. See cases collected in id. at 1201-13.
147. 32 N.C. App. 449, 232 S.E.2d 497 (1977).
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of the subject of the hearing and no opportunity to prepare his defense. 148 At
the conclusion of tfie hearing, the judge indefinitely suspended respondent's
license to practice law in the state. The court of appeals, vacating the
decision of the lower court, held that the license to practice law is a property
right that cannot be abridged without due process, even when the miscon-
duct relates to a matter then before the hearing judge.149
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied upon a 1962 North
Carolina Supreme Court case, In re Burton ,150 in which the court held that
when "the conduct complained of is not related to litigation pending before
the court investigating [the] attorney's alleged misconduct," due process
requires a sworn written complaint and an order advising the attorney of the
specific charges against him, followed by a reasonable time in which to
prepare his defense.' 5 1 The Palmer court correctly extended the Burton
rationale to include instances in which the alleged misconduct is related to
litigation pending before the investigating court. The court of appeals
stopped short, however, of requiring a sworn complaint and a formal order,
holding only that respondent was entitled to notice of the subject of the
disbarment hearing and a reasonable time to prepare his defense.1
52
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 153 the United States Supreme Court held that a
judicial-type hearing requires notice, the opportunity to present and rebut
evidence, the right to have a decision based only on evidence introduced at
the hearing, a proper record of the proceeding and opportunity to obtain
counsel.15 4 With the possible exception of the right to counsel (a question
not before the court), the court of appeals' decision in Palmer explicitly or
implicitly includes each of these requirements. Although the additional
prerequisite of a sworn complaint and a formal order seems desirable in a
disbarment proceeding in view of the magnitude of the property right
involved,155 at present neither is required to satisfy the demands of due
process.
4. Right to Die
The fourteenth amendment forbids deprivation of life without due
process of law, but few courts have recognized as a corollary a constitution-
148. Id. at 449-51, 232 S.E.2d at 497-99.
149. Id. at 452, 232 S.E.2d at 499.
150. 257 N.C. 534, 126 S.E.2d 581 (1962).
151. Id. at 544, 126 S.E.2d at 588-89.
152. 32 N.C. App. at 452, 232 S.E.2d at 499.
153. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
154. Id. at 269-71; see Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-
95 (1975).
155. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
al right to end one's life in appropriate medical circumstances. 156 As a
result, recognition of a "right to die" must normally emanate from state
statutes. The General Assembly added article 23 to chapter 90 of the
General Statutes, making North Carolina one of a growing number of states
allowing use of the so-called "living will," 157 and recognizing cessation of
brain function as an indication of death. G.S. 90-321,158 entitled "Right to a
natural death," authorizes a physician to withhold "extraordinary means"
of life support 59 from a terminally ill person if his condition has been
confirmed by another physician and if the patient has executed a proper
written statement. The statement must be dated, signed by the patient in the
presence of two disinterested witnesses, 160 proved before a clerk or assistant
clerk of superior court, and must request that no extraordinary means be
used to prolong the declarant's life in the event of terminal illness. In
addition, the statute offers a suggested form for declarant, witness and clerk
that is "specifically determined to meet the requirements above." 161 Rather
unusually, the statute does not require that the declarant be fully competent
to execute the written declaration. Although the suggested form contains the
phrase "being of sound. mind," neither the witnesses nor the clerk must
attest to that fact. 162
G.S. 90-322t63 recognizes the "irreversible cessation of brain func-
tion" as an indication of death in certain circumstances. If a person is
comatose, if the attending physician (with confirmation) determines that his
condition is terminal, if there has been an irreversible cessation of brain
function 64 and if a "vital function" is being sustained by extraordinary
156. See, e.g., cases collected in Sharp & Crofts, Death with Dignity, the Physician's Civil
Liability, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 86, 89-95 (1975).
157. See Gurney, Is There a Right to Die?-A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3 CuM.
SAN. L. REV. 235, 255 (1972); Kutner, The Living Will-Coping with the Historical Event of
Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 39 (1975).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
159. The term "extraordinary means" is defined'by the statute as "any medical procedure
or intervention which in the judgment of the attending physician would serve only to postpone
artificially the moment of death by sustaining, restoring, or supplanting a vital function." Id. §
90-321 (a)(2).
160. The witnesses may not be related within the third degree to declarant or declarant's
spouse, may not be the attending physician or an employee of the physician or hospital, and
may not have a claim against declarant's estate or be entitled by will or intestate succession to a
share in declarant's estate. Id. § 90-321(c)(3).
161. Id. § 90-321(d).
162. Conceivably, however, the requirement that the clerk be "satisfied as to the genuine-
ness and due execution of the declaration" could be construed as including a finding that the
declarant was competent. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Cum. Supp. 1977)
(Declarant: "I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and mentally
competent to make this directive." Witness: "The declarant has been personally known to me
and I believe him or her to be of sound mind.").
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
164. Id. § 90-322(a)(l)c.
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means, 165 the person may be declared dead. At that point the "extraordinary
means" may be discontinued at the request of the spouse, guardian or
relatives of the deceased, or by the doctor if no such person is available. 
166
G.S. 90-322 follows the precedent of a California statute,1 67 merely adding
to the existing definitions of point of death rather than superseding them. In
so doing, the General Assembly modernized the law regarding determina-
tion of death without attempting the impossible task of formulating an all-





The newly enacted version of G.S. 14-391 provides that anyone who
restrains, confines or removes another for one of three specified purposes,
165. Id. § 90-322(a)(3).
166. Id. § 90-322(b).
167. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
168. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 77-202 (1977); VA. CODE § 32-364.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This
all-inclusive approach is criticized in Friloux, Death, When Does It Occur?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
10, 17-18 (1975), and in Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining
Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 108-11 (1972). The latter
article advocates a definition of death similar to the one adopted by the North Carolina General
Assembly. See id. at I 1.
In 1977 two important amendments to the North Carolina constitution were ratified by the
people of the state. In a general election held November 8, 1977, the voters amended N.C.
CONST. art. III, § 2(2) to allow the Governor and Lieutenant Governor to succeed themselves in
office. Prior to the amendment, neither office could be filled for successive terms by the same
individual. Also in 1977, N.C. CONST. art. X, § 5 was amended to allow every person, male or
female, the right to insure his or her life for the benefit of spouse or children. The amendment
replaced a provision that allowed a male to insure his life for the benefit of wife or children but
did not make any such allowance for females.
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to
another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person,
or any other person under the age of 16 years without the consent of a parent or legal
custodian of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement,. restraint
or removal is for the purpose of:
(1) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other
person as a shield; or
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person
following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, re-
strained or removed or any other person.
(b) Any person convicted of kidnapping shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than 25 years nor more than life. If the person
kidnapped, as defined in subsection (a), was released by the defendant in a safe place
and had not been sexually assaulted or seriously injured, the person so convicted shall
be punished by imprisonment for not more than 25 years, or by a fine of not more than
ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both, in the discretion of the court.
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including facilitating the commission of a felony, commits the crime of
kidnapping. The North Carolina Court of Appeals in State v. Fulcher
2
construed this statute as requiring substantial restraint, confinement or
removal3 to constitute kidnapping.4 This construction is consistent with both
the Model Penal Code5 and the most recent North Carolina Supreme Court
decisions prior to the enactment of G.S. 14-396 and avoids the potential due
process and equal protection problems of subjecting a defendant to punish-
ment for two crimes when only one has been committed. 7 The strength of
the court of appeals' interpretation, however, may be undercut by its
reliance on cases decided under the common law rather than on the basis of
the actual wording and the probable intent of the new statute.8 This may
affect the way the supreme court treats this decision on appeal.
[EDITORIAL NOTE: On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme
Court rejected this statutory construction, 294 N. C. 503, 243 S.E.2d
338 (1978). The supreme court held that the legislature had passed
G.S. 14-39 in order to redefine that court's common law definition
of kidnapping, and that the legislature clearly intended any re-
straint, confinement or removal to be sufficient to constitute kid-
napping. Because it is not unconstitutional to charge a defendant
with two separate and distinct crimes, even if they closely follow one
another, the court held that the statute was not unconstitutional on
its face. The supreme court noted that it was not at liberty to
construe the statute in a manner at variance with the legislative
2. 34 N.C. App. 233, 237 S.E.2d 909 (1977), aff'd, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
3. The court noted that both unlawful asportation and unlawful confinement must in-
volve unlawful restraint. Thus the State may charge solely on unlawful restraint, and similarly
the trial judge may limit his definition and explanation to the term "unlawful restraint." Id. at
238, 241-42, 237 S.E.2d at 913, 915. Compare State v. Dammons, 293 N.C, 263,237 S.E.2d 834
(1977), in which the State charged defendant with "removing" the victim and the judge
instructed the jury on the entire statute. For this error, the supreme court ordered a new trial.
4. 34 N.C. App. at 240, 237 S.E.2d at 914. The court set out guidelines for future trials
that provided in substance that the trial judge must define the three terms to the jury as meaning
substantial confinement, restraint or removal and not that merely incidental to the commission
of another crime. Id. at 241, 237 S.E.2d at 915.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place
of residence or business, or a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found,
or if he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in a place of isolation, with
any of the following purposes:
(a) to hold for ransom or reward, or as shield or hostage; or
(b) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political function.
Kidnapping is a felony of the first degree unless the actor voluntarily releases the
victim alive and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is a felony of the second
degree. A removal or confinement is unlawful within the meaning of this Section if it is
accomplished by force, threat or deception . ...
6. See text accompanying notes 11-18 infra.
7. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
8. See Criminal Law-Kidnapping in North Carolina-A Statutory Definition for the
Offense, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 434 (1976), for a general commentary on § 14-39, and on how
other jurisdictions have interpreted similar statutes.
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intent, even if that construction would make the statute more desira-
ble and would free it from potential constitutional difficulties. The
court did recommend, however, that the legislature rewrite the law
to make asportation an essential element of kidnapping, and to
require more than a minor asportation.]
Defendant in Fulcher forced his way into a motel room occupied by
two women. After making the women lie down, he bound their wrists and
forced them to have oral sex with him. Defendant was convicted of both the
crime against nature and kidnapping. 9 On appeal, he challenged the
constitutionality of G.S. 14-39 on the ground that it violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution by subjecting
him to convictions for two crimes when only one had been committed. The
court of appeals found that each victim was bound and restrained for a
substantial period of time and that the restraint was not merely incidental to
the commission of the crime against nature because the restraint was
committed against one victim while he was committing the crime upon the
other. 10 Thus, the court found two distinct crimes regardless of the breadth
of the definition applied to "restraint," leaving no constitutional issue on
the facts of this case. Nonetheless, the court construed the statute to avoid
any future constitutional challenges.
The court relied on State v. Roberts,II State v. Dix12 and the Model
Penal Code for guidance on what constituted kidnapping. Both Roberts and
Dix, however, were decided under the former version of G.S. 14-39, which
simply incorporated the common law definition of kidnapping. 13 The court
in Dix repudiated the former rule that "any carrying away is sufficient,"
14
requiring a finding of more than "mere technical asportation" incidental to
the crime.15 The Dix court considered in depth the policy reasons for its
decision, such as the need to consider the increased risk to the victim, 16 and
carefully distinguished cases from other jurisdictions that defined asporta-
tion to include any removal by noting that they all had been decided under
statutory definitions of kidnapping rather than under the common law
9. 34 N.C. App. at 235, 237 S.E.2d at 911. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive
10 year sentences on the crime against nature charges, to run concurrently with a 28-40 year
sentence on the consolidated kidnapping charge.
10. Id. at 240-41, 237 S.E.2d at 914.
11. 286 N.C. 265, 210 S.E.2d 1396 (1974).
12. 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973).
13. See State v. Lowry, 263 N.C. 536, 539-41, 139 S.E.2d 870, 872-74, cert. denied, 382
U.S. 22 (1965).
14. This former rule was most recently stated in State v. Ingland, 278 N.C. 42, 178 S.E.2d
577 (1971).
15. 282 N.C. at 502, 193 S.E.2d at 904.
16. Id. at 501-02, 193 S.E.2d at 903-04. Defendant in Dix marched a jailor 62 feet through
the jail at gunpoint and then locked him in a cell. The court reversed the kidnapping conviction,
holding that the asportation and detention were incidental to the principal crime and did not
expose the jailor to any additional risk.
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definition.' 7 Similarly, in Roberts the court held that the victim must be
held "for some appreciable period of time" and that he must be carried
"beyond the immediate victinity of the place of such false imprison-
ment." '18
Although the court in Fulcher noted that G.S. 14-39 may have been
rewritten in order to limit the impact of cases such as Dix and Roberts, 19 it
chose not to consider this evidence of legislative intent. The new statute was
passed shortly after these cases were decided and eliminated the common
law requirement of asportation as an element of kidnapping. That the
legislature was attempting to redefine kidnapping completely is further
shown by the statute's listing of three specific purposes for which the
removal or restraint must have been committed. The court of appeals, in
attempting to "maintain judicial consistency without doing violence to the
legislative intent to change the elements of common law kidnapping," '20
relied more heavily on these earlier cases than it did on the legislative
language and reasonable interpretations thereof.21
The court's reliance on the Model Penal Code further exposes the
possible inconsistency between the new statute and the common law rule.22
The Model Penal Code is similar to the new North Carolina statute, yet it
expressly qualifies both "asportation" and "confinement." Asportation
must be "a substantial distance from the vicinity"; confinement must be
"for a substantial period in a place of isolation.''23 The North Carolina
legislature chose not to include these definitions, and instead produced a
statute that apparently, by not including any specific qualifications as to
time or distance, made any restraint, confinement or removal sufficient to
constitute kidnapping.
17. 282 N.C. at 495, 193 S.E.2d at 900.
18. 286 N.C. at 277, 210 S.E.2d at 404. The Roberts court reversed a kidnapping convic-
tion of a man who had grabbed a seven year old child from a playground and dragged her 80-90
feet.
19. As the court stated in Fulcher, "It is possible that the two decisions had some
influence on the enactment of the new statute which defined kidnapping and eliminated
asportation as a necessary element of the crime." 34 N.C. App. at 236, 237 S.E.2d at 912.
20. Id. at 240, 237 S.E.2d at 914.
21. Id. at 236-40, 237 S.E.2d at 913-15; see, e.g., State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d
720 (1976). Under statutory language similar to that in North Carolina, the Kansas Supreme
Court first noted that the legislature had purposefully not used the "substantial" language of
the Model Penal Code, but then held that the word "facilitate" as used in "facilitate the
commission of any felony" meant more than slight, inconsequential and merely incidental
taking or confining. Id. at 213-16, 547 P.2d at 729-31. See also State v. Williams, Ill Ariz. 222,
526 P.2d 1244 (1974).
22. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 281 Minn. 119, 222, 160 N.W.2d 715,717 (1968) (significant
that legislature chose not to follow language of Model Penal Code; since legislature had chosen
to enact the statute without any qualifications as to time and distance, it was held not
appropriate for court to rewrite law).
23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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The Fulcher court argued that without this judicial construction the
statute might face constitutional problems as a violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses. 24 As the court noted, it is difficult to imagine
any felony against the person not involving some unlawful restraint and thus
falling within the broad definition of kidnapping. This inclusive definition
could easily lead to prosecutorial abuse, with "prosecutions for kidnapping
for the sole purpose of securing the more severe statutory punishment for
crimes not subject to such severe penalties.' 25
The recent North Carolina case State v. Vawter26 illustrates this prob-
lem. Defendants in that case took the keys and pocketbook of a store
employee and then forced him to wheel a shopping cart full of cigarettes to
the front of the store. When a police car approached the store, defendant
held the employee by the top of his pants in front of the store and told him to
get rid of the police. Since the restraint was for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of a felony and flight thereafter, one of the purposes listed in
the statute, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient to show
kidnapping. The court stated that the employee "was forced to aid in the
robbery of the store by pushing the carts. "27 In other words, the robbery
was still under way when he was kidnapped. The court did not discuss the
question of "substantial" removal or restraint, nor did it discuss the
constitutional problems of allowing the prosecutor to choose either or both
of two crimes to charge for a single set of acts. The essential elements of the
two crimes were separate, so technically there were two crimes.
Despite the Fulcher court's concern with the constitutionality of a strict
reading of G.S. 14-39, the mere possibility of prosecutorial abuse does not
necessarily rise to constitutional proportions. As long as the elements of the
two crimes are not identical, there is no constitutional prohibition against
making one act subject to two separate statutory crimes. 28 Rather than
24. 34 N.C. App. at 239, 237 S.E.2d at 914; see Kidnapping and the Element of Asporta-
tion, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 212, 216 (1962) (suggesting that it could be a violation of equal
protection to allow the prosecutor alone to decide whether to prosecute for one of two offenses
with the same essential elements).
25. 34 N.C. App. at 238-39, 237 S.E.2d at 913.
26. 33 N.C. App. 131, 234 S.E.2d 438, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977).
27. Id. at 138, 234 S.E.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 274-76, 237 S.E.2d 834, 841-43 (1977).
Only when all the essentials of the lesser offense are also included among the essentials of the
greater offense will the law merge them and treat the less serious charge as a "lesser included
offense." State v. Stepney, 280 N.C. 306, 318, 185 S.E.2d 844, 852 (1972). Thus, even when all
injuries arise out of the same explosion, two separate offenses punishable under two separate
statutes can occur. State v. Sanders, 288 N.C. 285,293,218 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1091 (1976). The practical test to determine if the elements are identical is to eliminate
the elements in one charge and determine whether the remaining facts would support the other
charge. When, for instance, the facts of the kidnapping could be eliminated and the rape
conviction still stand, and the facts of the rape could be eliminated and the kidnapping still
stand, a defendant can be convicted for both offenses. State v. Burchett, 107 Ariz. 185, 190, 484
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seeking support for its reading of the statute in a dubious constitutional
argument, the court of appeals should have based its decision on rather clear
policy reasons .29 The maximum penalty for any crime should be determined
under the applicable criminal statute, not by a discretionary additional
charge of kidnapping. Thus, some courts have construed similar statutory
language on the basis of legislative intent30 or "common sense," 31 thereby
avoiding results such as an additional kidnapping conviction for forcing
someone into an adjoining room in the process of committing a felony
without regard to the nature of the crime or the increased risk to the victim.
As the Model Penal Code points out, the "criminologically nonsignificant
circumstance that the victim was detained or moved incident to the crime"
should not determine "whether the offender lives or dies. "32
One court has held under a similar kidnapping statute that "it is the
duty of the prosecutor, the court, and the correctional authorities to modify
. . .the sentence . . . so that it will be commensurate with the gravity of
the crime and the harm or potential harm which ig inflicted by the defend-
ant." ' 33 By reading G.S. 14-39 in light of the common law requirement of
more than a technical asportation or confinement, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals has adopted a much more direct solution to this problem. The
court would have stood on firmer ground, however, if it had reached its
conclusion by interpreting the language of the statute or by referring to the
common sense intent of the legislature rather than by trying to
constitutionalize the result.
B. Rape
A defendant's conviction for first degree rape may require a victim's
submission procured by the infliction of serious bodily injury.34 The North
P.2d 181, 186 (1971). Thus, a kidnapping conviction and a rape conviction can be upheld when
the victim is taken from one room to another in defendant's house and raped. State v. Williams,
111 Ariz. 222, 526 P.2d 1244 (1974).
29. See generally State v. Dix, 282 N.C. 490, 193 S.E.2d 897 (1973); MODEL PENAL CODE §
212.1, Comment, at 11-17 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960); Note, A Rationale of the Law of
Kidnapping, 53 COLO. L. REv. 540 (1953).
30. See, e.g., State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 213-16, 547 P.2d 720,729-31(1976), discussed
in note 21 supra.
31. See, e.g., People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969);
People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938
(1965).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1, Comment, at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
33. State v. Morris, 281 Minn. 119, 124, 160 N.W.2d 715, 718 (1968).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1977), provides in pertinent part:
Every person who ravishes and carnally knows any female of the age of 12 years or
more by force and against her will . . . shall be guilty of rape, and upon conviction,
shall be punished as follows:
(1) First-Degree Rape-
b. If the person guilty of rape is more than 16 years of age, and the rape victim
had her resistance overcome or her submission procured by the use of a deadly
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Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Roberts35 construed for the first time the
rape statute's meaning of the phrase "serious bodily injury," finding the
phrase to be words of ordinary significance that need not be defined by the
court in its instructions to the jury.36 The court's holding accords with the
generally accepted construction of that phrase.
37
Defendant in Roberts raped the prosecuting witness, overcoming her
resistance by striking her two times in the jaw with his fist. 38 The battery
knocked five teeth out of alignment and broke the root of one tooth.
39
Defendant, strictly interpreting G.S. 14-21(1)(b), 4° contended that the in-
jury inflicted did not amount to a serious bodily injury.41 The supreme court
disagreed.
Justice Huskins, writing for the court, utilized case law42 construing the
offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting
serious injury43 and analogous cases from other jurisdictions 44 to interpret
the meaning of "serious bodily injury" in the rape statute. North Carolina
law dealing with aggravated assaults was not on point in Roberts because
weapon, or by the infliction of serious bodily injury to her, the punishment shall be
death ....
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of evidentiary developments involving the subject of
rape, see this Survey, Evidence: Character-The Rape Shield Statute.
35. 293 N.C. 1, 235 S.E.2d 203 (1977).
36. Id. at 14, 235 S.E.2d at 211-12.
37. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 5 Ariz. App. 315,426 P.2d 415 (1967); State v. McKeehan, 91
Idaho 808, 430 P.2d 886 (1967); Andrason v. Sheriff, Washoe County, 88 Nev. 589, 503 P.2d 15
(1972); Thomas v. State, 55 Tex. Crim. 293, 116 S.W. 600 (1909); La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d
327, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976); 11 C.J.S. Bodily 374, 378 (1938).
38. 293 N.C. at 4, 235 S.E.2d at 206. "G.S. 14-21(a)(2) . . . does not mean that the
victim's resistance must completely cease in order to be 'overcome' by infliction of serious
bodily injury. The statute means that the assailant is guilty of first degree rape if . . . the
victim's resistance is rendered ineffectual by the infliction of serious bodily injury." Id. at 17,
235 S.E.2d at 213.
39. Id. at 4, 235 S.E.2d at 206.
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
41. 293 N.C. at I1, 235 S.E.2d at 210.
42. Id. at 13, 235 S.E.2d at 211 (citing State v. White, 270 N.C: 78, 153 S.E.2d 774 (1967)
(knife wounds requiring 64 stitches to close); State v. Ferguson, 261 N.C. 558, 135 S.E.2d 626
(1964) (whiplash injury); State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E.2d 1 (1962) (.410 shotgun wound
in the back)).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides: "Any person who assaults
another person with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicts serious injury is guilty of a
felony punishable by a fine, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both such fine and
imprisonment."
44. See State v. Miller, 16 Ariz. App. 92, 491 P.2d 481 (1971) (bruise on ear, abrasions on
hand and knee, and jaw fractured); State v. Perry, 5 Ariz. App. 315, 426 P.2d 415 (1967) (two
and one-half inch cut, black eye and broken rib); State v. McKeehan,'91 Idaho 808,430 P.2d 886
(1967) (bruises, swelling, cuts and eye injury); Brooks v. Sheriff, Clark County, 89 Nev. 260,
510 P.2d 1371 (1973) (cut on head, swollen eyes and head); Andrason v. Sheriff, Washoe
County, 88 Nev. 589, 503 P.2d 15 (1972) (kick in groin, area swollen and black and blue);
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 111, 346 A.2d 319 (1975) (broken nose, two
black eyes and other head wounds requiring stitches); La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 246
N.W.2d 794 (1976) (twelve wounds needing stitching and minor cuts, abrasions and bruises).
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aggravated assault requires the infliction of a serious injury through the use
of a deadly weapon.45 Defendant in Roberts did not employ such a weapon
in inflicting the victim's injury. As Justice Huskins apparently recognized,
however, first degree rape requires merely a "submission procured by the
use of a deadly weapon, or by the infliction of serious bodily injury,"
46
implying that the infliction of serious bodily injury can be achieved without
the use of a lethal weapon.
In State v. Perry,47 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the old
form of indictment for rape, used prior to the division of that crime into two
degrees, 48 was insufficient to support a conviction of first degree rape.
Although subsequently countered by legislative action, 49 the Perry court
held that an indictment for first degree rape must allege that the defendant
was more than sixteen years of age at the time of the offense and that he used
deadly force to commit the crime.50 The Perry court did find the old form of
indictment sufficient, however, to support a conviction and sentence for
second degree rape." Defendant in Perry was indicted for raping his
neighbor. The indictment charged only that defendant "with force and arms
• . did, unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously ravish and carnally know [the
prosecuting witness] a female, by force and against her will by use and
threatened use of firearm or other dangerous weapon." 52 The evidence at
trial subsequently established that defendant was nineteen years of age.
53
The jury found defendant guilty of first degree rape.
Justice Lake, writing for the Perry court, attempted to distinguish State
v. Courtney,54 in which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that one
convicted of assault upon a female may be sentenced to a longer term of
45. See notes 34 & 43 supra.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added), quoted in note 34
supra.
47. 291 N.C. 586, 231 S.E.2d 262 (1977).
48. There was only one degree of rape in North Carolina before § 14-21 was amended in
1974. "Rape is the carnal knowledge of a female person [more than 12 years of age] by force
and against her will." State v. Hines, 286 N.C. 377, 380, 211 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1975). Chapter
1201 of the Session Laws of 1973, Law of Apr. 8, 1974, ch. 1201, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d
Sess. 323, divided rape into separate offenses: first and second degree rape. Section 14-21
retained, however, the traditional definition of rape per se. Id. (current version codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
49. See text accompanying notes 59 & 60 infra.
50. 291 N.C. at 592, 231 S.E.2d at 266.
51. Id. at 595, 231 S.E.2d at 267. The court held that "[a] verdict of guilty of rape in the
first degree necessarily includes the jury's determination that the defendant is guilty of each
element of rape in the second degree." Id. at 591, 231 S.E.2d at 266. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21(2)
(Cum. Supp. 1977) provides: "Second-Degree Rape-Any other offense of rape defined in this
section shall be a lesser-included offense of rape in the first degree and shall be punished by
imprisonment in the State's prison for life, or for a term of years, in the discretion of the
court."
52. 291 N.C. at 592, 231 S.E.2d at 266 (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 587, 231 S.E.2d at 263.
54. 248 N.C. 447, 103 S.E.2d 861 (1958).
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imprisonment if the jury finds that defendant was over eighteen years of age,
even though the indictment failed to allege his age. 55 According to the
Courtney court, the age requirement for sexual offenses in the assault statute
was added simply to provide for punishment of the offender-not to create a
new offense or to divide the existing offense into degrees. 56 Defendant's age
was not considered an essential element of the crime and, therefore, was not
held to be an essential allegation in the indictment for sexual assault. Justice
Lake distinguished Perry from Courtney on the ground that a 1973 amend-
ment to G.S. 14-21 divided the crime of rape into two distinct offenses, and
defendant's age was intended to be an essential element only of first degree
rape. 57 The distinction appears somewhat superficial, however, as the crime
of rape was separated into degrees solely for punishment purposes.58 A
defendant's age is determinative of his punishment for rape and, therefore,
is an essential allegation in an indictment for first degree rape. Logic
dictates that if a defendant's age is determinative of his punishment for
sexual assault, it also should have been an essential allegation in the
Courtney indictment for sexual assault f defendant was to te subjected to
the possibility of a longer term of imprisonment.
The General Assembly, in apparent reaction to the Perry decision,
enacted G.S. 15-144.159 to prescribe the essentials of bills of indictment for
rape. The Act provides in essence, that the old form of indictment for
rape is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty of first degree rape, rape in
the second degree, assault with intent to commit rape or assault on a
female.60 Whether the Act comports with a defendant's right, guaranteed by
the North Carolina Constitution, to be informed of the accusation against
him is not clear.6 Although the general rule in North Carolina is that an
indictment for a statutory offense is sufficient if the crime is charged in the
words of the statute, the rule is inapplicable when the words of the statute
fail to set forth all of the crime's essential elements.
62
55. Id. at 456, 103 S.E.2d at 868. The offense of assault on a female presumes a defendant
to be over 18 years of age, in the absence of evidence offered by the defendant to the contrary.
Id. at 450-51, 103 S.E.2d at 864.
56. Id. at 450, 103 S.E.2d at 864.
57. Id. at 597, 231 S.E.2d at 269; see notes 34 & 48 supra.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part: "Every person
• . .guilty of rape . .. shall be punished as follows: (1) First-Degree Rape-(a) . .. the
punishment shall be death. (2) Second-Degree Rape ...punished by imprisonment in the
State's prison for life, or for a term of years, in the discretion of the court." Id. (emphasis
added).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-144.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
60. Id. § 15-144.1(a).
61. "In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has the right to be
informed of the accusation ...." N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23.
62. See State v. Barnes, 253 N.C. 711, 117 S.E.2d 849 (1961); 7 J. STRtONG, N.C. INDEX
Indictment and Warrant § 9, at 125 (3d ed. 1976).
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Section 15-144.1 appears to be modeled after section 15-144 and
section 15-172, which provide that the old form of indictment for murder, 63
used prior to the division of that crime into two degrees, is sufficient to
support a verdict of guilty of first or second degree murder without allega-
tions of deliberation or premeditation, essential elements of murder in the
first degree. 64 Sections 15-144 and 15-172 have withstood numerous chal-
lenges to their constitutionality. 65 The old form of indictment for murder,
however, may be distinguishable from the old form of indictment for rape
with respect to their omitted essential elements. The old murder indictment
alleged that the defendant killed with "malice aforethought," which ap-
pears to satisfy the omitted elements of deliberation and premeditation.
There is no analogous provision in the old rape indictment from which one
may infer a defendant's age.
C. Safecracking
State v. Thomas66 ultimately pitted Chief Justice against Chief Judge
and General Assembly against supreme court in determining exactly what
constitutes the crime of safecracking. Within a five month period in 1977
the North Carolina Supreme Court strictly construed, and the General
Assembly broadened, the crime of safecracking. In Thomas the supreme
court held that safecracking required the unlawful opening of a safe by the
use of safecracking implements. 67 In apparent reaction to the Thomas
decision, the General Assembly amended the safecracking statute to pros-
cribe the unlawful opening of a safe by the use of any safecracking means. 68
Defendant in Thomas opened a safe whose combination was partially
dialed (for convenience) by dialing the last digit of the combination, and
was convicted for felonious larceny and safecracking. 69 The court of appeals
63. See, e.g., State v. Arnold, 107 N.C. 861, 11 S.E. 990 (1890).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-144, -172 (1975).
65. See, e.g., State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 17, 194 S.E.2d 800 (1973).
66. 292 N.C. 251, 232 S.E.2d 411 (1977).
67. Law of Apr. 19, 1973, ch. 235, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws Ist Sess. 323 (formerly
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-89.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975)) (amended 1977), provided:
Any person who shall by the use of explosives, drills, or tools unlawfully force open or
attempt to force open or "pick" the combination of a safe or vault used for storing
money or other valuables, shall, upon conviction thereof, receive a sentence, in the
discretion of the trial judge, of not less than two years nor more than 30 years in the
State penitentiary.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-89.1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of safecracking if he unlawfully opens, enters, or attempts to
open or enter a safe or vault: (1) By the use of explosives, drills, or tools; or (2)
Through the use of a stolen combination, key, electronic device, or other fraudulently
acquired implement or means; or (3) Through the use of a master key, duplicate key or
device made or obtained in an unauthorized manner, stethoscope or other listening
device, electronic device used for unauthorized entry in a safe or vault, or other
surreptitious means; or (4) By the use of any other safecracking implement or means.
69. 292 N.C. at 252, 232 S.E.2d at 413.
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vacated the safecracking conviction for lack of evidence that some sort of
safecracking implement was employed to pick or force open the safe.
70
Chief Judge Brock dissented, advocating a sufficiently broad definition of
the verb "pick" to cover defendant's act and contending that the majority
holding misconstrued and unduly limited the statute's intended purpose-to
protect the property secured in a safe.
71
Chief Justice Sharp, writing for the Thomas court, strictly construed
the safecracking statute and affirmed the court of appeals' majority decision.
Citing dictionary definitions of the verb "pick''72 and utilizing traditional
rules of grammatical and statutory construction, the court held that in order
to pick a safe under the statute73 one had to use "explosives, drills, or
tools." ,74 As the Chief Justice seemed to recognize, the safecracking statute,
given the severity of its penalty, 75 was intended to punish a certain type of
criminal: one with the expertise to pick or the preparation to force open a
safe. Defendant in Thomas was not such a criminal.
76
Shortly after the Thomas decision, the General Assembly broadened
the scope of safecracking to cover the unlawful opening of a safe "[b]y the
use of any . . . safecracking implement or means. " 77 It remains unclear,
however, whether defendant's act in Thomas would fall within the expand-
ed scope of the statute. The statute is silent on whether the combination dial
on a safe is a type of safecracking implement, or whether the mere turning of
the combination dial to a position that allows the door to be opened
constitutes a means of safecracking. The timing of the amendment in
relation to the Thomas decision, however, provides a strong inference of a
legislative intent to proscribe such action under the amended statute.
D. Habitual Offenders
The purpose of recidivist statutes is to provide enhanced punishment
for those convicted of a crime who have previously been convicted of other
70. 31 N.C. App. 52,228 S.E.2d 468 (1976), discussed in 55 N.C.L. REV. 976,977 (1976).
71. Id. at 57, 228 S.E.2d at 470 (Brock, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Brock condemned
the majority's attempt to ascribe to the General Assembly "an intent to punish for damage to
the safe." Id.
72. The supreme court cited the definitions of the transitive verb "pick" in WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1951): "to open (a lock) by or as by a wire," and in the
"more casual" WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971): "to turn (a lock)
with a wire or a pointed tool instead of the key esp. with intent to steal." 292 N.C. at 254, 232
S.E.2d at 414.
73. See note 67 supra.
74. 292 N.C. at 253-54, 232 S.E.2d at 413-14.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-89.1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977), provides: "Safecracking is a felony
punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than two nor more than 30 years."
76. Defendant in Thomas "demonstrated neither particular preparation nor prowess."
292 N.C. at 254, 232 S.E.2d at 414.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-89.1(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Compare note 67 supra (quoting
pre-amendment statute) with note 68 supra (quoting post-amendment statute).
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crimes. 78 In State v. Allen ,79 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
proceeding under the Habitual Felons Act80 (the Act) must be attached to a
pending felony prosecution and cannot be brought subsequent to the felony
conviction. As the Act also provides that the substantive guilt must be tried
separately from the recidivist issue,81 the court thus confirmed that the
legislature intended to adopt the two-pronged procedure recommended by
most modern authorities.
8 2
Defendant in Allen pleaded guilty at different times to three successive
felonies; each felony was committed after conviction for the prior one,
thus satisfying the requirements of the Act.8 3 Allen had been sentenced on
all three of these convictions when the State indicted, tried and obtained a
conviction under the Habitual Felons Act. He was then sentenced to an
additional twenty years. On appeal, the court reversed Allen's conviction,
holding that the Act does not authorize such a proceeding after all the
underlying felony prosecutions have been completed and that defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment should, therefore, have been allowed.8 4
In seeking the recidivist conviction, the State relied on language in the
Act stating that the indictment charging the habitual felon status "shall be
separate from the indictment charging him with the principal felony" and
that the issue "may be presented to the same jury." 5 The court summarily
dismissed this argument as missing the point of the Act. 6 The court noted
that there are three basic types of multiple offender procedures:87 (1) the
same jury simultaneously tries the substantive offense and the recidivism
issue;88 (2) the habitual felon charge is filed after the completion of the
underlying felony prosecution;8 9 and (3) the indictment is separated into two
parts, one charging the recidivist status and one charging the substantive
crime. The third type provides defendants with the greatest amount of
78. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556 (1967). See generally Note, Recidivist
Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 332 (1965).
79. 292 N.C. 431, 233 S.E.2d 585 (1977).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-7.1 to .6 (1969 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
81. Id. § 14-7.5 (1969).
82. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-68 (1967); Note, supra note 78, at 348;
Note, New Jersey's Habitual Criminal Act, 11 RUTGERs L. REV. 654, 667-68 (1957). See also,
e.g., Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84, 114-15 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 909 (1965); Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 136, 167 (1964).
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
84. 292 N.C. at 432, 436, 233 S.E.2d at 586, 589.
85. Id. at 435, 233 S.E.2d at 588 (emphasis omitted).
86. Id. at 436, 233 S.E.2d at 588.
87. Id. at 434, 233 S.E.2d at 587-88; see Note, supra note 78.
88. This type of proceeding withstood constitutional attack in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S.
554 (1967).
89. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 324 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1




protection. Unlike the second type, it ensures that defendants are fully
informed of the charge and potential sentence before they plead. 90 The third
procedure also provides more protection than the first in that the jury trying
substantive guilt is not influenced by a defendant's prior record.
A careful reading of the Habitual Felons Act shows that North Carolina
chose this third procedure. G.S. 14-7.3 states that "[a]n indictment which
charges a person . . .with the commission of any felony . . .must, in
order to sustain a conviction of habitual felon, also charge that said person is
an habitual felon. "91 G.S. 14-7.5 provides that when a defendant is indicted
for both a felony and for being an habitual felon, he shall be tried for the
felony without the indictment charging him with being an habitual felon
being revealed to the jury until the issue of substantive guilt has been
determined. For the convenience of the court, the same jury may then be
used to decide the habitual felon charge, but the subsequent proceeding
"shall be as if the issue of habitual felon were a principal charge.' '92 Thus
both protections for the defendant are contained in the Act.
The rationale underlying habitual felon statutes is that a defendant's
prior conduct justifies increased punishment. 93 The supreme court's in-
terpretation of the North Carolina statute in Allen, however, reflects an
awareness that recidivism is for all practical purposes being treated as a
crime distinct from the underlying felony.
94
E. Double Jeopardy
The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. McKenzie 95 expressly
recognized for the first time the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppe196 in criminal proceedings. 97 In McKenzie, the court held that a
defendant's acquittal "precludes the state from relitigating in a subsequent
90. Failure to provide this notice when a guilty plea on a substantive crime is accepted
may well vitiate the guilty plea as not being made with full understanding of the consequences.
Note, supra note 78, at 348. The same notice requirements prevail with jury verdicts because
the statute makes no distinction between guilty pleas and jury verdicts of guilt. 292 N.C. at 436,
233 S.E.2d at 588 (citing United States v. Edwards, 379 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Fla. 1974)). But see
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962) (holding that since the two determinations are
essentially independent, "due process does not require advance notice that the trial on the
substantive offense will be followed by an habitual criminal proceeding").
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.3 (1969).
92. Id. § 14-7.5.
93. 292 N.C. at 435, 233 S.E.2d at 588.
94. See Note, supra note 78, at 350.
95. 292 N.C. 170, 232 S.E.2d 424 (1977).
96. "'Collateral estoppel' . . . stands for an extremely important principle in our adver-
sary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same
parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
97. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court apparently recognized the doctrine of
collateral estoppel in State v. Midgett, 214 N.C. 107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938), the court actually held
that the doctrine did not apply to the facts of that case, id. at ill, 198 S.E. at 615.
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prosecution any issue necessarily decided in favor of the defendant in the
former acquittal.,"98 North Carolina, therefore, joins a growing number of
jurisdictions applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal proceed-
ings .99
Although defendant in McKenzie was originally charged in district
court with operating a vehicle on the public highway while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of G.S. 20-138(a), 1°° he was
convicted of the lesser included offense of operating a motor vehicle with a
blood alcohol content of .10%101 in violation of G.S. 20-138(b). 102 On
appeal to superior court for trial de novo, defendant's case was consolidated
for trial with an outstanding manslaughter indictment against him arising
from the same incident. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both
charges. 10 3 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that defendant's acquittal
of driving under the influence in district court did not bar the superior court
from instructing the jury that a violation of that offense could be a basis for
convicting defendant of involuntary manslaughter, provided that there was
evidence that defendant was driving under the influence at the time in
question.l°4 The supreme court disagreed, but affirmed on the ground that
defendant's failure to raise his district court acquittal in superior court
constituted a waiver of the double jeopardy defense he would otherwise
have had. 0 5
There is a considerable degree of conflict among jurisdictions regard-
ing whether a conviction or acquittal in an inferior court having no juris-
diction over a greater charge bars a subsequent prosecution in a superior
98. 292 N.C. at 175, 232 S.E.2d at 428.
99. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203, 228-33 (1966).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138(a) (1975). The offense of driving under the influence of
intoxicating liquor consists of three elements: (1) driving a vehicle; (2) upon a highway within
the state; (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. State v. Kellum, 273 N.C. 348,
349, 160 S.E.2d 76,77 (1968) (per curiam); State v. Haddock, 254 N.C. 162, 165, 118 S.E.2d 411,
413 (1961).
101. 292 N.C. at 172, 232 S.E.2d at 426. Defendant's conviction of driving with the
proscribed blood alcohol content level constituted an acquittal in the district court of driving
under the influence. See State v. Miller, 272 N.C. 243, 246, 158 S.E.2d 47, 49 (1967); State v.
Broome, 269 N.C. 661, 666, 153 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-170 (1975).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138(b) (1975). A violator of subsection (b) is eligible for limited
driving privileges. Id. § 20-179(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
103. 292 N.C. at 172, 232 S.E.2d at 426.
104. State v. McKenzie, 29 N.C. App. 524, 528,225 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1976), discussed in 55
N.C.L. REv. 976, 984 (1976). Judge Hedrick wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge
Brock concurred; Judge Clark dissented. Judge Clark relied on State v. Heitter, 57 Del. 595, 203
A.2d 69 (1964), in his dissenting opinion. See 29 N.C. App. at 529,225 S.E.2d at 154. Defendant
in Heitter was acquitted by a justice of the peace of two statutory misdemeanors of reckless
driving and driving while intoxicated. The Heitter court held that defendant's acquittal was res
judicata to a prosecution for manslaughter upon counts in the indictment alleging the same acts.
57 Del. at 601, 203 A.2d at 72.
105. 292 N.C. at 172, 232 S.E.2d at 426; see State v. Baldwin, 226 N.C. 295, 37 S.E.2d 898
(1946).
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court on the greater charge when both offenses arose out of the same
occurrence. The apparent majority view is that a defendant's prior acquittal
or conviction on a lesser included or minor offense in a court with no
jurisdiction over the greater offense subsequently charged against that de-
fendant does not bar a subsequent prosecution in another court with juris-
diction over the greater offense. 106 The basic rationale supporting this view
is that the inferior court's lack of jurisdiction over the subsequently charged
offense prevents jeopardy from attaching.1
0 7
Until McKenzie, North Carolina courts adhered to the majority view
on this issue. '08 In State v. Midgett, 19 defendant was acquitted in recorder's
court of drunken and reckless driving, but was convicted in superior court of
manslaughter. Both offenses arose from the same factual situation. 0 On
appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, holding
that defendant's acquittal in recorder's court did not bar his subsequent
conviction in superior court on the grounds that: (1) the offenses were not
the same; (2) one was not a lesser included degree of the other; (3) different
proof was required in each prosecution; and (4) the jeopardy incident to the
trial in the inferior court did not extend to an offense beyond its juris-
diction. "' Thus, McKenzie casts serious doubt about the continued vitality
of the Midgett court's decision.
Justice Exum, writing for the McKenzie court, relied on Ashe v.
Swenson,112 in which the United States Supreme Court held that an alleged
robber of six poker players, tried on one count of robbery and acquitted for
insufficient evidence, could not be subsequently prosecuted by the other
players without violating the fifth amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy. 13 Narrowly interpreted, however, Ashe does not compel the
McKenzie holding because defendant's acquittal of robbery in Ashe merely
barred a subsequent prosecution for robbery based on the same occurrence:
offenses that were identical in nature and were to be tried in the same
106. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 874, 880 n.2 (1965).
107. Id. at 880.
108. See State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1964); State v. Midgett, 214
N.C. 107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938); State v. Albertson, 113 N.C. 633, 18 S.E. 321 (1893); State v.
Huntley, 91 N.C. 617 (1884).
109. 214 N.C. 107, 198 S.E. 613 (1938).
110. Id. at 108, 198 S.E. at 613-14.
111. Id. at 109-11, 198 S.E. at 615.
112. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
113. See id. at 445-47. In Ashe the Supreme Court held that the "established rule of federal
law [of collateral estoppel] is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double
jeopardy," which is enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment. Id. at
445 (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)). The Ashe Court concluded that "[t]he
single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had
been one of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not. The federal rule of
law, therefore, would make a second prosecution for the robbery. . . wholly impermissible."
Id. at 445.
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tribunal. Defendant in McKenzie was subsequently prosecuted on a greater
charge and in a higher trial court. The McKenzie decision, though,
conforms to the general policy asserted in Ashe that "the rule of collateral
estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and
archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and
rationality. '" 114 Apparently recognizing the illogical result of permitting
defendant in McKenzie to be convicted of manslaughter based upon a
violation of a statute for which defendant had previously been acquitted,
Justice Exum's conclusion represents a rational extension of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
The factual situation in McKenzie, however, creates the prospect of
conflict between collateral estoppel and trial de novo. The doctrine of
collateral estoppel is based on the principle that an issue of ultimate fact
cannot be relitigated between the same parties in any subsequent lawsuit
once it has been determined by a valid and final judgment."15 Conversely,
"[tlhe trial de novo represents a completely fresh determination of guilt or
innocence. It is not an appeal on the record. . . . [T]he record from the
lower court is not before the superior court and is irrelevant to its proceed-
ings.' ' 116 The McKenzie court, although willing to accord finality to de-
fendant's acquittal in district court of driving under the influence in accord-
ance with the doctrine of collateral estoppel, appears willing to allow
defendant to relitigate his conviction in district court for driving with the
proscribed blood alcohol content level in accordance with defendant's right
to a trial de novo. Logical consistency, however, would bar defendant from
relitigating his district court conviction upon the assertion of his double
jeopardy defense in superior court. On the other hand, the principle behind
the trial de novo would bar defendant from asserting his district court
acquittal upon the exercise of his right to a trial de novo in the superior
court. The supreme court appears willing to allow defendants to enjoy the
benefits of both collateral estoppel and trial de novo. The McKenzie court's
application of collateral estoppel in conjunction with the trial de novo is
questionable.
F. Presumption of Compulsion
In the recent case of State v. Smith,'17 the North Carolina Court of
114. Id. at 444.
115. See note 96 supra.
116. State v. Brooks, 287 N.C. 392, 405, 215 S.E.2d 111, 121 (1975) (quoting Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972)). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
4 J. STRONG, supra note 62, Criminal Law § 18.4.




Appeals announced that when presented with a proper case, it will abolish
the presumption that a wife who commits a crime in the presence of her
husband does so under compulsion.118 Although various justifications for
this presumption have been offered over the years,'9 " [t]he trend against it
is so obvious and so persistent as to forecast its eventual disappearance." 
120
In light of Smith, North Carolina is now apparently ready to join this
trend. 121
In Smith, a wife, her husband and another couple were convicted of
breaking and entering and larceny. The evidence revealed that the two men
broke into a house while the two women drove up and down an adjoining
road. After the men returned to the road and were picked up by the women,
they loaded the car with the stolen goods. 122 At trial, defendant-wife made
no request for instructions on the presumption of compulsion, instead
testifying that she and her husband had nothing to do with the planning or
execution of the robbery. In light of this stance, the court of appeals held
that defendant was not entitled to the presumption, 23 even if it had not
"outlived its necessity and usefulness." 1 24
In concluding that the presumption should not be applied in the future,
the court relied on a simple historical analysis. The court noted that the
presumption became incorporated into the common law at a time when
women had almost no rights and when the wife's legal existence was almost
completely suspended and incorporated into that of the husband.125 Actual-
ly, the presumption first arose at common law as a result of a man's right to
the "benefit of clergy" if he could read. This fictional association with the
clergy often enabled men to escape capital punishment. Since women could
not be clergy, however, they could not avail themselves of the benefit.
Thus, without the presumption of compulsion, if a husband and wife
committed the same crime, the wife could be sentenced to death while the
118. Id. at 518, 235 S.E.2d at 865.
119. These justifications include the legal identity of husband and wife, the duty of
obedience, the status of the wife as a servant and the power and dominion of the husband over
the wife. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 910 (2d ed. 1969).
120. Id. at 915; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes, - Mass. -, -, 340 N.E.2d 863, 867
(1976) (finally laying "this ghost to rest" after first having questioned it 50 years earlier). See
also United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1960) ("[We cannot infuse into the conspiracy
statute a fictitious attribution to Congress of regard for the medieval notion of woman's
submissiveness to the benevolent coercive powers of a husband in order to relieve her of her
obligation of obedience to an unqualifiedly expressed Act of Congress. .. ").
121. See Note, Criminal Law-Presumption of Coercion--Crimes Committed by Wife in
Husband's Presence, 35 N.C.L. REv. 104 (1956), for a general review of how the various
jurisdictions have dealt with this presumption.
122. 33 N.C. App. at 512-13, 235 S.E.2d at 862.
123. Id. at 520, 235 S.E.2d at 866.
124. Id. at 528, 235 S.E.2d at 865.
125. Id. at 517, 235 S.E.2d at 864.
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husband might receive only a minor penalty such as branding the thumb and
imprisonment for one year. 1
26
As is often the case, long after the reason for a rule at common law has
disappeared, the rule remains. 2 7 As stated by Chief Justice Clark in 1911,
"[T]hat presumption does not comport with Twentieth Century conditions.
The contention that a wife has no more intelligence or responsibility than a
child is now out of date. No one believes it. '"128 Although the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed a trial court for failure to instruct on this
presumption in 1956 in a prosecution for aiding and abetting in a felonious
assault in a wife's presence, 129 the court of appeals has finally realized that
"it is simply unrealistic to presume that crimes committed by a wife in the
presence of her husband were executed under his dominion and control." 130
The statement by the court in Smith does not mean, however, that a
wife may never be coerced by her husband into committing an illegal act.
The court properly noted that wives are now subject to the same burden of
proof as anyone else claiming coercion. 131 They simply can no longer claim




126. "Benefit of clergy" refers to the common law rule that any clergy charged with a
crime in the lay courts had merely to assert his "benefit of clergy" in order to have his case
transferred to the ecclesiastical court, where he would rarely fail to clear himself. This privilege
was gradually extended to secular clerks who assisted the clergy in the services of the church,
but as the lay courts grew in prestige the time came when the privilege could only be claimed by
one who had confessed the felony or been convicted by verdict. By pleading benefit of clergy,
although defendant's goods were forfeited to the crown, he could avoid capital punishment. In
order to counteract the severity of the penal system and the great number of offenses punish-
able by death, this benefit was extended to every man who could read regardless of whether he
was actually ordained. It was not extended to women, however, because they were incapable of
being ordained. Thus, the presumption of compulsion arose to protect women who had done no
more than their pardoned husbands. R. PERKINS, supra note 119, at 911-12. See also Sayre,
MensRea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1011-13 (1932); Note, supra note 121, at 104 n.2.
127. For an argument that the rule remains for logical reasons, see Commonwealth v.
Jones, I Pa. D. & C. 2d 269 (Lehigh County Ct. 1954).
We recognize that many jurisdictions have abandoned the rule. . . but we are not
impressed by the reasons given. . . .Granting that the original actual reasons for the
rule are no longer valid, the rule would not have survived so long had it not appealed to
some new reason, which we are convinced is human experience of the wife's tendency
to follow her husband's bidding.
. .. [W]e have not yet reached the point where we decry the nobility, dignity or
grace of a wife's deference to her husband's desires. Chivalry alone would call for this
explanation of a married woman's participation in her husband's crime.
Id. at 274-75.
128. State v. Seahorn, 166 N.C. 373,378, 81 S.E. 687, 689 (1911) (Clark, C.J., concurring).
129. State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956).




A. Searches and Seizures
1. Search Incident to Arrest
In two cases the North Carolina Court of Appeals examined the search
incident to a valid arrest exception to the general requirement that a valid
search warrant is required to make a search reasonable. The court in State v.
Williams' invalidated the search because the arrest had been improper, and
also articulated the rights of one faced with an illegal arrest to avoid that
arrest. On the other hand, in State v. Wooten,2 the court, examining the
reasons for the exception, expanded its scope to include some searches that
take place prior to the arrest.
3
In North Carolina the right to resist an unlawful arrest is well estab-
lished.4 Although the right to flee from such an arrest would seem to be a
logical extension of that right, State v. Williams is the first North Carolina
case to so hold. 5 In Williams the court of appeals held that defendant had a
right to flee an unlawful arrest, and that his flight could not be used as a
factor in assessing probable cause for a subsequent warrantless arrest.6 The
arresting officer saw defendant meet an unidentified male in an area of
substantial drug traffic. Defendant joined hands with the unidentified male
and put his hand in his left coat pocket and then withdrew it. The officer
1. 32 N.C. App. 204, 231 S.E.2d 282, appeal dismissed, 292 N.C. 470, 233 S.E.2d 924
(1977).
2. 34 N.C. App. 85, 237 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
3. Most search and seizure cases before the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals during 1977 involved warrantless searches. In State v. Flynn, 33 N.C. App. 492, 235
S.E.2d 424, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 255, 236 S.E.2d 708 (1977), however, the court of appeals
considered a charge that a search warrant was invalid because the magistrate's signature was
omitted from the jurat of the affidavit on which the warrant was issued. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-244 (1975) provides that "[e]ach application for a search warrant must be made in writing
upon oath or affirmation." The trial court found that the affiant was sworn to the affidavit and
that the magistrate's signature was omitted by inadvertence. 33 N.C. App. at 493, 235 S.E.2d at
425. The court of appeals accepted these findings and ruled that the search was proper. Cf.
State v. Brannon, 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 287 N.C.
665, 216 S.E.2d 908 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (even though search warrant was
signed before affidavit, warrant was proper when trial judge found on competent evidence that
warrant was issued upon probable cause as set out in affidavit).
4. E.g., State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954).
5. In State v. Borland, 21 N.C. App. 559, 205 S.E.2d 340 (1974), the court upheld
defendant's right to flee an attempted arrest, but Borland differed from the instant case in
several aspects. In Borland a deputy sheriff in an unmarked car (without siren or blue light)
attempted to make defendants, who were driving at a proper speed, pull over. Defendants did
not know that their pursuer was a law officer or that he was attempting to arrest them and
reasonably thought that they were being attacked. In Williams the officer identified himself to
defendant and made his intention to arrest defendant obvious. 32 N.C. App. at 206-07, 231
S.E.2d at 284; see text accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
6. 32 N.C. App. at 208, 231 S.E.2d at 284-85.
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stopped defendant, identified himself as a police officer and asked defendant
for identification. After defendant stated that he had none, the officer told
him that he had reason to believe that defendant had drugs on his person and
ordered him to face the wall and assume a position for frisking. Defendant
ran but was caught, arrested and searched. Marijuana was found and
defendant, upon denial of his motion to suppress the evidence, pleaded
guilty to possession.
7
The State justified the warrantless search as incident to a valid arrest. 8
The trial court adopted this theory, finding that defendant was arrested after
the chase and that there was probable cause for the arrest. 9 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the officer did not have probable cause for an
arrest when he stopped defendant' ° and that the circumstances did not justify
a "stop and frisk."" Although the officer could have approached and
temporarily detained defendant for "purposes of investigating his possible
criminal behavior,"' 2 he resorted instead to, "aggressive and unlawful
behavior,"' 13 which constituted an attempt to arrest defendant. 14 The
court held that defendant had a right to flee from such an unlawful arrest. I5
Moreover, defendant's flight in this situation could not "be added to other
relevant facts to give the officer probable cause for making a warrantless
arrest ' 16 because the court found that the unlawful arrest was the direct and
7. Id. at 205-07, 231 S.E.2d at 283-84.
8. Id. at 206, 231 S.E.2d at 283.
9. Id. at 207, 231 S.E.2d at 284.
10. Id.
11. Id. The court noted that "[t]he frisk incident to a field interrogation must be based
upon circumstances from which it can reasonably be inferred that the individual was armed and
dangerous." Id. (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)). In Sibron v. New York the
United States Supreme Court noted that "[tjhe suspect's mere act of talking with a number of
known narcotics addicts over an eight-hour period no more gives rise to reasonable fear of life
or limb on the part of the police officer than it justifies an arrest for committing a crime." 392
U.S. at 64.
In State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 195 S.E.2d 502 (1973), the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the lack of a "stop and frisk statute" does not prevent law enforcement officers
in North Carolina from stopping suspicious persons for questioning and searching those
persons for dangerous weapons. Id. at 209, 195 S.E.2d at 506. It is, however, necessary under
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (decided same day as Sibron), that the officer have "reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual," and in determining the
reasonableness of the officer's belief "due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." Id. at 27.
12. 32 N.C. App. at 207, 231 S.E.2d at 284. The court does not reveal the permissible
scope of the investigation. It seems clear that the officer could stop and question the suspect.
If, during questioning, the suspect should attempt to flee, the flight would become a relevant
factor in assessing probable cause for an arrest. See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
13. 32 N.C. App. at 207, 231 S.E.2d at 284.
14. Id. at 207-08, 231 S.E.2d at 284.
15. Id. at 208, 231 S.E.2d at 284.
16. Id. at 208, 231 S.E.2d at 285; see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-84
(1962).
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proximate cause of the flight.17 If defendant had fled when the officer
approached and identified himself, but before he resorted to aggressive and
unlawful behavior, flight would have been a proper factor to consider in
assessing probable cause for the subsequent arrest.18 The officer in Williams
possibly could have determined from proper questioning that defendant was
in possession of marijuana, 19 but his overzealous actions went beyond the
proper limits of law enforcement activity.
In State v. Wooten,20 the court of appeals ruled for the first time that a
search could be justified as incident to a valid arrest even though the search
took place before the arrest. 21 In Wooten the police had information from a
reliable informant that defendant possessed heroin. An officer approached
defendant in a parking lot, informed him that he had probable cause to
search defendant for heroin and frisked him. The frisk yielded a pistol but no
drugs. Defendant was placed under arrest for carrying a concealed weapon
and taken to the police station where the police conducted a more thorough
search. After the latter search, defendant was charged with possession of
heroin.22 The court of appeals found that the officer had probable cause to
arrest defendant and that therefore the officer could search him incident to a
valid arrest. 23 Defendant contended that the search in the parking lot oc-
curred before he was arrested and was therefore not "incident to an ar-
rest." ,24 The court ruled that
where a search of a suspect's person occurs before instead of after
formal arrest, such search can be equally justified as "incident to
the arrest" provided probable cause to arrest existed prior to the
search and it is clear that the evidence seized was in no way
necessary to establish the probable cause.25
17. 32 N.C. App. at 208, 231 S.E.2d at 285.
18. State v. Harrington, 17 N.C. App. 221,193 S.E.2d 294(1972), aff'd, 283 N.C. 527, 196
S.E.2d 742 (1973), was distinguished from the Williams situation. In Harrington officers
approached defendant in a dinette. They identified themselves and asked defendant if he would
come outside and talk to them. He agreed, but ran away when he got outside. The court held
that since there was no manual touching or seizure and the officers had not intended to arrest
defendant in the dinette, that flight could be considered in assessing probable cause to arrest.
Id. at 223-25, 193 S.E.2d at 297.
19. 32 N.C. App. at 207, 231 S.E.2d at 284.
20. 34 N.C. App. 85, 237 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
21. Id. at 89-90, 237 S.E.2d at 305.
22. Id. at 86-87, 237 S.E.2d at 303.
23. rd. at 88-89, 237 S.E.2d at 304.
24. Id. at 89, 237 S.E.2d at 305.
25. Id. The court noted that there was authority in this state to find a prior arrest (prior to
the search) notwithstanding the absence of a formal declaration of arrest and despite the
testimony of the officer that defendant was not under arrest at the time. See State v. Jackson,
280 N.C. 122, 125, 185 S.E.2d 202, 204 (1971); State v. Tippett, 270 N.C. 588, 596, 155 S.E.2d
269, 275 (1967). The court, however, declined to rely on that line of authority. 34 N.C. App. at
89, 237 S.E.2d at 304-05.
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The court recognized that the justification for a search incident to an arrest is
the "need for immediate action to protect the arresting officer from the use
of weapons and to prevent destruction of evidence of the crime."26 These
considerations, according to the court, are rendered no less important by
postponement of the arrest.
27
Although Wooten is the first North Carolina case to hold specifically
that a search prior to an arrest can be valid as incident to an arrest, federal
precedent has long supported such a result.28 As the result in Wooten could
have been reached on other grounds more firmly rooted in North Carolina
case law, such as manipulating the time of arrest, 29 the court's holding is
apparently an attempt to open a new avenue of analysis for similar fact
situations. This opening may have been made to free courts from the
necessity of resorting to strained interpretations of arrest situations in order
to justify a search as incident to an arrest. 30
2. Plain View
In State v. Blackwelder,31 the court of appeals circumscribed the
power of law enforcement officers to stop suspects and conduct searches of
their vehicles under the Motor Vehicle Act 32 by limiting the scope of the
"plain view" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. In
26. 34 N.C. App. at 89-90, 237 S.E.2d at 305.
27. Id.
28. See cases cited at 34 N.C. App. at 90,237 S.E.2d at 305. United States v. Skinner, 412
F.2d 98 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 967 (1969), is a good example of the approach the
federal courts have taken to the Wooten-type situation. In that case the Eighth Circuit held that
where the government sustains its burden of proving that a police officer had probable
cause for arresting a suspect . . . and where it is clear that evidence seized in a
contemporaneous search . . . was in no way necessary to establish probable cause,
the search is incidental to the arrest. The search is valid whether it took place moments
before or moments after [the arrest].
1d. at 103.
29. See note 25 supra.
30. In United States v. Skinner, 412 F.2d 98 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 967 (1969),
the court said:
In our view, the announced rule (that a search before an arrest may be incident to
an arrest] protects the rights of accuseds and provides a non-technical standard for
police to follow. It permits trial courts and reviewing courts to determine whether a
search is incidental to a valid arrest by objective standards. It relieves the courts in the
proper case of the difficult task of determining the moment at which an arrest takes
place, and the even more difficult task of determining the moment at which a police
officer intended to make an arrest.
1d. at 103-04.
Application of the Wooten analysis should yield the same results as the line of cases that
found that an arrest can take place prior to a formal declaration of arrest. See note 25 supra.
Under either analysis the crucial factors are that the officer have probable cause to make an
arrest and that the search be "substantially contemporaneous with the arrest" so as to be
"incident to an arrest." Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964).
31. 34 N.C. App. 352, 238 S.E.2d 190 (1977).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-39 to -183 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
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Blackwelder, law enforcement officers spotted and followed a car that had
been involved in a narcotics transaction two nights before. The officers
observed, however, that the operator of the car on the night of the narcotics
transaction was not then in the car. When the officers attempted to stop the
car they observed some "commotion" inside and saw the driver lean or
bend down. One officer went to the door and pulled defendant out even
though the officer knew that he was neither the person sought nor the
registered owner of the car. The officer then went back to the car, reached
under the seat and picked up a plastic box containing LSD tablets. He
arrested defendant for felonious possession.
33
The State contended that the officer had the power to stop the vehicle
and remove defendant pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act34 and that the box
was seized legally under the plain view exception. 35 The court of appeals
rejected the State's contention that the plain view exception rendered the
seizure of the box legal, 36 apparently on the basis that the officer had no
"right to be there." 37 A small box under the seat of a car would be in plain
view only if the officer had the right to be looking under the seat; usually
such a view would result only from making a general exploratory search of
the interior of the vehicle. Thus, the rejection of the State's plain view
theory rests on a rejection of the right of the officer to remove defendant
from the car and to conduct such an intrusive search. The court held that the
power to stop under the Motor Vehicle Act does not include the power to
search. 38 Since the officer, after making the stop, had no independent
grounds for a search, 39 his subsequent search was unlawful.
33. 34 N.C. App. at 353-54, 238 S.E.2d at 191. The trial court found that there had been no
probable cause to stop the car and remove defendant and search. Thus, the LSD evidence was
ordered suppressed. The State appealed from that order to bring the case before the court of
appeals. Id.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183 (1975) provides that "[sluch officers . . . shall have the
power to stop any motor vehicle. . . for the purpose of determining whether the same is being
operated in violation of any of the provisions of this Article."
35. 34 N.C. App. at 354-55, 238 S.E.2d at 191-92.
36. Id. at 355-56, 238 S.E.2d at 192.
37. There are two dimensions to the plain view exception to warrantless searches in North
Carolina. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-253 (1975) an officer conducting a search pursuant to a
search warrant may seize items subject to seizure under id. § 15A-242 if he inadvertently dis-
covers them during the course of the search. In addition, id. § 15A-231 allows constitutionally
permissible searches and seizures which are not regulated by the General Statutes. The
constitutional plain view exception is limited to situations when the officer has legal justifica-
tion to be at the place where he inadvertently sees evidence in plain view. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
38. 34 N.C. App. at 355, 238 S.E.2d at 192. The power to stop a vehicle is granted in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-183 (1975). The court observed that an officer could search incident to an arrest
after a stop under § 20-183, but only for an arrest for a violation of the MQtor Vehicle Act. 34
N.C. App. at 355, 238 S.E.2d at 191-92.
39. The State contended that even without the plain view exception, the officer had
independent grounds for his warrantless search in that the furtive movements he observed
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The court left one important issue raised by the Blackwelder facts
unresolved. The officer in Blackwelder did not stop the vehicle to determine
if the Motor Vehicle Act was being violated; rather, he stopped the car to
see if there were contraband drugs in defendant's possession.40 The trial
court found that the officer lacked probable cause to stop the car, 41 but the
court of appeals, by deciding the case on the basis of the extent of the
search, glossed over whether the officer was justified in stopping the car at
all. The opinion can be read as implying that if the officers were not justified
in stopping the car, then even if the contraband were in plain view it would
not be admissible against the driver since the officer would have no "right to
be there." 42 Although there is no probable cause requirement for making a
while stopping the car gave him probable cause to search. 34 N.C. App. at 356, 238 S.E.2d at
192. The court of appeals rejected this notion. Id. at 356-57, 238 S.E.2d at 192-93. First, the
court noted that the movements did not give rise to probable cause to search the automobile in
the belief that the vehicle contained contraband. The State relied on State v. Ratliff, 281 N.C.
397, 189 S.E.2d 179 (1972). In Ratliff
[tjhe officer observed defendant, apparently nude, in a parked car on the parking lot of
a business establishment at midnight. . . . When the officer stopped, defendant tried
to drive away. Then he was seen brushing something out of his lap onto the floorboard
of the car. Then he appeared to kick something under the seat with his left leg and
foot. Such suspicious, furtive conduct would alert any officer to the fact that defend-
ant had something to hide.
Id. at 404, 189 S.E.2d at 183. The court in Blackwelder felt that the movements in the suspect
car did not rise to the level of Ratliff. The court noted that the observed movement was
"explicable by innocent fear and confusion at being pulled over by a police car." 34 N.C. App.
at 356, 238 S.E.2d at 192.
Second, the court observed that the search might have been justified had the officer had
probable cause to believe that someone in the car was committing a crime. Then there could
have been a search incident to a valid arrest, a right to search that is justified on different
grounds than a search of a vehicle by one with probable cause to believe it contains the
instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220-22 (1968); State v. Ratliff, 281 N.C. at 403, 189 S.E.2d at 182-83.
To make a search incident to a valid arrest, however, the officer would have to have probable
cause to believe that a crime is being committed. See text accompanying note 25 supra. Furtive
movements are proper factors in assessing probable cause "when coupled with specific knowl-
edge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime." Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968). The court of appeals found, however, that the movements were
not clearly furtive and that the officer had no specific knowledge linking the passengers of the
car to the narcotics trafficking under investigation. 34 N.C. App. at 357, 238 S.E.2d at 193.
40. 34 N.C. App. at 355, 238 S.E.2d at 192.
41. Id. at 354, 238 S.E.2d at 191.
42. The court, in rejecting the plain view theory, distinguished the Blackwelder situation
from State v. Smith, 289 N.C. 143, 221 S.E.2d 247 (1976), and State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194
S.E.2d 9 (1973), citing both for the "right to be there" requirement. 34 N.C. App. at 355-56, 238
S.E.2d at 192. In Smith, an officer stopped a car for reckless driving and saw a revolver on the
seat. The revolver was held admissible under the plain view theory. 289 N.C. at 149-51, 221
S.E.2d at 250-52. In Allen, the court found that the officers had stopped defendants to
determine the validity and presence of a driver's license and registration card. The court
apparently accepted the State's rationale that the primary motive in making the stop was to
investigate compliance with the Motor Vehicle Act. Evidence was spotted in the front seat and
was admitted under the plain view exception. 282 N.C. at 507, 194 S.E.2d at 13. It is unclear
whether the court in Blackwelder, by distinguishing Smith and Allen, meant to imply that the
officer had no right to stop the vehicle, or only that the officer had no right to look under the
seat.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
stop under the Motor Vehicle Act,43 the statutory power to stop a vehicle is
limited to stops "for the purpose of determining whether the [vehicle] is
being operated in violation of any of the provisions of [the Motor Vehicle
Act]. '" 44 Even if a stop must be made to determine if the Act is being
violated before an officer has a "right to be there," Blackwelder's conclu-
sion that the officer's purpose in making the stop was not to see if a motor
vehicle statute was being violated, will likely be the exception rather than
the rule. If credible evidence exists, courts are likely to find that the stop in
question was made to see if a motor vehicle statute was being violated.
45
B. Right to Speedy Trial
In 1977 the North Carolina General Assembly thoroughly revised the
statutory provisions for the speedy trial of criminal defendants, 46 adopting
an entirely different approach from that taken in the 1973 amendments. 
47
Rather than leaving the determination of whether a prompt trial should be
ordered for a particular defendant to the discretion of the judge, 48 the new
Speedy Trial Act (the Act)49 provides for a defendant's absolute discharge if
he is not tried within a specified time. 50 Certain periods of delay, most of
which are attributable to the defendant, are excluded from the computation
of the waiting period,51 thus preventing defendants from taking advantage of
the provision by means of delaying tactics. Taken as a whole, the Act is a
commendable attempt to codify the constitutional requirements of the
balancing test prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
43. 34 N.C. App. at 355, 238 S.E.2d at 191-92; State v. Dark, 22 N.C. App. 566, 207
S.E.2d 290, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 760, 209 S.E.2d 284 (1974); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183
(1975).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183 (1975).
45. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 289 N.C. 143,221 S.E.2d 247 (1976); State v. Allen, 282 N.C.
503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973); State v. Dark, 22 N.C. App. 566, 207 S.E.2d 290, cert. denied, 285
N.C. 760, 209 S.E.2d 284 (1974).
46. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-701 to -704) (effective Oct. 1, 1978).
47. Law of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1286, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Sess. 490 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §H 15A-701 to -706 (1975)) (repealed, effective Oct. 1, 1978).
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-702 (1975). A judge may order a prompt trial for a
defendant after 60 days of confinement, or after 30 days if the defendant has petitioned the
judge for a speedy trial. For a defendant awaiting trial but not confined, the respective waiting
periods for a judge's action are 90 days and 60 days. A judge may order the defendant's release
or dismissal of charges if he is not brought to trial in the time specified.
49. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-701 to -704) (effective Oct. 1, 1978).
50. As of October 1, 1980, a defendant must be tried within 90 days of his arrest or
indictment, and within 60 days following a mistrial or appeal that resulted in a remand. Between
October 1, 1978, and October 1, 1980, the permissible waiting period will be 120 days. Id. sec. i,
§ 15A-701(a), (al).
51. Id. sec. 1, § 15A-701(b).
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Wingo52 for determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has
been abridged, while eliminating much of that test's uncertainty.
The sanctions provided in the Act for failure to provide a speedy trial
significantly modify both the Barker test and North Carolina case law. New
section 15A-70353 requires the dismissal of charges on a defendant's motion
if he has not been brought to trial within the specified time. A defendant
claiming the protection of the Act has the burden of supporting his motion,
but the State has the burden of "going forward with evidence" that any time
periods should be excluded from the computation. 54 Since a defendant's
"burden" apparently involves only a showing that the specified days have
elapsed, the Act eliminates two elements of the Barker test: the defendant's
assertion of his right to a speedy trial and his showing of prejudice from the
delay. 55 Despite its rigidity, the statutory approach is both more practical
and equitable than the Barker test, which, to some extent, required defend-I it.56
ants to repeatedly demand their constitutional right in order to preserve
Moreover, proving prejudice from a delay has often been difficult for
defendants, since courts have required more specific proof than a general
assertion of faded memory. 57 The statute eliminates this difficulty by plac-
52. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The Court concluded that each claim of denial of the right to a
speedy trial must be judged on its own facts, but listed four factors that should be weighed in
the decisions: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his
right; and possible prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. The Court refrained from the
"legislative activity" of defining the right in terms of specific periods within which a defendant
must be tried, but indicated that states were free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent
with constitutional standards. Id. at 523.
53. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, sec. 1, § 15A-703, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-703) (effective Oct. 1, 1978).
54. Id.
55. See note 52 supra.
56. See, e.g., Morrison v. Jones, 565 F.2d 272, 273 (4th Cir. 1977). Other constitutional
rights must be afforded a defendant unless knowingly and intelligently waived. See, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101
(1942) (waiver of right to trial, by guilty plea).
57. Two 1977 cases, one in the North Carolina Court of Appeals and one in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, are good examples of prior case law that will be
changed by this statute. In State v. McKoy, 33 N.C. App. 304, 235 S.E.2d 98 (1977), rev'd, 294
N.C. 135, 383 S.E.2d 383 (1978), the court held that a 22-month delay between a defendant's
arrest and trial did not abridge his right to a speedy trial. Though the defendant claimed
prejudice due to the absence of a "crucial" witness when the case was tried, the court found
that it was "very doubtful that her testimony would have helped defendant" and, therefore,
that he had failed to show prejudice as a result of her unavailability. Id. at 309, 235 S.E.2d at
101. Defendant in Morrison v. Jones, 565 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1977), waited three years to be
retried and convicted after his first trial on a murder charge ended in a mistrial. The district
court granted defendant's habeas corpus petition, 428 F. Supp. 86 (W.D.N.C. 1977), and the
Fourth Circuit reversed stating: "While we agree with the district judge that the delay of some
three years was sufficient to trigger a consideration of the other factors identified in Barker, in
our opinion the absence of any showing of prejudice and the failure of the petitioner to assert
his right to a speedy trial preclude relief in this case." 565 F.2d at 273. The State's failure to
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ing the responsibility on the State to try a defendant within a reasonable time
or release him, while excluding from the allowable time period any delays
that are beyond the State's control.
Though the Act's effect in the area of the right to a speedy trial should
be salutary, there are several potential weak points. The most important
weakness concerns the time from which the waiting period will run. G.S.
15A-701(a)(1) requires a defendant's trial to begin "within 90 days from the
date the defendant is arrested, served with criminal process, waives an
indictment or is notified pursuant to G.S. § 15A-630 that an indictment has
been filed with the superior court against him, whichever occurs last
... . "58 In United States v. Marion59 the Supreme Court held that the
sixth amendment's protection should not attach until the suspected criminal
becomes an "accused."6 The Court went on to note, however, that "[i]t is
either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints im-
posed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge, that engage the
particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amend-
ment. "61 The statute appears to conform to this interpretation by providing
arrest or indictment as alternative starting points; yet the final phrase
"whichever occurs last" withdraws the Act's protection from a defendant
who is arrested and later indicted. It is not uncommon for an indictment to
be returned months after an arrest, 62 but a strict reading of the statute would
measure the permissible waiting period only from the date of the indict-
ment. 63 There is no statutory time limit on the submission of a bill of
indictment for an offense; 64 moreover, in regard to felonies, there is no
present a good reason for delaying retrial, see Morrison v. Jones, 428 F. Supp. at 86, was
ignored by the court. See also State v. Frank, 284 N.C. 137, 200 S.E.2d 169 (1973);
State v. Harrell, 281 N.C. 111, 187 S.E.2d 789 (1972); State v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 487, 235
S.E.2d 424 (1977). The effect of the new statute on these results depends upon how much of the
delay would fall within time periods excludable under new § 15A-701(b). Certainly, however,
the focus of the judicial analysis must shift from the defendant's conduct to that of the State.
58. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, sec. 1, § 15A-703, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701(a)(1)) (effective Oct. 1, 1978).
59. 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
60. Id. at 313.
61. Id. at 320.
62. See, e.g., Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968) (16 year lapse);
Courtney v. Pinion, 420 F. Supp. 890 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (10 1/2 months); State v. Dietz, 289 N.C.
488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976) (4 1/2 months); State v. Davis, 33 N.C. App. 487, 235 S.E.2d 416
(1977) (5 1/2 months).
63. The statutory period begins to run only when a true bill of indictment has been
returned by a grand jury and filed in superior court and the defendant has been notified of the
filing. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, sec. 1, § 15A-701(a)(1), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701(a)(1)) (effective Oct. 1, 1978).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-627 (1975) directs the solicitor to submit a bill of indictment to
a grand jury "[w]hen a defendant has been bound over for trial in the superior court." The
Official Commentary to this section relates that the Commission found it was not necessary to
set time limits on the solicitor's action. "It was believed that the rights granted defendants
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applicable statute of limitations on prosecution in North Carolina to encour-
age action by the State.
65
Other North Carolina statutes place time limitations on the custody of
an unindicted defendant; they will, however, afford only limited protection
in light of several 1977 decisions of the North Carolina courts. In State v.
Burgess6 the court of appeals interpreted the statute requiring an arrested
person to be taken before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay," 67 as
well as the provision that a charged defendant must appear before a district
court judge within ninety-six hours after being taken into custody or at the
first regular session of district court in the county, whichever occurs first.
68
These statutes, the court held, "do not prescribe mandatory procedures
affecting the validity of the trial in the absence of a showing that defendant
was prejudiced thereby.' '69 Another statute governing preliminary proceed-
ings entitles a defendant, absent waiver, to a probable cause hearing within
fifteen days following his initial appearance before the district court judge.
70
Defendant in State v. Siler7l moved to dismiss the charges against him,
claiming that his constitutional rights were violated because his probable
cause hearing was not held within the prescribed time limits. The supreme
court held that due process did not require that a probable cause hearing be
held within a specific number of days following arrest, though it assumed
that some "reasonable time" limit might be constitutionally imposed. 72
Though holding only that defendant's motion should be dismissed because
he had not shown that the trial court, in granting two continuances of the
hearing, failed to find "good cause shown" by the State, 73 the court also
elsewhere to assure speedy trials would be sufficient to cover this matter." Id., Official
Commentary.
65. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 167 S.E.2d 274 (1969).
66. 33 N.C. App. 76, 234 S.E.2d 40 (1977).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-511(a)(1) (1975).
68. Id. § 15A-601(c).
69. 33 N.C. App. at 78, 234 S.E.2d at 41. The court based its interpretation of N.C.
GEN STAT. § 15A-511(a) (1975) on the fact that the former statute, Law of Apr. 12, 1869, ch.
178, subch. 1, § 1, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 447 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-46
(1965)) (repealed 1973), had required that the arrested person be taken "immediately" before a
magistrate, and the North Carolina Supreme Court had held it was not mandatory. See, e.g.,
State v. McCloud, 276 N.C. 518, 531-32, 173 S.E.2d 733,762-63 (1973). Section 15A-601(c) was
held to have the same effect since its purpose, as indicated in the Official Commentary, was
found to be unobstructed by a lengthier waiting period. 33 N.C. App. at 77-78, 234 S.E.2d at 41;
see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-601(c), Official Commentary (1975).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-606 (1975). A defendant who has been indicted, however, has
no right to a probable cause hearing. State v. Dangerfield, 32 N.C. App. 608, 233 S.E.2d 663,
cert. denied, 292 N.C. 642, 235 S.E.2d 63 (1977).
71. 292 N.C. 543, 234 S.E.2d 733 (1977).
72. Id. at 554, 234 S.E.2d at 740.
73. Id. at 555, 234 S.E.2d at 741. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-606(f) (1975) provides: "Upon a
showing of good cause, a scheduled probable-cause hearing may be continued by the district
court upon timely motion of the defendant or the State."
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questioned whether these provisions "were designed to provide defendant
with additional rights, rather than as rules for the orderly and efficient
administration of justice." 74 The lack of legislative sanctions accompanying
the breach of these statutes makes them meaningless as methods of enforce-
ment of a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Perhaps they were intended to
be no more than "housekeeping" rules, rather than the source of substantive
rights;75 yet if the new Speedy Trial Act is to afford effective protection to a
defendant at the pre-indictment stage, there must be some method for
enforcement of the time limits on these procedures, whether by independent
sanctions or by a clarification of the period covered by the time limits of the
Act itself.
76
Arguably, in order to comply with constitutional requirements, the
Act must be interpreted to allow an arrest, even when indictment follows, to
mark the starting point of the time period. In Dillingham v. United States,77
the United States Supreme Court held that even when a defendant proves no
actual prejudice, the time between his arrest and indictment must be con-
sidered in appraising the speedy trial issue.78 A defendant who is neither
74. 292 N.C. at 555, 234 S.E.2d at 741.
75. Interestingly, in a case decided later in 1977, State v. Shook, 293 N.C. 315, 237 S.E.2d
843 (1977), the state supreme court interpreted another statute setting procedural time limits as
vesting substantive rights in a defendant. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-943 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977)
requires a solicitor to calendar arraignments on at least the first day of every other week during
criminal session and provides that a defendant who pleads not guilty may not be tried without
his consent in the week in which he is arraigned. Justice Exum, writing for the court, concluded
that the statute created a right in defendants, the infringement of which (here, the holding of
defendant's trial the same day as his arraignment over his objection) was reversible error. 293
N.C. at 319-20, 237 S.E.2d at 846-47. His conclusion that the statute was more than directory
was based on the considerations that it promotes justice, affects the public interest and requires
a defendant's consent before a different procedure can be used. Under these circumstances, he
held, "[p]rejudice from a violation must necessarily be presumed." Id. at 319, 237 S.E.2d at
846-47. It is difficult to discern the distinction between this statute and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
606(d) (1975) (requiring probable cause hearing to be held within 15 days unless waived by
defendant), such that the former bestows rights on a defendant and the latter does not.
76. Another section of the statute, Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, sec. 1, § 15A-
701(b)(7)(c), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701(b)(7)(c))
(effective Oct. 1, 1978), indicates that the legislature may have intended that the time limits
described in id. § 15A-701(a)(l) apply to the period between arrest and indictment. Subsection
15A-701(b)(7) provides that among the time periods to be excluded from the 90 day computation
are continuances granted by the judge "in the interests of justice." Id. § 15A-701(b)(7). One of
the factors to be considered by a judge in determining whether to grant a continuance is"whether delay after the grand jury proceedings have begun, in a case where arrest precedes
indictment, is caused by the unusual complexity of the factual determination to be made by the
grand jury or by events beyond the control of the court or the State." Id. § 15A-701(b)(7)(c). If
the 90 day time period starts to run only from the later of the two events of arrest and the filing
of an indictment, as § 15A-701(a)(l) provides, see text accompanying notes 58-63 supra, then
any delay in grand jury proceedings, whether or not arrest has already occurred, would have no
significance under the statute.
77. 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per curiam).
78. Id. at 64-65. See also Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968) (delay
computed not from date of indictment but from date warrant sworn out for defendant's arrest);
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arrested nor indicted at the time of his offense but who is indicted much later
is also left unprotected by the North Carolina statute and, according to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Marion, is outside the sixth
amendment's protection as well. 79 The Marion Court indicated, however,
that if a pre-indictment delay caused substantial prejudice to a defendant and
was intentionally caused by the State, the due process clause of the fifth
amendment would require dismissal of the indictment. s0 The North Carolina
Supreme Court's decisions also furnish some recourse in extreme instances
of pre-indictment delay. s1 Assuming, however, that the new Act was intend-
ed to provide some degree of certainty in evaluating the speedy trial issue, it
would be preferable for the legislature to specify the desired effect of pre-
indictment delay on its statutory scheme.
A second area in which the statute falls short of extending full sixth
amendment protection to criminal defendants is in its exclusion from the
computation time of any period following a voluntary dismissal of charges
by a prosecutor, when new charges are later brought for the same offense.
82
The system of taking a "nolle prosequi" with leave to file new charges at
anytime was made infamous in the case of Klopfer v. North Carolina,83 in
which the United States Supreme Court held the practice unconstitutional
when used to leave charges pending indefinitely against a defendant. The
legislature repealed the statute in 1974, 84 replacing it with one that sup-
Courtney v. Pinion, 420 F. Supp. 890 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (length of delay measured from time of
arrest on manslaughter charge, not from date of indictment).
79. 404 U.S. at 313; see text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
80. 404 U.S. at 324.
81. See State v. Johnson, 275 N.C. 264, 277, 167 S.E.2d 274, 283 (1969)(when defendant
shows (I) " a typical delay" by prosecution in issuing warrant or indictment, (2) that prosecu-
tion deliberately and unnecessarily caused delay for convenience or supposed advantage of
State, and (3) that length of delay created reasonable possibility of prejudice, he has been
denied right to speedy trial and prosecution must be dismissed). Later decisions follow the
Johnson formulation, but it is rare that a defendant can meet the burden of proof it imposes.
See, e.g., State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 223 S.E.2d 357 (1976).
82. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, sec. 1, § 15A-701(b), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be
codified at 15A-701(b)) (effective Oct. 1, 1978) provides in pertinent part:
The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time within which the trial of
a criminal offense must begin:
(5) When a charge is dismissed by the prosecutor under the authority of G.S. 15A-
931 and afterwards a new indictment or information is filed against the same
defendant or the same defendant is arrested or served with criminal process for
the same offense, or an offense based on the same act or transaction or on the
same series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
single scheme or plan, any period of delay from the date the initial charge was
dismissed to the date the time limits for trial under this section would have
commenced to run as to the subsequent charge.
83. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
84. Law of Mar. 2, 1905, ch. 360, § 1, 1905 N.C. Pub. Laws 395 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-175 (1965)) (repealed 1974).
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posedly remedied the defects disapproved by the Court.85 That replacement
statute, and now the new Speedy Trial Act, in actuality leave the old "nol
pros" procedure largely intact. G.S. 15A-931(a) allows the solicitor to
dismiss any charges in a criminal pleading orally in open court, or by filing a
written dismissal at any time. Subsection 15A-931(b) provides that no
applicable statute of limitations will be tolled by a dismissal under the
section. 86 The Official Commentary to the statute notes: "This section does
not itself bar the bringing of new charges. That would be prevented if there
were a statute of limitations which had run, or if jeopardy had attached when
the first charges were dismissed." 87 Thus, the section eliminates the nol
pros procedure only for misdemeanors, since there is no statute of limita-
tions on felonies in North Carolina, and the attachment of jeopardy provides
no more protection than it did under the old statute.8 8 Since this procedure
remains in use,89 the new Act should have placed some limitations on its
abuse rather than wholly excluding the period after a nol pros is taken from
the computation of days within which a trial must take place.
The new North Carolina Speedy Trial Act represents a major step
towards assuring each criminal defendant a trial within a reasonable (in
the context of today's crowded courts) length of time. The approach of
placing the burden on the State to try a defendant within this period or justify
the delay is preferable to the balancing test that essentially gave defendants
the benefit of their sixth amendment right only when they could prove injury
from its denial. However, until the ambiguities concerning what type of
activity in relation to a defendant actually invokes the protection of the Act
are resolved, its application may prove difficult.
85. Law of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1286, § 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Sess. 490 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-931 (1975)).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-931(b) (1975).
87. Id. § 15A-931, Official Commentary.
88. The protection afforded by the fifth amendment prohibition against a person's being
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is uncertain at best. The Supreme Court has adhered
to the view that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn, but a retrial may still be permitted if a
trial is terminated before verdict due to "manifest necessity." See United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). There has been little agreement, however, on what circum-
stances amount to manifest necessity, and recent decisions have largely been limited to the
facts of the individual case. See, e.g., Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973); United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
89. Morrison v. Jones, 565 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1977), see note 57 supra, affords a recent
example of the use of the nol pros. The State took a nol pros with leave after defendant's
murder trial ended in mistrial in 1972, reindicted him three years later, and obtained a guilty
verdict. Counsel informed the court in oral argument that the procedure was no longer used
since its statutory basis has been repealed in 1973. 565 F.2d at 273 n. I. It appears, however, that
the State could use the same procedure today, with the difference that the nol pros would be
taken immediately after the trial instead of two years later, and still be in compliance with both
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-931 (1975) (voluntary dismissal) and Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 787, sec.
I, § 15A-701, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1032 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701
(effective Oct. 1, 1978) (speedy trial)).
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C. Right to Counsel
1. Indigents
The North Carolina courts had several opportunities to examine the
difficulties faced by indigent defendants.' In State v. Cole," the supreme
court considered the plight of a defendant dissatisfied with his appointed
attorney, and in State v. Sanders,92 the court of appeals denied relief to a
defendant who had not been able to establish indigency before the trial court
despite an unrefuted showing of severe financial difficulties.
Defendant in State v. Cole asked during the trial that his court-
appointed counsel be dismissed.9 3 A voir dire hearing was conducted and
90. In State v. McNeill, 33 N.C. App. 317, 235 S.E.2d 274 (1977), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals announced a new rule with respect to the provision of trial transcripts to
indigent defendants-free transcripts are to be routinely provided to indigents not only for use
on direct appeal, but also to aid in their defense if retried following a mistrial. Id. at 323, 255
S.E.2d at 277-78.
The United States Supreme Court, in Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1973), noted in
51 N.C.L. Rev. 621 (1973), had upheld the state's refusal to supply an indigent defendant with a
transcript following a mistrial. The Court held that this practice did not violate the rule of
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), that when the transcript of a trial is necessary for an
appeal, the state is required to supply the transcript free of charge to an indigent defendant
unless adequate means are available for obtaining it, because other adequate means were
available. 404 U.S. at 230. In McNeill, as in Britt, the court found that alternate sources of
obtaining the needed testimony were available to defendant. 33 N.C. App. at 323, 235 S.E.2d at
277. Moreover, defendant's lack of the transcript did not prejudice him in the second trial. Id.
at 321-22, 235 S.E.2d at 276-77. After finding no error in defendant's conviction, the court
nevertheless concluded that in the future, a defendant who makes a timely request following a
mistrial should be provided with the use of the trial transcript. Id. at 323, 235 S.E.2d at 277-78.
The court's conclusion was prompted largely by the realization that in most cases it is not clear
from the record whether a defendant has been damaged by the lack of a transcript. Further-
more, the state always has the use of the transcript, which, even if not vital, would undeniably
be helpful to a defendant as well. Id. at 323, 235 S.E.2d at 277. The decision in McNeill thus
simplifies one aspect of criminal procedure, relieving indigent defendants of the burden of
showing prejudice from the lack of a transcript, and appellate courts of the task of speculating
on the presence or absence of such prejudice. If, as the court suggests, the instances in which a
mistrial is ordered are few, id., the resulting burden on the state should be slight.
91. 293 N.C. 328, 237 S.E.2d 814 (1977).
92. 34 N.C. App. 59, 237 S.E.2d 475 (1977).
93. 293 N.C. at 335, 237 S.E.2d at 818. A somewhat similar case, State v. Beeson, 292
N.C. 602, 234 S.E.2d 595 (1977), also involved an indigent dissatisfied with his court-appointed
attorney. Defendant in Beeson had been granted two continuances, one on the ground that he
was in the process of retaining private counsel. The other continuance was on the ground of
surprise, granted when a codefendant agreed to plead guilty and testify for the State. Id. at 604,
234 S.E.2d at 596. Defendant then sought another continuance, asserting that he had not
cooperated with his court-appointed counsel and was still intending to retain private counsel.
This third motion for continuance was denied. The court did, however, appoint another
attorney to assist the original court-appointed counsel. The second counsel moved for a
continuance to let him prepare. That motion was denied. Id. at 604-05, 234 S.E.2d at 596. On
appeal, the supreme court upheld the trial court and ruled that the denial of the motion for
continuance did not deny defendant effective assistance of counsel since the original attorney
was thoroughly prepared and effectively represented defendant. Id. at 608, 234 S.E.2d at 598.
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the court, finding that defendant was adequately represented, denied his
request. 94 Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court was required, to
advise him of the right to proceed without counsel after his motion to replace
counsel was denied.95 The court held that when counsel continued to be a
vigorous advocate such that no prejudice to defendant resulted, the trial
court's failure to advise defendant of his right to represent himself was not
reversible error.
96
Federal courts have reached the same result in similar situations,
holding that while it is preferable for a trial court to ask a dissatisfied
defendant whether he wishes to proceed pro se, failure to do so is not
reversible error when defendant fails to indicate his desire to defend him-
self. 97 Thus, the right to dismiss counsel during trial and proceed pro se is
one that a defendant must assert himself, since both federal and North
Carolina courts are reluctant to force trial courts to inform a defendant of his
right unless he has already clearly indicated that he wishes to exercise that
right.98
State v. Sanders99 involved a defendant who, after first deciding to
retain counsel, tried and failed to establish indigency. When he first sought
As defendant was indigent, he had no right to select his attorney, and mere dissatisfaction with
the appointed attorney is not a sufficient basis for removal. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230
S.E.2d 524 (1976). The Beeson holding followed the holdings in several similar federal court
cases. See, e.g., United States v. Abshire, 471 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Sykes v.
Virginia, 364 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1966).
94. 293 N.C. at 335, 237 S.E.2d at 818.
95. Id. In State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976), the trial court refused to
remove appointed counsel, but limited his activities. As a result, according to the supreme
court, the attorney and defendant appeared to the jury to be at odds with each other. Thus,
defendant did not receive a fair trial. The supreme court pointed out that a defendant has a right
to conduct his own defense and that the trial court should have instructed him of that right. Id.
at 67-68, 224 S.E.2d at 180. Similarly, in State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976),
the court said:
It would have been the better practice for the trial judge to have excused the jury
and allowed defendant to state his reasons for desiring other counsel. If no good
reason was shown requiring the removal of counsel, then the court should have
determined whether the defendant actually desired to conduct his own defense.
rd. at 372, 230 S.E.2d at 529.
96. 293 N.C. at 335-36, 237 S.E.2d at 818-19. The court did warn that the better practice is
for the trial court to inquire of defendant whether he wishes to conduct his own defense. Id. at
336, 237 S.E.2d at 819.
97. Williams v. United States, 389 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam). The Williams court
seemed to feel that defendant was only trying to delay and really did not want to represent
himself. The court said that an unequivocal request to proceed pro se was necessary to invoke
the right to do so. The desire to proceed pro se must be timely asserted, United States v. Jones,
514 F.2d 1331, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1975), but even a request made during the trial should be granted
if doing so will not delay the trial since a defendant must have complete confidence in his
counsel. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1943).
98. Williams v. United States, 389 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam); State v. Cole, 293
N.C. 328, 237 S.E.2d 814 (1977).
99. 34 N.C. App. 59, 237 S.E.2d 475 (1977).
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to establish indigency he asserted that he was regularly employed, earned
$100 per week, owned a house and a car, and owed $728. The district court
judge found him not indigent. 00 A month and a half later he filed another
affidavit of indigency in superior court, this time asserting that he was
unemployed and that he was paying $500 to $600 per month on his house
and $40 per month on his car. The superior court judge also ruled him not
indigent. 101 Defendant appeared pro se at two subsequent trials that resulted
in mistrials and at the trial at which he was finally convicted. 102 On appeal,
defendant argued that at each of the trials the judge should have warned him
of his right to appointed counsel and conducted a hearing on his financial
ability. The court of appeals held that, having been advised once at the
district court level and once at the superior court level of his right to
appointed counsel if indigent, defendant was aware of his rights, and that by
not further seeking to establish indigency he chose to proceed pro se. 103
If defendant had asked for a redetermination of indigency, the court
could have considered the question at any time. 104 Sanders makes it clear,
however, that once a defendant has been found not indigent, he has the
burden of raising the issue. This burden can be compared to the burden of
one who has waived counsel to indicate to the court that he wishes to
withdraw his waiver. Such a waiver, once given, is good until the proceed-
ings finally terminate; successive waivers at every level of the proceedings
are not required. 05
Judge Martin, in dissent, saw Sanders as a case involving a waiver of
right to counsel." ° He argued that by finding that defendant chose to
proceed pro se the court was actually finding a waiver of right to counsel.
He charged that the majority presumed a knowing and voluntary waiver of
defendant's right to assistance of counsel when the record did not indicate
that the trial court informed him of that right or sought to determine whether
the lack of counsel resulted from indigency or choice. 10 7 The facts shown by
the record, according to the dissent, fell far short of showing a knowing and
voluntary waiver. Furthermore, the dissent argued that the superior court
judge should have found defendant indigent on defendant's second affidavit
100. Id. at 60-61, 237 S.E.2d at 475.
101. Id. at 61, 237 S.E.2d at 476.
102. The two mistrials were declared on the initiative of the trial court. Id.
103. Id. at 62, 237 S.E.2d at 476-77.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(c) (1969).
105. State v. Watson, 21 N.C. App. 374, 204 S.E.2d 537, cert. denied, 285 N.C. 595, 206
S.E.2d 866 (1974). Watson interpreted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-457(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977),
concerning waiver of counsel by indigents, but the same reasoning should apply for nonindi-
gents also.
106. 34 N.C. App. at 63-66, 237 S.E.2d at 477-78 (Martin, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 63-64, 237 S.E.2d at 477-78.
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of indigency, 108 and that failure to do so frustrated defendant's further
efforts to obtain counsel. 109 Judge Martin would have had the superior court
judge, in light of the numerous delays in the process of trying defendant! 10
and the seriousness of the charge,1t1 ascertain whether lack of counsel was a
result of indigency or choice1 I2 If indigency were the cause, Judge Martin
would require the record to show that counsel was offered and that defend-
ant voluntarily and intelligently refused the offer.
113
2. Nonindigents
A situation often arises when, without fault on defendant's part, his
counsel cannot be present on the scheduled day of trial. An attorney who
anticipates such a problem should, of course, attempt to work the matter out
beforehand with the trial judge. Occasionally, however, the attorney ne-
glects to do so or the judge and attorney cannot come to a mutually
acceptable solution. In such a situation, a trial court must decide whether to
grant the defendant a continuance or proceed with the trial. Denial of a
continuance risks denying defendant's right to select counsel and his right to
effective representation of counsel. Granting the continuance, however,
may encourage use of "unavailability" as a delaying tactic upsetting orderly
judicial proceedings. 114
108. Id. at 64-65, 237 S.E.2d at 478. Judge Martin pointed out that defendant had made a
strong showing of being "financially unable to secure legal representation and to provide all
other necessary expenses of representation," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(a) (1969), yet he was
denied indigency status even though "[n]othing in the record refutes or contradicts the import
of defendant's affidavit of indigency." 34 N.C. App. at 64-65, 237 S.E.2d at 478. Compare
Sanders with State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198, 188 S.E.2d 296, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972),
in which defendant entered an affidavit of indigency and the record did not refute or contradict
the impact of defendant's affidavit. In that case the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
district court judge and found the defendant indigent. Id. at 204, 188 S.E.2d at 300.
109. The dissent observed that it was likely that "the court's refusal to appoint counsel on
August 10 upon the strong showing made by defendant thwarted any further efforts by him to
establish his indigency. As a layman, defendant may well have perceived that any further
remonstration on his part would be futile." 34 N.C. App. at 66, 237 S.E.2d at 478 (Martin, J.,
dissenting).
110. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
11l. Defendant was sentenced to two years for nonfeloniously receiving stolen goods. 34
N.C. App. at 60, 237 S.E.2d at 475.
112. Id. at 65-66, 237 S.E.2d at 478 (Martin, J., dissenting). Such a requirement was
imposed in State v. Morris, 275 N.C. 50, 60, 165 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1969). Arguably, in Sanders
such a determination had been made when defendant was found not indigent. But he was found
not indigent on August 10; he was convicted at trial on October 18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(c)
(1969) provides that "[t]he question of indigency may be determined or redetermined by the
court at any stage of the action or proceeding at which an indigent is entitled to representation."
According to the dissent, situations such as defendant's long delay during a period of worsening
financial condition illustrate one of the reasons for this statutory provision. 34 N.C. App. at 65-
66, 237 S.E.2d at 478 (Martin, J., dissenting).
113. 34 N.C. App. at 65, 237 S.E.2d at 478 (Martin, J., dissenting); see State v. Morris, 275
N.C. 50, 60, 165 S.E.2d 245, 251 (1969).
114. Federal courts have held that whether a delay should be granted depends upon all the
1978]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In State v. McFadden15 and State v. Williams 16 North Carolina
courts confronted this dilemma. In McFadden, on the day of the trial,
retained counsel's junior associate appeared in court and stated that counsel
was engaged in a trial in federal court, that counsel was the only person
prepared to try the case, that he (the associate) knew nothing about the case
and that defendant wished to have his chosen counsel. 117 The superior judge
denied the motion for continuance and ordered the associate to represent
defendant. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to seven to ten years. 118
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that defendant was
denied both his right to select counsel of his choice and effective assistance
of counsel.
According to the state supreme court, " '[b]oth the State and Federal
Constitutions secure to every man the right to be defended in all criminal
prosecutions by counsel whom he selects and retains.' -!19 That right is not
absolute; a defendant must timely exercise the right and not use it to delay
intentionally the disposition of his case. 120 Defendant in McFadden had
timely exercised his right and was not responsible for counsel's absence.
According to the McFadden court, counsel's absence was not chargeable to
defendant and could not be used to deny him his constitutional right to
counsel of his choice. 121 The court also found that defendant was denied his
right to effective assistance of counsel, because the associate who was
ordered to try the case did not have reasonable time 122 to investigate, prepare
and present the defense. 1
23
In State v. Williams, 24 defendant employed a principal attorney to
surrounding facts and circumstances. Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971).
Some factors mentioned in Giacalone are: length of delay; whether the principal counsel has
associates prepared to try the case in his absence; whether other continuances have been
requested and received; convenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel, and the court;
and whether the delay seems to be for legitimate purposes. Id.
115. 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977).
116. 34 N.C. App. 408, 238 S.E.2d 668 (1977).
117. 292 N.C. at 610, 234 S.E.2d at 742.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 612, 234 S.E.2d at 744 (quoting State v. Speller, 230 N.C. 345, 351, 53 S.E.2d
294, 298 (1949)).
120. See Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1956); People v. Brady, 275 Cal.
App. 2d 984, 80 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1969).
121. 292 N.C. at 615, 234 S.E.2d at 746-47; accord, Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
122. 292 N.C. at 616, 234 S.E.2d at 747. What constitutes reasonable time depends on the
circumstances of the case. State v. Vick, 287 N.C. 37,213 S.E.2d 335, cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
918 (1975).
123. The associate first met defendant 90 minutes before trial and knew nothing about the
case. 292 N.C. at 610, 616, 234 S.E.2d at 742, 747. "Under these circumstances defendant was
denied effective assistance of counsel because he and [the associate] did not have a reasonable
time in which to prepare and present a defense." Id. at 616, 234 S.E.2d at 747.
124. 34 N.C. App. 408, 238 S.E.2d 668 (1977).
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conduct his defense and two others to assist. When the case was called for
trial the principal attorney was trying a different case, but the other two
attorneys were present. 125 The trial judge maintained that defendant was
ably represented by the two associate attorneys 126 and denied a motion for
continuance. 127 The court of appeals upheld the trial judge's ruling, making
the following comment on defendant's right to counsel he selects:
We do not believe this is a right without limitation. We think a
reasonable line must be drawn between the rights of defendants to
be represented by counsel of their choice, and the rights of society
to have the many criminal courts of the State operated with a
reasonable degree of efficiency. . . . [C]onsiderable discretion
has to be vested in the trial judge who is on the scene and has the
superior vantage point to view and consider the merits of a particu-
lar case.
128
The court felt that Williams was easily distinguished from McFadden
because in Williams defendant had two attorneys present who were "proved
advocates of many years' experience, who had been employed by defendant
for several months prior to the trial and who had every reason to be
thoroughly familiar with the case."
129
It is not clear, however, whether the Williams court was asserting that
defendant had not been denied his right to select counsel of his choice or his
right to have effective assistance of counsel. 130 Although defendant in
Williams probably had effective assistance of counsel, under the McFadden
reasoning he may nevertheless have been denied the right to be represented
by counsel of his choice. 131 However, as he was represented by attorneys
whom he had employed, even though not his chosen principal attorney, his
right to be represented by counsel of his choice may not have been violated.
D. Defendant's Right To Be Present at Trial
In State v. Montgomery,132 the court of appeals held that a defendant
not represented by counsel could waive his right to be present at his trial by
absenting himself from the proceedings. Defendant in Montgomery had
125. Id. at 411-12, 238 S.E.2d at 670.
126. Id. at 412, 238 S.E.2d at 670.
127. One such continuance had already been granted. Id.
128. Id. at 413, 238 S.E.2d at 671. The court of appeals did not reverse the trial court ruling
but did recognize that another judge might have ruled differently. Id.
129. Id. at 413-14, 238 S.E.2d at 671.
130. The court in State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977), found both of
these rights violated. See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 117-23 supra.
132. 33 N.C. App. 693, 236 S.E.2d 390, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 293 N.C. 256, 237
S.E.2d 258 (1977).
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elected to conduct his own defense 133 in a trial at which he and two
codefendants were charged with felonious larceny and receiving of checks
and money. 134 Defendant participated in jury selection but left during a
court-ordered break for lunch before the jury was impaneled. Defendant,
who apparently was free on bail, did not reappear after the recess. The court
proceeded with the trial and defendant was convicted.135
The court of appeals held that the trial had already begun when
defendant voluntarily left, 136 and that by leaving he waived his right to be
present.137 In North Carolina a defendant may waive his right to be present
during a trial for a noncapital offense by voluntarily absenting himself from
court after the trial begins.I" Montgomery, however, is apparently the first
North Chrolina case to consider whether such absence during almost the
entire course of the trial constitutes an effective waiver when defendant is
representing himself. In Montgomery the court accepted defendant's ab-
sence as an effective waiver.
One problem with finding a waiver in Montgomery is that it is not clear
that the court was sure that defendant had made a knowing and voluntary
waiver and was aware of the consequences of his action. 139 Finding an
effective waiver in this situation is justified by the probable result of a
different conclusion. If the court had held otherwise, defendant would have,
by electing to proceed pro se and then disappearing, effectively circumvent-
ed the trial court's proper denial of his earlier motion for continuance. 140
Finding a waiver in the Montgomery situation, however, extends the
waiver by absence rule beyond its ordinary scope. If the concern in whether
133. Id. at 696-97, 236 S.E.2d at 392. Defendant "elected" to proceed prose by discharging
his counsel immediately before trial and after his motion for continuance to obtain other
counsel was denied. He was told that he would have to proceed with his then-retained counsel or
represent himself. Id.
134. Id. at 694, 236 S.E.2d at 390.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 695, 236 S.E.2d at 392. In Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 504, 126 S.E.2d 597,
610 (1972), the court held that the trial began when the process of selecting jurors began. The
court noted, however, that while it was following the general rule, "[the answer [to when a trial
begins] may vary according to the . . . circumstances in a particular case." Id.
137. 33 N.C. App. at 696, 236 S.E.2d at 392.
138. State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887), seems to be the first North Carolina
case to so hold, and Kelly has been consistently followed. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 27 N.C.
App. 15, 217 S.E.2d 729, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 512, 219 S.E.2d 347 (1975) (defendant
waived right to be present and to have his attorney present when both defendant and counsel
absented themselves for rendering of verdict); State v. Stockton, 13 N.C. App. 15, 217 S.E.2d
459 (1971).
139. If the court had ruled that absence was not an effective waiver, then in the future trial
courts might be required to explain to defendants that unexcused absences could result in
waivers.
140. See 33 N.C. App. at 696-97, 236 S.E.2d at 392.
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to apply the rule is that the defendant's case not be unduly prejudiced,141
waiver by absence would be justified only when either (1) defendant is
represented by counsel 42 or (2) defendant is absent during a noncritical
stage of the trial. 143 Montgomery embraces neither situation; it seems based




In addition to the rules prohibiting the finding of contempt on the basis
of the content of a broadcast or publication, 145 the 1977 General Assembly
adopted G.S. 7A-276. 1, which prevents North Carolina's courts from issu-
ing orders "banning, prohibiting, or restricting the publication or broad-
cast" of proceedings in open court or the contents of any public record. 
146
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Nebraska Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart'47 provided the incentive for this statute. In Stuart, prior to
the trial of a defendant charged with a sensational mass murder, the trial
judge entered an order that prohibited the publication or broadcasting of any
facts "strongly implicative" of the accused. 148 Although the Nebraska
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the order, 149 the United States Su-
preme Court held that such a prohibition could not be justified in the face of
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and the presumption
against the use of prior restraints.150 The Court refused to say that a "gag"
order could never be justified, but before the entering of such an order, there
would have to be a showing that there were no effective alternatives and that
the "gag" order would serve its intended purpose.15 1 Recognizing the
141. State v. Kelly, 97 N.C. 404, 2 S.E. 185 (1887) (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 407, 2 S.E. at 186, where the court observed: "We can conceive of no just
reason why [defendant] may not [absent himself], especially when he is represented by counsel
... who. . . can generally take care of his rights better than he could do himself." Generally,
in these situations, counsel has been present during the time when defendant was absent. E.g.,
State v. Stockton, 13 N.C. App. 287, 185 S.E.2d 459 (1971). But cf. State v. Harris, 27 N.C.
App. 15, 217 S.E.2d 729, appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 512, 219 S.E.2d 347 (1975) (counsel and
defendant were both absent, but only for rendering of verdict).
143. Few cases seem to have considered this second ground for finding waiver by absence
independently of the first ground, since in most cases the defendant's attorney is present. Even
if the defendant is proceeding pro se, however, absence during a noncritical stage would not
prejudice his rights.
144. Cf. State v. Williams, 34 N.C. App. 408,238 S.E.2d 668 (1977) (right to be represented
by counsel of defendant's choice must be balanced against right of society to have criminal
courts operated with reasonable degree of efficiency).
145. See text accompanying notes 458 & 459 infra.
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-276.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
147. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
148. Id. at 541.
149. Id. at 545.
150. Id. at 570.
151. Id. at 569-70.
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difficulty of ever meeting the requirements of Stuart, the General Assembly
chose to prohibit the issuance of such orders altogether.
F. Pretrial Identification of Defendant
In State v. Sanders,1 52 the North Carolina Court of Appeals measured
the pretrial identification procedure involved in that case against the statu-
tory provisions for procedures to be followed after arrest set out in G.S.
15A-501153 and concluded that, because of substantial violations of that
statute, the pretrial identification testimony had to be suppressed. 1
54
G.S. 15A-501 provides that upon arrest, a law enforcement officer
must take the person arrested before a judicial official without unnecessary
delay. The officer may, however, prior to taking the person before a judicial
officer, take him to some other place "if such action is reasonably neces-
sary for the purpose of having that person identified.' 155 Defendant in
Sanders was arrested without a warrant at 11:45 p.m. five miles from the
scene of the robbery, which had occurred forty-five minutes earlier. He was
taken to the local police station, where officers called a magistrate and asked
him to come to the station. Before the magistrate arrived, the officers took
defendant to the police station in the town where the robbery had occurred
for a show-up, at which he was identified as the robber.
156
The issue before the court was whether it was "reasonably necessary,"
within the meaning of the statute, to take defendant to the show-up before
taking him to the magistrate. The State argued that "in view of the late hour,
the difficulty in procuring a magistrate and the benefits of prompt identifica-
tion," the officers had acted reasonably. 157 The court seemed to agree with
the State that the officers had acted reasonably, but held that the legislature
intended "reasonably necessary" to set a much stricter standard. The court
suggested that only exigent circumstances, such as when an identification by
a person in imminent danger of death or loss of faculties is needed, would
justify obtaining an identification prior to an appearance before a judicial
officer. 158 The Sanders court found no constitutional violation in the show-
152. 33 N.C. App. 284, 235 S.E.2d 94, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 257, 237 S.E.2d 539 (1977).
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
154. 33 N.C. App. at 288-89, 235 S.E.2d at 97. North Carolina appellate courts have been
criticized for engaging in only cursory review of pretrial identification procedures. See Survey
of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REV. 895, 1004-05 (1977). If that
criticism is valid, then Sanders may mark a turn toward closer analysis of pretrial identification
procedures, which may in turn encourage law enforcement officials to avoid procedures that do
not comport with statutory standards or that are impermissibly suggestive. See Id.
155. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
156. 33 N.C. App. at 285-86, 235 S.E.2d at 95.
157. Id. at 289, 235 S.E.2d at 97.
158. Id. at 288-89, 235 S.E.2d at 97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-501(4) (1975), according to the
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up, 159 but held that testimony concerning the pretrial identification should
have been suppressed because it was evidence " 'obtained as a result of a
substantial violation' of the Criminal Procedure Act."
160
G. Criminal Discovery
North Carolina courts had several occasions to interpret the state's rules
of criminal discovery.' 61 The supreme court decided two cases that may
significantly affect the right of criminal defendants to pretrial discovery of
the identity and statements of the State's witnesses. In State v. Smith,162 the
supreme court held that the State's witnesses should not be prohibited from
testifying because their names were omitted from a witness list furnished
defendant pursuant to a pretrial discovery motion. In State v. Hardy, 163 after
an extensive discussion of criminal discovery in North Carolina, the su-
preme court determined that a defendant has no right to the pretrial dis-
Official Commentary, is based upon the ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 3.09(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) (alternate provision) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967). The Model Code uses "reasonably necessary" to mean "reasonably necessary for the
purpose of having such person identified by a person in imminent danger of death or loss of
faculties." In Stovall v. Denno the Court found no due process violation in a show-up when the
only witness was in the hospital and no one knew how long she would live. 388 U.S. at 302. The
Sanders court observed that if a magistrate were not able to come in the middle of the night, the
officers would be justified under N.C, GEN. STAT. § 15A-501(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977), in holding
defendant until morning since he had been arrested on adequate probable cause. 33 N.C. App.
at 289, 235 S.E.2d at 97.
159. 33 N.C. App. at 287-88, 235 S.E.2d at 96.
160. Id. at 289, 235 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974 (1975) (emphasis in
original)). Section 15A-974(2) provides that factors to be considered in determining whether
a violation is substantial are: the importance of the particular interest violated; the extent of the
deviation from lawful conduct; the extent to which the violation was willful; and the extent to
which exclusion will tend to deter future violations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-974(2) (1975). The
court did not explain its reason for concluding that the violation was substantial, but because it
found no constitutional violation and because it seemed to feel that the officers acted reason-
ably, it seems likely that an important factor for the court was the deterrence value of
exclusion. This conclusion is especially likely since in Sanders it was not necessary to overturn
the conviction because the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of the
evidence was harmless. 33 N.C. App. at 289-90, 235 S.E.2d at 97-98.
161. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 293 N.C. 616, 625, 239 S.E.2d 439, 444 (1977) (relief is
discretionary for noncompliance with discovery order); State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 122-28,
235 S.E.2d 828, 838-42 (1977) (discovery of witnesses' statements) (see text accompanying
notes 190-203 infra); State v. Cross, 293 N.C. 296, 303-04, 237 S.E.2d 734, 739.40 (1977)
(discovery of material and exculpatory evidence); State v. Dollar, 292 N.C. 344, 351, 233
S.E.2d 521, 525 (1977) (discovery of State's witnesses); State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 657-58, 235
S.E.2d 178, 186-87, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 414 (1977) (discovery of material and exculpatory
evidence); State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 533-34, 231 S.E.2d 644, 649 (1977) (discovery of State's
witnesses); State v. Thomas, 291 N.C. 687, 692, 231 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1977) (relief is discretion-
ary for noncompliance with discovery order); State v. Smith, 291 N.C. 505, 523-24,231 S.E.2d
663, 674-75 (1977) (discovery of State's witnesses) (see text accompanying notes 164-76 infra);
State v. Kessack, 32 N.C. App. 536, 541, 232 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1977) (relief is discretionary for
noncompliance with discovery order).
162. 291 N.C. 505, 231 S.E.2d 663 (1977).
163. 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977).
1006 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
covery of the statements of the State's witnesses although there may be a
right to such statements at trial if they are exculpatory and material to the
defense.
In Smith, the trial court issued a pretrial order requiring the State to
disclose a list of its witnesses to defendant. The trial court later permitted the
State to call two witnesses whose names were omitted from the list. 164 In
ruling that permitting the witnesses to testify did not constitute error, the
North Carolina Supreme Court cited the legislative history of G.S. 15A-
903165 as specifically excluding the right to the discovery of witnesses'
names. 166 Although the Smith court refused to say that it was beyond the
power of the trial court to order such discovery, the court felt that "trial
judges should not encourage, by court order, what the Legislature specific-
ally rejected during the consideration of the legislation."1
67
Although the American Bar Association has recommended that defend-
ants be permitted to discover the names and addresses of the prosecution's
witnesses,168 a similar provision in a proposed version of G.S. 15A-903
proved so controversial when presented to the General Assembly that it was
deleted. 169 There is no provision for discovery of witnesses' names in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 170 and the federal courts have held that
the rules neither authorize nor forbid the discovery of the government's
witnesses. 171 Federal district judges, however, do possess an inherent power
to order disclosure of the government's witnesses. Such an order is review-
able only for an abuse of discretion.' 72 In at least one case, a United States
Court of Appeals found such an abuse when the district court ordered
disclosure of witnesses' names even though two of the defendants were
charged with beating a grand jury witness. 
173
The primary reason for denying discovery of the State's witnesses is a
fear of reprisals against them by defendants. 174 Although this concern may
be very real in some cases, it must be balanced against the importance of
164. 291 N.C. at 523, 231 S.E.2d at 674.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (1975).
166. 291 N.C. at 523-24, 231 S.E.2d at 675; accord, State v. Dollar, 292 N.C. 344, 233
S.E.2d 521 (1977); State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 231 S.E.2d 644 (1977).
167. 291 N.C. at 524, 231 S.E.2d at 675.
168. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.1(a)(i), at 13 (Tent. Draft, 1969).
169. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903, Official Commentary (1975).
170. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
171. See United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Jackson,
508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975).
172. United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Jackson,
508 F.2d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 1975).
173. United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975).
174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903, Official Commentary (1975).
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granting defendants a fair trial. For example, an eyewitness to a crime may
be unknown to the defendant but crucial to establishing a defense to the
charge. 175 In such a situation, it would seem that discovery of the witnesses'
names should be allowed. Since the Smith case does not strictly prohibit
pretrial discovery of the State's witnesses, it should perhaps be interpreted
as reserving such discovery for unusual circumstances rather than allowing
such discovery as a matter of course. When there is a genuine threat of
harassment, the State can seek a protective order to prevent discovery.1
76
In State v. Hardy,177 the supreme court also took note of the problem
of witness intimidation in concluding that North Carolina's criminal dis-
covery laws 178 specifically prohibit pretrial orders for the discovery of
statements made by the prosecution's witnesses. The court also held, how-
ever, that specifically requested statements could be discovered at trial if,
after inspection, the trial judge determines that they were both favorable to
the defendant and material to his guilt or punishment.
In Hardy, the trial judge ordered disclosure of "papers, documents,
photographs, mechanical or electronic recordings, [and] tangible objects in
control of the State relative to said case." 179 Upon discovering that the State
had failed to disclose a recorded and transcribed statement of one of the
witnesses who had testified at trial, defendant moved to strike the witness'
testimony. The trial judge ruled that the recording and transcript were the
work product of the State and not subject to discovery. 180 On appeal,
defendant argued that the pretrial order encompassed the discovery of the
statements of witnesses. The State's position was that the trial judge had
exceeded his authority and that the order was therefore a nullity.
Relying on North Carolina's criminal discovery rules, 8 ' the supreme
court interpreted the order as excluding the discovery of witnesses' state-
ments. 182 Admitting that G.S. 15A-903(d) seemed to allow discovery of any
175. This was the situation in People v. Harrison, 81 Misc. 2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 760 (J. Ct.
1975). In that case, the court allowed discovery both of the identity of the State's witnesses and
of their statements taken at the scene of the crime.
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-908 (1975) provides in relevant part that "the court may at any
time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or may make other
appropriate orders."
177. 293 N.C. 105, 235 S.E.2d 828 (1977).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-901 to -910 (1975); see text accompanying note 174 supra.
179. 293 N.C. at 122, 235 S.E.2d at 838.
180. d. at 123, 235 S.E.2d at 839.
In several cases decided during 1977, North Carolina courts held that when the State fails
to comply with discovery orders, the relief granted is within the discretion of the trial judge and
not reviewable absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Shaw, 293 N.C. 616, 239 S.E.2d 439
(1977); State v. Thomas, 291 N.C. 687, 231 S.E.2d 585 (1977); State v. Kessack, 32 N.C. App.
536, 232 S.E.2d 859 (1977).
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-903 to -904 (1975).
182. 293 N.C. at 125, 235 S.E.2d at 840.
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documents and tangible objects held by the State, 183 the court found that
G.S. 15A-904(a) specifically excluded from pretrial discovery "statements
made by witnesses or prospective witnesses of the State to anyone acting on
behalf of the State.' 1 84 The court did not decide whether a judge had
authority to order discovery of materials not protected by statute but
concluded that the discovery of the statements of State witnesses was
expressly prohibited by statute and that the trial court had no inherent
authority to order discovery of such statements.1 85 The court reasoned that
this prohibition was consistent with the legislature's desire to shield the
State's witnesses from possible harassment.
8 6
According to the Official Commentary to G.S. 15A-904(a), however,
the primary purpose of this section is the protection of the work product of
the State. 187 Certainly an attorney's impressions, opinions, conclusions and
legal theories should be protected from discovery under this section, but the
statements of witnesses are not work product in the same sense as legal
memoranda 88 and it is questionable whether the legislature meant to ex-
clude discovery of the statements of witnesses in all circumstances. Since
assuring defendants a fair trial is the primary purpose of criminal discovery,
trial judges should be permitted to order the discovery of witnesses' state-
ments when they are crucial to the defense's trial preparation. Since the
North Carolina Supreme Court has decided that trial courts cannot order the
disclosure of the State's witnesses and their statements, however, defend-
ants must rely on voluntary disclosure by the prosecutor 89 or seek discovery
at trial.
The Hardy court also ruled that the prohibitions of G.S. 15A-904(a)
were applicable only to pretrial discovery and that the statements of the
State's witnesses could be discovered at trial if such statements were not
otherwise privileged.'tg Although in Hardy the trial court had ruled that
183. !d. at 123, 235 S.E.2d at 839. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(d) (1975) provides:
Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order the solicitor to permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
motion pictures, mechanical or electronic recordings, tangible objects, or copies or
portions thereof which are within the possession, custody, or control of the State and
which are material to the preparation of his defense, are intended for use by the State
as evidence at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
184. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(a) (1975).
185. 293 N.C. at 125, 235 S.E.2d at 840. The court's interpretation is in accord with the
interpretation given to similar provisions in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by the
federal courts. See United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
McMillen, 489 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1972).
186. 293 N.C. at 124, 235 S.E.2d at 839.
187. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(a), Official Commentary (1975).
188. 293 N.C. at 126, 235 S.E.2d at 841.
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-904(b) (1975) makes it clear that nothing in the statutes is
meant to discourage voluntary disclosure by the State.
190. 293 N.C. at 125, 235 S.E.2d at 840. To support this proposition, the court relied on a
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witnesses' statements were protected by the work product privilege, the
supreme court held that the privilege was waived whenever the "defendant
or the State [sought] at trial to make a testimonial use of the work prod-
uct.' 191 Even though the State had waived the work product privilege by
calling the witness whose pretrial statement was in question to testify, the
supreme court refused to hold that the statements of witnesses should
routinely be disclosed at trial. Before disclosure is required, the statements
must also be favorable and material either to the guilt or punishment of the
defendant. 
192
Recognizing that it was a violation of due process for the prosecution to
suppress favorable and material evidence, 193 the North Carolina Supreme
Court interpreted the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Agurs 194 as requiring the disclosure of such material evidence only
at trial. 195 In Agurs, however, the Supreme Court discussed the standard of
materiality that must be met before there is a duty to disclose and did not
directly discuss the timing of the prosecutor's disclosure. t96 The Agurs
similar holding in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). In Nobles the defense used an
investigator's report to impeach one of the prosecution's witnesses. When the defense called
the investigator to the stand, the trial judge ordered that the report be given to the prosecutor.
In holding for the government, the Supreme Court stated that there was nothing in the federal
criminal discovery rules that limited the court's power to order production once the trial has
begun. Id. at 235; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
191. 293 N.C. at 126, 235 S.E.2d at 841. The North Carolina Supreme Court again relied on
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1973), in which the Court said that even though the work
product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney and materials prepared by agents
of the attorney, the privilege was waived in respect to the statements of persons who testify at
trial. Id. at 238-39.
192. 293 N.C. at 128, 235 S.E.2d at 842. Under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976),
defendants in federal courts are automatically entitled to the statements of the prosecution's
witnesses when they testify at trial.
193. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The defense in Brady had made a specific
request for all of the statements made by defendant's accomplice. After defendant was found
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death, the defense learned that the State had
failed to disclose a statement of the accomplice in which he had confessed to the crime. The
United States Supreme Court ordered defendant resentenced since this information could have
influenced the jury's sentence determination. The Supreme Court held that when specific
evidence has been requested by the defense, "[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused. . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." rd. at 87;
accord, State v. Gaines, 283 N.C. 33, 194 S.E.2d 839 (1973).
194. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the United States Supreme Court ruled that even absent
a request for specific evidence, the prosecution has a-duty to disclose exculpatory and material
evidence. Nondisclosure in this situation would be constitutional error "if the omitted evidence
create[d] a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." Id. at 112.
195. 293 N.C. at 127, 235 S.E.2d at 841. In requiring discovery of material and exculpatory
statements only at trial, the North Carolina Supreme Court followed the majority view that
developed after Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See generally Nakell, Criminal Dis-
covery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50
N.C.L. REv. 437, 452-53 (1972); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8, 122-29 (1966).
196. See generally Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose After United States v. Agurs,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690, 710-11.
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Court said that the applicable standard of materiality would apply "in
advance of trial, and perhaps during the course of a trial" when the
prosecutor must determine what "he should voluntarily submit to defense
counsel.' 1 97 Although the Agurs decision does not specifically require
pretrial discovery, this dictum would seem at least to encourage the prosecu-
tor to disclose any material evidence prior to trial. Certainly if evidence is so
favorable and material that it creates a reasonable doubt about the guilt of a
defendant, the defense should be apprised of it in time to make effective use
of it at trial.
Under Agurs, before there is a duty to disclose the evidence in question
must be both exculpatory and material. Since the lawyers working on a case
are most familiar with its facts, many courts permit the prosecuting attorney
to decide whether evidence is material. 198 When the prosecuting attorney
determines the question of materiality, however, there is often no basis for
appellate review unless the defense is fortunate enough to discover the
omitted evidence. 199 Recognizing this problem in Hardy, the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court said that when a defendant makes a request for specific
information, such as the statements of a State's witness, the trial judge
should hold an in camera inspection and make appropriate findings of fact.
When the decision is against disclosure, the judge must place a sealed copy
of the statement in the record.20 This procedure ensures that the information
sought by a defendant will be preserved for appellate review.
The North Carolina Supreme Court did not extend this procedure to
situations not involving a request for specific information by the defend-
ant. 201 However, since the disclosure of material, exculpatory evidence is
required by due process even in the absence of a request for specific
evidence, it would seem that appellate review of the nondisclosure of
arguably material evidence should not be left to happenstance. Neverthe-
less, it is impossible to preserve the State's entire case file for appellate
review, and judges should not be required to sift through the prosecution's
files.202 The prosecution does not have a duty to make routine disclosure of
its entire file to the defense, 20 3 but in this situation, justice might be better
served if the State disclosed any arguably material evidence or submitted
such evidence for an in camera inspection by the trial judge.
197. 427 U.S. at 107.
198. See, e.g., People v. Harrison, 81 Misc. 2d 144, 364 N.Y.S.2d 760 (J. Ct. 1975).
199. See examples cited in Nakell, supra note 195, at 453-58.
200. 293 N.C. at 128, 235 S.E.2d at 842.
201. Id. at 127, 235 S.E.2d at 842.
202. Id.
203. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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The Hardy court found no error by the trial judge because defendant
made no request for the witness' statements at trial and the statement was
not in the record for review on materiality. Nevertheless the court's discus-
sion did answer several questions about criminal discovery in North Caroli-
na. It is now clear that under G.S. 15A-904(a) the statements of a prosecu-
tor's witness are not subject to pretrial discovery orders. Such statements,
however, may be discovered at trial if not protected by the work product
privilege. When a witness has testified, the State does not have to disclose
his pretrial statements as a matter of course, but once the defense requests
such statements as exculpatory, the trial court must inspect the evidence in
camera and make appropriate findings of fact. It is unclear whether this
procedure will be followed when the defense has not made a request for
specific material.
H. Burden of Proof
In a 1975 decision, Mullaney v. Wilbur,20 4 the United States Supreme
Court held that the prosecution, to obtain a criminal conviction, must
persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements of the crime
charged. The State of Maine's procedure, whereby defendant was required
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of
passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce a murder charge to
manslaughter, was held to be a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.20 5 After Mullaney, any procedure that placed the
burden of proof on a criminal defendant to disprove any element of his crime
became questionable. 2°6 Later that year, in State v. Hankerson ,207 the North
204. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
205. Id. at 703-04.
206. In State v. Batdorf, 293 N.C. 486, 238 S.E.2d 497 (1977), for example, the North
Carolina Supreme Court chose to change the state's long-standing rule that a challenge to the
court's jurisdiction and venue in a criminal trial is an affirmative defense, with the burden of
proof on the defendant. Though it was uncertain whether such a revision was required by
Mullaney and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (reasonable doubt standard of proof required
in juvenile cases), the court stated that the change was warranted by policy considerations. Not
only did a question as basic as jurisdiction seem most suitably proved by the State, but also
other states would be more likely to accept a North Carolina court's determination of juris-
diction if the highest standard of proof had been applied, thus reducing the danger of double
jeopardy for defendants. 293 N.C. at 493-94, 238 S.E.2d at 502-03. The court reasoned that
proof of venue by a preponderance of the evidence would be sufficient because that issue did
not affect the question of a defendant's guilt or the power of the court to try him. Id. at 496,238
S.E.2d at 503-04. The court's holding did not require a reversal of the conviction in Batdorf,
since the trial judge's charge had in fact placed the burden of proving jurisdiction on the State,
and the jury found it had met that burden. Defendant's claim that the State's evidence was
insufficient to establish jurisdiction and venue was rejected, the court ruling that the undisputed
fact that the victim's body was found in North Carolina, weighted and tied with materials from
the North Carolina home of defendant's girl friend, constituted a prima facie showing of
jurisdiction sufficient for the jury to infer that the killing took place within the state. Id. at 494-
95, 238 S.E.2d at 503.'
207. 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 233 (1977). The North Carolina
Supreme Court decision was noted in 54 N.C.L. REv. 1020 (1976).
19781 1011
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Carolina Supreme Court considered the question whether the Mullaney rule
should be applied to require the State, when the defendant in a homicide
case claims self-defense, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing
was not in self-defense. Although the court held that a defendant could not
constitutionally be required, as Hankerson was by the judge's jury instruc-
tions, to "satisfy" the jury that he had acted in self-defense, 20 8 the court
nevertheless affirmed Hankerson's conviction, concluding that the Mul-
laney rule was inapplicable in this case because it was announced after
defendant's conviction.
2°9
In Hankerson v. North Carolina,210 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision that Mullaney would
not be applied retroactively. Hankerson, the Court ruled, was controlled by
the decision in Ivan V. v. City of New York, 21 in which the Court held that
In re Winship212 would be retroactively applied. In Winship the Court had
ruled that the reasonable doubt standard must be used in state juvenile
proceedings. 213 Announcing the retroactivity of Winship, the Court said:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs
its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been
given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by
state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has
sufficed to require prospective application in these
circumstances.
214
In Hankerson the Court held that the Mullaney rule, like that of Winship,
"was designed to diminish the probability that an innocent person would be
convicted and thus to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that 'substantial-
ly impairs the truthfinding function.' "215
The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized the closeness of Win-
ship and Hankerson on the question of the purpose to be served by the new
rule and the importance of that factor in past decisions of the United States
Supreme Court on retroactivity. 216 The court nevertheless concluded that
208. Id. at 643, 220 S.E.2d at 584.
209. Id.
210. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
211. 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam).
212. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
213. Id. at 368.
214. 407 U.S. at 204 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)).
215. 432 U.S. at 242 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971)).
216. 288 N.C. at 652, 220 S.E.2d at 590.
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because the two cases were "poles apart" in terms of two other factors-the
extent of the courts' reliance on previous decisions and the effect of retroac-
tive application on the administration of justice-a different result on the
retroactivity question was justified.
2 17
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. Conceding that it had
considered both the fact of reliance on the old rule and the fact that the new
rule would have a significant impact on the administration of justice even
though it would affect only marginally the integrity of the fact-finding
process, the court confirmed that when the impact of the rule on the truth-
finding function of the criminal trial was "substantial," it must be given
retroactive application.
218
In considering the arguments advanced by the State in support of the
state supreme court ruling, Justice White, writing for the Court, noted that
the State did not argue that self-defense could be designated an affirmative
defense that the prosecution need not disprove beyond a reasonable
doubt. 219 Such a procedure was upheld by the Court in Patterson v. New
York, 220 a decision handed down the same day as Hankerson. The New
York law challenged in Patterson provided that when someone is charged
with murder, the State must prove every element of the accused's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt: "[e]xtreme emotional disturbance," however,
was designated an affirmative defense that a defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce the crime to manslaugh-
ter.221 The Court upheld this practice on a due process challenge, distin-
guishing Mullaney on the ground that the State did not shift the burden to
defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged, since this
affirmative defense bore no direct relation to any element of the crime of
murder. 222
217. rd. at 654, 220 S.E.2d at 590. The court found that there was no reliance by New York
on previous rules in Winship, whereas North Carolina courts had relied on the presumption of
unlawfulness from proof of an intentional killing for over 100 years. Additionally, the retroac-
tive impact of Mullaney on the criminal justice system, the court felt, would be devastating,
since it would apply to convicted murderers, many of whose convictions were years old,
making retrial virtually impossible. Id. at 654, 220 S.E.2d at 590-91.
218. 432 U.S. at 243.
219. Id. at 240 n.6, 245. See also id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
220. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
221. Id. at 201.
222. Id. at 210. The Maine statute struck down in Mullaney designated malice as an
essential element of the crime of murder, while the New York statute did not. Justice Powell,
dissenting, charged that the Court's decision was thus "formalistic rather than substantive,"
allowing a state legislature "to shift, virtually at will, the burden of persuasion with respect to
any factor in a criminal case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that
factor in the statutory language that defines the crime." Id. at 221,223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Even under Patterson, however, it is unclear whether North Carolina
can constitutionally shift the burden of proof on self-defense to defendants
by making it an affirmative defense. Though unlawfulness is not an express
statutory element of the crime of murder, 223 it has been recognized by the
North Carolina Supreme Court as an essential element of the crime.
224
Moreover, the Court in Patterson warned that there were some constitution-
al limits beyond which state legislatures could not go in reallocating burdens
of proof by labeling various elements of a crime as affirmative defenses.
225
On the whole it seems that the wiser course for North Carolina is to retain its
new-found place among the majority of jurisdictions,226 requiring the State
to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Hankerson Court also hinted that the states might be able to avoid
much of the impact of a retroactive Mullaney rule by application of the
general rule that failure to object to a jury instruction constitutes a waiver of
any claim of error.2 27 As the rule shifting the burden of proof to defendants
on the self-defense issue was well-settled prior to this case, the Court
commented that "it is unlikely that prior to Mullaney many defense lawyers
made appropriate objections to jury instructions incorporating those pre-
sumptions. "228 Such a strict application of the waiver rule, however, would
not comply with the provisions regulating appellate review adopted by the
North Carolina General Assembly in 1977 .229 This statute couples a general
provision that errors may not be asserted on appellate review unless previ-
ously objected to in the trial court at the appropriate time, with a list of
exceptions that "may be the subject of appellate review even though no
objection, exception, or motion has been made in the trial division." 230 This
list of excepted errors includes:
(7) The conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.
(13) Error of law in the charge to the jury.
(19) A significant change in law, either substantive or procedural,
applies to the proceedings leading to the defendant's conviction or
sentence, and retroactive application of the changed legal standard
is required.2 31
223. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
224. State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. at 648-52, 220 S.E.2d at 587-89.
225. 432 U.S. at 210. The Court did not, however, define those limits.
226. See State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. at 654-55, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
227. 432 U.S. at 244 n.8.
228. Id.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
230. Id. § 15A-1446(a), (d).
231. Id. § 15A-1446(d)(7), (13), (19).
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Any of these exceptions should allow a petitioner convicted under an
erroneous burden of proof charge to raise a claim under Mullaney on direct
appeal. Although these provisions do not govern procedure on collateral
review, a prisoner convicted under the pre-Mullaney procedure would
appear to have a valid claim on federal habeas corpus.
232
L Motion for Dismissal
New G.S. 15A-1227 233 liberalizes the rules for a motion for dismissal
during trial. The statute that controlled this question before the 1977 change,
G.S. 15-173,234 was interpreted as requiring that, in order to preserve the
motion on appeal, 35 the motion be made after State's evidence, and that in
no event could the motion be raised for the first time after verdict.
2 36
Subsection (a) of the new statute provides that the motion can be made at the
close of the State's evidence, the close of all the evidence, after a guilty
verdict and before entry of judgment or after discharge of the jury without a
verdict. 237 Subsection (b) provides that failure to make the motion at the




In State v. Harbison,239 the North Carolina Supreme Court restricted
the application of the State v. Perry24° mandate that criminal defendants be
232. Although recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have narrowed the
scope of review on habeas corpus, they should not exclude a Mullaney-type claim. In Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), the Court held that when a state procedural rule requires a
defendant to raise a claim at trial or waive it, a federal court must also give effect to the waiver
rule, unless the petitioner can show cause for his failure to object at the appropriate time and
actual prejudice from the error. 1d. at 542. Aside from the fact that North Carolina does not
have a statutory waiver rule for this type of error, a petitioner raising a Mullaney claim should
have good cause for not objecting to the jury instructions at trial or raising the claim on direct
appeal, since such instructions would have followed the accepted pattern at the time. "Actual
prejudice" from the error must be presumed since the Court itself has said that an erroneous
instruction on burden of proof affects the "truth-finding function" of the criminal trial. See text
accompanying notes 211 & 214 supra. For the same reason, a petitioner would not be barred by
the Court's intimation in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-95 (1976), that only constitutional
claims that question the integrity of the state fact-finding process would be considered on
federal habeas corpus.
233. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1227 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
234. Id. § 15-173 (1975).
235. State v. Weaver, 228 N.C. 39, 44 S.E.2d 360 (1947).
236. State v. Wiggs, 269 N.C. 507, 153 S.E.2d 84 (1967).
237. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1227(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
238. Id. § 15A-1227(b).
239. 293 N.C. 474, 238 S.E.2d 449 (1977).
240. 248 N.C. 334, 103 S.E.2d 404 (1958). The circumstances in Perry were admittedly
more objectionable than those in Harbison. In Perry, defendant was indicted by an all white
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afforded a reasonable period of time to investigate alleged racial discrimina-
tion in the makeup of grand juries and jury venires. The Harbison court did
not deny the validity of the requirement, 241 but put defense counsel on notice
that in order to preserve the right, they must begin investigation before the
problem becomes apparent. In Harbison, the trial judge's denial of a motion
for continuance was held not to be error because a fifty-five day period had
elapsed between the time the sixty member venire had been announced and
the trial date.242 During that period defendant's attorneys had made no
investigation into the jury selection process and had introduced no evidence
to support their motion.243 The court concluded that:
It places no undue burden on defense counsel to require them
to make investigations into jury composition and selection proce-
dures prior to the time of trial, so long as the time between reten-
tion or appointment of counsel, the date the jury panel is drawn,
and the date of trial is not so brief as to make such investigation
impractical. 244
Justice Exum dissented, arguing that the reasonable opportunity the
Supreme Court found in the Harbison facts was too theoretical to be
acceptable. 245 Justice Exum pointed out that of the sixty persons listed on
the venire, only thirty-two--all whites-reported for jury duty on the day of
the trial. Even if defendant had investigated all the names on the venire, he
would have had no way of knowing until the trial date that he faced an all
white panel from which to choose his jury.246 "Faced with that circumstance
. . . defendant should have been entitled to inquire into the reasons and be
given an opportunity to present evidence on the point he raised.' '247 The
effect of the majority rationale is to require a defense attorney to expend
time and effort in investigating a problem that may not arise.
248
grand jury from another county, and brought to trial two days later. Defendant's out-qf.county
counsel brought a timely motion to quash the indictment on the grounds that blacks had been
systematically excluded from county grand juries; the motion was denied because defendant
had produced no evidence. Defendant then moved for a continuance to allow time to investigate
and submit evidence; this motion was also denied. The supreme court reversed, holding that
due process required defendant be allowed a reasonable opportunity and period of time to
investigate. The court held the reasonableness of the opportunity was to be judged on the facts
of each case, and that in this instance the time period was inadequate.
241. 293 N.C. at 480, 238 S.E.2d at 452.
242. Id. at 481, 238 S.E.2d at 452-53.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 481, 238 S.E.2d at 453. The burden the supreme court has put on defense
counsel is essentially a requirement that counsel examine and investigate the names on every
published jury venire scheduled for the week of any minority defendant's trial date as a matter
of course. For an active defense lawyer, this could prove to be a time-consuming, expensive
and futile process.
245. Id. at 485, 238 S.E.2d at 455 (Exum, J., dissenting).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See note 244 supra.
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2. Unified Selection Procedure
Before 1977, North Carolina had no general statutory scheme govern-
ing the process of jury selection from the voir dire panel. Consequently, the
procedures for selecting juries varied in each judicial district. 24 9 The General
Assembly remedied this situation by enacting a bill that unified the process
of jury selection throughout the state." The major aspects of the legislation
provide for the manner of questioning prospective jurors and modify the
requirements for preserving the right to appeal a denial of a challenge for
cause.
251
G.S. 15A-121422 requires that the State first question prospective
jurors and make its challenges until satisfied with the twelve. These twelve
will then be turned over to the defendant's counsel for questioning and
challenge. After the defendant has exercised challenges against any of the
twelve, replacement jurors will be called, questioned and challenged, first
by the State and then by the defendant; this process will be repeated until the
parties have either agreed on twelve or exhausted their challenges. General-
ly, once a party has accepted a juror, he may not reexamine or challenge that
juror. 5
3
Subsection (c) of G.S. 15A-1214 allows either counsel or defendant to
question prospective jurors personally during the selection process to deter-
mine whether to exercise a challenge. 254 This provision overrules a North
Carolina case 255 interpreting the previously controlling statute256 as allowing
249. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
250. Id. § 15A-1214.
251. Other changes in the selection procedure equalize the allocation of peremptory chal-
lenges between the State and defendant. Id. § 15A-1217 gives each defendant fourteen in a
capital case and six in a noncapital one. The State has the same number for each defendant on
trial. The old statute, 22 Hen. 8, ch. 14, § 6 (1530) (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 9-21 (1969)) allowed the defendant more challenges than the State had.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides a list of acceptable challenges for
cause. Subsection (6) works a change in the rule allowing a challenge to any juror who has
formed an opinion on the question of defendant's guilt. Id. § 15A-1212(6). The subsection
provides that the juror may not be asked to state his opinion, to prevent the expression of any
opinion in the presence of other prospective jurors. Prior to the enactment, a party was required
to show that a juror had formed an opinion adverse to his side before challenging for cause. Id.
§ 15A-1212, Official Commentary; see, e.g., State v. Chavis, 24 N.C. App. 148, 210 S.E.2d 555
(1974), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 287 N.C. 261, 214 S.E.2d 434 (1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1080 (1976).
252. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
253. See id. § 15A-1214(f). But see id. § 15A-1214(g); text accompanying notes 265, 266 &
272 infra.
254. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
255. State v. Dawson, 281 N.C. 645, 190 S.E.2d 196 (1972).
256. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-15(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). As of July 1,' 1978, § 9-15(a) was
controlled in criminal trials by the more specific standards of N.C. GEN. STeT. § 15A-1214(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
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the trial judge to require that all questions be asked by the court. This
holding was apparently an effort to save court time by avoiding repetitive
questioning.2 57 The drafting commission, many of whom are trial attor-
neys,258 obviously found this reasoning inadequate to overcome the value
counsel derives from direct questioning of prospective jurors. Thus, G.S.
15A-1214(c) explicitly allows both the prosecution and the defense counsel
to ask questions already put by the court. Again, this provision is contrary to
North Carolina cases that have allowed a trial judge to foreclose such
questions in the interest of saving court time.
259
The General Assembly also made important changes in the require-
ments for preserving the right of appeal on denied challenges. Present case
law requires a party who wishes to preserve the right to appeal a denial of a
challenge for cause to exhaust first his peremptory challenges and then to
assert a right to challenge an additional juror peremptorily. 260 G.S. 15A-
1214(h)261 requires only that the challenging party exhaust his peremptory
challenges and then renew and have denied his challenge for cause. The
change was made because of dissatisfaction with the probable result of
requiring a peremptory challenge beyond those permissible-the juror who
is challenged unsuccessfully will remain on the jury without understanding
why he was challenged. 262 Such a challenge could produce unconscious
hostility to the challenging party in the mind of the juror. Subsection (i)
263
allows the renewal of a challenge for cause required by subsection (h) to be
made in writing rather than orally in the presence of the jury. This provision
grew out of a belief that a juror who will probably remain on the panel
264
should not know that the renewal has been made, when he does not
understand why it was necessary.
Subsection (g) of G.S. 15A-1214 265 provides an exception to the
general rule that once a party has accepted a juror, he may not renew
questioning of or challenge that juror. 266 On discovering that the juror has
made an incorrect statement during voir dire, or for some other good reason,
a party may further examine and exercise challenges against that juror
257. State v. Dawson, 281 N.C. 645, 654, 190 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1972).
258. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
259. See, e.g., State v. Girley, 27 N.C. App. 388, 219 S.E.2d 301 (1975), cert. denied, 289
N.C. 141, 220 S.E.2d 799 (1976).
260. State v. Fox, 277 N.C. 1, 175 S.E.2d 561 (1970).
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(h) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
262. Id. § 15A-1214, Official Commentary.
263. Id. § 15A-1214(i).
264. If the juror has already been challenged once for cause, the second challenge, which is
required to preserve the right of appeal, will in all likelihood be denied. Id. § 15A-1214, Official
Commentary.
265. Id. § 15A-1214(g).
266. See text accompanying note 253 supra.
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before the jury has been impaneled. This provision effectively invalidates
the 1977 decision of the court of appeals in State v. Lee. 267 The Lee court,
relying on a 1902 civil case, Dunn v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. ,268 held
that the North Carolina rule is that the State cannot peremptorily challenge a
juror it has already accepted once the defendant has exhausted his peremp-
tory challenges. The court, noting a split of authority, 269 opted for the Dunn
rule out of concern that a defendant who is improvident in having exhausted
his peremptory challenges might be deprived of the right to challenge the
replacement juror.27 At first blush, the Lee court's reasoning seems to
follow from the norm that the defense should always have the- advantage of
following the State in examining and challenging jurors. The court, how-
ever, ignored the fact that in Lee the trial court allowed the State to
reexamine and challenge because the State showed that not being able to
reexamine and challenge would result in prejudice to the State.271 When
prejudice can be shown, the better practice is to allow the challenge, even at
the expense of the defendant's loss of the right to the last challenge. New
G.S. 15A-1214(g), not in effect when Lee was decided, reflects this policy
by allowing "any party who has not exhausted his peremptory challenges
. . . [to] challenge the juror" on a showing of good cause.
272
The trial court's procedure in Lee would probably be erroneous under
an additional facet of G.S. 15A-1214(g). The jury in Lee was impaneled
before the challenge was made and granted.2 73 The G.S. 15A-1214(g)
allowance of reopening the questioning and challenging of a juror applies
only before the jury has been impaneled. The Official Commentary to the
statute indicates that "[a]fter the jury is impaneled, . . . the issue is
escalated to whether to declare a mistrial or not."274
As the North Carolina Supreme Court recently suggested in State v.
Kirkman,275 the impaneling of the jury may be a rather arbitrary place to
draw the line. The court first noted that it is well established that a trial judge
has the discretionary power to reopen examination and challenge of accept-
267. 32 N.C. App. 591, 233 S.E.2d 87 (1977).
268. 131 N.C. 446, 42 S.E. 862 (1902).
269. 32 N.C. App. at 592,233 S.E.2d at 88. The court cited an Arkansas case, Nail v. State,
231 Ark. 70, 328 S.W.2d 836 (1959), which held that before finding error in the granting of the
State's challenge, defendant must show that the replacement juror is objectionable.
270. 32 N.C. App. at 592, 233 S.E.2d at 88.
271. In Lee, a juror who had been accepted by the State after questioning, later informed
the court she was personally acquainted with defense counsel. The State did not attempt to
challenge for cause because it had not yet exhausted its peremptory challenges. Id. at 591, 233
S.E.2d at 87.
272. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214(g)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
273. 32 N.C. App. at 591, 233 S.E.2d at 87.
274. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
275. 293 N.C. 447, 238 S.E.2d 456 (1977).
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ed jurors before the jury is impaneled,276 and continued "[w]e perceive no
reason for the termination of this discretion in the trial judge at the impanel-
ment of the jury.''277 This language is broader than the facts of Kirkman
required278 and will probably be restricted in light of G.S. 15A-1214(g).
279
K. Jury Instructions
The General Assembly curtailed the scope of judicial discretion in-
volved in jury instructions; 280 the most noteworthy change is the provision
concerning permissible instructions to a deadlocked jury. Under G.S. 15A-
1235(b), the judge may instruct the jurors that they have a duty to deliberate
with a view to reaching an agreement after an impartial consideration of the
evidence and that the jurors should not hesitate to reexamine their views and
change their opinions. 281 The judge is also to instruct that no juror should
surrender his honest opinion because of the opinion of other jurors, or
merely to return a verdict. 282 The section will promote well-balanced in-
structions by requiring that these new instructions as a whole be given to the
jury. The reminder to the jury that their inability to agree on a verdict
necessitates a new trial, a new jury and extra expense to the state and
county, allowed by the North Carolina Supreme Court,283 is not expressly
permitted under the new section.
284
276. Id. at 453, 238 S.E.2d at 460 (citing State v. Bowden, 290 N.C. 702, 228 S.E.2d 444
(1976)).
277. Id. at 454, 238 S.E.2d at 460.
278. In Kiikman, the replacement juror was an alternate who had presumably been accept-
ed by defendant and impaneled with the regular jury. Since alternate jurors may take seats
vacated by death or illness of regular jurors during trial, it is arguable that there should be no
reason to object to the challenge in this instance.
279. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977). One
reason for the bright line distinction in the statute may be found in the Official Commentary
accompanying id. § 15A-1216 which codifies the procedure for impaneling the jury: "Impanel-
ing the jury is an especially critical stage in criminal cases as jeopardy attaches at this point."
Id., Official Commentary.
280. Id. § 15A-1231(b) makes it mandatory for the trial judge to hold a recorded conference
on instructions at the request of either party. The provision is tempered by the statement that
failure to comply will not be grounds for appeal unless the failure materially prejudiced the
defendant.
281. Id. § 15A-1235(b) allows the instructions:
(1) Jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(2) Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial con-
sideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(3) In the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own
views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(4). No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the
evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of
returning a verdict.
282. Id.
283. See State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975).
284. The language of the section does not make it clear that the listed instructions are
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L. Verdicts
The General Assembly changed several of the rules relating to jury
verdicts. 285 One alteration, in G.S. 15A-1240, expands permissible jury
impeachments of the verdict. Before the jury disperses, and upon an inquiry
into the validity of the verdict, the provision prohibits only that evidence
that shows the effect of any statement or conduct on the mind of the juror or
relates to the thought processes of the jurors. 286 Subsection (c) further limits
the scope of acceptable impeachment evidence; only evidence concerning
matters not in evidence that came to the attention of jurors in violation of the
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation or evidence of bribery or
intimidation of a juror may be accepted from a juror after the jury has
dispersed. 287 Before the enactment of this section, the position of the North
Carolina Supreme Court was to disallow all impeachment evidence from a
juror.
288
M. Post-Trial Relief in the Trial Court
In an attempt to maximize a trial court's ability to correct its errors and
thereby avoid appeals, 289 the General Assembly established the motion for
appropriate relief. 29° This motion replaces motions in arrest of judgment, 291
exclusive, and the section may not be so construed. The Official Commentary. however, seems
to contemplate that these instructions are exclusive and clearly states that the State v. Williams,
288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975), instruction was specifically considered and rejected by the
drafters. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1235, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
285. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1237 (Cum. Supp. 1977) imposes two new requirements for
North Carolina verdicts. Subsection (a) requires a written verdict; subsection (c) requires that
verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity must so state. Verdicts are presently given orally.
See State v. Stone, 231 N.C. 324,56 S.E.2d 675 (1949). The Official Commentary indicates that
the drafting Commission contemplated the introduction of a verdict form to eliminate the
confusion that often attends oral verdicts. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1237, Official Commentary
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
286. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1240 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This is generally known as the Iowa
Rule, which
is based upon the distinction between extrinsic or overt acts which may be
corroborated or disproved, such as access to improper matter or an illegal method of
reaching a verdict, and intrinsic matters which "inhere in the verdict itself" and hence
are known only to the individual juror, such as misunderstanding or prejudice. Be-
cause . . . the thought processes and motives of the juror in reaching his decision, are
not readily capable of being either corroborated or disproved they should be excluded.
Sopp v. Smith, 59 Cal. 2d 12, 18, 377 P.2d 649, 652, 27 Cal. Rptr. 593, 596 (1963) (Peters, J.,
dissenting). This is probably a minority rule; most jurisdictions disallow juror verdict impeach-
ment on the grounds of jury misconduct. 76 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 1220 (1975).
287. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1240(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
288. State v. Hollingsworth, 263 N.C. 158, 139 S.E.2d 235 (1964). The stricter rule was a
public policy decision in favor of the certainty of jury verdicts. This policy is continued to a
lesser degree by the § 15A-1240(c) restrictions on the types of evidence receivable after the jury
has been dispersed. See text accompanying note 287 supra.
289. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 15A, art. 89, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
290. Id. §§ 15A-1411 to -1422.
291. "A motion in arrest of judgment is generally made after verdict to prevent entry of
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motions to set aside the verdict,292 motions for new trial, 293 post-conviction
proceedings, 294 coram nobis295 and all other post-trial relief.296 By affording
a combination of requests for relief under one motion, the General Assem-
bly intended to focus attention on the alleged error and avoid attaching any
significance to the name of motion. 297 Although the motion for appropriate
relief298 is essentially a combination of the procedures previously applicable
to motions for new trial299 and relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
the 1977 legislative action did result in several significant changes in this
area.
300
Prior to the availability of the motion for appropriate relief, a motion
for a new trial had to be made within ten days of the entry of judgment. The
grounds for such a motion in criminal cases were the same as in civil cases
and focused on errors of law and the essential fairness of the trial.30 1 Under
the new law, these same gounds can be used to support a motion for
appropriate relief made within ten days of the entry of judgment.30 2 While in
the past some motions for new trial were denied by trial courts because the
defendant's notice of appeal had divested the trial court of jurisdiction, 30 3
judgment based on a defective indictment or some fatal defect on the face of the record
proper." State v. Davis, 282 N.C. 107, 117, 191 S.E.2d 664, 670 (1972).
292. This motion is primarily used to attack a verdict as being against the greater weight of
the evidence. See State v. Dull, 289 N.C. 55,220 S.E.2d 344 (1975), modified on othergrounds,
428 U.S. 904 (1976).
293. For the grounds for the motion for a new trial, see note 301 infra.
294. Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, Law of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1083, § I, 1951
N.C. Sess. Laws 1085 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222
(1975)) (repealed 1977), noted in 55 N.C.L. REv. 653 (1977), a petition for a hearing could be
based on the denial of constitutional rights, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, the fact that the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law or any error
previously available under habeas corpus and coram nobis.
295. "The writ of error coram nobis is an established common law writ available under our
procedure to challenge the validity of a conviction by reason of matters extraneous to the
record." State v. Green, 277 N.C. 188, 191, 176 S.E.2d 756, 759 (1970). This writ was
previously supplanted by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in reference to any person impris-
oned. Id.
296. The availability of this motion does not bar relief by writ of habeas corpus. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411 & Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
297. Id. ch. 15A, art. 89, Official Commentary.
298. Id. §§ 15A-1411 to -1422.
299. Previously, the grounds for new trial were the same in criminal actions as in civil
actions. The grounds for new trial in civil actions appear in N.C.R. Civ. P. 59. See note 301
infra.
300. See note 294 supra.
301. The grounds for a new trial under N.C.R. Civ. P. 59 applicable to criminal cases are:
(1) any irregularity that prevented a fair trial; (2) misconduct of the jury; (3) accident or
surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5) manifest disregard of the courts instructions by the
jury; (6) insufficiency of the evidence; (7) the verdict is contrary to the law; and (8) an error in
law at trial.
302. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
303. See State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, I1 S.E.2d I (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1414, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
1022 [Vol. 56
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
trial courts are now empowered by G.S. 15A-1414(c) 3°4 to act on motions
for appropriate relief made within ten days of the entry of judgment whether
or not notice of appeal has been given.
Previously, a motion for new trial based on the discovery of new
evidence also had to be made within ten days of the entry of judgment,
30 5
although the trial court had discretion to grant a new trial up to one year after
the final judgment. 306 In drafting the contours of the motion for appropriate
relief, the Criminal Code Commission felt that newly discovered evidence
might be so crucial to the reliability of the verdict that there should be no
time limit on the assertion of newly discovered evidence as grounds for a
new trial. Therefore, G.S. 15A-1415(b)(6) permits a defendant to move for
appropriate relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence at any time after
trial.
307
By replacing several previously available post-trial motions, the act
establishing the motion for appropriate relief necessarily gives the trial court
wide discretion in selecting the appropriate relief. 308 Under G.S. 15A-
1417(b), if the evidence does not sustain the verdict but is sufficient to
support a conviction of a lesser included offense, the trial court, with the
consent of the State, may now avoid a new trial by accepting a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense.
309
Prior to this statutory change a superior court could accept a guilty plea
to a lesser included offense only on appeal from a district court for a trial de
novo of a misdemeanor. 310 G.S. 15A-1417(b) represents a broadening of
that power to the correction of errors made in superior court.
New G.S. 15A-1418, which requires that motions for appropriate relief
be made in the appellate courts once "a case is in the appellate division for
review," 311 represents a significant change from the former practice. Al-
304. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Under id. § 15A-1448, notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction until 10
days after the entry of judgment or 10 days after the trial court has ruled on any motions for
appropriate relief.
305. N.C.R. Civ. P. 59(a)(4), (b).
306. Id. 60(b). See also Wiggins v. Bunch, 280 N.C. 106, 184 S.E.2d 879 (1971).
307. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) reads: "At any time after verdict,
the defendant by motion may seek appropriate relief upon any of the grounds enumerated in
this section."
Id. § 15A-1415 represents a codification of the grounds for relief previously available under
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and the motion in arrest of judgment. There is no time limit to
the assertion of a motion based on these grounds.
308. When the court grants a motion for appropriate relief, it can award a new trial, dismiss
all or any of the charges, or grant any other appropriate relief. Id. § 15A-1417(a).
309. Id. § 15A-1417(b).
310. Id. § 7A-271 (1969).
311. Id. § 15A-1418 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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though previously motions in arrest of judgment could be made for the first
time on appeal,3 12 other post-trial motions such as the motion for a new trial
could only be made in the trial court. 313 Appellate courts may now deter-
mine the motion for appropriate relief in conjunction with the appeal or
remand the case to the trial court for the taking of evidence. 314 If the motion
for appropriate relief is remanded to the trial court, the time periods for
perfecting or proceeding with the appeal are tolled until the trial court has
acted on the motion.
315
Although the policy behind the motion for appellate relief is to avoid
appeal whenever possible, the motion is not a substitute for appeal and
cannot be used repeatedly to review the same trial. 316 Under the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act, 317 the asserted error was waived if it had been or
could have been raised in a previous petition or appeal. 318 To avoid the
abuse of the motion for appropriate relief, G.S. 15A-1419 permits the trial
court to deny a motion on the basis of prior adjudication or prior opportunity
to raise the issue.
319
If there has been no prior adjudication of the issue, review of the
motion for appropriate relief may be by affidavit320 or by an evidentiary
hearing. 32t Unlike the practice under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,
322
defendants have a waivable right to be present at any evidentiary hearing.
323
As under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, 324 however, defendants carry the
burden of showing the evidence of the asserted ground for relief, and relief
will be denied unless they show prejudice.
325
312. State v. Wallace, 25 N.C. App. 360, 213 S.E.2d 420 (1975).
313. See State v. Nance, 253 N.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 3 (1960); State v. Smith, 245 N.C. 230,
95 S.E.2d 576 (1956).
314. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1418(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
315. Id. § 15A-1418(c).
316. See id. § 15A-1419.
317. See note 294 supra.
318. Law of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1083, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws. 1085 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -218 (1975)) (repealed 1977). See also State v. White,
274 N.C. 220, 162 S.E.2d 473 (1968).
319. "[O]nce a matter has been litigated or there has been opportunity to litigate a matter,
there will not be a right to seek relief by additional motions at a later date." N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-1419, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
320. Id. § 15A-1420(b)(1).
321. Id. § 15A-1420(c).
322. State v. Gainey, 265 N.C. 437, 144 S.E.2d 249 (1965), held that there was no require-
ment that a defendant be present at a post-conviction hearing.
323. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(c)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
324. "In this proceeding, the burden is upon the petitioner to show a denial of some right
." Branch v. State, 269 N.C. 642, 649-50, 153 S.E.2d 343, 349 (1967).
325. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(c)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). For the statutory definition of
prejudice, see text accompanying notes 330-37 infra.
If a motion based on any of the grounds listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1414 (Cum. Supp.
1977) is granted or denied, appellate review is only by appeal since the time limit for taking an
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N. Appeal
The new statute governing appeals from criminal trial dispositions
passed by the 1977 General Assembly 2 6 is primarily a codification of
existing case law and statutes in this area. 327 Although several minor
changes have been made to integrate the new motion for appropriate relief32 8
with appellate procedures, the most interesting changes are the codification
of prejudicial error standards32 9 and the clarification of the grounds available
for appeal by the State.
Under the new appeals statute, the standard to be used in determining
whether an error is prejudicial to the defendant depends on the nature of the
right infringed.330 When the error does not relate to a constitutional right,
the statute331 has adopted the prejudicial error rule of the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Turner:332 the defendant carries the
burden of showing that a "different result would have been reached at the
trial" if the error had not been committed.3 33 As the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Chapman v. California334 suggests, although a violation
appeal does not begin to run until there has been a ruling on such a motion. See id. § 15A-
1422(b). While rulings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, see note 294 supra, and on
motions for new trial were reviewable only by writ of certiorari, see State v. Shelton, 21 N.C.
App. 662, 205 S.E.2d 316 (1974), actions on motions for appropriate relief under § 15A-1415
may be reviewable by appeal if the time for appeal from conviction has not expired or if an
appeal is pending when the action is entered. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1422(c) (Cum. Supp.
1977).
326. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1441 to -1448 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
327. Id. § 15A-1431 provides procedures for appealing from the district court to the
superior court. This statute is primarily an extension of the trial de novo provisions of id. § 7A-
290. Unlike the prior law barring appeal and trial de novo upon compliance with the judgment,
however, id. § 15A-1431(d) permits appeal regardless of defendants' compliance with the
judgment as long as notice of appeal is given after compliance.
The State may still appeal from the district court, but under id. § 15A-1432 such an appeal
must be made within 10 days of the entry of judgment by written motion and must be based on
the same grounds as for appeal from superior court. For an explanation of the grounds on which
the state can appeal, see text accompanying notes 338-47 infra.
328. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1411 to -1422 (Cum. Supp. 1977); see text accompanying
notes 289-325 supra.
329. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1442 (Cum. Supp. 1977), the appellate courts have
broad discretion to correct any prejudicial error. The appellate division can correct errors on
the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) error in the criminal pleading; (3) insufficien-
cy of the evidence; (4) procedural errors; (5) an unconstitutional procedure or statute; and (6)
any other error of law.
330. In general, under id. § 15A-1446, an error must be brought to the attention of the trial
court before it can be asserted on appeal. A motion for appropriate relief is not a prerequisite
for appeal, but such a motion can be used to bring an error to the attention of the trial court. See
id. § 15A-1446(c).
331. Id. § 15A-1443(a).
332. 268 N.C. 225, 150 S.E.2d 406 (1966).
333. Id. at 232, 150 S.E.2d at 411.
334. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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of a defendant's constitutional rights is not automatically ground for revers-
ing a conviction, 335 such a violation shifts the burden of proof to the State
and thereby makes reversal more likely. New G.S. 15A-1443(b), 336 essen-
tially a codification of the Chapman rule, requires the State to demonstrate
beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error was harmless.
337
Unless further prosecution is prohibited by the constitutional provision
against double jeopardy, 338 the new appeals statute permits the State to
appeal from the superior court to the appellate division. 339 Formerly the
State was allowed to appeal upon special verdict, demurrer, motion to
quash, arrest of judgment or motion for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. 34° Basing the State's right to appeal on the identity of
the relief granted, however, led to confusion--especially when the relief
granted was misnamed by the trial judge. 341 The new law still permits the
State to appeal the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence 342 and the granting of a motion to suppress evidence.343 Instead of
listing the motions from which the State can appeal, however, the new
provision allows the State to appeal on other grounds only when there has
been a decision dismissing criminal charges against a defendant. 3 4 The
wording of this statute follows closely the federal provision that permits the
United States to appeal only from decisions dismissing an indictment or
information. 345 The federal courts have interpreted this provision to mean
that an appeal does not lie from a decision that rests on extraneous facts
instead of the sufficiency of the indictment alone. 346 If this interpretation
applies to the North Carolina statute, once the court receives any evidence,
jeopardy attaches and the State cannot appeal.
347
335. Id. at 24.
336. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1443(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
337. See 386 U.S. at 24.
Under the "invited error" rule, a defendant is not prejudiced by error resulting from his
own conduct. See State v. Payne, 280 N.C. 170, 185 S.E.2d 101 (1971). The "invited error" rule
is codified for the first time in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1443(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
338. U.S. CONST. amend. V reads in pertinent part: "No person. . . shall. . . be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
339. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1445 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
340. N.C. CODE ch. 26, § 1237 (1883) (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15-179 (1975)) (repealed 1977). Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979(c) (1975) the State can appeal
an order to suppress evidence entered by the court prior to trial.
341. See, e.g., State v. Vaughn, 268 N.C. 105, 150 S.E.2d 31 (1966); State v. Brown, 29
N.C. App. 180, 223 S.E.2d 572 (1976).
342. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1445(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977). An appeal by the State on this
ground can only be on questions of law.
343. Id. § 15A-979(c) (1975).
344. Id. § 15A-1445(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
345. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
346. United States v. Southern Ry., 485 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1973).
347. See id. When an indictment is dismissed on the basis of extraneous facts, the dismissal
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On the whole, the new appeals statute is an attempt by the General
Assembly to avoid formality and focus on the error committed at trial. The
appeals provisions, together with the motion for appropriate relief,34 8 pre-
sent a simplified procedure for correcting trial errors with primary emphasis
on correcting errors at the trial level.
0. Sentencing
1. Sentencing Procedure for Capital Punishment
In response to Woodson v. North Carolina349 which struck down North
Carolina's 1975 death penalty statute,35° the General Assembly attempted to
enact a constitutional statute351 by tracking the provisions of the Georgia
statute 352 approved by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Geor-
gia. 353 The Court, in upholding the Gregg death penalty, noted with
approval that the Georgia procedure required (1) a separate sentencing
procedure by the jury with adequate guidance provided by an instruction on
is an acquittal. "Mhen no appeal may be taken by the government because jeopardy would
have attached on account of the acquittal." Id. at 312.
348. See text accompanying notes 289-325 supra.
349. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
350. Law of Apr. 18, 1974, ch. 1201, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Sess. 323 (formerly codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2, -17, -21, -52, -58 (Cum. Supp. 1975)). The Woodson statute had
been enacted in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), which struck down a
Georgia statute providing for total jury discretion in the imposition of the death sentence. The
Woodson statute attempted to correct this constitutional infirmity in the comparable North
Carolina law by imposing a mandatory death penalty on conviction of certain crimes.
351. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
The legislature also made changes in the general sentencing procedure. Id. § 15A-1332
removes the requirement that a trial judge order and consider a presentence report on a
defendant charged with a felony before placing him on probation, as required by Law of Mar.
13, 1937, ch. 132, § 2, 1936-1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 351 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15-198 (1975)) (repealed 1977), and makes such an order a matter within the court's discretion.
Apparently, former § 15-198 was never strictly followed-felons put on probation did not
generally object to their lenient probation sentence on the ground that the judge failed to order a
presentence report. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1977, at 25 (J.
Brannon ed. 1977). The court may order the report only after conviction, unless the defendant
moves for an earlier investigation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1332(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). A
defendant may choose to ask for a preconviction report for plea bargaining purposes. Id. § 15A-
1332(b) also changes the requirements of the former statute, Law of Mar. 13, 1937, ch. 132, §
2, 1936-1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 351 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-198 (1975))
(repealed 1977), by providing that the presentence report may include sentence recommenda-
tions only if requested by the court. Contra, State v. Pigg, 13 N.C. App. 345, 185 S.E.2d 438
(1971).
To facilitate the ordering of presentence investigation, N.C. GEm. STAT. § 15A-1334 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) allows a judge who orders a presentence report to hold the sentencing hearing in a
county or session other than the one in which the defendant was convicted. The provision
allows a rotating superior court judge to order a report when he knows he will be in another
county by the time the report is prepared and the hearing can be held.
352. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1, -2537 (1978).
353. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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the statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances that may be con-
sidered in conjunction with mitigating circumstances, 354 and (2) the auto-
matic review of the sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court. 355 The 1977
North Carolina capital punishment legislation requires a separate sentencing
procedure before the jury to determine whether the death penalty is appro-
priate.3 56 Language in Gregg expressly approves such a bifurcated pro-
ceeding.
Under North Carolina's new procedure, the trial judge is required by
G.S. 15A-2000(b) to instruct the jurors that they must consider any ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstances supported by the evidence and to
furnish the jurors a written list of issues regarding these relevant circum-
stances.357 Before a capital verdict can be returned, the jury must find the
existence of at least one of an exclusive list of ten aggravating circum-
stances35 beyond a reasonable doubt, 359 and the absence of any mitigating
circumstance 36° that outweighs the aggravating circumstances.
354. Id. at 197-98.
355. Id. at 198.
356. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
357. Id. § 15A-2000(b).
358. The aggravating circumstances that may be considered are:
(I) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony.
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnap-
ping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law enforcement officer, employee
of the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge
or justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or
former witness against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of his
official duties or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.
Id. § 15A-2000(e).
359. Id. § 15A-2000(c)(1).
360. rd. § 15A-2000(c)(3). The mitigating circumstances include:
(i) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed
by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
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Another feature of the new statute suggested by Woodson 361 is the
provision for automatic review of any death sentence by the North Carolina
Supreme Court. 362 On review, the court is to consider the punishment
imposed and any error assigned on appeal. 363 If the supreme court concludes
that the record does not support the jury's finding of an aggravating circum-
stance, that the penalty was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, or that the penalty is disproportion-
ate, the court must impose a sentence of life imprisonment in lieu of the
death penalty. 364 If the court finds error in the sentencing procedure, how-
ever, a new sentencing hearing must be conducted.
365
The United States Supreme Court objected to North Carolina's Wood-
son statute on three grounds. First, mandatory death penalties have histori-
cally been rejected as unduly harsh and rigid.3 6 Second, the statute failed to
correct the infirmity of total jury discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences. The Court pointed out that American juries persistently refuse to
convict because of mandatory sentences they feel are too harsh; by a finding
of guilt of a lesser offense, the jury exercises complete discretion without
any guidelines or standards from the statute or instructing judge. In this
situation, there is no way for the judiciary in reviewing the decision to check
an arbitrary exercise of the power to impose the death penalty. 367 The
Woodson Court's third objection was that the statute failed to allow par-
ticularized consideration of the relevant aspects of character and record of
each defendant. The court held that this sort of consideration is required by
the eighth amendment in capital cases.
368
North Carolina's new death penalty procedure appears fairly certain to
pass constitutional muster. Not only does it reflect the provisions of the
Georgia statute highlighted by the Supreme Court in Gregg,369 but it also
effectively answers the objections raised in Woodson.370 The statute pro-
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified
truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.
(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have
mitigating value.
Id. § 15A-2000(f).
361. 428 U.S. at 303.
362. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
363. Id.
364. Id. § 15A-2000(d)(2).
365. Id. § 15A-2000(d)(3).
366. 428 U.S. at 301.
367. Id. at 302-03.
368. Id. at 304-05.
369. See text accompanying notes 352 & 353 supra.
370. See text accompanying notes 366-68 supra.
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vides the flexibility lacking in the former statute, offers definite guidance for
the sentencing body with automatic, meaningful appeal to the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court and mandates consideration by the sentencing body of the
defendant's particular characteristics through the use of the aggravating and
mitigating factors device.
2. Sentencing Hearings
Although the general rule, continued by G.S. 15A-1334(b), 37' is that
formal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings, the court of
appeals nevertheless held in State v. Locklear372 that "rank hearsay" 373 was
inadmissible as the only evidence in aggravation of a sentence.
374
Defendant in Locklear, who was under twenty-one and had no prior
criminal record, 375 pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to
sell and sale and delivery of marijuana. The only evidence unfavorable to
defendant presented at the sentencing hearing was the testimony of a law
enforcement officer that an "unidentified but reliable" source had told him
that defendant "was doing between $500 and $1,000 worth of grass a
week.''376 The trial judge found that defendant would not benefit from
treatment as a youthful offender 377 and sentenced him to the maximum
possible sentence of two consecutive five year terms.
378
The court of appeals, in holding the introduction of the evidence
prejudicial error, pointed out not only that defendant lacked an effective
opportunity to confront the witness or contradict the testimony but also that
the evidence was actually unrelated to the circumstances of the offense to
371. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1334(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
372. 34 N.C. App. 37, 277 S.E.2d 289, cert. granted, 293 N.C. 591, 238 S.E.2d 151 (1977)
(No. II1).
373. The term "rank hearsay" is taken from State v. Pope, 257 N.C. 326, 126 S.E.2d 126
(1962). "Unsolicited whispered representations and rank hearsay are to be disregarded." Id. at
335, 126 S.E.2d at 133. The Locklear court, recognizing that hearsay is admissible in a
sentencing hearing, did not attempt to define the term "rank hearsay." 34 N.C. App. at 39, 237
S.E.2d at 291.
374. 34 N.C. App. at 39-41, 237 S.E.2d at 291-92. The Locklear decision finds some
support in two recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In
United States v. Looney, 501 F.2d 1039 (4th Cir. 1974), the court overturned a sentence because
the judge stated it was based on unverified information received in the presence of only some of
the defendants. The information was that several guns that defendants were convicted of
illegally shipping had been used in New York murders. In United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325
(4th Cir. 1973), the court struck down a lengthy sentence because it was apparently based on an
unsubstantiated report that defendant was the "ringleader" of a gang that committed the crime.
According to the Fourth Circuit: "[A]n unfounded assumption concerning the facts of this
importance is sufficient to render the sentencing procedure invalid." Id. at 328.
375. 34 N.C. App. at 40, 237 S.E.2d at 291.
376. Id.
377. See text accompanying note 375 supra.
378. 34 N.C. App. at 40, 237 S.E.2d at 291.
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which defendant pleaded guilty.3 79 It was partially on the latter ground that
the court distinguished Locklear from State v. Perry,380 a case in which the
state supreme court upheld a sentence imposed after the trial judge received
aggravating hearsay evidence. In Perry, police officers related statements of
residents of the dormitory broken into by defendant. The Perry court
disapproved the hearsay, but held that it was not prejudicial to defendant.
381
Perry can be distinguished from Locklear on other grounds as well.
First, the victim's statements were not the only factors relied on by the judge
in Perry; defendant's criminal record also served as aggravating evi-
dence. 382 Second, the victims in Perry were not present probably merely for
convenience; defendant knew who they were and probably knew their
sources of information.383 Thus, Perry had an opportunity, if not to cross-
examine, at least to rebut and offer contradictory evidence. By contrast,
Locklear knew neither the informant nor the source of information and was
thus in the position of not knowing what to attack. In the absence of other
aggravating evidence, the court's position seems the only acceptable way to
deal with the problem.
A dissenting justice in Locklear argued that the trial judge who wit-
nessed "the attitude and demeanor of the defendant'394 and who is capable
of "cull[ing] out the incompetent evidence and not rely[ing] upon it in
reaching his judgment" 385 should be allowed wide discretion in imposing
the sentence. 316 She continued, "[u]nquestionably, had the court entered the
judgments without having conducted any sentencing hearing at all, we
would have refused to review the sentences. '387
379. Id. It is not usually required that sentencing evidence relate to the crime in question;
for example, courts usually consider a defendant's criminal record. E.g., State v. Perry, 265
N.C. 517, 520, 144 S.E.2d 591, 594 (1965).
380. 265 N.C. 517, 144 S.E.2d 591 (1965).
381. Id. at 520-21, 144 S.E.2d at 594.
382. Id. at 520, 144 S.E.2d at 594.
383. The opinion does not indicate what the hearsay statements were.
384. 34 N.C. App. at 42, 237 S.E.2d at 292 (Morris, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 41, 237 S.E.2d at 292.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 42, 237 S.E.2d at 292. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1334(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977)
provides that a court must hold a hearing on the sentence unless the defendant waives the
requirement.
The court of appeals also ruled on admissibility of evidence in a sentencing hearing in State
v. Clemmons, 34 N.C. App. 101, 237 S.E.2d 298 (1977). In Clemmons, the trial judge, after
hearing defendant's statement on punishment, asked a victim of the attempted armed robbery
for a statement concerning defendant's punishment. Id. at 105, 237 S.E.2d at 301. The court of
appeals held that while this was an unusual practice, it was not error. The trial judge is allowed
to "look anywhere, within reasonable limits, for other facts which will enable the court to act
wisely." Id. The statement of the victim of a violent crime concerning the appropriate punish-
ment of the defendant seems highly prejudicial, without offering much aid in fitting the
punishment to the defendant. Arguably this comes very close to the line of reasonable limits
and at least should be discouraged.
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3. Imposition of Harsher Sentences
During the past year, both the North Carolina judiciary and the legisla-
ture responded to the United States Supreme Court's holding in North
Carolina v. Pearce388 that a sentencing judge may not impose a harsher
sentence in a new trial following a successful appeal unless "events subse-
quent to the first trial. . . have thrown new light upon the defendant's 'life,
health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.' "389 In State v.
Foster, 390 the court of appeals somewhat grudgingly struck down the sen-
tences defendants received at their second trials, holding that the harsher
sentences violated the Pearce rule. 391 The second trial judge in Foster
imposed these harsher sentences after considering evidence of prior convic-
tions that was not before the first sentencing judge. 392 The Foster court held
that this evidence was technically insufficient to allow a harsher second
sentence because the prior convictions were not events subsequent to the
first trial. The court felt "constrained by the unequivocal language of
Pearce" and voided the sentences, 393 but added that it was "unsure that the
policies underlying Pearce's construction of the due process clause (elimi-
nation of retaliatory motivation upon resentencing) would not be equally
well served by allowing consideration of any conduct unknown to the judge
at the first trial, irrespective of when the conduct occurred."
394
The General Assembly took a different view, possibly with an eye
toward administrative ease and certainty. G.S. 15A-1335 395 now specifical-
ly prohibits any new sentence for the same offense, or for a different offense
based on the same conduct, harsher than the original sentence.
396
P. Punishment
The General Assembly amended several sections of the General Stat-
388. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
389. Id. at 723 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949)).
390. 33 N.C. App. 145, 234 S.E.2d 443, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 255, 237 S.E.2d 537 (1977).
391. Id. at 151, 234 S.E.2d at 447.
392. Id. at 150, 234 S.E.2d at 447.
393. Id. at 151, 234 S.E.2d at 447.
394. Id. Analogous to the problem of retaliatory sentences imposed because of a defend-
ant's exercise of his right to appeal is the problem the North Carolina Supreme Court dealt with
in State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 239 S.E.2d 459, aff'd, 294 N.C. 702, - S.E.2d - (1977). In
that case, the court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, 33 N.C. App. 378, 235 S.E.2d 74
(1977), to vacate a sentence, when the trial judge stated in open court that he would be
compelled to give the defendant an active sentence because defendant had pleaded not guilty.
Id. at 380-81, 235 S.E.2d at 77. The court of appeals noted that an "inference that a greater
sentence was imposed because a defendant exercised his right to appeal," was reversible error,
id. at 381, 235 S.E.2d at 77; the same inference concerning a defendant's exercise of his
constitutional right to plead not guilty was equally objectionable. Id.




utes to incorporate restitution and reparation as integral parts of the criminal
justice system. 397 According to the new statute, these changes were made
because
the General Assembly recognizes that an awareness on the part of a
criminal that he is responsible for his actions is an indication of his
rehabilitation, and that, therefore, an agreement to make restitu-
tion and reparation should rightfully and appropriately be con-
sidered in plea negotiations and in determining parole and work
release .... 398
The major provisions and definitions are found in an amendment to
G.S. 15-199(10), which provides that restitution and reparation may be
ordered by the court as a condition of probation. 399 In ordering restitution or
reparation as a probation condition, the court is instructed to consider the
defendant's ability to pay, including such factors as his financial resources
and number of dependents. 0 ° Such restitution and reparation may be made
only to an aggrieved party40 1 and only for an amount that reflects the damage
caused by the defendant arising out of the offense for which he has been
convicted. 402 Restitution is defined as "compensation for damage or loss
as could ordinarily be recovered by an aggrieved party in a civil ac-
tion . .. ;403 reparation shall include but not be limited to the performing of
397. Law of June 20, 1977, ch. 614, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 15, 15A, 143B, 148 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
398. Id. Preamble.
399. Id. § I (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977))
(repealed 1977). The amendment became effective July 1, 1978, which is also the date repeal of
the entire section became effective. Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 711, § 33, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws
853. However, id. § 34 provides that "[a]Il statutes which refer to sections repealed or amended
by the act shall be deemed, insofar as possible, to refer to those provisions of this act which
accomplish the same or an equivalent purpose." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(6) (Cum.
Supp. 1977) is the portion of the Act that replaces former § 15-199(10).
400. Law of June 20, 1977, ch. 614, § 10, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1977).
401. Id. An aggrieved party may be an individual, firm, corporation, association or a
federal, state or local government agency. Id.
402. Id. The determination of the amount of damages must find support in the record.
Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976). As a further safeguard, the statute
expressly provides that no government agency is to benefit from such restitution or reparation,
except for damage or loss to it over normal operating costs. Law of June 20, 1977, ch. 614, § 10,
1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199(10) (Cum. Supp.
1977)) (repealed 1977). These provisions can be traced to the principles articulated in Shore v.
Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553 (1976). The court also ruled that defendant could be
required to reimburse the police for money they paid to him to procure the evidence to convict
him, but not to pay for general law enforcement. Id.
403. Law of June 20, 1977, ch. 614, § 10, 1977%N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199(10) (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1977) (footnote added). The section
also provides that an order for restitution or reparation will not bar the right of an aggrieved
party to bring a civil action against the defendant for money damages. Any amount paid by the
defendant as restitution is to be credited against the civil judgment. Id.
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community services, volunteer work, or doing such other acts or things as
shall aid the defendant in his rehabilitation."
40 4
G.S. 15A-1021 ,45 dealing with plea conferences, was also amended to
allow the inclusion of restitution and reparation in a plea arrangement. 40
6 If
the judge concurs in the arrangement, he may order that restitution or
reparation be made 40 7 in compliance with G.S. 15-199(10). 408 If the sen-
tencing judge imposes an active sentence, he may require that work release




An addition to G.S. 143B-266410 authorizes the Parole Commission to
impose reparation or restitution as a condition of parole or work release.
411
Section 148-33.2412 regulates restitution by prisoners with work release
privileges; it confers broad powers on the judiciary in conjunction with the
Secretary of the Department of Correction and the Parole Commission.
413
The Secretary and Commission are empowered to impose restitution or
reparation as a work release condition when ordered by a court pursuant to a
G.S. 15A-1021414 plea arrangement,' 415 or when such a condition is recom-
mended by a sentencing court. 4'6 The Secretary and Commission are further
404. Id. The section concludes that reparation and restitution are merely "ancillary reme-
dies to promote rehabilitation. . . and to provide compensation to victims of crime, and shall
not be construed to be a fine or other punishment as provided for in the Constitution and laws of
this State." Id.
The General Assembly also amended Law of May 22, 1975, ch. 360, sec. I, § 15-197.1,
1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 366 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977))
(repealed 1977), adding the reparation and restitution provisions of former § 15-199(10) as a
possible condition of special probation. Section 15-197. l(c) has been repealed. Law of June 23,
1977, ch. 711, § 33, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 853; see note 399 supra. The replacement section is
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1351(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
405. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
406. Id. § 15A-1021(c).
407. Id. § 15A-1021(d).
408. Law of June 20, 1977, ch. 614, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 721 (formerly codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-199(10)) (repealed 1977); see notes 399, 401-04 and text accompanying notes
399-404 supra. Many of the restitution amendments require imposition in compliance with
former § 15-199(10).
409. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
410. Id. § 143B-266(d).
411. The new § 148-33.1(f) (3a) authorizes the Department of Correction to disperse money
earned by a prisoner on work release to make such restitution as is imposed as a condition of
work release. Id. § 148-33.1(f)(3a).
412. Id. § 148-33.2.
413. See note 416 infra.
414. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
415. Id. § 148-33.2(a). If the order for work release cannot reasonably be implemented, the
Parole Commission must give the court a written explanation that is to be considered by the
court in issuing further orders regarding the prisoner. Id.
416. Id. § 148-33.2(b). The Secretary and Commission are not bound by the court's
recommendation, but if they do not follow it, they must send a written explanation to the
sentencing court. Id. Subsection (c) directs a sentencing court to consider whether reparation
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directed to make appropriate rules and regulations, including provisions for
adequate notice to the prisoner that restitution or reparation is being con-
sidered as a work release condition and for an opportunity to be heard. 417
At least one commentator 418 has suggested that the provisions authoriz-
ing judicial involvement in ordering restitution and recommending it as a
condition of work release and parole are a violation of the North Carolina
Constitution's requirement of separation of powers.419 The restitution reme-
dy is expressly declared to be a rehabilitative remedy rather than a constitu-
tional fine or punishment;420 North Carolina courts are limited by the state
constitution to imposing as criminal sentences death, removal from office,
fines and imprisonment.42' Furthermore, G.S. 143B-266 422 gives the Parole
Commission and Department of Correction control of work release-in-
deed, a 1977 amendment authorizes the Parole Commission to make restitu-
tion or reparation a condition of probation or work release.423 The provision
giving the courts the power to make or recommend restitution or reparation
as a work release condition may be an unconstitutional judicial intrusion into
this executive sphere.
Q. Probation
Article 82 of the 1977 Session Laws consolidates North Carolina's
probation provisions.424 The new legislation recategorizes types of proba-
tion,425 defines and lists permissible conditions of probation426 and sets out
should be ordered or recommended whenever an active sentence is imposed and to make its
order part of the commitment order. Id. § 148-33.2(c).
417. Id. § 148-33.2(d). The authority granted jointly to the Secretary of the Department of
Correction and the Parole Commission by § 148-33.2(a), (b), (d), see notes 415 & 416 and text
accompanying notes 412-16 supra, are conferred on the Parole Commission regarding restitu-
tion or reparation as a parole condition by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-57.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
418. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 351, at 36-37.
419. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 6.
420. See note 404 supra.
421. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1. See also Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 227 S.E.2d 553
(1976); INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 351, at 35-37.
422. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-266 (1975).
423. See note 411 and accompanying text supra.
424. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1341 to -1347 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
425. rd. § 15A-1341(b) recategorizes probation and a suspended sentence as supervised and
unsupervised probation, respectively. The pre-1978 authorization for probation was Law of
Mar. 13, 1937, ch. 132, § 1, 1936-1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 351 (formerly codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-197 (1975)) (repealed 1977). The suspended sentence was seen as an
inherent power of a court, which former § 15-197 did not withdraw. State v. Simmington, 235
N.C. 612, 614, 70 S.E.2d 842, 844 (1952). The sole difference between supervised and unsuper-
vised probation is that the unsupervised probationer is, as the name implies, not supervised by a
probation officer. Subsection 15A-1341(c) allows a probationer to elect to serve his suspended
sentence of imprisonment at any time during the probationary period.
426. Permissible conditions of probation are defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1977) as those "reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-
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the procedural framework for altering, amending and revoking probation. 427
The two most significant aspects of the new probation statute are the
warrantless search probation condition428 and the codification of the pro-
cedural framework for violation hearings.
429
Included in the new legislation's list of appropriate probation condi-
tions is a subsection which, if imposed by the court, requires a probationer
to submit at reasonable times to warrantless searches by his probation
officer.4 30 Before the enactment of this section, North Carolina courts had
held that conditions requiring that probationers submit to searches by any
law enforcement officers at reasonable times were valid. 431 The drafting
commission, possibly influenced by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,432
decided to limit warrantless searches to those by the probation officer that
are reasonably related to his probation supervision.4 33 In Consuelo-Gon-
zalez, the court held that the purposes of the Federal Probation Act,434
coupled with the fourth amendment prohibition, made the condition of
warrantless searches by any law enforcement officers unacceptable.
435
abiding life or to assist him to do so." Subsection (b) provides a list of appropriate conditions,
most of which were found in Law of Mar. 13, 1937, ch. 132, § 3, 1936-1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 351
(formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-199 (1975)) (repealed 1977).
427. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345. Id. § 15A-1344 controls the power of courts to alter or
revoke probation in response to violations of the conditions imposed. Subsection (a) provides
that this power rests in any judge entitled to sit in the court that imposed probation, and who is a
resident or is presiding in the district where probation was imposed, where the probation
violation occurred or where the probationer resides. Id. § 15A-1344(a). Subsection (b) contains
an exception to this general rule. A sentencing judge may limit jurisdiction to alter or revoke a
sentence of unsupervised probation to the sentencing judge, or if he is no longer serving, to a
presiding judge in the court where the defendant was sentenced. Id. § 15A-1344(b).
This framework represents a compromise among the drafting commission members. Power
to alter suspended sentences has traditionally been limited because, with no supervision or
-report from a probation officer, the sentencing judge was generally considered the only
authority qualified to alter the sentence. Section 15A-1344(b) modifies this rule by applying it
only when the sentencing judge expressly limits jurisdiction. See id. § 15A-1342, Official
Commentary.
428. Id. § 15A-1343(b)(15).
429. Id. § 15A-1345.
430. Id. § 15A-1343(b)(15).
431. State v. Craft, 32 N.C. App. 357, 232 S.E.2d 282, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 642, 235
S.E.2d 63 (1977) (condition of warrantless search by probationer's probation officer or any
other law enforcement officer in presence of probation officer held valid); State v. Mitchell, 22
N.C. App. 663, 665, 207 S.E.2d 263,264-65 (1974) (waiver and consent to warrantless search by
lawful officer as condition of probation held valid).
432. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
433. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(b)(15) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
434. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976).
435. The court explained that all probation conditions must "serve the dual objectives of
rehabilitation and public safety." 521 F.2d at 265. The court held that some forms of search by
probation officers are permissible, but blanket authorization for warrantless searches by any
law enforcement officers gives rise to searches that could not possibly serve the ends of
probation. Id. The court confined its holding by expressly reserving any opinion on how far the
states can go in imposing the warrantless search condition. Id. at 266.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals ignored Conseulo-Gonzalez in its
1977 decision in State v. Craft4 36 and upheld a condition of warrantless
searches by any law enforcement officer in the presence of the probation
officer as not unreasonable, partially because consent to the condition was
voluntarily given at sentencing. 437 In support of its holding, the court cited a
1971 California case, People v. Mason,438 which held a warrantless search
condition reasonable in effecting the probation purposes of fostering re-
habilitation and protecting public safety. 439 The California court, however,
emphasized that the peculiar nature of defendant's conviction, a narcotics
charge, and its high recividism rate44° made the search condition reasonable
in deterring and discovering subsequent criminal offenses of the same
nature.
441
The Craft court did not engage in analysis linking the search condition
to the particular offense for which defendant was put on probation; indeed,
the opinion failed to indicate the exact offense for which defendant was
convicted. 442 Despite legislative disapproval of this probation condition,
however, 443 Craft has continuing vitality as long as the warrantless search
condition can be found "reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant
will lead a law-abiding life." 4
North Carolina's new provision for probation violatidn hearings
445
codifies the procedural requirements announced by the United States Su-
preme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.446 G.S. 15A-1345(c) requires a pre-
liminary hearing within five working days of arrest to determine if there is
probable cause to believe the probationer violated one of his probation
conditions, 447 unless the final revocation hearing is held before that time.
The procedural framework of the preliminary hearing is set out in subsection
436. 32 N.C. App. 357, 232 S.E.2d 282, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 642, 235 S.E.2d 63 (197).
437. Id. at 360-61, 232 S.E.2d at 285. It is questionable whether "consent" for such a
condition can be termed voluntary, when the alternative is a prison sentence.
438. 5 Cal. 3d 759, 488 P.2d 630, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
439. These are the same criteria articulated in Consuelo-Gonzalez. See note 435 supra.
440. 5 Cal. 3d at 764 n.2, 488 P.2d at 632 n.2, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 304 n.2.
441. Id. at 764-65, 488 P.2d at 632-33, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.
442. The search was made for stolen groceries and cigarettes. 32 N.C. App. at 358, 232
S.E.2d at 283-84.
443. See text accompanying notes 430-33 supra. The list of appropriate probation condi-
tions is not exclusive. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp.
1977).
444. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
445. Id. § 15A-1345.
446. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The Gagnon Court held that while probation revocation is not a
part of a criminal prosecution, the loss of liberty involved is serious enough to require the
probationer to be accorded due process safeguards-"a probationer , .. is entitled to a
preliminary and a final revocation hearing." Id. at 782. The court further decided that appoint-
ed counsel is not always required at either the preliminary or final hearing. Id. at 790.
447. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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(d). This provision requires that the probationer have notice, including a
statement of violations alleged. He may speak in his own behalf, present
relevant information and personally question adverse informants.
448
Moreover, the legislature went beyond Gagnon by requiring that all defend-
ants be allowed counsel, or, if indigent, be represented by appointed counsel
for the final revocation hearing. 449 The new section450 also resolves a
conflict in present North Carolina law45 1 concerning the setting of bail
following arrest for probation violation. Subsection (b) now provides that
the arrested probationer be taken "without unnecessary delay before a
judicial official" to have his bail set.
452
R. Contempt
Under previous North Carolina statutes, criminal contempt was desig-
nated "for contempt" while civil contempt was called "as for
contempt." 45 3 The similarity in the wording of these statutes led to confu-
sion over the procedures to be followed in determining contempt and the
type of punishment to be imposed. The 1977 General Assembly, attempting
to eliminate this confusion, drew a sharp distinction between criminal and
civil contempt in the new contempt statute.4 54 The legislature also made
several changes in the grounds for criminal contempt and codified the
procedures for finding contempt with regard to defendants' due process
rights.
Regardless of what may have been considered contempt at common
law, 455 G.S. 5A-11456 now contains the exclusive grounds for criminal
448. Id. § 15A-1345(d). These are the required elements detailed in Gagnon, 411 U.S. at
786; however, the statute does not specify that a written report of the hearing must be made, as
specified in Gagnon, id.
The procedure for the formal revocation hearing is specified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1345(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977), which also conforms to the Gagnon mandate, 411 U.S. at 786, and
generally follows Law of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1038, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 1036 (formerly
codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1977).
449. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977); see note 446 supra.
450. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
451. Law of Apr. 14, 1951, ch. 1038, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 1036 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-200 (1975)) (repealed 1977), provided that a probation officer
having charge of a defendant may take justified bail for the defendant's appearance at the
hearing. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-274 (1969) provides that in any district in which a district court
has been established, only officers of the General Court of Justice may set bail.
452. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1345(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
453. Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 124, 84 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1954). See Luther v. Luther,
234 N.C. 429, 67 S.E.2d 345 (1951), for an example of the confusion created by the prior
wording of North Carolina's contempt statutes.
454. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 5A, art. 1, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977). Criminal
contempt covers matters for which the sanction is purely punishment while civil contempt is
used to induce compliance with a court order. Id. § 5A-21, Official Commentary.
455. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 186-220 (1971).
456. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-I1 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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contempt. All of the grounds "for contempt" previously listed in the
statutes457 were preserved and several new grounds were added to ensure
that courts will have full power to protect their proceedings. Before the
change, a person could be found in contempt for the willful publication of a
grossly inaccurate report of court proceedings that presented a clear and
present danger of imminent and serious threat to the administration of
justice. 458 This ground now appears in G.S. 5A-1 1(a)(5) with the additional
requirement that the publisher must have knowledge of the report's fal-
sity.
459
In order to protect trial proceedings, the new law includes two new
grounds for the trial judge to find criminal contempt. First, under the new
statute "willful or grossly negligent failure to comply with the schedules
and practices of the court" are grounds for criminal contempt. 46° Thus, if
someone fails to appear in court at the proper time, thereby interfering with
the court's schedule, such an omission might be treated as criminal
contempt. 461 Second, G.S. 5A-11(a)(9), providing a new ground for
contempt that has no counterpart in present law, makes the willful attempt to
influence a jury's deliberations punishable as criminal contempt. 462 Al-
though such conduct may also be punishable under other criminal laws,
463
classifying it as contempt gives the trial judge the power to act quickly to
protect the proceedings before him.
464
457. Law of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 177, § 1, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 426 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-I (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1977).
Instead of listing specific conduct punishable as civil contempt, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21
(Cum. Supp. 1977) requires only that there be a failure to comply with an order of the court.
According to case law, the person to whom the order is directed must be capable of compliance.
See Cox v. Cox, 10 N.C. App. 476, 179 S.E.2d 194 (1971). Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-21(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1977), a person refusing to comply with a court order can be imprisoned as long as
the civil contempt continues. A person who is only suspected of a crime and fails to comply
with a nontestimonial identification order, however, may only be imprisoned for 90 days. Id.
458. Law of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 177, § 1, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 426 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-1(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (repealed 1977).
459. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-II(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This addition is based on the
standard enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 5A-I I, Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
460. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-l(a)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
461. Id., Official Commentary.
462. Id. § 5A-1l(a)(9).
463. See id. § 14-226 (1969).
464. Except for the publication of inaccurate reports and attempts to influence the jury, id.
§ 5A-12 (Cum. Supp. 1977) prohibits the imposition of punishment for contempt unless the act
or omission is "willfully contemptuous" or "preceded by a clear warning by the court that the
conduct is improper." rd. This section codifies case law interpreting "'willful" behavior under
the criminal laws as the "doing of [an] act purposely and deliberately in violation of law." Id.;
see In re Hege, 205 N.C. 625,630, 172 S.E.345,347 (1934). Therefore, those who have no power
to act or to refrain from acting and those who are unaware that their behavior violates a rule of
the court cannot be found in criminal contempt.
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According to North Carolina case law, "[a] direct contempt consists of
words spoken or acts committed in the actual or constructive presence of the
court . . . which tend to subvert or prevent justice. 465 Under the new law,
a direct contempt can be punished summarily if the punishment is imposed
"substantially contemporaneously" with the contempt and the person
charged is given summary notice and a summary chance to respond. 466
These minimum requirements balance the due process rights of the contem-
nor and the interest of the court in maintaining its authority. The United
States Supreme Court has approved such procedures when contempt pro-
ceedings occur immediately after the contemptuous conduct.467
If the judicial official chooses not to proceed summarily against a
person charged with direct contempt or the person is charged with indirect
contempt, 468 due process requires that the person have reasonable notice of
the specific charges and an opportunity to be heard in his own behalf before
an unbiased judge. 6 9 In addition to meeting these due process requirements,
plenary proceedings for contempt under G. S. 5A- 15 must be held before a
judge who is the trier of fact. 470 There is no constitutional right to a jury trial
in a criminal contempt case unless the maximum punishment exceeds six
months imprisonment and a $500 fine. 47' The punishment imposed by the
new statute is within this limit, so an alleged contemnor has no right to a
jury trial in the plenary proceedings under G.S. 5A-15. 472
Previously, no appeals were allowed from orders of direct contempt
although a defendant could seek relief through a petition for writ of habeas
corpus.473 The new law, however, permits an appeal from a finding of
465. Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 123, 84 S.E.2d 822, 824-25 (1954) (citations omitted).
466. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-14 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
467. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 504 (1972).
468. "Any criminal contempt other than direct criminal contempt is indirect criminal
contempt. ... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-13(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
469. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). A judge might be considered biased "(i]f the
criminal contempt is based upon acts before a judge which so involve him that his objectivity
may reasonably be questioned." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-15(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); seeln re Paul,
28 N.C. App. 610, 222 S.E.2d 479 (1976).
As in the plenary proceedings for criminal contempt, an alleged civil contemnor must be
given notice of the hearing at which the judge is the trier of fact. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-23
(Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition to the issuance of an order to show cause allowed under the
prior law, Law of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 177, § 8, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 426 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-9 (1969)) (repealed 1977), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-23 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) also permits the judge to issue a notice to the defendant that he will be held in
contempt unless he appears at a specified time to show cause.
470. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-15(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
471. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), held that there was a constitutional right to a
jury trial only in relation to serious offenses. A serious offense is one for which the authorized
punishment exceeds six months imprisonment and a $500 fine. See Blue Jeans Corp. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 275 N.C. 503, 169 S.E.2d 867 (1969).
472. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-15 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
473. In re Palmer, 265 N.C. 485, 144 S.E.2d 413 (1965).
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In In re Arthur,475 the North Carolina Supreme Court limited the scope
of an evidentiary statute that threatened to operate to deny confrontation
rights in juvenile proceedings. G.S. 90-95(g) provides that whenever matter
is submitted to certain specified laboratories for chemical analysis to deter-
mine if the matter is a controlled substance, the report of that analysis
"[s]hall be admissible without further authentication in all proceedings in
the district court . . . as evidence of the identity, nature, and quantity of the
matter analyzed."
476
Petitioner in Arthur was adjudged a delinquent juvenile in district
court. The district court, relying on G.S. 90-95(g), admitted into evidence
an SBI laboratory analysis concluding that material found in petitioner's
possession was marijuana. The chemist who performed the analysis was not
present and did not testify.47 7 On appeal, the juvenile contended that the
statute as applied to his adjudication denied him the right to confront and
cross-examine the chemist. The court of appeals ruled adversely to the
juvenile. 478 The state supreme court reversed but declined to reach the
constitutional issue, holding only that the statute was not intended to apply
to juvenile delinquency proceedings in the district court. 479 The court first
examined the legislative intent underlying the statute and decided that the
legislature had contemplated only the great majority of district court crimi-
nal proceedings. These proceedings involve only a determination of prob-
able cause in felony cases, and in misdemeanor cases there is a right to a
trial de novo in superior court. In both instances the opportunity ultimately
to confront and cross-examine the chemist is assured in superior court.480
Second, the court observed that G.S. 90-95481 creates and defines criminal
474. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-17 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
A person found in civil contempt can appeal in the manner provided for appeals in civil
actions. See id. § 5A-24.
475. 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
476. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(g) (1975).
477. 291 N.C. at 641, 231 S.E.2d at 615.
478. 27 N.C. App. 227, 218 S.E.2d 869 (1975), revd, 291 N.C. 648, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
The court of appeals had two bases for its holding. First, the court found no prejudice to the
juvenile since he had a right to compulsory process and was afforded access to the report in
time to prepare for the hearing. Second, the court felt that the report possessed sufficient
regularity, trustworthiness, reliability and freedom from selfish or pecuniary interests to render
it an acceptable exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 231, 218 S.E.2d at 872.
479. 291 N.C. at 641, 231 S.E.2d at 615.
480. Id. at 643, 231 S.E.2d at 616. Appeal from juvenile adjudications is to the court of
appeals. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
481. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
1978] 1041
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
violations under the Controlled Substances Act,4 82 and that juvenile pro-
ceedings should not be grouped with the proceedings for criminal violations
of the Act. Finally, the court noted that G.S. 7A-285483 preserves the rights
of confrontation and cross-examination in juvenile adjudications, thus mak-
ing it doubtful that the legislature intended to risk depriving juveniles of
confrontation rights by the operation of G.S. 90-95(g).
484
The opinion in Arthur recognized that if the statute did apply to
adjudication of delinquency a serious question about its constitutionality
would arise. 485 The supreme court, while not specifically overruling the
court of appeals' conclusions on the constitutionality of the statute, seemed
to express doubts as to the correctness of those conclusions. The court was
especially doubtful that "any applicable provision [of the Bill of Rights]
might . . . be given less force or vigor in juvenile proceedings than in adult
criminal prosecutions.' '486
The issue in In re Drakeford4s7 was whether jeopardy attaches in a
juvenile adjudication and thus bars a subsequent juvenile proceeding as a
violation of the double jeopardy clause. In Drakeford a petition was filed
alleging that respondent was a delinquent child because she assaulted a
fellow student with a razor blade on a school bus. At a hearing the petition
was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Another petition was filed
alleging that respondent had committed an affray by assaulting a fellow
student on the bus (the same incident). 488 The affray charge, on which
respondent was convicted, had as an essential element the assault charge
that had been dropped for lack of evidence. 48 9 Therefore, if jeopardy
attached at the first hearing, the second hearing caused respondent to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Juvenile proceedings are not traditionally thought of as criminal pro-
ceedings: a finding of delinquency is not considered to be the same as
482. d. § 90-86 to -113.8.
483. Id. § 7A-285 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
484. 291 N.C. at 643, 231 S.E.2d at 616-17.
485. Id. In juvenile adjudications the district court is the ultimate fact-finding forum, Id.
Thus, the statute, largely a rule of convenience for the State, would operate to deprive the
juvenile of a chance to confront and cross-examine the chemist. Id. The court of appeals had
concluded that there was no denial of those rights since the juvenile retained his right to
compulsory process and could subpoena the chemist if he wanted to do so. 27 N.C. App. 227,
231, 218 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1975), rev'd, 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977); see note 478 supra.
486. 291 N.C. at 644, 234 S.E.2d at 617.
487. 32 N.C. App. 113, 230 S.E.2d 779 (1977).
488. Id. at 114, 230 S.E.2d at 780. An assault or participation in an affray is a violation of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (Cum. Supp. 1977). An affray is a fight between two or more persons
in a public place that causes terror to surrounding people. 32 N.C. App. at 118, 230 S.E.2d at
782.
489. 32 N.C. App. at 119, 230 S.E.2d at 782.
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conviction of a crime.49 Thus, the full gamut of constitutional guarantees is
not required in juvenile proceedings. 491 The court of appeals, however, said:
Although we do not obliterate all distinctions between juvenile
proceedings and criminal prosecutions, we believe, and so hold,
that they are sufficiently similar in nature that the double jeopardy
provisions of the United States and North Carolina Constitutions
are applicable to them. Accordingly, jeopardy attached to the ini-
tial petition once an adjudicatory hearing on the merits was held.492
The court relied on the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Breed
v. Jones,493 in which petitioner was tried first in a juvenile proceeding and
then in an adult criminal proceeding. In Breed the Supreme Court recQg-
nized, as did the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Drakeford, that the
stigma and potential loss of liberty that accompany a finding of delinquency
are serious consequences-so serious that there is little to distinguish such
an adjudicatory hearing from a traditional criminal prosecution. 494 The
Drakeford court thus concluded that jeopardy attached to the first juvenile
proceeding and that the second one was barred.
The court of appeals' decision in In re Byers495 offers an interesting
contrast to the attitude expressed toward juvenile proceedings in Drakeford.
Defendant in Byers was charged with delinquency on the basis of assault
and theft. The district court ordered defendant placed in the custody of the
Department of Human Resources for an indefinite period not to exceed his
eighteenth birthday. 496 Defendant contended that the hearing in the district
court did not meet the requirements of due process under the fourteenth
amendment because it was held before a lay judge and without a right to a
trial de novo before a legally trained judge. 497 Defendant argued that the
United States Supreme Court's decision in North v. Russell498 requires this
right in a trial or hearing presenting the possibility of confinement.4 99
490. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886-87 (1969), aff'd sub nom.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
491. A juvenile does not, for example, have a right to a jury trial. McKeiver v. Pennsylva-
nia, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
492. 32 N.C. App. at 117, 230 S.E.2d at 781.
493. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
494. Id. at 530-31; see 32 N.C. App. at 117, 230 S.E.2d at 781.
495. 34 N.C. App. 710, 239 S.E.2d 618 (1977).
496. Id. at 710-11, 239 S.E.2d at 618.
497. Id. at 712, 239 S.E.2d at 619.
498. 427 U.S. 328 (1976). In North, defendant was tried for a traffic offense and sentenced
to 30 days by a city police court in Kentucky. The judge was a nonlawyer. Defendant argued
that when confinement is a possible penalty, it is a due process violation not to be tried by a
legally trained judge. The Court, noting that any Kentucky defendant facing a criminal sentence
had a right to a trial de novo before a lawyer-judge, found no due process violation. Id. at 333-
38.
499. 34 N.C. App. at 712, 239 S.E.2d at 619. In North Carolina, district courts have
criminal jurisdiction only over misdemeanor cases. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-272 (1969). In these
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The court of appeals rejected defendant's contention on two grounds.
First, the court observed that North did not actually reach the question
whether a person could be convicted and imprisoned in a proceeding in
which the only trial afforded is before a lay judge; moreover, there was
nothing in the Constitution to require that conclusion. 5°° This aspect of
Byers may reflect an unduly narrow interpretation of the Supreme Court's
analysis of the validity of the Kentucky procedures involved in North .501 In
an earlier case challenging Kentucky's two-tier system, the Supreme Court
said: "We are not persuaded, however, that the Kentucky arrangement for
dealing with the less serious offenses disadvantages defendants any more or
any less than trials conducted in a court of general jurisdiction in the first
instance, as long as the latter are always available. "502 Although North did
not hold that trials before a lay judge were impermissible, the main impetus
for so holding was arguably the fact that every defendant had the right to a
trial de novo before a legally trained judge.
503
In addition, the court of appeals held that even if North were construed
as defendant suggested it should be, it would be inapplicable to North
Carolina juvenile proceedings. 504 North dealt with criminal proceedings
while Byers concerned a juvenile petition. The court of appeals concluded
that when the institution to which a juvenile is committed is not of a penal
character, full constitutional guarantees need not extend to the proceed-
ing. 505 Indeed, the court asserted that delinquent children are not treated as
criminals, but rather as wards to be given the control and environment
required for their reformation. 5°6 Moreover, the court observed that the
"noncriminal nature of juvenile hearings and the nonpenal nature of the
confinement at risk has been noted by the North Carolina Appellate Courts
in several cases." 507 The court did not mention, however, that less than one
year earlier in Drakeford the same court of appeals found the nature of
cases, the defendant has the right to a trial de novo in superior court. Id. § 7A-271(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1977).
500. 34 N.C. App. at 712, 239 S.E.2d at 619.
501. North did not reach that issue because the procedure involved there guaranteed a
defendant facing a criminal sentence a right to a trial de novo before a legally trained judge. 427
U.S. at 334.
502. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) (emphasis added).
503. See 427 U.S. at 334-38.
504. 34 N.C. App. at 712-13, 239 S.E.2d at 619-20.
505. Id.; see In re Wichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 161, 174 S.E.2d 281, 285, appeal dismissed,
276 N.C. 727 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971).
506. 34 N.C. App. at 713,239 S.E.2d at 620; see In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 39, 191 S.E.2d
702, 709 (1972).
507. 34 N.C. App. at 713, 239 S.E.2d at 620; see In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879
(1969), aff'd sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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juvenile proceedings so serious that jeopardy attached to a juvenile adjudica-
tion. 5
08
The Byers court concluded that "our Juvenile Court Act, pursuant to
its benevolent guidelines, and with the right of appeal directly to this Court,
passes the most strict requirements of fairness and due process. The possi-
bility of confinement resulting from a hearing before a lay judge does not







In pursuing the policy of encouraging adoptions, the court of appeals,
in two recent decisions, carefully protected the rights of the natural and
adoptive parents' involved, but in so doing gave insufficient consideration
to the interests of the children concerned. With its decision in In re Spinks2
the court for the first time interpreted the North Carolina statute concerning
the procedure for opening court records3 and vacated the trial court's order
that granted the eighteen-year-old petitioner's motion that the identity of her
natural parents be revealed to her.4 While taking note of recent commentary
508. See text accompanying notes 487-94 supra. In Drakeford the court of appeals said
"[j]uvenile proceedings in North Carolina do more than merely determine the delinquency of
the minor; they may result in severe curtailment of his freedom and, in some cases, in
institutional commitment." 32 N.C. App. at 117,230 S.E.2d at 781. Judge Morris authored both
the Drakeford and the Byers opinions.
509. 34 N.C. App. at 713, 239 S.E.2d at 620.
1. The General Assembly also protected the rights of parents in passing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 7A-289.20 to .32 (Cum. Supp. 1977) which carefully sets forth the procedure to be followed
in the judicial termination of parental rights. The General Assembly, however, focused its
primary attention on the best interests of the child, stating that it was the purpose of the Act "to
recognize the necessity for any child to have a permanent plan of care. . . while at the same
time recognizing the need to protect all children from the unnecessary severance of a relation-
ship with biological or legal parents." Id. § 7A-289.20(2). In keeping with its concern for the
welfare of the child, the General Assembly established an additional ground for ending parental
rights. If the court finds that a "parent has without cause failed to establish or maintain concern
or responsibility as to the child's welfare," parental rights may be terminated. Id. § 7A-
289.30(1).
2. 32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (1977).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26 (1976).
4. In reviewing the refusal of the county clerk's office to open the records, the lower
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critical of sealed adoption records statutes, 5 the court nevertheless narrowly
interpreted the North Carolina statute's requirement that opening the record
"be to the best interest of the child or of the public to have such information
disclosed,"- 6 by requiring that opening the record be in the best interest of
the child and the public. 7 In remanding the case, the court directed the lower
court to consider the interests of the natural and adoptive parents as well as
those of the child, although the court was to resolve any conflict in favor of
the child.
8
With this holding, the Spinks court recognized that an adoptee does
have a right to know his or her natural heritage, but its narrow interpretation
of the statute requires that the lower court specifically find that access to
such information be not just to the benefit of the adoptee but in his or her
best interests. 9 The decision indicates that the desires of the adoptee alone
do not determine his or her best interests, for courts are now obliged to
consider carefully the interests of the natural and adoptive parents in deter-
mining the adoptee's best interests.
10
In Acker v. Barnes,1 the court of appeals upheld a lower court's
refusal to recognize that a paternal grandmother and aunt had any cause of
action in seeking visitation rights with the children of divorced parents who
had been adopted by their stepfather. 12 The ruling foreclosed any attempted
communication between the children and their paternal relatives. The court
strictly followed the statutory requirement that, after an adoption, the
natural parents are divested of all rights with respect to the adopted child,
13
but chose to ignore any right the child itself might have to receive visits from
court found that petitioner's adopted parents supported and encouraged her quest and that
petitioner had suffered mental disturbance from not knowing the identity of her true parents. 32
N.C. App. at 423, 232 S.E.2d at 483.
5. Id. at 426, 232 S.E.2d at 482 (citing Note, Sealed Records in Adoptions: The Need for
Legislative Reform, 21 CATH. LAW. 211 (1975); Note, The Adoptee's Right to Know His Natural
Heritage, 19 N.Y.L.F. 137 (1973); Note, The Adult Adoptee's Constitutional Right to Know His
Origins, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1196 (1975)). These Notes recognize the adoptee's right to examine
records concerning his origins. Although considering counterbalancing effects, the writers
generally conclude that the psychological problems caused by loss of identity in not knowing
one's biological parents as well as constitutional principles of equal protection and the right to
receive information constitute compelling grounds for providing an adult adoptee access to
sealed records containing information about his or her parentage.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-26 (1976) (emphasis added).
7. 32 N.C. App. at 427, 232 S.E.2d at 482.
8. Id. at 427-28, 232 S.E.2d at 483.
9. Id. at 429, 232 S.E.2d at 482.
10. Id. at 427, 232 S.E.2d at 482.
I1. 33 N.C. App. 750, 236 S.E.2d 715, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 360, 238 S.E.2d 149 (1977).
12. Id. at 752, 236 S.E.2d at 716. Earlier North Carolina decisions have recognized that a
parent has a natural and legal right to visitation with his or her minor children when custody of
the child is awarded to another, provided that the parent has not forfeited the right. See, e.g., In
re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 551, 179 S.E.2d 844, 849 (1971).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23 (1976).
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a grandparent. 14 A minority of states are taking into consideration the best
interests and rights of the child in this situation so that, while recognizing
that the grandparent has no legal visitation right, courts are given con-
siderable discretion to determine the child's best interests, 15 and to allow
communication between the child and his or her relatives.
B. Child Custody
16
A 1977 amendment to G.S. 50-13.2(a), 17 which determines who is
14. See Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objections of a Parent: The
Best Interests of the Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 51 (1976-77).
15. See, e.g., Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975). But see Lee v. Kepler,
197 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
16. In reviewing child custody decisions, the North Carolina appellate courts have tradi-
tionally relied on two principles that largely determine the outcome of such cases. Basing the
decision on the best interests of the child is a statutorily required consideration, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Supp. 1977), that is stressed by the courts. See, e.g., Tyner v. Tyner, 206
N.C. 776, 175 S.E. 144 (1934); In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31 (1883). Many appellate decisions also
reflect the principle that the trial court should enjoy wide discretion in determining child
custody. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 411, 75 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1953); In re
Custody of Cox, 17 N.C. App. 687, 689, 195 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1973). In each of the 1977 cases,
fathers sought to show changed circumstances in order to justify modification of a child
custody decree, and in each case the court of appeals deferred to the great discretion granted
the trial judge.
In Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977), plaintiff-father claimed
that his child had been physically abused by defendant's current husband, but the lower court
found no substantial change in circumstances. The court of appeals affirmed this finding,
holding that although the lower court did err in ruling that defendant's current husband was not
a hostile witness, the error was not prejudicial, thereby foreclosing the use of leading questions
concerning allegations of child beating. Id. at 79, 231 S.E.2d at 181.
Affirming the lower court's holding in Dean v. Dean, 32 N.C. App. 482, 232 S.E.2d 470
(1977), the court found that the fact that defendant had given birth to two illegitimate children
since the divorce and was rearing them in her home was a sufficient change in circumstances to
justify a change in custody. Id. at 484, 232 S.E.2d at 472. While recognizing the continued
validity of the North Carolina rule that evidence of adulterous conduct by itself is not sufficient
to determine that a parent is unfit to retain custody of a child, see, e.g., In re McCraw Children,
3 N.C. App. 390, 395, 165 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1969), the court felt that the rule was not applicable in
this case since the birth of illegitimate children and their residence with their mother was much
more than evidence of an act of adultery.
The affirmation of the lower court's custody determination of In re Williamson, 32 N.C.
App. 616, 233 S.E.2d 677 (1977), exemplified the utilization of another factor that courts often
consider in determining child custody-the preference of the children involved. In granting the
mother continued custody of her daughters, the court noted the desire of the girls to remain
with their mother. In custody cases North Carolina courts take into consideration the wishes of
a child who has reached the age of discretion. See Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 631, 184
S.E.2d 417, 420 (1971). It has recently been suggested that not only should children be
represented by independent counsel in custody disputes, but that their custodial preference
should be presumptively controlling. Bersoff, Representation for Children in Custody Deci-
sions: All That Glitters Is Not Gault, 15 J. FAM. L. 27 (1976-77). See also Comment, A Child's
Due Process Right to Counsel in Divorce Custody Proceedings, 27 HASTiNGS L.J. 917 (1976);
Note, Seen and Not Heard: The Child's Need for His Own Lawyer in Child Abuse and Neglect
Cases, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 439 (1976).
17. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (Supp. 1977) provides in part: "[A]n order for custody of
a minor child entered pursuant to this section shall award custody of such child to such person,
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entitled to the custody of a minor, voids the judicially created presumption
favoring the mother in custody controversies between parents. t 8 This statu-
tory amendment reflects the current trend recognizing the ability of the
father to provide proper care and comfort for the child. 19 Prior to this
amendment, the North Carolina Supreme Court had recently and strongly
reaffirmed the traditional view giving added weight to the mother's child-
caring abilities. 20 In a similar vein, an amendment changing the first two
sentences of G.S. 33-2,21 relating to the parents' rights to dispose of the
custody and tuition of minor children by will, eliminates the distinctions
previously maintained between the rights of the father and the mother22 and
states that the parents are allowed to "recommend" disposition of custody
rather than simply "dispose" of custody.
23
agency, organization or institution as will, in the opinion of the judge, best promote the interest
and welfare of the child."
18. The amendment reads, "Provided, between the mother and father, whether natural or
adoptive, there is no presumption as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of the
child." Id.
Other states have also adopted statutes expressly forbidding courts to discriminate against
fathers in custody proceedings. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b) (Harrison 1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 247.24(3) (West Supp. 1977).
19. See Comment, The Father's Right to Child Custody in Interparental Disputes, 49 TUL.
L. REv. 189, 200 (1974).
20. The court in Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 687, 198 S.E.2d 537, 547 (1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) (quoting 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.09, at 226 (2d
ed. 1961)) stated:
It is universally recognized that the mother is the natural custodian of her young, ...
If, she is a fit and proper person to have custody of the children, other things being
equal, the mother should be given their custody, in order that the children may not
only receive her attention, care, supervision, and kindly advice, but also may have the
advantage and benefit of a mother's love and devotion for which there is no substitute.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-2 (Supp. 1977).
22. Law of Apr. 12, 1869, ch. 201, § 1, 1868 N.C. Pub. Laws 534 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-2 (1976)) (father generally had right to make disposition if
mother were dead, but mother could make disposition only if father were dead and had made no
disposition in his will).
The amendment to § 33-2 is one of several amendments and modifications to incorporate
gender neutral statutory language in the domestic relations laws. Other amendments to remove
unneeded references to gender were N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-223 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (now relates to
judgments against a married person, not just married women); id. § 6-21 (respecting costs in
civil actions; "widow" changed to "surviving spouse," "wife" to "either spouse"); id. § 23-18
(recognizing an imprisoned debtor can be a woman); id. § 33-67 (Supp. 1977) (recognizing that
person in military service can be male or female for purpose of disbursements of allotments to
minor children); id. § 35-13 (spouse of incompetent husband or wife entitled to special proceed-
ing for sale of property); id. § 35-19 (now refers to income of incompetent surviving spouse);
id. § 48-6 (consent of parent in adoption proceedings); id. § 50-5(6) (divorce on grounds of
insanity); id. §§ 5-1, -6 (marriage); and id. §§ 94-7, -8 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (regulating apprentice-
ship). See also Law of Feb. 16, 1859, ch. 52, § 1, 1858 N.C. Pub. Laws 91 (repealed 1977)
(allowance to abandoned, insane wife).
The new amendments in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (Supp. 1977) and the addition of id. § 51-
3.1 have removed prior bars to interracial marriage. Section 51-3.1 validates any interracial
marriage declared void by statute or court prior to its enactment and the new version of § 51-3
does away with the statutory prohibition against marriage between whites and blacks.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-2 (Supp. 1977). The amendment accords great emphasis to the
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
C. Child Neglect
Several statutory changes related to child neglect were made to G.S.
Chapter 7A, Jurisdiction and Procedure Applicable to Children. In general,
the statutory changes reflect an increased sensitivity for the rights and well-
being of victims of child neglect.24 Perhaps the most significant of these
amendments is that to G.S. 7A-283 which, as amended, requires that a court
appoint an attorney as guardian ad litem to represent the child in cases
involving alleged child neglect "unless the court shall find as a fact that the
child is not in need of and cannot benefit from such representation.'"2 The
statute expressly states that the guardian ad litem is to serve the child and
protect the child's best interests and gives the guardian ad litem wide-
ranging authority to obtain reports and information relevant to the pro-
ceeding.
26
An amendment to G.S. 7A-451(a), which is a compilation of the
proceedings in which an indigent person is entitled to the services of
counsel, provides that such assistance will now be provided "[i]n the case of
a juvenile alleged to be neglected.' '27 This marks an extension of a
juvenile's right to counsel in certain judicial proceedings, previously limited
to delinquency hearings, 28 and may presage a future provision finally recog-
nizing, as has often been suggested, that children should be represented by
counsel in custody proceedings.29
G.S. 7A-284 provides that the court may give a concerned party an
immediate order of physical custody, with a hearing to follow within five
days, if it appears that a child is subject to serious neglect.30 An amendment
parental recommendation by stating that "parents are presumed to know the best interest of
their children" and that the recommendation will be a "strong guide" if there is a dispute. Id.
24. E.g., id. § 7A-286(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) now provides for periodic review of child
placement when the custody of the child has been removed from a parent "to determine if the
needs of the child are being met and if the placement is in the child's best interests." A separate
amendment to the same statute provides that a child removed from custody of a parent or one
standing in loco parentis cannot be returned to that person "unless the court finds sufficient
facts to show that the child will receive proper care and supervision." Id. These amendments
allow the court to have control and supervision that was not previously possible over child
placement.
25. Id. § 7A-283.
26. Neither the physician-patient privilege nor the husband-wife privilege may be invoked
to prevent the guardian from obtaining such information. Id.
27. Id. § 7A-451(a)(12).
28. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969),
aff'd sub nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); State v. Rush, 13 N.C. App.
539, 186 S.E.2d 595 (1972).
29. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973); Inker, Expanding the Rights of Children in Custody and Adoption Cases, 11 J. FAM. L.
129 (1971-72).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-284(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). In Newton v. Burgin, 363 F. Supp.
782 (W.D.N.C. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974), a federal district court held that this
provision did not violate the due process rights of the parent of the child. Id. at 788.
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to this procedure provides that an order for immediate, seventy-two hour
custody may be issued by the magistrate on the oral direction of the judge,
31
ensuring that a child seriously endangered may swiftly be brought under the
protective custody of the court for a short time.
In the only 1977 decision related to child neglect, In re Kowalzek, 32 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals granted standing to a person with physical
(though not legal) custody of a child to appeal the modification of a court
order that had been issued without the provision of required notice or any
finding of changed circumstances. The modification, which had been sought
by the county social services department as legal custodian, gave custody of
the child to the mother, who had abandoned the child in 1974. The child's
father had died in February 1975, and appellants had had custody of the
child since that time (approximately eighteen months when custody modifi-
cation was ordered). 33 The court found that appellants as custodians stood in
loco parentis to the child and therefore had standing. 34 By giving the
custodian standing to appeal, the court increased the possibility that in the
subsequent course of the litigation the child's need for a continued relation-
ship with its actual custodians would be appropriately considered in the final




The court of appeals articulated a new principle in the child support
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-284(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
32. 32 N.C. App. 718, 233 S.E.2d 655 (1977).
33. At a full custody hearing in 1975 the mother did appear, but the court found that she
had abandoned the child and could not provide support. Id. at 719, 233 S.E.2d at 656.
34. Id. at 721, 233 S.E.2d at 657.
35. The court itself made no reference to this need. See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD
& A. SoLNrr, supra note 29, at 31-35.
36. In two child support cases, the state courts followed the general decisional trend in
this and other jurisdictions. In Brondum v. Cox, 292 N.C. 192, 232 S.E.2d 687 (1977), the
supreme court considered the effect of a foreign order for child support that plaintiff sought to
enforce under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1
to -32 (1976). Defendant, who had made no appearance in the foreign action, denied being the
father of the child for whom support was sought. The North Carolina trial court had held that
the Hawaiian (issuing) court could decide the paternity issue by virtue of the in rem jurisdiction
it possessed over defendant. Both the court of appeals and the supreme court, however, held
that the Hawaiian court, lacking personal jurisdiction over defendant, had no power to deter-
mine the paternity question, which could be relitigated in the North Carolina action. This
decision is in accordance with rulings by other courts on this issue. See, e.g., Hartford v.
Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956); State v. Murphy, 354 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1962); Watkins v. Watkins, 194 Tenn. 621, 254 S.W.2d 735 (1953). For further discussion
of Brondum, see this Survey, Civil Procedure: Jurisdiction.
Upholding its supervision of child support payments in separation agreements, the court of
appeals in Perry v. Perry, 33 N.C. App. 139, 234 S.E.2d 449, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 730, 235
S.E.2d 784 (1977), held that the substantial evidence of changed circumstances presented by
plaintiff (serious illness and permanent disability of the parent with custody) amply justified the
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area in Goodson v. Goodson37 by recognizing that the parent paying child
support should, in some cases, receive credit for voluntary expenditures that
he or she has made on behalf of the child.3 8 This question had never before
been presented to a North Carolina court, and other jurisdictions are divided
in their determinations of the question. 39 The majority of courts hold that the
parent paying support should not be allowed credit for voluntary expendi-
tures, and are reluctant to allow a party the discretion to alter so freely the
court's order for child support. 40 Aligning itself with a sizable minority of
jurisdictions, however, the court of appeals held that credit should be
allowed "when equitable considerations exist which would create an injus-
tice if credit were not allowed. "41
The lower court in Goodson had determined that the father owed the
full $1320 arrearage claimed by the mother for the children.42 On appeal,
the father contended that he was entitled to credit for clothing, food,
recreation and medical treatment expenses he had incurred on behalf of the
children amounting to $1768.25. The court approved of the principle of
allowing credit for some voluntary expenditures and remanded the question
of the amount of credit due for determination by the lower court, providing
in addition some specific guidelines to be followed.43 The court empha-
sized, however, that the guidelines were not "hard and fast rules, and that
the controlling principle is that credit is appropriate only when an injustice
would exist if credit were not given."I The court thus prudently recognized
the need for flexibility in this area where emergencies often arise, while
acknowledging and accommodating the need for detailed directions to assist
lower courts in their determination of whether or not to allow credit.
court's order increasing the amount of child support provided for in the separation agreement.
Plaintiff, in meeting her burden to show changed circumstances, did not need to show the needs
of the child at the time the separation agreement was signed since the terms were in no way
binding upon the court in connection with the children. Id. at 142, 234 S.E.2d at 452; see
Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 56, 134 S.E.2d 227, 233 (1964). The court did, however,
continue to recognize the presumption that the provisions mutually agreed upon in a separation
agreement concerning child support are just and reasonable and that the court is not warranted
in changing such provisions in the absence of changed circumstances. 33 N.C. App. at 143,234
S.E.2d at 452; see Fuchs v. Fuchs, 260 N.C. 635, 639, 133 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1963).
37. 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977).
38. Id. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182.
39. See Annot., 47 A.L.R.3d 1031 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
40. See Baures v. Baures, 13 Ariz. App. 515, 519, 478 P.2d 130, 134 (1970).
41. 32 N.C. App. at 81, 231 S.E.2d at 182.
42. Id.
43. The specific guidelines included the following: The delinquent parent is not entitled to
credit for all voluntary expenditures as a matter of law or for obligations incurred prior to the
time of the entry of the support order; the parent is not entitled as a matter of law to a deduction
proportional to the amount of time spent with the child; credit is not ordinarily appropriate for
frivolous expenses or those incurred in entertaining and feeding children during visitation
periods, but would usually be appropriate for expenses incurred with the consent of the parent
with custody or for payments made under compulsion of circumstances. Id.
44. Id.
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In Hicks v. Hicks,' 5 the court of appeals clarified the statutory
command making the father primarily liable for the support of his minor
child. 46 One year after a final divorce, the mother, with whom the children
resided, sought child support and custody. Defendant father did not answer
the complaint, but appealed the portion of the judgment awarding plaintiff
$8000 for past due child support. The lower court reached this sum by
concluding that defendant should have paid the same amount in the past that
he was being required to pay in the future. Finding no evidence of the
amount that plaintiff had actually spent for support of the children, the court
held that defendant's past liability could not be measured by the child
support that had just been awarded.47 Instead, defendant was liable for "the
amount actually expended by plaintiff for the support of the children which
represented . . . defendant's share of the support,''48 a sum to be arrived at
by considering the needs of the children and the ability of defendant to pay
during the time for which past due support was being sought.
49
E. Separation Agreements
In Riddle v. Riddle,5° a North Carolina court for the first time confront-
ed the question whether injunctive relief is available to a former wife to
compel her husband to make payments provided for only in the private
separation agreement. Relying on earlier cases that emphasized the contrac-
tual nature of consent judgments and separation agreements,51 the court
reversed the lower court's grant of injunctive relief, holding that plaintiff
possessed an adequate remedy at law in seeking damages for breach of
45. 34 N.C. App. 128, 237 S.E.2d 307 (1977).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1976).
47. 34 N.C. App. at 130, 237 S.E.2d at 309.
48. Id.
49. In two cases the court of appeals considered the question of a father's ability to pay
child support. In State v. Buff, 32 N.C. App. 395, 232 S.E.2d 303, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 468,
233 S.E.2d 397 (1977), the court of appeals found that evidence of the fact that defendant was
employed and had increased support payments at approximately the same time that a warrant
was issued under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (1969) (willful failure to provide adequate support a
misdemeanor) was sufficient evidence to show that defendant was able to pay. In Brumfield v.
Brumfield, 34 N.C. App. 322, 237 S.E.2d 868 (1977), the court found that defendant-father did
have the ability to pay $50 per week child support for two children of his first marriage from his
$125 per week salary. Defendant had contended that he was unable to pay because of the $700
per month living expenses he incurred by virtue of his custody of two other children of the first
marriage and a child of his present marriage, and his second wife's custody of her four children,
all of whom resided with him. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's finding
respecting defendant's ability to pay. Id. at 323, 237 S.E.2d at 869.
50. 32 N.C. App. 83, 230 S.E.2d 809 (1977).
51. Id. at 86-87,230 S.E.2d at 811-12 (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 253,154 S.E.2d
71 (1967) (consent judgment part of court order can be upheld by means of contempt proceed-
ings); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964) (consent judgment that court merely
approves enforceable only as contract); Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N.C. 129, 37 S.E.2d 118 (1946)
(separation agreement was extrajudicial transaction enforceable only as contract)).
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contract 52 and that a separation agreement not ordered, but merely approved
by the court, could not be enforced by means of an injunction. 53 Although
the alimony provisions of consent judgments reached without benefit of any
court order may be modified by the court,54 the court in Riddle continues in
this instance to recognize the distinction between private agreements be-
tween parties the provisions of which are incorporated into the order of the
court and those agreements that the court merely approves.
55
In several other court decisions resolving separation agreement
controversies, the court of appeals stressed the contractual nature of the
agreement in reaching its rulings. In Whitt v. Whitt, 56 the court held that a
wife's agreement to convey property to her husband was binding upon her,
notwithstanding a later reconciliation. 57 The wife argued that the agreement
to convey was executory and therefore void because of the reconciliation.
58
Following principles of contract law, the court stated that "[o]ne spouse
may not transform a provision in a separation agreement which is otherwise
fully executed into an executory provision merely by fraudulently avoiding
compliance with the executed covenant." ' 59 Similarly, the court looked to
the intent of the parties in interpreting the terms of a separation agreement in
Krickhan v. Krickhan.6° After selling the family home, plaintiff claimed
that the $100 that had been designated as alimony in the separation agree-
ment but was paid directly to the mortgagee by defendant should continue to
be paid to plaintiff as alimony after the house was sold and the mortgage
52. Id. at 87, 230 S.E.2d at 812. See also 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 201,
at 423-24 (3d ed. 1963).
53. 32 N.C. App. at 87, 230 S.E.2d at 811.
54. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976), discussed in note 72 infra.
55. This distinction also was of pivotal concern in Levitch v. Levitch, 34 N.C. App. 56,
237 S.E.2d 281 (1977), rev'd, 294 N.C. 437 (1978), in which the court held that plaintiff could not
use a contempt proceeding to compel defendant to pay alimony as provided in the separation
agreement when the court did not order the payment of alimony but merely incorporated the
separation agreement into the divorce judgment. This seems somewhat inconsistent with the
policy of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976), which establishes the courts' power to modify
alimony payments under contractual agreements. Section 50-16.9(a), however, does apply only
to modification of alimony provisions in private agreements and not to the enforcement of
provisions. In 1978 the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed Levitch, 294 N.C. 437 (1978)
("incorporation language . . . appears sufficiently compelling to indicate an intent on the part
of the court to order payment of alimony"). The court, in blocking contempt proceedings, is not
denying any relief available under a contract theory of recovery.
56. 32 N.C. App. 125, 230 S.E.2d 793 (1977).
57. Id. at 130, 230 S.E.2d at 796.
58. Id. at 129, 230 S.E.2d at 795. The reconciliation took place two years after the
agreement was signed. During the two-year period, the husband continually tried to persuade
the wife to sign the deeds of conveyance as she had promised. Id. at 127-28, 230 S.E.2d at 794-
95.
59. Id. at 130, 230 S.E.2d at 796. See Mather v. Mather, 25 Cal. 2d 582, 586, 154 P.2d 684,
686 (1944). There is no prior North Carolina case on this point.
60. 34 N.C. App. 363, 238 S.E.2d 184 (1977).
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paid.61 The court agreed, basing its decision in its entirety on interpretive
principles of contract law.
62
F. Divorce
In Freeman v. Freeman,63 a case of first impression, the court of
appeals held that the general guardian of an incompetent person cannot
maintain an action for divorce based on one year's separation. 64 In two
earlier North Carolina cases, guardians had represented incompetent persons
in divorce actions. 65 The court, however, distinguished these cases. In
Smith v. Smith, a guardian ad litem was permitted to defend the divorce
action, since defendant's only election was to defend or abstain from
answering and suffer a default judgment. 66 The court stated that Sims v.
Sims, 67 in which the guardian of a lunatic was allowed to annul a marriage
of his ward, applied only to divorces based upon the incompetency of a
person at the time of his or her marriage. 68 With the Freeman decision, the
court followed the rule recognized by the majority of states that a suit for
61. Id. at 366, 238 S.E.2d at 186.
62. A separation agreement's status as a contract brought it, in past years, within the
mandate of Law of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 193, § 27, 1871 N.C. Pub. Laws 336 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6(a) (1976)), which required that the officer certifying certain contracts
between husband and wife privately examine the wife to determine that the agreement was not
unreasonable or injurious to her. One important action of the 1977 General Assembly was to
repeal § 52-6 and to incorporate some of its requirements into a rewritten N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-
10 (Supp. 1977). The requirement for a private examination of the wife was among those
omitted from the new statute.
Before its repeal § 52-6 was challenged on constitutional grounds in Spencer v. Spencer,
430 F. Supp. 683 (M.D.N.C.), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 98 S. Ct. 39 (1977).
Plaintiff-husband claimed the provisions of § 52-6(a) were a denial of his equal protection rights
in not allowing him the same private examination determining the reasonableness of the
separation agreement that his wife enjoyed. The court, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to
decide the question, did not reach the equal protection issue.
In Cooke v. Cooke, 34 N.C. App. 124, 237 S.E.2d 323, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 740, 241
S.E.2d 513 (1977), another case concerning a separation agreement, plaintiff-husband raised the
issue of reconciliation in attempting to avoid the executory terms of the agreement. The court
held that plaintiff's evidence of two isolated acts of sexual intercourse demonstrated at most
"only a temporary resumption of marital relations on a trial basis without the intent to resume a
full marital relationship, or to repudiate the separation agreement." Id. at 127, 237 S.E.2d at
325. Cooke follows other North Carolina decisions holding that isolated acts of sexual inter-
course are not conclusive evidence of reconciliation, see Newton v. Williams, 25 N.C. App.
527, 214 S.E.2d 285 (1975), and continues the policy of encouraging the possibility of reconcilia-
tion by allowing separated couples to attempt reconciliation without forfeiting the terms of an
earlier separation agreement should the attempted reconciliation fail. See I R. LEE, supra note
52, § 74, at 288.
63. 34 N.C. App. 301, 237 S.E.2d 857 (1977).
64. Id.
65. Smith v. Smith, 226 N.C. 544, 39 S.E.2d 458 (1946); Sims v. Sims, 121 N.C. 297, 28
S.E. 407 (1897).
66. 226 N.C. 544, 39 S.E.2d 458 (1946).
67. 121 N.C. 297, 28 S.E. 407 (1897).
68. 34 N.C. App. at 304, 237 S.E.2d at 859.
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divorce is so strictly personal that it cannot be maintained by another on
behalf of an incompetent.
69
G. Alimony
In Seaborn v. Seaborn,7° the court of appeals confronted the question
of modification of consent judgments, a question that had often arisen in
North Carolina decisions71 prior to the enactment of G.S. 50-16.9(a)
72
which specifically allows an alimony order by consent to be modified.
Reversing the lower court's holding that the consent judgment could not be
modified, the court held that the property settlement (which could not be
modified73) was separable from the alimony provisions and that the alimony
provisions were modifiable according to the statute. 74 In considering the two
provisions of the consent judgment separately, the court upheld the intent of
the statute that the court should retain supervision of alimony provisions.
75
The court in Bugher v. Bugher76 also upheld its control over alimony
agreements not otherwise under court order. Defendant-husband had signed
69. See Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 681 (1966).
The only other case decided in this area was Ponder v. Ponder, 32 N.C. App. 150, 230
S.E.2d 786 (1977), a suit for divorce on the basis of a one-year separation that dealt with the
effects of cohabitation upon the required one-year separation period. Defendant-wife moved
for a dismissal of plaintiff-husband's divorce action on the ground that the parties had not lived
separate and apart for one year. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's grant of
dismissal. The evidence showed that, although the parties occupied separate bedrooms and had
discontinued sexual relations, their association was still one of cohabitation, a term that
includes not just sexual relations, but other marital responsibilities. Id. at 154, 230 S.E.2d at
788. In Ponder, the undisputed evidence showed that the parties occupied the same house, that
plaintiff paid for defendant's automobile expenses, that defendant prepared plaintiff's meals,
and that plaintiff operated his business from the house. Ponder follows other North Carolina
cases that clearly state that separation as used in the context of divorce statutes means living
apart in such a way that those who come into contact with the separated couple will realize that
they are not living together. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945);
Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d 489 (1945).
70. 32 N.C. App. 556, 233 S.E.2d 67 (1977).
71. See, e.g., Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240 (1964).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a) (1976) provides that an order for alimony may be
modified, even though the order was by consent, upon a showing of changed circumstances.
See also Brooks v. Brooks, 12 N.C. App. 626, 184 S.E.2d 417 (1971).
73. [A~n agreement for the division of property rights [between the parties] and an
order for payment of alimony may be included as separable provisions in a consent
judgment. In such event the division of property would be beyond the power of the
court to change, but the order for future installments of alimony would be subject to
modification in a proper case.
R. LEE, supra note 52, § 152, at 89 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
74. 32 N.C. App. at 558-59, 233 S.E.2d at 69.
75. Prior to the passage of the statute, the supreme court in Holsomback v. Holsomback,
273 N.C. 728, 732-33, 161 S.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1968), held that, although provisions in a consent
judgment relating to the division of property could be modified or set aside only for fraud or
mistake, the terms for the payment of future alimony could be modified in the event of changed
circumstances when the consent judgment was a part of the court's decree.
76. 34 N.C. App. 601, 239 S.E.2d 303 (1977).
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an agreement lessening the amount of alimony he was to pay after his former
wife began receiving social security benefits. The court held that the unila-
teral agreement77 could not reduce defendant's obligation under the court
order, particularly since the social security payments were not amounts paid
on behalf of defendant.
78
Several of the alimony decisions the court of appeals delivered
concerned jurisdictional questions. In allowing the issue of changed circum-
stances concerning future payments to be considered in an action for
alimony past due79 and in allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction to
hear a motion concerning alimony when the appellate court was hearing
another question involving the same divorce action, 80 the court avoided the
need for separate proceedings regarding different issues arising out of one
case.
In Webber v. Webber,81 the court of appeals ruled that it had juris-
diction to determine alimony and child support when plaintiff's hearing in a
North Carolina divorce action followed defendant's prior Georgia divorce
determination in which plaintiff had made no personal appearance. The
court found that plaintiff did not make a general in personam appearance in
the Georgia action when she authorized her attorney to negotiate through the
mails to acquire title to a house and an automobile in exchange for her
agreement not to contest the Georgia divorce.
82
With this ruling, the court affirmed the protection afforded the depen-
dent spouse under G.S. 50-11(d),83 which provides that a foreign divorce
obtained without in personam jurisdiction over the dependent spouse does
not affect his or her right to obtain alimony in North Carolina. The telephone
negotiations, although so limited as to lack the characteristics of a general
appearance, did gain plaintiff valuable property. Even so, the court held that
plaintiff was not estopped in her action by having received any benefit
which the Georgia divorce decree had conferred. 84 In addition, by narrowly
77. Plaintiff signed a separate statement agreeing to pay back to defendant any amount of
social security benefits she received for those months during which defendant had paid the full
amount of alimony. Id. at 602, 239 S.E.2d at 304.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), 416(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) create a category of eligible social
security beneficiaries--divorced wives without their own adequate contribution records.
79. Thompson v. Thompson, 34 N.C. App. 51, 237 S.E.2d 283 (1977). In allowing defend-
ant to offer evidence of changed circumstances in relation to future payments, the court
suggested that the better procedure would be for defendant to allege changed circumstances in a
counterclaim seeking relief as to future payments only. Id. at 52, 237 S.E.2d at 285.
80. Cox v. Cox, 33 N.C. App. 73, 234 S.E.2d 189 (1977).
81. 32 N.C. App. 572, 232 S.E.2d 865 (1977).
82. Id. at 575, 232 S.E.2d at 866.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(d) (1976).
84. 32 N.C. App. at 575, 232 S.E.2d at 867. This ruling greatly liberalizes the rule that a
person cannot attack a divorce decree after enjoying a benefit it has conferred. See 1 R. LEE,
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interpreting plaintiff's agreement not to contest the Georgia divorce, which
had resulted in a judgment including an award of alimony and child support,
the court found that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not operate to bar
plaintiff's claims.85 In denying either ground for estoppel of plaintiff's suit,
the court in general expanded the dependent spouse's right to bring a suit for
alimony in North Carolina.
86
H. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
8 7
In Pinner v. Pinner88 the court of appeals for the first time interpreted a
portion of the 1975 amendments to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act (URESA), holding that neither in personam nor in rem juris-
diction over the obligor was necessary for a foreign support order to be
registered under G.S. 52A-29.8 9 The court also ruled, however, that the
registration and enforcement of foreign support orders were two separate
procedures and declined to decide whether jurisdiction over the obligor was
necessary in an enforcement proceeding. 90 In refusing to decide the latter
supra note 52, § 98, at 388. Plaintiff did bring her North Carolina action on the day defendant's
Georgia proceeding started, so the telephone transactions were not, in fact, part of the decree.
The court, however, did not consider whether these prior property transfers realistically should
have been considered a benefit, even though peripheral, conferred by the Georgia divorce.
85. "Plaintiff has not contested the Georgia divorce. In the present action she is simply
asserting her right to alimony and child support." 32 N.C. App. at 576, 232 S.E.2d at 867.
86. In Streeter v. Streeter, 33 N.C. App. 679, 236 S.E.2d 185 (1977), the court also
protected the dependent spouse's right to alimony. In Streeter, nine years had passed between
the time of the couple's separation and the dependent spouse's claim for support. The court
reaffirmed the longstanding North Carolina rule "that the mere delay by the dependent spouse
in seeking maintenance from the supporting spouse, absent any showing of prejudice to the
supporting spouse resulting from the delay, does not bar the dependent spouse's action to
enforce the right to support." Id. at 682, 236 S.E.2d at 187; see Nall v. Nall, 229 N.C. 598, 599,
50 S.E.2d 737, 737 (1948).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -32 (1976).
88. 33 N.C. App. 204, 234 S.E.2d 633 (1977). The court found that cases arising in the 24
states that had adopted the registration provisions in question provided no guidance to the court
in its ruling. Ad. at 205, 234 S.E.2d at 635.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-29 (1976). Ordinarily the question of the court's jurisdiction
over the obligor would not arise since the obligee would register the foreign judgment in the
state of the obligor's residence. In this case, the obligee resided in North Carolina and the
obligor in Pennsylvania. 33 N.C. App. at 204, 234 S.E.2d at 635.
The effect of registration of a foreign support order is stipulated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-
30(a) (1976), which provides:
Upon registration, the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same
manner as a support order issued by a court of this State. It has the same effect and is
subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating or
staying as a support order of this State and may be enforced and satisfied in a like
manner.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-22 (1976) provides that participation in any proceeding under
URESA does not confer jurisdiction over any of the parties in any other proceeding. Therefore,
the court stressed, the jurisdictional question remained open in an enforcement proceeding,
despite the obligor's unsuccessful challenge to the registration procedure. 33 N.C. App. at 207-
08, 234 S.E.2d at 636.
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jurisdictional question, the court unnecessarily postponed consideration of
an unavoidable issue. Registration of a foreign support order accomplishes
little when, as the court in Pinner held, enforcement must be separately
pursued. 91 The court did explain that the registration "changes the status of
the foreign support order by allowing it to be treated the same as a support
order issued by a court of North Carolina," 92 but then paradoxically left the
actual question of enforcement unresolved. 93
In Blake v. Blake, 94 the court of appeals held that a prior decision
under URESA that defendant-wife was not entitled to alimony made the
issue res judicata in the husband's subsequent action for divorce. 95 Rejecting
defendant's interpretation that G.S. 52A-4, which provides that the reme-
dies of URESA are "in addition to and not in substitution for any other
remedies,'' 96 precluded the operation of res judicata, the court held that the
statute merely provides additional means of enforcing support obligations
and does not establish an additional duty to support since under the Act the
duty to support is governed by North Carolina law.
97
L Alimony Pendente Lite and Attorneys' Fees
Although the general rule in North Carolina is that the award of
attorneys' fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is binding
on the appellate court unless there is an abuse of discretion,98 the court of
appeals has been very careful in its review of lower court awards in this area
and heedful of the necessity for specific findings of fact to support any such
awards. In Wyatt v. Wyatt9 9 the court found the lower court's award of
attorneys' fees in a divorce proceeding in error because of insufficient
findings of fact. 10 Following earlier cases that interpreted the requirement
91. See note 89 supra.
92. 33 N.C. App. at 207, 234 S.E.2d at 636.
93. Leading authorities interpreting the Act seem to go further than the North Carolina
court in recognizing that the purpose of registration is enforcement. See W. BROCKELBANK & F.
INFAUSTO, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT (THE RUNAWAY PAPPY ACT) 83 (2d
ed. 1971). In light of their observations, the Pinner court's failure to decide the jurisdictional
question in enforcement appears to be unnecessarily timid.
94. 34 N.C. App. 160, 237 S.E.2d 310 (1977).
95. Id. at 160-61, 237 S.E.2d at 311.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52A-4 (1976).
97. Id. § 52A-5.
98. See Stadiem v. Stadiem, 230 N.C. 318, 52 S.E.2d 899 (1949); Wyche v. Wyche, 29
N.C. App. 685, 225 S.E.2d 626 (1976).
99. 32 N.C. App. 162, 231 S.E.2d 42 (1977).
100. Id. at 165, 231 S.E.2d at 43. In Lindsey v. Lindsey, 34 N.C. App. 201,204,237 S.E.2d
561, 564 (1977), the court also found that there were insufficient findings of fact to determine
the reasonableness of attorney's fees.
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of G.S. 50-13.6l0l that there be findings of fact that the fee is reasonable,10 2
the court held that a partial listing of legal expenses is an insufficient finding
of fact concerning the reasonable worth of attorneys' services. 10 3 Wyatt
clarifies the limitations put upon the trial judge's discretion in this area.
In Ross v. Ross,1" the court of appeals reversed the lower court's
award of alimony pendente lite for plaintiff after carefully interpreting G.S.
50-16.3,105 which provides for the granting of alimony pendente lite if the
party seeking the alimony is a dependent spouse, is entitled to the relief
demanded in the action, and is without the means upon which to subsist
during the suit. Maintaining its earlier cautious attitude in awarding alimony
pendente lite, t°6 the court held that plaintiff did not establish that she was a
dependent spouse merely by partially accounting for her expenses and that
the partial showing did not establish need. 107
CARLYN GRAU POOLE
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.6 (1976) requires that before the court may order payment of
attorneys' fees there be findings that the legal fee is reasonable, that the moving party is acting
in good faith without adequate means to defray legal expenses and that the party ordered to
furnish support has refused to provide adequate support. The Wyatt court held there were
adequate findings of "good faith without sufficient financial means and that plaintiff had
refused to provide adequate support." 32 N.C. App. at 165, 231 S.E.2d at 43-44.
102. See, e.g., Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 21 N.C. App. 276, 280, 204 S.E.2d 198, 201
(1974), aff'd on other grounds, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976) (award of attorneys' fees
not upheld in absence of evidence on scope and nature of services or time involved).
103. 32 N.C. App. at 165, 231 S.E.2d at 44.
104. 33 N.C. App. 447, 235 S.E.2d 405 (1977).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (1976).
106. Although recognizing that the award of alimony pendente lite "is intended to enable
[the dependent spouse] to maintain herself according to her station in life," the court of appeals
in Newsome v. Newsome, 22 N.C. App. 651, 654, 207 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1974), held that the
lower court erred in awarding alimony pendente lite when there were no findings of fact other
than "findings that plaintiff was no longer working and that she had no other source of income"
to support the lower court's conclusion that plaintiff was a dependent spouse substantially in
need of maintenance. Id. See also Hogue v. Hogue, 20 N.C. App. 583,588, 202 S.E.2d 327, 330
(1974).
107. 33 N.C. App. at 457, 235 S.E.2d at 411.
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VIII. EVIDENCE
A. Opinion'
In State v. Periman,2 the court of appeals held that a qualified medical
expert could testify as to his diagnosis and understanding of the "battered
child syndrome." 3 Although the use of the term had been tacitly approved in
State v. Fredell,4 Perlman appears to be the first case in which a North
Carolina appellate court directly faced the issue whether such a subject is a
proper one for expert testimony. In Perlman, defendant was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter of the three-year-old daughter of the woman with
whom he was living.5 The prosecution sought to introduce expert testimony
that the child was a victim of the "battered child syndrome." This tes-
timony was admitted over defendant's objection. On review, the court of
appeals rejected the argument that the experts were attempting to say that
defendant inflicted the wounds. According to the court, the evidence merely
precluded the possibility of accidental or self-inflicted wounds and consisted
of conclusions properly based on medical science.
6
I. In State v. Van Cross, 293 N.C. 296, 237 S.E.2d 734 (1977), the supreme court held
that a witness who was not present at the scene of the crime could not give her opinion that
defendant resembled eyewitness sketches of the alleged perpetrator. Such testimony is "past
opinion as to the identity of the individual depicted in the sketch" and invades the province of
the jury. Id. at 302, 237 S.E.2d at 738. The North Carolina courts continued, however, to admit
lay opinions based on contemporaneous perceptions of the physical and mental state of
persons, animals and things. See State v. Jones, 291 N.C. 681, 231 S.E.2d 252 (1977) (allowing
layman's testimony that he saw blood on defendant's shirt); State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370,
235 S.E.2d 281 (1977) (upholding lay testimony that individual was intoxicated); Waters v.
Humphrey, 33 N.C. App. 185,234 S.E.2d 462, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 163,236
S.E.2d 707 (1977) (allowing lay witness to testify that certain chop marks on tree were old).
2. 32 N.C. App. 33, 230 S.E.2d 802 (1977).
3. Id. at 40, 230 S.E.2d at 806.
The battered child syndrome is a term used . . . to characterize a clinical condi-
tion in young children who have received serious physical abuse, generally from a
parent or foster parent. The condition has also been described as "unrecognized
trauma" by radiologists, orthopedists, pediatricians and social service workers. It is a
significant cause of childhood disability and death.
Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181
J.A.M.A. 17, 17 (1962).
4. 17 N.C. App. 205, 193 S.E.2d 587 (1972), aff'd, 283 N.C. 242, 193 S.E.2d 587 (1973).
In Fredell, medical experts were allowed on redirect to define "battered child syndrome."
Defendant, who was charged with child abuse, objected on the grounds that the testimony was
new evidence that should have been excluded. The court of appeals did not question whether
expert testimony on this subject was proper, but upheld admission of the testimony because the
testimony clarified certain direct and cross-examination. Id. at 209, 193 S.E.2d at 590-91. On
appeal, the supreme court, although not faced with the question of admissibility, stated that
"[t]he condition of the child was diagnosed as that of a 'battered child,' a term meaning the
most extreme form of child abuse." 283 N.C. 242, 243, 193 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1973).
5. 32 N.C. App. at 37, 230 S.E.2d at 804.
6. Id. at 40-41, 230 S.E.2d at 806.
There are two possible objections to admitting testimony on the "bat-
tered child syndrome." First, it arguably is not a proper subject for expert
testimony because the "battered child syndrome" diagnosis is scientific
evidence that is not sufficiently accepted by the medical community to be
admissible. The second objection is that the use of the term "battered child
syndrome," with its implication that a parent or guardian of the child is
responsible for the abuse, invades the province of the jury. Neither of these
objections can withstand scrutiny. The general test in North Carolina for
admitting expert testimony is whether "this witness [is] better qualified than
this jury to form an opinion from these facts."'7 The "battered child
syndrome" is a medical diagnosis of the existence of a particular physical
condition. Expert testimony should aid any jury in determining whether the
condition is present in a particular case and what significance its presence
might have. Moreover, testimony on the "battered child syndrome" can
legitimately be classified as scientific evidence. Such testimony, to be
admitted, must satisfy one of two tests. Some courts have required that
when expert testimony is deduced from a scientific principle, that principle
must be generally accepted within the particular field in which it lies.8 A less
strict standard, suggested by some commentators, accepts into evidence
"[any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert
witness." 9 The diagnosis of the "battered child syndrome" is admissible
under either test. It is founded on medical science as well as being generally
accepted within the medical field. 10 In addition, in a case involving injury to
or the death of a child, expert testimony concerning the "battered child
syndrome" will provide relevant conclusions that the jury might not other-
wise reach: specifically, the conclusion that the injuries were not self-
inflicted, but instead were caused by someone in constant contact with the
child.
The second possible objection to the testimony in Periman, that it
invades the province of the jury, also appears unfounded. "The battered-
child syndrome is a term used . . . to characterize a clinical condition in
young children who have received serious physical abuse, generally from a
parent or a foster parent." 11 The fact that a jury might legitimately conclude
from such testimony that a parent or a guardian inflicted the injuries does not
mean that the expert is stating that a particular defendant did in fact cause
7. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 132, at 425-26 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
8. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 488-89
(2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
9. Id. at 491.
10. See McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1965).
11. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, supra note 3, at 17.
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the injuries in question. Instead, this diagnosis merely recognizes that the
injuries involved developed over time and were not accidental. That some-
one close to the child probably caused the injuries is merely a conclusion
that logically follows from the diagnosis. 12 The diagnosis itself cannot be
said to invade the province of the jury to determine whether a particular
defendant did in fact cause the injuries in question.
The North Carolina rule with regard to expert causation testimony is
that "[i]f the opinion asked for is one relating to cause and effect, the
witness should be asked whether in his opinion a particular event or condi-
tion could or might have produced the result in question, not whether it did
produce such result.' 13 The court of appeals held in the 1977 case of
Lawrence v. Reliance Insurance Co. 14 that this rule addresses itself to the
question asked and not necessarily to the answer given. 15 This holding is not
particularly surprising in light of the supreme court's 1973 holding in Mann
v. Virginia Dare Transportation Co. 16 that an expert witness may answer a
causation question with the degree of certainty he feels appropriate. 17 It
does, however, have certain implications as to the remaining viability of the
supreme court's much criticized, earlier holding in Lockwood v. McCas-
kill. 18
Lockwood involved a personal injury suit in which plaintiff claimed
that he suffered amnesia one month after a motor vehicle accident with
defendant. A medical expert for plaintiff was asked if the accident was a
contributing factor to the amnesia attack. He answered that it "may" have
influenced the condition. Defendant appealed a verdict against him on the
grounds that the medical testimony was not a sufficient basis for awarding
damages. 19 Although the supreme court affirmed the verdict, it did state:
The "could" or "might" as used by Stansbury refers to probability
and not mere possibility. . . .If it is not reasonably probable, as a
scientific fact, that a particular effect is capable of production by a
given cause, and the witness so indicates, the evidence is not
12. See People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971).
13. D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 137, at 453.
14. 32 N.C. App. 414, 232 S.E.2d 462 (1977).
15. Id. at 420, 232 S.E.2d at 466.
16. 283 N.C. 734, 198 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
17. Id. at 748, 198 S.E.2d at 568.
18. 262 N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964). "The most charitable thing to be said about the
Lockwood opinion is that it confused admissibility with sufficiency. . . .It is clear that the
Lockwood decision should not be-and, in fact, has apparently not been-followed in passing
upon admissibility." D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 137, at 455-56, 456 n.97. The supreme
court's decision in Mann did not mention Lockwood. See 283 N.C. 734, 198 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
19. 262 N.C. at 665-666, 138 S.E.2d at 544. It appears that defendant in Lockwood
contended only that the medical testimony was so uncertain that the jury could not determine
what part of the injuries had been caused by defendant and thus could not properly apportion
damages. There was no contention that the testimony itself was inadmissible. Id.
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sufficient to establish prima facie the causal relation, and if the
testimony is offered by the party having the burden of showing the
causal relation, the testimony, upon objection, should not be ad-
mitted .... 20
The Lockwood court went on to say that the use of the term "it may have
had an influence" by itself would be insufficient to allow admission of the
evidence. The court did, however, sustain the admission of the evidence
because the expert's further testimony showed a probability of causation.
21
Lawrence involved a suit for property damage under an insurance
contract. Plaintiff introduced the testimony of an expert who was asked
"whether fire could cause damage to the tractor.'"22 The expert replied that
such an effect was possible. On appeal from an adverse verdict, defendant
contended that the admission of this evidence violated the rule in Lockwood
that causation testimony must be given in terms of probability.23 The court
of appeals, however, stated that Lockwood was not controlling in this case,
reasoning that although the court in Lockwood restated the could or might
rule, it still admitted the evidence.24 In reality, the court's statement that
Lockwood was not controlling was not based on any significant distinction
between Lockwood and Lawrence,25 but was a recognition that the Lock-
wood decision was an aberration that confused admissibility with suffi-
ciency and that has not been followed. The Lockwood rule, although not yet
overruled by the supreme court, appears to be no longer viable.26 Instead, a
witness may answer a causation question with the degree of certainty he
deems appropriate, 27 and the trier of fact will be allowed to continue its




Conduct of a person that is intended as an assertion of fact is hearsay
20. Id. at 668-69, 138 S.E.2d at 545-46. Although the court discussed the evidence in terms
of sufficiency, it laid down a rule of exclusion when no showing of scientific probability of
causation is made. Id.
21. Id. at 669, 138 S.E.2d at 546.
22. 32 N.C. App. at 419, 232 S.E.2d at 466.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 420, 232 S.E.2d at 466.
25. There is no real distinction between the two cases. In Lockwood the expert answered
in terms of "may have had an influence." 262 N.C. at 666, 138 S.E.2d at 543. In Lawrence the
expert stated that "it's possible" that the condition caused the effect in question. 32 N.C. App.
at 419, 232 S.E.2d at 466. Any distinction between "may have" and "possibly" is artificial.
Moreover, the Lockwood court stated that the use of the word "possibly" by itself was an
insufficient basis for admissibility. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
26. It has, to say the least, been distinguished to death. See note 25 supra.
27. See Mann v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 283 N.C. 734, 198 S.E.2d 558 (1973).
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when offered to prove that fact. 28 Sometimes, however, conduct that is not
intended as an assertion of a fact will tend "to show that the actor believed
that the fact existed." 29 One of the more difficult questions of evidence law
is whether such conduct is hearsay. The trend in other jurisdictions has been
away from allowing hearsay objections in these implied assertion situa-
tions.30 Although past North Carolina cases have vacillated,
31 the trend in
1977 appeared to favor admission of such evidence as nonhearsay.
32
In State v. Garner,33 defendant was charged with willful refusal to
support his illegitimate child. The trial court admitted over objection tes-
timony of the prosecutrix that defendant's mother came to her house and
wrote her a check. The jury found that defendant was the child's father but
that he had not willfully refused to support the child. On appeal, defendant
alleged error in the admission of the testimony concerning his mother's
conduct. 34 The court of appeals found no error on the grounds that testimony
about the mother's conduct was not hearsay, reasoning that the inherent vice
of hearsay is that its value depends upon the credibility of someone other
than the witness, whereas here the credibility of defendant's mother was not
at issue.
35
McCormick has suggested that classification of evidence as an implied
assertion is only a start. The problem whether an implied assertion is
hearsay can only be resolved by evaluating the evidence "in terms of the
dangers which the hearsay rule is designed to guard against, i.e., imperfec-
tions of perception, memory, and narration." 36 Under such an analysis, the
court's decision in Garner appears correct. 37 The actions of defendant's
28. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 142, at 472.
29. Id. at 472-73.
30. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 250, at 598. Under FFD. R. EvID. 801 conduct that is
not intended by the actor as an assertion is not hearsay.
31. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 142, at 473-74.
32. See State v. Tilley, 292 N.C. 132, 232 S.E.2d 433 (1977) (testimony in murder trial that
coconspirator of defendant carried pistol was not declaration and not hearsay); State v.
Locklear, 291 N.C. 598,231 S.E.2d 256 (1977); State v. Garner, 34 N.C. App. 498, 238 S.E.2d
653 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 519 (1978).
33. 34 N.C. App. 498, 238 S.E.2d 653 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 184, 241 S.E.2d 519
(1978).
34. Id. at 499,238 S.E.2d at 654. Because the jury found for defendant on all issues except
that of paternity, his hearsay objection must have been that the purpose of the prosecutrix'
testimony was to prove that he was the father. Even if defendant's mother intended to assert
that defendant was the father, it is possible that the purpose of the testimony was to prove that
defendant had failed to support the child fully and not that he was the father. Under such
circumstances, the evidence could not be hearsay because the purpose of the testimony would
not be to prove the truth of the matter impliedly asserted. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, §
246, at 584.
35. 34 N.C. App. at 500, 238 S.E.2d at 654.
36. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 250, at 598-99.
37. McCormick states that under such an analysis implied assertions should be classified
as nonhearsay. Id. at 599.
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mother in writing and delivering the check were arguably not intended as an
assertion that defendant was the child's father. It is possible, however, to
infer that because she wrote the check she believed that defendant was the
father and that her actions were an implied assertion that defendant was the
father. When viewed as an implied assertion, the dangers underlying the
hearsay rule are not so great in Garner that the testimony should have been
excluded. The major objection to admitting hearsay evidence is "that the
actor's perception and memory are untested by cross-examination for the
possibility of honest mistake. "38 There was little danger that the disputed
testimony in Garner would be flawed by poor perception or memory.39 The
prosecutrix was merely testifying to what she observed firsthand. 4° Thus,
there should be no more concern about flawed perception than there is in any
situation in which a witness testifies to firsthand knowledge. 41 Moreover,
"in contrast to the risks arising from insincerity, those arising from the
chance of honest mistake seem more sensibly to be factors useful in evalu-
ating weight and credibility rather than grounds for exclusion." 42 The
approach taken in Garner appears to be the proper one. "Evidence, oral or
written, is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in
part, upon the competency and credibility of some person other than the
witness by whom it is sought to produce it. "I In Garner the witness was
testifying about what she saw. It was the credibility of the in-court witness
and not the out-of-court actor that was important. It is true that the out-of-
court actions, as they did in Garner, may result in certain implications. The
testimony itself, however, is best viewed as circumstantial evidence, with
inferences from it best left to be drawn by the jury.
44
In State v. Locklear,45 the supreme court reached a result similar to
that of the court of appeals in Garner. Defendant in Locklear was tried and
convicted of murder. His alleged partner was convicted in a separate trial.
At defendant's trial, evidence that the perpetrators had driven to the scene of
the crime in a yellow station wagon was offered. The trial court admitted
38. rd.
39. In addition, the type of situation ordinarily involved in implied assertions is such as to
reduce the probability of poor memory or perception. Id.
40. 34 N.C. App. at 500, 238 S.E.2d at 654.
41. In any case, the relevant perception is that of the witness and not of the out-of-court
actor. There can be no hearsay objection to the perception of an in-court witness since hearsay
by its very definition deals with out-of-court assertions. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, §
246, at 584.
42. Id. § 250, at 599.
43. D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 138, at 458.
44. McCormick further supports his conclusion that nonassertive conduct should be
classified as nonhearsay by pointing out that a rule of exclusion in these situations creates
undue complication and operates unevenly because the hearsay objection is usually over-
looked. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 250, at 599.
45. 291 N.C. 598, 231 S.E.2d 256 (1977).
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testimony of a locksmith that he made a key for a 1973 yellow station
wagon, that he gave the key to a girl and that the girl paid him and signed the
appropriate authorization in the name of defendant's partner. Defendant
objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. 4 The supreme court rejected
his argument, stating that the locksmith only testified to what he did and to
what he saw the girl do and that such testimony was not hearsay. 47
In Locklear, the initial question whether the girl's conduct should be
classified as an intended assertion or an implied assertion of fact is dif-
ficult. 48 It is certainly arguable that by signing the authorization card in the
name of defendant's partner, the girl intended to assert that he was the
owner of the station wagon. Had the court made such a finding, the evidence
would have been hearsay.49 Assuming the correctness of a contrary finding
as to intent, however, the court's holding appears proper. The only real
objection to the admission of this testimony is the lack of an opportunity to
cross-examine the girl about what she meant in signing the authorization.5 0
If, however, the girl intended no assertion of fact by her actions there should
be less need to cross-examine her as to what she intended. Instead, as in
Garner, the testimony should be viewed as circumstantial evidence that the
jury can weigh as it sees fit.
2. Former Testimony
The admission of the former testimony of a witness is generally viewed
as an exception to the hearsay rule."' Former testimony is admitted, how-
ever, only if certain requirements are met. The first prerequisite in North
46. Id. at 600-01, 231 S.E.2d at 258.
47. Id. at 601, 231 S.E.2d at 258.
48. Although this initial question may be difficult, the probability against intent is so great
that the objector should have the burden of proving intent. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8,
§ 250, at 599.
49. "If a person intends by his conduct to make an assertion of fact, and evidence of that
conduct is offered to prove the existence of that fact, this is hearsay . D. STANSBURY,
supra note 7, § 142, at 472.
50. In addition to a lack of opportunity for cross-examination, hearsay is also excluded
because of the absence of oath as well as personal presence of the declarant. See C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 8, § 245, at 582-83. These latter two objections are less pertinent in implied
assertion situations such as Locklear. The declarant's personal presence at trial is desired so
that the jury may examine demeanor to determine the credibility of the declarant, while the oath
helps ensure that the declarant speaks sincerely. See id. As for the alleged necessity of an oath,
"it was recognized long ago that purposeful deception is less likely in the absence of intent to
communicate." Id. § 250, at 599. The need for personal presence is also lessened when verbal
conduct is involved because the in-court witness who is testifying about these actions is present
for demeanor observation. Also, there is less need for exact recitation of actions than there is
for verbal declarations.
51. See id., § 254, at 614. Wigmore, however, views former testimony as a class of
evidence in which the requirements of the hearsay rule are met. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 9
1370 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
EVIDENCE
Carolina is that the witness be unavailable.52 Moreover, "[tihe proceeding
at which the currently unavailable witness testified must have been a former
trial of the same cause, or a preliminary stage of the same cause, or the trial
of another cause involving the issue and subject matter to which his tes-
timony is directed at the current trial."I 3 Finally, the party against whom the
evidence was originally offered must have had the same motive and oppor-
tunity for cross-examination as the party against whom it is presently
offered.
54
Former testimony is admitted because of its relatively high trustworthi-
ness, the oath under which it was given and the solemnity of the occasion at
which it was given. 55 When former testimony meets the requirements of the
hearsay rule, it may be proved in several ways. Although the transcript of
the testimony is probably the most accurate method of proof, there is no best
evidence requirement.56 Oral proof may be used, therefore, but the second
witness "must be able to give at least the substance, and not merely the
effect, of the former testimony." 57 North Carolina generally allows any
person who heard the prior testimony to prove it. 58 In In re Williamson,
59
the court of appeals went beyond the usual limits of this rule by allowing
former testimony to be proved by a person who was not present when one
original testimony was given. Although the court's decision is a liberal one,
it properly recognizes that traditional application of the hearsay rule to
former testimony may be overly stringent.
Petitioner and respondent in Williamson were divorced on June 4,
1974. Respondent, the wife, was awarded custody of the three children. On
June 11, 1975, petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus
asking that custody of the children be awarded to him. The grounds for his
petition were that circumstances had changed and respondent was no longer
fit to care for the children. 60 A hearing was held on June 20, 1975, in which
one Dr. Sanders, a qualified expert in the field of child psychology, testified
both on direct and cross-examination as to her opinion based on her exami-
nation of the children. 61 The court subsequently awarded temporary custody
of the two girls to respondent and temporary custody of the boy to peti-
52. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 145, at 480.
53. Id. at 482-83.
54. Id. at 484.
55. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 254, at 615.
56. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 145, at 485.
57. Id. at 486. McCormick states that the witness must be able to give the substance of all
the testimony, both direct and cross-examination. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 260, at 624.
58. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 145, at 485.
59. 32 N.C. App. 616, 233 S.E.2d 677 (1977).
60. Id. at 617, 233 S.E.2d at 678.
61. Id. at 618-19, 233 S.E.2d at 679.
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tioner. The court also ordered the local Department of Social Services to
make an investigation of the living arrangements of the children. On Decem-
ber 3, 1975, petitioner filed a motion that he be awarded permanent custody
of all three children. A hearing was held in January 1976, and the court
awarded permanent custody of the two girls to respondent and permanent
custody of the boy to petitioner.62 At this hearing, an employee of the local
Department of Social Services was allowed to testify over objection that it
was the opinion of Dr. Sanders that the children should remain with their
mother. The Social Services employee was not present at the former hearing
at which Dr. Sanders testified. Her testimony was based on a private opinion
expressed to her by Dr. Sanders. 63 The court of appeals sustained the
admission of this testimony because "[t]he opinion which [Dr. Sanders]
expressed from the witness stand at that hearing was substantially the same
as that attributed to her by the witness.''
64
At first glance it appears incongruous to allow a witness who was not
present at the former hearing to give the testimony of a witness at that
hearing. Such proof is certainly an extension of the four common methods
of introducing admissible evidence of former testimony, all of which are
based either on firsthand observation or the transcript of the testimony.
65 If
viewed pragmatically, however, the result appears proper. The restrictions
on the admission of former testimony have been criticized as "fantastically
strict.''66 Commentators have advocated that the courts use liberality in
admitting former testimony as the reliability of such testimony is far greater
than that of many other exceptions to the hearsay rule. 67 Although this desire
was addressed to the restrictions on former testimony and not to the manner
of its proof, the logic behind the desire for liberality is also applicable to
modes of proof. The crucial requirement in proving former testimony is that
the witness "satisfy the court that he is able to give the substance of all that
the witness has said, both on direct and cross-examintion, about the subject
matter relevant to the present suit.' '68 Once this requirement has been
determined affirmatively, as was done to the satisfaction of the court in
62. Id. at 617, 233 S.E.2d at 679.
63. Id. at 618, 233 S.E.2d at 679.
64. Id. at 619, 233 S.E.2d at 679.
65. McCormick sets out four possible methods of acceptable introduction: (i) eliciting
testimony of any firsthand observer of the former testimony who is testifying from unaided
memory; (2) eliciting testimony of any firsthand observer testifying from present recollection
refreshed; (3) the use of the transcript of the former testimony when properly authenticated;
and (4) eliciting testimony of any firsthand observer who made notes and is testifying from past
recollection recorded. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 260.
66. Id. § 261, at 626.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 260, at 624.
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Williamson, the witness should be allowed to testify. The primary argument
against allowing the witness to give the out-of-court opinion of the declarant
when it is substantially the same as the declarant's former testimony is that
the opinion being related was not made under oath or at a formal proceed-
ing. This fact appears inconsequential, however, when the opinion being
related is equivalent to the witness' former testimony which was given under
oath. The court in Williamson thus properly recognized that the hearsay rule
should not be applied in a mechanical fashion in the context of former
testimony.
C. Character-The Rape Shield Statute
The 1975 General Assembly directed the Legislative Research
Commission to study the problem of sexual assaults. 69 In a response to this
charge, a committee established by the Commission proposed legislation
that would have revamped North Carolina sexual assault law. 0 Although a
subsequent legislative committee substitute7' diminished the scope of the
bill significantly,72 the provisions in the resulting law relating to the admis-
sion of evidence will substantially modify rape trials in North Carolina.
73
The resulting rape shield statute redefines the law of relevancy in rape
trials, drastically limiting what evidence may come in as to prior sexual
activities of the complainant. 74 It declares all sexual behavior of the com-
plainant irrelevant unless such behavior specifically falls within one of four
69. The General Assembly directed the Legislative Research Commission to undertake, in
part: "[a]n examination of the reasons rape cases are not reported or not prosecuted, [and]...
[a] follow-up study of the long-term impact of the crime upon rape victims." Law of June 25,
1975, ch. 851, § 11.7, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1209.
70. Professor Thomas Andrews of the University of North Carolina School of Law
drafted the initial version and subsequently revised it in view of public comments and commit-
tee hearings. See generally LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1977 GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA: SEXUAL ASSAULTS 3-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
71. The legislative committee proffered S.B. 84, 1977 N.C. General Assembly, 1st Sess.
(1977) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
72. The committee substitute contained only a revised form of the sexual behavior
evidence section, omitting the proposed sexual assault revision. This version is the basis of the
present law.
73. The significant impact that this law will have on evidence in rape trials may very well
have been the controlling consideration in delaying its effective date to encompass only
offenses committed on or after January 1, 1978. See Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 851, § 2, 1977
N.C. Sess. Laws 1172.
74. This limitation of the evidence stemmed from a finding of the Legislative Research
Commission that in many cases the victim was "assaulted" twice: the physical sexual assault
and the indignity of public suspicion:
Several victims suggested that in a very real sense the second "assault" was more
painful and more difficult to overcome. In the final analysis, it is because so many
victims who reported the assault have subsequently expressed resentment and anger at
the public's insensitivity to them that such a large percentage of sexual assaults still
are not reported.
REPORT, supra note 70, at 37-38.
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exceptions.75 The statute also provides for a special in camera hearing in
which all evidence bearing upon the complainant's sexual behavior is to be
examined by the trial court to determine its relevance prior to the offer of
proof at trial. 76 Last, the statute contains privacy provisions to prevent the
unnecessary publication of irrelevant evidence, limiting access to the evi-
dence to the court, its agents, the complainant, the defendant and the
attorneys.
77
1. Pre-1978 Rape Evidence Law
Prior to the effective date of the new rape shield statute, when the
complainant testified, the defendant could cross-examine her for the purpose
of impeachment to show her bad character through specific acts. 78 Because
such evidence was collateral, the defendant was bound by her answer.
79
Thus the defendant could not present direct evidence of prior sexual acts;
such testimony had no substantive value.80 In addition to proof of bad
character by specific acts, the general character of the complainant could be
shown to attack her credibility and to establish the likelihood of consent. 81
The defendant could thus introduce character evidence through witnesses,
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The commentary to the draft law
observes that the "law completely rejects the notion that all sexual behavior, however proved,
has some intrinsic relevance in a sexual assault proceeding, and requires a more specific
showing of relevance before such behavior can be proved." REPORT, supra note 70, at 92. In
this framework, the exceptions to the general irrelevancy rule reflect a decision by the General
Assembly that the rational probative value of these exceptions outweighs their potential
prejudicial effect; conversely, all other evidence of sexual behavior is considered not logically
relevant or, if relevant, so prejudicial in effect as to outweigh its probative value.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); see notes 106-08 and accompanying
text infra.
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(d).; see notes 108-09 and accompanying text infra.
78. Prior acts could and usually did include prior sexual acts with third persons. See, e.g.,
State v. Murray, 63 N.C. 31 (1868); State v. Satchell, 17 N.C. App. 312, 194 S.E.2d 51, cert.
denied, 283 N.C. 260, 195 S.E.2d 692 (1973) (error to exclude cross-examination of prosecuting
witness in rape trial to bring out that she had had intercourse "over several dozen times," but
harmless error). See also Seventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 38 N.C.L.
REV. 506, 562-64 (1960).
79. See State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 917
(1960); State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 222, 1 Ired. 305 (1846). The defendant was not, however,
bound by her answer when questioning her about prior sexual acts with him. See, e.g., State v.
Parish, 104 N.C. 679, 10 S.E. 457 (1889) (dictum).
80. See State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 917
(1960); State v. Arnold, 146 N.C. 602, 60 S.E. 504 (1908); State v. Murray, 63 N.C. 31 (1868).
81. See State v. Goss, 293 N.C. 147, 235 S.E.2d 844 (1977); State v. Daniel, 87 N.C. 507
(1882); State v. Cole, 20 N.C. App. 137, 201 S.E.2d 100 (1973).
In addition, there is dictum in North Carolina cases suggesting that evidence of the
prosecutrix' reputation for virtue, a specific character trait, could be elicited on direct examina-
tion of the defendant's witnesses in order to show consent. State v. Daniel, 87 N.C. 507 (1882);
see State v. Jefferson, 28 N.C. 222, 1 Ired. 305 (1846) (suggesting that evidence that prosecutrix
is strumpet would be admissible to show consent). But see State v. Hairston, 121 N.C, 579, 28
S.E. 492 (1897), discussed in note 82 infra.
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although their testimony was limited to statements about the complainant's
reputation. A character witness could, however, on his own, volunteer
testimony as to specific character traits.82 Moreover, on cross-examination
the character witness could be asked about specific relevant traits of charac-
ter, although not about specific acts nor about reputation for having done a
specific act.83
Prior case law regarding evidence in rape trials has not been completely
rejected. As the original draft provision declaring that relevant sexual
behavior "shall be proved only by otherwise admissible evidence of specific
acts and not by opinion or by evidence of reputation or character" 84 was
deleted from the committee substitute, 85 the North Carolina rape shield
statute is silent as to method of proof. Ordinarily, such silence would
indicate a preference for the common law method of proof in effect at the
time of enactment.8 6 However, because the statute has effected a significant
modification in the common law scheme of relevant proof, the courts should
also examine the policy underlying the statute in determining the method for
proving relevant evidence. An analysis of these factors follows in the
discussion of specific exceptions.
2. The Exceptions Under the Rape Shield Statute
The first exception in G.S. 8-58.6(b)(1) 8 7 applies to all sexual behavior
between the defendant and the victim.8 8 This exception essentially continues
the common law rule; consequently, the defendant is not bound by the
82. State v. Hairston, 121 N.C. 579, 28 S.E. 492 (1897). The Hairston court stated the rule
as follows: "A party introducing a witness as to character can only prove the general character
of the person asked about. The witness, of his own motion, may say in what respect it is good or
bad." Id. at 582, 28 S.E. at 493. See D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 114, at 348 n.48, which
notes: "It is remarkable that more than seventy years have since elapsed without an effort to re-
examine this curiously illogical rule. . . .No other rule of evidence known to the present
author can compete with this one in encouraging the coaching of witnesses."
83. See State v. Lefevers, 216 N.C. 494, 5 S.E.2d 552 (1939); State v. Cathey, 170 N.C.
794, 87 S.E. 532 (1916).
84. REPORT, supra note 70, at 58.
85. Had the deleted provision remained in the law, character evidence showing the
complainant's sexual behavior with third parties could only be elicited by cross-examining her
as the provision added the condition "by otherwise admissible evidence." Id. Prior law had
indicated that specific acts could only be brought out upon cross-examination.
86. Kearney v. Vann, 154 N.C. 311, 70 S.E. 747 (1911); cf. Winslow v. Morton, 118 N.C.
486, 24 S.E. 417 (1896) (law does not favor repeal of older statute by enactment of later one by
mere implication). Moreover, the deletion of the provision from the Act may demonstrate the
intent of the General Assembly to continue the common law rules of proof in these situations.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
88. The common law rules as developed in North Carolina did not place any limitation
regarding sexual activity about which the complainant could be questioned. However, it is
generally thought that the relevancy of an incident will fade over time particularly when the
evidence is to go to bias or consent. See, e.g., Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape
Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 58 (1977).
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complainant's answer, but may introduce direct evidence of such acts.
89
This blanket coverage of sexual activity between the complainant and the
defendant may include some evidence that otherwise would be legally
irrelevant. 90 This problem should, however, be ameliorated by the require-
ment that the relevancy of all such evidence be examined by the trial judge
in an in camera hearing.
91
Section 8-58.6(b)(2) provides an exception for "evidence of specific
instances of sexual behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act
or acts charged were not committed by the defendant.''92 This exception
will most often operate in situations in which the defendant attacks the
prosecution's attempts to corroborate the crime by proof of such sex-related
conditions as the presence of semen, pregnancy, venereal disease or damage
to sexual organs.93 Evidence admitted under this exception is clearly rele-
vant because it "at least calls into question this particular corroboration of
the victim's testimony," 94 and is limited to specific instances within a short
time span. The defendant in this situation should not be bound by the
complainant's answers on cross-examination. Instead, he should be able to
introduce direct evidence, as the matter is not collateral and does not bear
solely on the complainant's character but goes directly to the question
whether the corroborating evidence has validity. 95 Moreover, permitting
evidence to be introduced by direct evidence also comports with the policy
of the statute because this evidence consists of specific, relevant instances
89. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
90. The commentary to the draft law (§ 8-58.6(b)(1) remains unchanged from draft form)
noted:
The draft law opts for blanket treatment of this type of behavior despite the possibility
that in some cases even it may be irrelevant. The fact that the defendant and the victim
have previously engaged in sexual relations is likely enough to demonstrate some
particular bias of the victim against the defendant, or some particular motive to falsify
an accusation or alter or misinterpret the facts of an encounter between them, that
evidence of this type of activity ought to be admissible. This behavior is also less likely
to create the kind of prejudice which sexual behavior of a more general nature might
create.
REPORT, supra note 70, at 92.
91. See text accompanying notes 106-09 infra.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); cf. REPORT, supra note 70, at 57
(draft bill allowed exception for evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior to "show an
origin of semen other than in the alleged sexual assault").
93. Obviously, this defense can arise only when the defendant denies intercourse took
place; it is not available when he claims consent.
94. REPORT, supra note 70, at 93; see Berger, supra note 88, at 58.
95. For example, if the prosecution offers a doctor's testimony that he found semen
in the complainant shortly after the alleged rape, the defendant may in good faith ask
her whether she had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend shortly before the (alleged]
rape. The defendant is not bound by her answer and may present evidence (such as the
boyfriend) to show that the prior sexual act may have caused the presence of the
semen.
Farb, The New Rape Evidence Law, AD. JUST. MEMORANDA, December 1977, at 4 (Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
rather than the broad character attack that the statute was designed to
prevent.
The third of the exceptions, G.S. 8-58.6(b)(3), allows the introduction
of
evidence of a pattern of sexual behavior so distinctive and so
closely resembling the defendant's version of the alleged encounter
with the complainant as to tend to prove that such complainant
consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as
to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant
consented. 96
Quite evidently, the first prerequisite for the application of this provision is
that the defense be one of consent. The introduction of such highly
specialized pattern evidence is permitted, under the rationale that pattern
evidence avoids the evils often associated with permitting evidence of
general sexual behavior of the complainant with third parties, as long as
the pattern is sufficiently distinctive to indicate that consent would have
been forthcoming.98 Alternatively, this provision permits the defendant who
claims consent as a defense to introduce evidence of facts and sexual
behavior leading to the honest but mistaken assumption by the defendant
that the victim consented. 99 The language of this subdivision implies that
evidence is to be elicited in the form of specific acts; therefore, because the
only manner of introducing evidence of specific acts of the complainant into
evidence has been upon cross-examination"° and because these specific acts
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977). This provision, along with id. § 8-
58.6(b)(4) replaced the original draft provision which precluded evidence of the sexual behavior
of the victim unless such behavior
occurred in specific instances under circumstances or as part of a pattern of behavior
so similar to the alleged assault that its relevance to a material issue in such prosecu-
tion clearly outweighs any prejudice, confusion of issues, or invasion of privacy which
would result from introduction of evidence or reference to it during the proceeding.
REPORT, supra note 70, at 57-58.
97. "The fact that a woman may have been guilty of illicit intercourse with one man is too
slight and uncertain an indicator to warrant the conclusion that she would probably be guilty
with another man who sought such favors with her." Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 237, 17 So. 286,
287 (1895). Although a single encounter may not have probative value, habitual sexual conduct
with strangers may be relevant to the issue of consent with the defendant. See generally Note,
Indiana's Rape Shield Law: Conflict with the Confrontation Clause, 9 IND. L. REV. 418 (1976).
98. In light of the specific language of the statute and the policy against admitting evidence
of complainant's behavior with third persons, one or even a few sexual encounters is not
enough. What is necessary is habitual, indiscriminate sexual conduct, for only indiscriminate
behavior would tend to show that the complainant was likely to have consented. Extreme
caution should be observed by the trial judge in reference to this section during his in camera
review of pattern evidence bearing on consent. See Note, supra note 97, at 430.
99. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 141 N.C. 780, 53 S.E. 515 (1906). Powell involved the
selling of liquor; there is, however, no reason why the defense of a reasonable mistake of fact
would not apply in a rape case in which consent is in issue. See also State v. Dizon, 47 Haw.
444, 390 P.2d 759 (1964) (defense to a crime considered malum in se because of mistake of fact
is subject to qualification that mistake must not be due to negligence or carelessness of
defendant).
100. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
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are collateral,""1 it should follow that the defendant is bound by the com-
plainant's answer.
10 2
The final exception permits introduction of "evidence of sexual behav-
ior offered as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion that
the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged."' 1 3 It has
been suggested that this provision will be rarely used because a prosecutor
will seldom proceed to trial knowing that the defense will present expert
testimony that the victim fantasized the sexual act charged. 10 4 It is also
arguable that the provision is unnecessary, as the evidence at issue would
not ordinarily involve "evidence of sexual behavior." For example, the fact
that the complainant had made false accusations of sexual assault in the past
does not come within the definition of sexual behavior and, therefore, is not
declared irrelevant by the statute.1
05
3. In Camera and Probable Cause Hearings
Subsection (c) provides that no evidence of the complainant's sexual
behavior may be introduced unless the court in camera has determined that
such sexual behavior is relevant. 106 The purpose of this provision is to set up
an informal procedure for ensuring that unnecessarily prejudicial evidence
never comes before the jury. 107 After the hearing, the judge must enter an
101. An offer of evidence tending to show that the complainant consented would generally
be direct evidence. It is direct evidence, however, only because it pertains to the specific act
that is the basis of the prosecution. By contrast, pattern evidence deals with other acts
involving third parties and is therefore collateral. See generally Berger, supra note 88.
102. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (suggesting that it may be constitutionally
impermissible to prohibit necessary cross-examination about specific acts to establish defense).
But see People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d 268 (1977) (in most cases
probative value of such evidence does not outweigh prejudice to victim and society). The policy
of exclusion of third party sexual behavior inherent in the rape shield statute further supports
the proposition that the defendant should be bound by the complainant's answer, as does the
fact that prior sexual behavior (even in a pattern situation) has such slight probative value.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
104. See Farb, supra note 95, at 6.
105. See REPORT, supra note 70, at 94. Although the draft law contained no explicit
subdivision (4), the substance of this subdivision was envisioned to be included within the
catch-all subsection (3). As the commentary points out, that subsection dealt only with sexual
behavior; other behavior is outside the scope of the statute altogether and thus was not declared
irrelevant by the statute. Id.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977). While all the rape shield statutes
differ in some respect, most provide for some form of in camera hearing. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 794.022 (Harrison Cum. Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202.1 (Harrison Cum. Supp.
1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.13 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978). The North Carolina
statutory formula of making even excepted proof subject to judicial screening has been
commended by one commentator: "This resolution has the advantage of curbing freedom to
admit-but not to exclude evidence, and this ensures as much as possible effectuation of the
statute's purpose of changing past abusive practices in order to promote the state's and the
victim's legitimate interests." Berger, supra note 88, at 72.
107. The provision reflects a commonly recognized theme-"that a judge's instruction to
order stating what evidence is relevant and the nature of the questions that
will be admitted. The proponent of the evidence may move for such a
hearing either prior to or at the time of trial. 10
Subsection (d) provides a further protection for the complainant, de-
claring that the record of the in camera hearing is available for inspection
only by the parties, the complainant, the attorneys, the court and its agents,
and that it is to be used only as necessary for appellate review. 109 Subsection
(d) further provides for the secrecy of evidence received at a probable cause
hearing. At a probable cause hearing, the judge must take cognizance of the
admissible evidence in determining probable cause, without the questions or
evidence being resubmitted in open court. 110 This subdivision seems to refer
only to the evidence at the probable cause hearing and should not prevent the
same evidence, if found relevant at the in camera hearing at the trial stage,
from being introduced. In essence, the statute is attempting to prevent
disclosure of prejudicial and embarassing facts of the complainant's sexual
behavior until absolutely necessary in the court proceedings.
4. Conclusion
The rape shield statute will effect its greatest impact in the proof of the
complainant's sexual activity with third parties. No evidence of the com-
plainant's reputation for unchastity may come in, and evidence relating to
the complainant's sexual behavior with third parties is excluded, unless it
falls within three narrowly circumscribed exceptions: it is probative that
someone else committed the rape charged to the defendant; the com-
plainant's sexual behavior is so nondiscriminatory as to suggest either
consent or that the defendant could reasonably believe that she consented; or
the prior sexual behavior suggests that the complainant fabricated the story.
Thus, North Carolina has enacted a broad protection device for the rape
victim in the hopes of both ensuring the reporting of the crime and increas-
ing the conviction rate of defendants. Ultimately, however, the Act merely
defines relevance as it should always have been read and maintains a fair
balance between the complainant and the defendant.
D. Impeachment
1. Silent Admissions as Prior Inconsistent Statements
In 1977 the North Carolina courts confronted the complex issue of
disregard inadmissible evidence can never entirely cure the impact of its original introduction or
even of a question referring to it." REPORT, supra note 70, at 98.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.6(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
109. Id. § 8-58.6(d).
110. Id.
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silent admissions' 1' as prior inconsistent statements for purposes of im-
peaching a defendant's testimony. In separate cases both the court of
appeals and the supreme court approved the use of silence as impeach-
ment, 112 despite strong arguments that the law of evidence precluded such
use. 113
In State v. Foddrell ,114 the state supreme court appears to have held
that a cross-examination of defendant that brought out the fact that he had
not denied the commission of a rape when identified by the victim was not
error. 115 This silence, the court observed, "was entirely inconsistent with
the story he told on the witness stand." 1 6 The court rested its decision on
constitutional grounds, declaring that in the absence of Miranda warnings,
the silence of defendant was admissible as impeachment to show its incon-
sistency with defendant's testimony at trial." 7 In deciding this issue, the
court distinguished United States Supreme Court decisions that had held that
I11. If a former statement fails to mention a material circumstance of the present tes-
timony, which it would have been natural to mention in the prior statement, the prior statement
is inconsisent. See State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 340, 193 S.E.2d 71,75 (1972) (citing Esderts v.
Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 76 II1. App. 210, 222 N.E.2d 117 (1966); C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 34).
112. State v. Foddrell, 291 N.C. 546, 231 S.E.2d 618 (1977); State v. Fisher, 32 N.C. App.
722, 233 S.E.2d 634 (1977).
113. This issue raises constitutional questions when it arises in the criminal law context;
however, inquiry in this situation, if it passes the constitutional threshold, must relate to the
materiality of the silent admission, a question for the law of evidence.
114. 291 N.C. 546, 231 S.E.2d 618 (1977).
115. To ascertain a single holding in the case is difficult, as the court discussed several
alternative holdings. In the course of its opinion, it indicated that there was no objection, id. at
557, 231 S.E.2d at 625-26; that there was no police interrogation of defendant, id. at 557, 231
S.E.2d at 626; and that the introduction of defendant's admissions by silence was harmless
error, id. at 559-60, 231 S.E.2d at 627. The court's brief discussion of the absence of a timely
objection suggests that the question of impeachment by silent admissions is of such importance
that a timely objection is not necessary to raise it on appeal and that thus no waiver of objection
occurs. See note 163 infra. The court's second ground is clearly correct, because Miranda
warnings are not required in the absence of a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966). The court's third ground, harmless error, could have been controlling,
however, because there was ample evidence of the crime, including the victim's account and
sufficient corroborating evidence in the absence of the disputed evidence. As the court correct-
ly concluded, "there is no reasonable possibility that defendant's admission of silence contri-
buted to his conviction." 291 N.C. at 559-60, 231 S.E.2d at 627. Despite the alternative holding
of harmless error, the court's dicussion of admissions by silence represents a very important
development in North Carolina evidence law.
116. 291 N.C. at 558, 231 S.E.2d at 626.
117. As the court conceded, these admissions by silence are not admissible as substantive
evidence: "Had defendant exercised his right not to testify, evidence of his silence at the time
of the confrontation and accusation would not have been competent for it would then have been
offered as affirmative or substantive evidence tending to establish guilt of the crime charged."
Id. at 559, 231 S.E.2d at 627; see State v. Guffey, 261 N.C. 322, 134 S.E.2d 619 (1964)
(undenied statements made by another in presence and hearing of defendants after arrest
and custody are not admissible); 2 D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 179, at 54-55. See also State
v. Temple, 240 N.C. 738, 83 S.E.2d 792 (1954).
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silence could not be used as impeachment,1 18 noting the significance placed
by that Court upon the presence of Miranda warnings in those cases.1 19
Although the court's distinction was undoubtedly correct in terms of
constitutional law, it failed to take account of the complementary rationale
from evidence law for excluding the "admission"-that the fact of silence
possesses no significant probative value in certain situations. 120 Therefore,
despite an initial inquiry into constitutional issues, the analysis inevitably
devolves into an evidential one. The constitutional questions are important
in themselves, but they also constitute circumstances that aid in determining
whether defendant's silence was materially inconsistent with his later expla-
nation.
Two recent North Carolina cases, State v. Williams121 and State v.
Whitney, 122 are representative of this view. Defendant in 'Williams, in a
conversation with a police officer after defendant's arrest, failed to give the
story he later related at trial. 1 3 The court contrasted this situation
118. 291 N.C. at 557-59, 231 S.E.2d at 625-27 (discussing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S.
171 (1975)). Not discussed but also relevant was Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In both
Hale and Doyle the Court held that a prosecutor may not impeach a defendant's exculpatory
story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have
told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest.
119. In line with this distinction, the court noted the difference between a defendant's
silence in the face of a victim's accusations at the scene of the crime and his silence when he
was served with a warrant for his arrest. In the latter situation, when he had been given
Miranda warnings, the fact of his silence would have been inadmissible had an objection been
made to the question that elicited it. 291 N.C. at 559,231 S.E.2d at 627. The court's treatment of
this point may suggest that it was giving greater weight to its alternative holding that defendant
had waived his claim of error by his failure to object. See note 115 supra.
120. The Foddrell court's holding centered upon the Miranda warnings. However, the
Court in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), also considered evidence law in respect to
silence as a prior inconsistent statement:
Failure to contest an assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only
if it would have been natural under the circumstances to object to the assertion in
question. . . . But the situation of an arrestee is very different, for he is under no
duty to speak and . . . has ordinarily been advised by government authorities only
moments earlier that he has a right to remain silent ....
* . * [I]nnocent and guilty alike-perhaps particularly the innocent-may find the
situation so intimidating that they may choose to stand mute. A variety of reasons may
influence that decision. In these often emotional and confusing circumstances, a
suspect might not have heard or fully understood the question, or may have felt there
was no need to reply. He may have maintained silence out of fear or unwillingness to
incriminate another. Or the arrestee may simply react with silence in response to the
hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his detention.
Id. at 176-77 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
121. 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975).
122. 26 N.C. App. 460, 216 S.E.2d 439 (1975).
123. Defendant had been arrested on May 5, 1974. On May 8, a police officer talked with
him. The officer testified that, during his conversation with defendant, defendant failed to
make a statement as to the events of May 4-5. 288 N.C. at 692, 220 S.E.2d at 567-68.
Defendant testified at trial that he heard shots, ran into the house, and at the same time
observed someone going out the back door with a gun in his hand. Defendant pulled his pistol,
ran to the back door and shot several times. He was then apprehended by the police. Id. at 684,
220 S.E.2d at 563.
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with prior cases 124 in which it had been held that an illegally obtained
statement taken from a defendant could be used to impeach him after he
became a witness in his own behalf.'1 5 The Williams court noted that a prior
inconsistent statement "obviously had a material bearing" on credibility,
but concluded that no such inference could be drawn solely from defend-
ant's silence. 126 Similarly, in Whitney, the court of appeals held that it was
error to allow testimony concerning a statement, made in defendant's
presence, that he had been caught as a "Peeping Tom."' 127 The Whitney
court used a refreshingly simple analysis, determining that the statement in
question was made not to defendant but to a police officer as defendant was
being placed into custody and that thus no reply was required.12
8
In holding that when there is an accusation at the time of arrest and the
defendant does not come forward with a denial, his silence may be used to
impeach him, the supreme court in Foddrell ignored Williams and Whit-
ney. 12 9 By ignoring this prior law, the court refuted a sound and logical
evidence rule, that custodial silence lacks not only significant probative
value as substantive evidence but also fails to produce the material inconsis-
tency necessary for a prior inconsistent statement.
Unlike Foddrell, which presented the easier case of custodial accusa-
tions and fit more readily into established constitutional and evidentiary
guidelines, State v. Fisher130 involved the more difficult issue of noncusto-
dial, investigatory questioning of a defendant prior to arrest. Defendant in
Fisher testified and offered as a defense to a charge of rape that he and the
prosecuting witness had been having an affair, that the assault was commit-
ted by two others, and that afterwards she came to his apartment and they
had had sex before going to the hospital. In response the State offered
testimony by a police officer who testified that he had interviewed defendant
124. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d
111 (1972).
125. State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 556, 187 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1972).
126. 288 N.C. at 693, 220 S.E.2d at 568.
127. 26 N.C. App. at 462-63, 216 S.E.2d at 441.
128. Id. The supreme court evidently repudiated this holding and this logic by its decision
in Foddrell.
129. Before Miranda, the North Carolina courts endeavored to determine whether the
circumstances were such that a denial was called for. While Miranda, and particularly its
progeny, United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),
prohibit the use of silence as impeachment in custodial circumstances after Miranda warnings
have been given, see note 118 supra, there is no reason to restrict inquiry to this point. There
are other circumstances in which a denial should not be required, particularly custody-to
require a defendant to deny a statement while in custody before he has even been informed of
his rights conflicts with the spirit, if not the letter, of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,468 n.37
(1966). See also State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d 133 (1953) (fact of arrest or custody
alone sufficient to render confession inadmissible).
130. 32 N.C. App. 722, 233 S.E.2d 634 (1977).
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before his arrest and that defendant never claimed to have been having an
affair with the prosecuting witness.
t31
The court of appeals, as the supreme court had done in Foddrell,
distinguished prior constitutional precedent 132 by noting that Fisher did
"not present a situation in which a defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent is used against him.''133 The court followed State v. Mack,
134
which held that a witness may be impeached by a prior inconsistent state-
ment consisting of a failure to state a material fact to which he later testified
at trial. 135 Fisher, however, does not represent an analogous situation, for
Fisher involved a criminal defendant rather than a nonparty witness. This
distinction might not ordinarily affect the analysis; however, in Fisher
defendant had reason not to relate his full story to the police during an
ordinary investigation-a statement declaring these additional facts would
be an admission to a criminal act. 136 The facts not related in defendant's
story thus were not facts that he would naturally relate to the police.
Therefore, his prior statement, on both evidentiary and constitutional
grounds, was not properly held admissible as inconsistent with his testimony
at trial.
Foddrell and Fisher represent intrusions into basic principles of evi-
dence law. The courts' analyses focused on the constitutional rights of
defendants; finding no violation, the courts affirmed the use of silence as
impeachment. A preferred approach would begin by analyzing the effect of
any constitutional mandates upon the defendants' rights. If there is found to
be no danger of constitutional infringement, the next step would be to
consider the question whether the circumstances of the conversation re-
quired a denial by the defendant. Constitutional considerations may bear on
the latter question as well, but resolution of the constitutional issues does not
excuse the courts from completing the inquiry into materiality required by
the law of evidence.
131. Id. at 723, 233 S.E.2d at 635.
132. rd. at 725, 233 S.E.2d at 635-36 (discussing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)); see
note 118 supra.
133. 32 N.C. App. at 725, 233 S.E.2d at 636.
134. 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972).
135. Id. at 340, 193 S.E.2d at 75.
136. Defendant's alleged acts would have been a violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184
(1969) (prohibiting habitual cohabitation).
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2. Attacking Witness Credibility With Conviction 37 and Sentence
In State v. Finch,138 the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the
first time that when, for purposes of impeachment, a witness has admitted a
prior conviction, the time and place of the conviction and the punishment
imposed may be inquired into upon examination. 139 Prior to Finch, the court
of appeals had approved the introduction of sentencing information for
impeachment purposes, declaring that the sentence imposed bore a relation
to the gravity of the offense and thus had relevance to the credibility of the
witness. 14 This approach was adopted by the court of appeals despite a prior
intimation by the supreme court that "[o]rdinarily the quantum of punish-
ment imposed upon conviction or a plea of guilty of another criminal offense
is not admissible for purposes of impeachment.'1
41
The policy adopted in Finch accords with that of the federal courts
1 42
and other states. 143 This rule allowing sentences to be elicited along with
convictions satisfies the traditional arguments against inquiry into the details
of conviction.144 There is little distraction from the issues since the sentence
137. In State v. Guinn, 32 N.C. App. 595, 233 S.E.2d 73 (1977), the court of appeals
continued established impeachment practices by holding that the habitual offender statute,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-928 (1975), which prohibits the introduction in support of an element of
the offense charged evidence of prior convictions to which the defendant has admitted, does
not prohibit the introduction of the same prior offenses as impeachment when the defendant
takes the stand. This interpretation comports with the purpose of the statute that, in allowing
the defendant to admit judicially his prior convictions and thereby precluding the State from
introducing evidence of them, the habitual felon be set upon equal footing with the first
offender. Section 15A-928 was modeled after N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 200.60 (McKinney
1971). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-928, Official Commentary (1975). See generally People v.
Giuliano, 52 App. Div. 2d 240, 383 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1976) (construing the New York statute from
which § 15A-928 was drawn). That equal footing necessarily allows the use of the prior
conviction as impeachment when the defendant takes the stand. See, e.g., D. STANSBURY,
supra note 7, § 112, at 104-05 n.18 (Supp. 1976) (predicting that § 15A-928 would not be
construed to prohibit use of such prior convictions as impeachment).
138. 293 N.C. 132, 235 S.E.2d 819 (1977).
139. Id. at 141-42, 235 S.E.2d at 825. Previous North Carolina cases had allowed examina-
tion of the accused as to former convictions and the imposition of sentences of imprisonment.
The supreme court had simply applied the general rule permitting impeachment by showing
former convictions without discussion of the fact that a sentence was incidentally mentioned.
See, e.g., State v. Sheffield, 251 N.C. 309, 111 S.E.2d 195 (1959); State v. Holder, 153 N.C. 606,
69 S.E. 66 (1910).
140. Ormond v. Crampton, 16 N.C. App. 88, 92, 191 S.E.2d 405, 409, cert. denied, 282
N.C. 304, 192 S.E.2d 194 (1972). See also State v. Turner, 21 N.C. App. 608, 205 S.E.2d 628,
appeal dismissed, 285 N.C. 668, 207 S.E.2d 751 (1974).
141. State v. McNair, 272 N.C. 130, 134, 157 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1967).
142. E.g., Beaudine v. United States, 368 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Ramsey, 315 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
143. See Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405 (Alas. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969),
overruled on other grounds, Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831 (Alas. 1971); State v. Washington,
383 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. 1964) (extending not only to inquiry into punishment but also to nature of
crime); State v. Sinclair, 57 N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970).
144. Minimizing prejudice and distraction from the issues are the arguments most often
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is relevant to the gravity of the crime and any prejudice produced is minimal
once the conviction has been admitted.
E. Evidence of Prior Crimes As Substantive Evidence
In State v. May 45 the North Carolina Supreme Court expanded an
exception to the general rule that " 'in a prosecution for a particular crime,
the State cannot offer evidence tending to show that the accused has
committed another distinct, independent, or separate offense.' "146 The
exception to this rule relied on by the court in May allows the introduction
of evidence tending to establish intent even though such evidence discloses
the commission of a separate offense.
147
Defendant in May was prosecuted for a murder committed during the
commission of a robbery of a confectionery store proprietor.14 8 The State
offered testimony that defendant had participated in a robbery of another
retailer five days earlier. A State's witness identified the sawed-off shotgun
used in the prior robbery as the same gun recovered from defendant.
149
Defendant argued that the admission of evidence relating to his participation
in the prior crime constituted reversible error on the grounds that "the
evidence was not probative of any issue in the case and was introduced
solely to inflame the jury, to the prejudice of defendant.'
150
The supreme court affirmed defendant's conviction on the premises
that "the State was required to show that defendant possessed a specific
intent to rob [the confectionery store's proprietor]' ' 15 1 and that evidence of
posed against allowing use of details other than convictions. Neither of these concerns is
present here, as sentences are integral components of a conviction. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 8, § 43, at 88-89. Although it is true that the sentence lies wholly in the discretion of
the judge, today's trial judge has the benefit of reviewing the record of the defendant more
closely and tailoring each sentence to that individual.
145. 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 414 (1977).
146. Id. at 648, 235 S.E.2d at 181 (quoting State v. McClain, 340 N.C. 171, 173, 81
S.E.2d 364, 365 (1954)).
147. "Where a specific mental intent or state is an essential element of the crime
charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend
to establish the requisite mental intent or state, even though the evidence discloses the
commission of another offense by the accused."
Id. (quoting State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1954)). A vigorous dissent
by Justice Exum protested this extension of the intent exception to the facts in May. Id. at 662-
68, 235 S.E.2d at 189-93 (Exum, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 646, 235 S.E.2d at 180. The State's evidence tended to show that defendant was
seen entering the store, that a loud noise was heard and that defendant was seen limping away
from the store. Shortly thereafter, the proprietor was found dead in the store, killed by a
shotgun wound. Defendant was found that afternoon semi-conscious from a gunshot wound in
the chest, with a sawed-off shotgun in his possession that had been fired once. Id. at 646, 235
S.E.2d at 180-81.
149. Id. at 647, 235 S.E.2d at 181.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 649, 235 S.E.2d at 182. The court stated on this point:
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the prior offense was admissible to show the requisite intent.1 12 The court
relied upon State v. Long,'53 in which the State had proven an overt but
ambiguous act as an essential element of the crime charged. Long presented
the classic case in which evidence of a prior crime was relevant to show
intent because the ambiguous act, coupled with intent, constituted a
crime. 154 In May, however, there was no evidence of what happened inside
the store tending to show an overt act.155 Without the evidence of an overt
act, evidence of intent was therefore irrelevant.
This use of the intent exception goes far beyond prior precedent. 15 6 The
[T]he State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
murdered [the proprietor] during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an
armed robbery ...
Under G.S. 14-87, an armed robbery is defined as the taking of the personal
property of another in his presence or from his person without his consent by
endangering or threatening his life with a firearm, with the taker knowing that he is not
entitled to the property and the taker intending to permanently deprive the owner of
the property. An attempted armed robbery occurs when a defendant "with the requi-
site intent to rob, does some overt act calculated and designed to bring about the
robbery, thereby endangering or threatening the life of a person."
rd. (quoting State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 157-58, 184 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1971)).
152. Id. at 650, 235 S.E.2d at 182.
153. 280 N.C. 633, 187 S.E.2d 47 (1972).
154. In Long, the State introduced evidence that defendants, who were on trial for the
attempted armed robbery of a service station, endeavored to rob the station's attendant with a
pearl-handled pistol. The attempt failed after the attendant "tussled" over the gun with one of
the defendants. rd. at 635, 187 S.E.2d at 48. Defendant testified that the "tussle" was not
caused by an attempted robbery, but instead by a dispute over a refund alleged to be due from a
vending machine. In rebuttal, the State introduced testimony concerning defendant's participa-
tion in a robbery that had occurred about three weeks prior to the service station robbery in
which defendant had acquired the pearl-handled pistol. Id. at 636, 638, 187 S.E.2d at 49-50. The
Long court held that the earlier robbery was competent as evidence of defendant's intent at the
time he entered the service station. It further held that this intent was a critical disputed element
of the State's attempted robbery case and that the evidence of the prior robbery clearly tended
to prove intent. Id. at 641, 187 S.E.2d at 52.
155. The only evidence of what happened inside the store came from defendant's statement
to police:
[D]efendant stated that he had entered [the store] to purchase a package of cigarettes.
After purchasing the cigarettes and receiving his change, defendant turned and began
walking toward the door. As he looked over his shoulder, defendant saw that [the
proprietor] was about to shoot him with a pistol. He turned his body, and [the
proprietor] shot defendant on his left side. Defendant then took the sawed-off shotgun
from his right hip pocket and shot [the proprietor]. . . . Defendant then put the gun
back in his pants and staggered to Main Street.
292 N.C. at 647, 235 S.E.2d at 181. This testimony was clearly not sufficient to show an act
equivalent to the ambiguous act of State v. Long. Moreover, the State attempted to discredit
the statement, thereby leaving no evidence from which to find an overt act.
156. Justice Exum's dissent emphasized this point:
The effect of the majority's ruling is far-reaching. It amounts to this: The state,
lacking evidence of what actually happened, may bootstrap itself around this deficien-
cy by offering evidence of what defendant did on some other occasion. This, accord-
ing to the majority, proves defendant's intent to do on the occasion in question what
the state contends he did. This, in turn, somehow proves that he did it. Under the
majority's holding the rule against admitting such evidence is totally abrogated. The
state may use it in any case, but particularly in those cases where there is no other
evidence as to what happened.
Id. at 665, 235 S.E.2d at 191 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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court permitted the State to use the evidence of the prior crime not only to
show intent, but also to show what happened inside the store. This use
violates the general rule itself by allowing the commission of a prior offense
to be proof of the commission of another crime. 157 Under the majority's
holding, then, the rule against admitting such evidence is totally abrogated,
for the State may use proof that a defendant committed an earlier, similar
crime not only as evidence of intent but as its only proof that a defendant
committed the overt act required for the crime charged.
F. Privileged Communication
In State v. Lewis 158 the North Carolina Court of Appeals declared that
plea bargain negotiations with an arresting officer are admissible into evi-
dence. To do so, the court had to find that such negotiations do not fall
within the scope of G.S. 15A-1025, which provides: "The fact that the
defendant or his counsel and the solicitor engaged in plea discussions or
made a plea arrangement may not be received in evidence against or in favor
of the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceed-
ings." 159 The court's limiting construction of the statute is based on a very
literal interpretation that does not take into account the policy underlying the
statute, a policy that supports the argument that evidence of plea bargaining
should be inadmissible in court either for or against the defendant.
Defendant in Lewis was on trial for possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance.160 During the
cross-examination of defendant, the district attorney was permitted over
objection to make inquiries that led to an admission by defendant that he had
engaged in plea bargaining with the arresting officer.161 Defendant argued in
the court of appeals that G.S. 15A-1025 prohibited the introduction of any
evidence of plea bargaining, whether or not the solicitor was involved. 162
The court dismissed this argument by restricting the statute's application to
the specific instance of plea discussions between a defendant or his counsel
and the solicitor. 1
63
157. See State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954); People v. Molineux, 168
N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901), quoted in State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171,174,81 S.E.2d 364, 365
(1954); Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 60 (1872).
158. 32 N.C. App. 298, 231 S.E.2d 693 (1977).
159. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1025 (1975) (emphasis added).
160. 32 N.C. App. at 298, 231 S.E.2d at 693.
161. Id. at 300, 231 S.E.2d at 694.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court noted that defendant failed to make an objection or a motion to strike
this allegedly inadmissible evidence. Id. Ordinarily such a failure to make an objection waives
it. State v. Hunt, 223 N.C. 173, 25 S.E.2d 598 (1943). The fact that the court proceeded to deal
with the question would indicate that this was a situation in which admission of the evidence
could be reversible error even in the absence of objection. See State v. Everette, 284 N.C. 81,
199 S.E.2d 462 (1973); D. STANSBURY, supra note 7, § 27, at 67 n.16.
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While the court's holding follows from a literal reading of the statute, it
ignores the policy underlying it. The plea bargaining rule exists to encour-
age judicial compromises, to reduce clogged court dockets and to ensure
frank and open discussions of plea alternatives.1 64 These rationales apply
whether the state's representative is a police officer or a prosecutor. If
compromise is to be encouraged by G.S. 15A-1025 when discussions occur
between a solicitor and a defendant, there is no reason not to extend the
protection of the statute to plea discussions between a defendant and the
police. '
65
The Lewis holding means that a defendant whose good faith negotia-
tions with the police fail will be severely penalized by the introduction into
evidence of the fact of the plea bargaining and any contemporaneous
admissions; a similarly situated defendant who enters into the same discus-
sion with the solicitor will, however, have that evidence excluded. To read
the statute so narrowly severely erodes the protection it is intended to
provide. Moreover, it is not unreasonable that the solicitor be required to
oversee police practices in this area. It follows that if he does not prohibit
these plea bargaining practices, the solicitor should not then be permitted to
introduced evidence of unsuccessful negotiations that he has counte-
nanced. 
166
E. WILLIAM BATES, II
CHARLES PREYER ROBERTS, III
IX. INSURANCE
A. Ratemaking Legislation
In an action certain to produce a significant impact on the insurance
industry in North Carolina, the General Assembly passed comprehensive
164. The basic rationale for plea bargaining exists in reducing case loads. Viewed in this
light, the criminal rule is not unlike the civil rule forbidding evidence of negotiations. See C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 274, at 663-65.
165. It may well be argued that police should not engage in plea negotiations, and that by
refusing to prohibit introduction of the fact of negotiation, the court is intending to limit such
discussions. This approach, however, will not protect the unwary defendant. To penalize the
defendant who made a good faith effort at compromise with the figure of authority with whom
he has been most closely associated (the arresting officer) smacks of unfairness.
166. Otherwise, there is nothing short of legislative enactment to prohibit the solicitor from
using the police as his plea bargaining agents, and from subsequently introducing into evidence
whatever statements or admissions a defendant makes if the negotiations fall through.
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legislation I pertaining to ratemaking and effecting major changes in three
general areas of insurance regulation. As a result, ratemaking has been
changed from a prior approval system to a file and use system.2 Also,
methods of promulgating rates and procedures by which rates may be
disapproved by the Commissioner of Insurance have been outlined in detail
for the first time. Finally, the operation of the reinsurance pool for high-risk
insureds in the area of motor vehicle insurance has been revised to make that
pool self-sustaining.
Under the new law, for purposes of ratemaking, insurance is divided
into two categories 3-- so-called essential and nonessential lines 4 -for which
two patterns of rate regulation are established based upon mandatory or
voluntary rating bureau membership, respectively. The change from a prior
approval to a file and use system of ratemaking applies to both categories,
and all rates now take effect automatically after filing, subject to subsequent
disapproval by the Commissioner of Insurance.
5
Article 13C 6 of the new statute establishes a system of voluntary rating
bureau membership for the nonessential lines of insurance, which include
certain fire and property insurance, casualty insurance and inland marine
i. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 58, 97 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). The new law is based generally on
the recommendations of John W. Hall, Georgia State University, who was hired as a consultant
to the two insurance committees of the 1977 General Assembly. Several significant provisions,
however, were introduced and adopted during the floor debates. INSTITUTE oF GOVERNMENT,
LEGISLATIVE BULL. SERVICES, WEEKLY SUMMARY, June 24, 1977; id. June 17, 1977. See
generally INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1977, at 17-19 (J. Bran-
non ed. 1977).
2. There are six basic systems for ratemaking: (1) mandatory rating bureau; (2) state-
made rates; (3) prior approval; (4) modified prior approval; (5) file and use; and (6) open
competition. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE AND
RATES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA 8-9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as GOVER-
NOR'S STUDY COMMISSION]; see notes 17, 18, 20 & 36 and text accompanying notes 17-21 & 36infra.3. Under the previous system, the types of insurance subject to rate regulation had been
divided into five categories, each of which was regulated in a slightly different manner-fire,
casualty, miscellaneous lines, automobile liability and workers' compensation. See Law of
Mar. 6, 1945, ch. 380, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 443 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-125 to -131.9 (1975) (fire insurance); id. §§ 58-131.10 to .25 (casualty insurance); id.
§§ 58-131.26 to .33 (miscellaneous insurance)) (repealed 1977); Law of Apr. 4, 1939, ch. 394,
1935 N.C. Pub. Laws 861 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-246 to
-248.10 (1975) (automobile liability insurance)) (repealed 1977); Law of Apr. 15, 1931, ch. 279,
1931 N.C. Pub. Laws 355 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-102 to -104.6
(1972) (workers' compensation insurance)) (repealed 1977).
4. See INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1977, supra note 1, at
17-19.
5. See notes 17, 18 & 20 and text accompanying notes 17-21 infra (nonessential lines);
note 36 and accompanying text infra (essential lines).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. 99 58-131.34 to .60 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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insurance. 7 Article 13C begins with a statement of purpose 8 expressing the
legislature's determination that insurance rates should not be "excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory" 9 and that the most effective way to
achieve proper rates is through "reasonable price competition among insur-
ers." 10 The article contains detailed provisions further explaining the mean-
ing of these terms l and also provides a detailed list of the criteria to be
considered in determining whether rates comply with the specified stan-
dards. 12 Article 13C specifies in addition the factors that may be taken into
7. Id. § 58-131.36 defines the scope of application of Article 13C in the negative by listing
the types of insurance to which the article does not apply. This Article does not apply to the
essential lines regulated by new Article 12B, id. §§ 58-124.17 to .28; see note 23 and accompany-
ing text infra. It also does not apply to reinsurance insurance in connection with property
located outside the state, marine insurance, accident, health or life insurance, annuities, title
insurance, mortgage guaranty insurance, hospital service or medical service corporations,
investment companies, mutual benefit associations or fraternal beneficiary associations. Id.
§ 58-131.36. Article 13C does not apply to certain types of insurers operating on the assessment
plan. Id. § 58-131.60. The exclusion of assessment plan insurance, however, is inconsequential,
for even fraternal insurance, the field in which assessment plans were most commonly used, are
now generally conducted on the legal reserve plan. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
INSURANCE 30, 108-10, 343-47 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951). Although the terms of § 58-131.36 do
not list credit insurance as one of the categories of insurance excluded from coverage under
Article 13C, credit insurance is regulated exclusively by Article 32 of Chapter 58, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 58-341 to -358 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Article 13C, however, would apply to insurance
issued in connection with loans for a period of more than ten years, since such loans are not
subject to the exclusive regulation of Article 32. See id. § 58-341.
The definition section of Article 13C contains detailed definitions of "private passenger
motor vehicle" and "nonfleet motor vehicle" which are important in determining the scope of
the Article's application, since liability, theft and physical damage insurance on "private
passenger (nonfleet) motor vehicles" is excluded from coverage of the article. See id. §§ 58-
131.35(8)(a)-(c), (9), .36(9), (10). The inclusion of pickup trucks in the definition of "private
passenger motor vehicle," id. § 58-131.35(8)(b), is probably a legislative response to the
supreme court's decision in Security Ins. Group v. Parker, 289 N.C. 391,222 S.E.2d 437 (1976),
in which the court had held that the truck involved in the accident in question was not a private
passenger automobile. The definition also includes motorcycles, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
131.35(8)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977), thus codifying a recent decision to that effect reached by the
court of appeals in State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administra-
tive Office, 30 N.C. App. 477, 227 S.E.2d 621 (1976). It appears, however, that insurance rates
for private passenger motor vehicles that are eligible for a fleet classification as well as rates for
all commercial vehicles will be regulated in accordance with Article 13C. Motor vehicles that
are regulated by the Utilities Commission or the Interstate Commerce Commission are explic-
itly excluded from the ratemaking authority of the new North Carolina Rate Bureau. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-124.17(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.34.
9. Id. § 58-131.34(1).
10. rd. § 58-131.34(3). Professor Keeton has pointed out that, while competition tradition-
ally has been a factor in insurance rating, the complexity of insurance transactions reduces the
significance of price competition for the ordinary consumer. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAW § 8.4(a), at 557-58 (1971).
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.37(b)-(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
12. See text accompanying notes 29-35 infra. The former provisions regulating nonessen-
tial lines of insurance contained no comparable guidelines. Law of Mar. 6, 1945, ch. 380, § 1,
1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 443 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-131.10 to
.25 (1975) (casualty insurance); id. §§ 131.26 to .33 (miscellaneous lines of insurance)) (repealed
1977).
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consideration for purposes of classifying risks in order to establish rates. 13
Finally, this article authorizes the operation of rating organizations, whose
services must be made available to all insurers operating in the state.
14
Insurers are not required to join a rating organization and therefore may
choose whether to make their own rates or join a rating organization and use
its rates. 15 Simultaneously, however, the statute recognizes that, while
cooperation among insurers is desirable, it must be regulated to prevent
restraint of competition.1
6
A major portion of the new law relates to the exact procedures to be
followed in promulgating and reviewing rates. To promulgate new or
revised rates for nonessential lines, the insurer or rating organization"7 is
required only to file the rates and accompanying supportive data with the
Commissioner prior to the effective date of the rates.18 The rates then take
effect automatically19 and remain in effect until revised rates are filed. No
prior approval by the Commissioner is required for the rates to take effect.
13. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.38(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
14. Id. § 58-131.34(2).
15. Id. § 58-131.41.
16. Id. § 58-131.34(4). While each insurer is required to use the rates of the rating
organization to which it belongs or the rates which it files itself, id. § 58-131.39, additional
competitive variation can be achieved through the payment of dividends to policyholders. As a
plan for payment of dividends is not considered to be a "rating plan," it is not subject to
regulation by the Commissioner of Insurance and therefore can be used freely by the insurance
companies as a competitive device. Id. § 58-131.58. See generally C. KULP & J. HALL,
CASUALTY INSURANCE 993-94 (1968).
The rating organizations must obtain a license from the Commissioner of Insurance and
must disclose specified information about their organization and personnel. N.C. GEN. STAT. §9
58-131.35(5), .43(a), (c), (d) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Advisory organizations and joint underwriting
and joint reinsurance organizations are required to-submit the same type of information to the
Commissioner, but no license is required. Id. §9 58-131.35(1), .44(a), .45(a). But see id. § 58-
131.51 (referring to "each advisory organization licensed pursuant to G.S. 58-131.44" (empha-
sis added)).
Only in the context of a rating organization or a joint underwriting or joint reinsurance
organization may unrelated insurers agree to adhere to the same rates, rules and the like. Id. 99
58-131.46 to .48. Insurers who enter into agreements to adhere in violation of the prohibitions
will be deemed to be a rating organization, subject to licensing and disclosure requirements. Id.
§§ 58-131.35(5), .43. See also id. §§ 58-131.49 to .52, .55(a)-(c) (regulation of rating organiza-
tions).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.41 (Cum. Supp. 1977) also permits each insurer to give
notice to the Commissioner that it uses the rates of a designated rating organization. The giving
of such notice fulfills the insurer's obligation to file under § 58-131.39. See id. § 58-131.41(b).
18. Id. § 58-131.39. This filing requirement does not apply to inland marine risks. Id.
Policy forms must also be filed with the Commissioner. Id. § 58-131.56. One commentator, in
discussing the Pennsylvania insurance rate statutes, has raised the question whether the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the public be given prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard before revised rates take effect. See Comment, Insurance Rate
Regulation in Pennsylvania: Does the Consumer Have a Voice?, 81 DICK. L. REV. 297 (1976-
1977). Although rates under the new North Carolina statute take effect before a hearing is held,
the administrative and judicial review provisions of the statute clearly appear to satisfy due
process requirements. See note 41 and accompanying text infra.
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.39 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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In thus abandoning the prior approval system in favor of a file and use
system, North Carolina reflects the recent general trend of state regulatory
programs, 20 some of which have also gone so far as to eliminate the filing
requirement.
21
New Article 12B22 establishes a system of mandatory rating bureau
membership for the essential lines of insurance, which include certain
residential fire and property insurance, automobile theft and physical dam-
age insurance, automobile liability insurance and allied lines, and workers'
compensation and employers' liability insurance. 23 The article establishes
the North Carolina Rate Bureau24 and requires all insurance companies
writing any of the essential lines of insurance in North Carolina to be
members of the Bureau.' Mandatory bureau membership and mandatory
adherence to the rates established by the Bureau 26 are the primary features
that distinguish the regulation of the essential lines from the regulation of the
nonessential lines of insurance. No price competition is permitted among
20. The general trend of state regulatory programs since the late 1960's has been to move
from reliance on prior approval laws toward use of either file and use laws or no-filing ("open
competition") laws. R. KEETON, supra note 10, § 8.4(b), at 564. The adoption of a file and use
system for automobile insurance was formally recommended for use in North Carolina as early
as 1971. GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 49.
21. See GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 9.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-124.17 to .28 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
23. rd. § 58-124.17(1). Although Article 12B does not include a list of definitions, it adopts
by reference the definition of "private passenger (nonfleet) motor vehicle" established in
Article 13C. Id. The ratemaking procedures of Article 12B do not apply to certain commercial
vehicles because § 58-124.17(3) exempts certain commercial vehicles from "[t]he provisions of
this subdivision." Insurance rates for these commercial vehicles are apparently regulated by
Article 13C. Insurance operating on the assessment plan is also not regulated under Article 12B.
Id. § 58-124.28; see note 7 supra.
24. The Bureau is to assume the functions previously performed by the North Carolina
Fire Insurance Rating Bureau, the North Carolina Automobile Rate Administrative Office and
the Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau of North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
124.17(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
25. Id. § 58-124.18. Each member is represented in the Bureau and participates in its
administration. The expenses of the Bureau are shared among its members. Id.
26. See id. § 58-124.23. Deviations from Bureau rates are allowed only if the insurer files
the deviation with the Bureau and the Commissioner and only if the Commissioner approves the
deviation. Deviations must be renewed annually. Id. Under the former statute, no deviations
were allowed. See Law of Mar. 6, 1945, ch. 381, § 2, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 457 (formerly
codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1975)) (repealed 1977).
The Governor's Study Commission, however, recommended in 1971 that the prohibition of
rate deviation be repealed, citing the view that the adoption of this prohibition had represented
a complete rejection of competition in insurance ratemaking. See GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMIS-
SION, supra note 2, at 38, 49.
Members of the Bureau may also modify rates, subject to the approval of the Commis-
sioner, in connection with agreements to apportion among themselves high-risk insureds. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-124.17(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977). For "difficult to place" workers' compensation
insurance, the Bureau designates an insurance company to write coverage and sets the initial
premium for such coverage. Id. § 58-124.17(5).
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insurance companies in the essential lines, 27 whereas in the nonessential
lines bureau membership is voluntary, and companies who choose not to
join a rating organization are free to set their own rates.
28
The factors to be considered in establishing rates for essential lines are
specified in the statute. 29 The basic requirement-that the rates "not be
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory' 3 0-- coincides with the
standards set forth for the nonessential lines of insurance in Article 13C. 31
The statutory definitions of these standards, 32 however, may riot be compre-
hensive enough to eliminate all disputes regarding what factors may proper-
ly be considered in evaluating rates. For example, investment income of the
insurer is not mentioned as a factor to be considered in determining whether
rates are excessive; 33 neither is it included in the list of criteria to be applied
in determining whether the rates comply with the specified standards. 34
Investment income, however, is not excluded from such consideration, and
thus the propriety of considering investment income in determining whether
proposed or existing rates provide a reasonable profit for an insurance
company remains an unsettled issue. 35
27. As with the nonessential lines, however, insurers in the essential lines are free to
return dividends to policyholders without interference by the Bureau. Id. § 58-124.18(c); see
note 16 supra.
28. See note 17 supra.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum. Supp. 1977). In 1971, the Governor's Study
Commission had recommended that the rating statutes should be revised "by spelling out the
consideration to be given to all reasonable and related factors." GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMIS-
SION, supra note 2, at 50.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977). As with the nonessential lines, id.
§ 58-131.38(2), risks may be classified for ratemaking purposes, but the classification plan for
automobile insurance may not be based upon the age or sex of the persons insured. Id. § 58-
124.19(4). In other action relating to discrimination in insurance, the General Assembly passed
id. § 168-10 (prohibiting insurers from denying individual accident and health insurance
coverage to any handicapped person solely on the basis of the person's handicap).
31. See id. § 58-131.37(a). The rates for workers' compensation insurance are required to
be "fair, reasonable, and adequate." Id. § 97-100(a).
32. Id. § 58-131.37(b)-(e). There are no definitions of these terms in Article 12B, as there
are in Article 13C, but it is unlikely that the courts would interpret the terms any differently in
the absence of any ground for doing so.
33. The subsections defining the term "excessive" refer (1) to "a reasonable degree of
price competition" as an indication that the rates are not excessive and (2) in the absence of
such competition, to a "long-run underwriting profit that is unreasonably high" as an indication
that the rates are excessive. Id. § 58-131.37(b), (c).
34. See id. § 58-131.38(1).
35. In a case decided under the former statute, the North Carolina Supreme Court found
that investment profit could be taken into consideration in ratemaking. See State ex rel.
Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administrative Office, 292 N.C. 1, 12-16,
231 S.E.2d 867, 874-75 (1977). That finding, however, does not necessarily apply to the new
statute, and it is likely that the issue will have to be resolved in the courts once more.
The role of investment income in ratemaking was the subject of testimony at hearings on
the rates filed under the new law, and under its view of that law the North Carolina Rate Bureau
contends that investment income may not be considered. See Adams, Insurers Debate Rates,
Profits, Raleigh, N.C., News & Observer, Feb. 17, 1978, at 10, col. 1. See generally R. COOPER,
1090 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
Although rates for both essential and nonessential lines become effec-
tive without the Commissioner's approval,36 the statute for the first time
adequately outlines procedures under which the Commissioner may contest
such rates after they are filed. 37 To do so he must hold a hearing 38 and, if he
INVESTMENT RETURN AND PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE RATEMAKING 10-17 (1974); R.
KEETON, supra note 10, § 8.4(b), at 565.
The statute, however, does deal effectively with another question that had arisen in
previous litigation. The statute specifies when the factors to be considered in ratemaking are to
be based solely on North Carolina data and when countrywide data may be considbred. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (essential lines); id. § 58-131.38(1) (nonessential
lines). In an earlier case involving the sufficiency of evidence to support the Commissioner's
disapproval of proposed homeowners insurance rates, the North Carolina Supreme Court had
pointed out that the former statute permitted the Commissioner to consider "conflagration and
catastrophe hazards, both within and without the State." State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v.
North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 471, 492, 234 S.E.2d 720, 731-32 (1977). The
court implied, however, that the statute did not permit the use of countrywide data for the
"experience" factor. Id. The court found that the Bureau had presented no substantial
evidence that countrywide loss and expense data reflected North Carolina experience and that
the Commissioner therefore was not required to accept the Bureau's use of countrywide data.
The specificity of the new statute in addressing this point will eliminate future disputes on this
issue.
One other provision relating to the factors to be considered in ratemaking appears to
represent a direct legislative response to recent litigation. The new statute provides that, in
connection with fire insurance, "consideration may be given to the experience of such fire
insurance business during the most recent five-year period." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19(3)
(Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). The former statute had provided that "the Commissioner
shall give consideration to. . . the experience of the fire insurance business during a period of
not less than five years next preceding the year in which the review is made." Law of Mar. 6,
1945, ch. 380, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 443 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.2
(1975)) (repealed 1977). On two occasions the North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with
the question whether this provision set forth an absolute prerequisite to proper rate review, but
on both occasions the court found it unnecessary to reach that issue. See State ex rel.
Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. at 485,234 S.E.2d at
727-28 (1977); In re North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 245 N.C. 444, 452, 96 S.E.2d 344,
350 (1956). The new statute, which clearly makes the consideration of such data optional, deals
effectively with a requirement that had otherwise promised to be a continuing source of
controversy.
36. The rates for nonessential lines take effect on the date specified in the filing. See notes
17, 18 & 20 and text accompanying notes 17-21 supra. Rates for essential lines take effect
automatically on the date specified by the North Carolina Rate Bureau, following a 90-day
waiting period. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.20(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Until July 1, 1979, the "total
combined general rate level" for certain automobile coverages may not be increased more than
six percent per year. Id. § 58-124.26. This was a compromise measure added to the legislation as
a floor amendment in the house. INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION
1977, supra note I, at 18. Fifteen days' notice of any changes in rates or coverage must be given
to the insured and the agent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.27 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (essential lines);
id. § 58-131.59 (nonessential lines).
37. The North Carolina Supreme Court had pointed out that the former statute failed to
"clearly state the exact procedure to be followed by the Commissioner" in approving or
disapproving rates. State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Adminis-
trative Office, 292 N.C. 1, 9, 231 S.E.2d 867, 871 (1977). The new statute is obviously intended
to deal with the former statute's procedural shortcomings, reflected in a series of recent
insurance rate cases involving the Commissioner of Insurance. See, e.g., State ex rel. Commis-
sioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administrative Office, 293 N.C. 365, 239 S.E.2d 48
(1977); State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C.
471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 292 N.C. 244, 232 S.E.2d 414 (1977);
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finds that the rates are not in compliance with the statutory standards, 39 he
may disapprove the rates and declare them ineffective. 40 Any such decision
is subject to judicial review, 41 but the insurers may continue using the rates
pending such review, if the purportedly excessive premiums are placed in an
escrow account. 42 If a member of the North Carolina Rate Bureau disagrees
with a Bureau decision, the member may appeal to the Commissioner, who
is required to hold a hearing on the matter.43 In connection with the
nonessential lines, parties other than the Commissioner or an insurer may
also initiate administrative and judicial review of rates, rating plans, rating
systems or underwriting rules promulgated by insurers or rating organiza-
tions.44
State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70,231
S.E.2d 882 (1977); State ex rel. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Administra-
tive Office, 292 N.C. 1, 231 S.E.2d 867 (1977). Of the five rate cases to reach the appellate
courts in 1977, in only one was the Commissioner upheld. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 292
N.C. 244, 232 S.E.2d 414 (1977) (Commissioner properly allowed 10% reduction in mobile home
insurance premiums as credit for proper tie-downs because such reduction was mandated by
statute).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.21 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (essential lines); id. § 58-131.42
(nonessential lines).
39. Id. § 58-124.19 (standards for essential lines); id. § 58-131.37 (standards for nonessen-
tial lines).
40. Id. § 58-124.21 (essential lines; providing that Commissioner "may issue his order"
declaring rates ineffective (emphasis added)); id. § 58-131.42 (nonessential lines; providing that
Commissioner "shall issue an order" declaring rates ineffective (emphasis added)).
41. Id. § 58-124.22(a) (essential lines); id. § 58-131.54(b) (nonessential lines). On its face
the new law permits appeal to the courts from "any order or decision of the Commissioner"
and does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Id.
88 58-124.22(a), -131.54(b) (emphasis added). The courts nevertheless may require that a party
exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See generally Daye, North
Carolina's New Administrative Procedure Act: An Interpretive Analysis, 53 N.C.L. REv. 833,
904-08 (1975). Professor Daye, citing the judicial review provisions of the insurance statute as
illustrative of the "needless variety" of the state's judicial review statutes, has "strongly
recommended" that the legislature repeal the judicial review provisions contained in individual
statutes. Id. at 899 & n.296, 900 n.301. Uniformity of procedures would be assured if judicial
review of administrative decisions were available only under the Administrative Procedure Act,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 150A-1 to -64 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). The new insurance statute takes
no step in that direction, however, even though the Administrative Procedure Act is apparently
broad enough to apply to review of insurance ratemaking. See Daye, supra at 872 n. 187; Survey
of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REv. 895, 1058 n.38 (1977).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.22(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (essential lines); id. § 58-131.42(b)
(nonessential lines).
43. Id. § 58-124.24. The statute does not specify a time period within which the Commis-
sioner must hold the hearing. The Commissioner, therefore, could refuse to hold such a hearing
until the member had sought review from the Bureau itself, in accordance with the procedures
to be established under § 58-124.17(2).
44. The procedural steps required in order to obtain such review in connection with
nonessential lines are outlined in great detail in the statute. "Any person aggrieved" may
request in writing that the insurer or rating organization involved review its action and may
subsequently request a hearing before the Commissioner. Id. § 58-131.53. Whenever the
Commissioner issues an order or a decision without holding a hearing, the affected party may
request a hearing, and again the exact procedures to be followed are set forth in the statute. Id.
§ 58-131.54(a).
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The remaining substantive portions of the new law deal with the North
Carolina Reinsurance Facility, a statutory reinsurance pool for high-risk
insureds in the area of motor vehicle insurance. 45 The most significant
change made by the new law in the operation of the Facility is the establish-
ment of procedures designed to make the Facility self-sustaining. In the
past, a high-risk insured whose coverage was ceded 46 to the Facility paid the
same amount for insurance as the insured whose coverage was not ceded.
47
Under the new law, losses sustained by the Facility are to be recouped
"either through surcharging persons reinsured by the Facility or by equi-
table pro rata assessment of member companies. "48 The member
companies, in turn, are to recoup any such assessment by surcharging
policyholders. 49 On the other hand, if the Facility should realize any gain,
any balance remaining after losses of the Facility are defrayed is to be
distributed to persons reinsured by the Facility. 50 The decision to surcharge
insureds in order to recoup losses of the Facility represents an apparent
45. See id. § 58-248.26 to .40 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977). All insurance companies licensed
to write motor vehicle insurance in North Carolina are required to participate in the Facility. Id.
§ 58-248.34(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977). For a discussion of the Canadian Facility after which
reinsurance facilities in the United States have been modeled, see D. REINMUTH & G. STONE, A
STUDY OF ASSIGNED RISK PLANS 71-78 (1970) (report of Division of Industry Analysis, Bureau
of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, to Department of Transportation). For a compari-
son of the reinsurance systems in force in 1975 in Massachusetts, North Carolina and South
Carolina, see Lee & Formisano, Automobile Insurance Markets: Developments in the Reinsur-
ance Facility Technique, 1975 INS. L.J. 9, 15-25. See also Lee & Formisano, The North
Carolina Plan: Blueprint for an Automobile Reinsurance Facility, 1973 INS. L.J. 559.
The rates for motor vehicle insurance reinsured by the Facility are to be made by the
Facility itself or by a rating organization acting on its behalf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.33(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). The rates must be filed with the Commissioner, and the procedures for
administrative and judicial review are essentially the same as those prescribed for the essential
lines in id. §§ 58-124.20 to .22. The rates must conform to the familiar standard-"neither
excessive, inadequate nor unfairly discriminatory"-with the additional requirement that they
be "calculated, insofar as is possible, to produce neither a profit nor a loss." Id. § 58-248.33(I).
The new law also details the role of the agent in determining whether particular coverage is
to be rated at the Facility rate or the ordinary rate and establishes a detailed procedure for
authorizing licensed agents to write insurance for the Facility. See id. §§ 58-248.32(b), .33(g)(6).
See generally Lee & Formisano, The North Carolina Plan, supra at 569.
46. "'Cede' or 'cession' means the act of transferring the risk of loss from the individual
insurer to all insurers through the operation of the facility." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.26(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). The new law eliminates the previous 50% limit on risks which a company
could cede to the Facility. See id. § 58-248.35.
47. See Law of Mar. 6, 1945, ch. 381, § 2, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 461 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.2 (1975)) (repealed 1977).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.34(e) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
49. Id. § 58-248.34(f). This surcharge is to be assessed "on motor vehicle insurance
policies issued by the member or through the Facility." Id. The implication is that the surcharge
will not apply exclusively to policyholders whose coverage is ceded to the Facility.
50. Id. § 58-248.34(e). In accordance with the new provision requiring that gains be
distributed to insureds, several sections of the statute were amended to delete references to
gains being shared by the member companies. See, e.g., id. §§ 58-248.26(1), .29, .33(a), (g)(8).
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rejection of the principle that the industry should "subsidize the substandard
market." 51
Despite its complexity, the new law is internally consistent and well-
integrated with the retained portions of the old law. However, the most
important aspect of the law-the new ratemaking procedures-is quite
difficult to evaluate in the abstract; accordingly, how effective these proce-
dures will be in eliminating the ratemaking problems of the recent past52
remains to be seen.
B. Construction of Policy Terms
In Gaddy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 53 the court
of appeals found that the automobile for which coverage was sought was
neither an "owned" nor a "non-owned" automobile under the terms of the
policy.5 4 This result was compelled by an earlier decision of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hayes,55
which had held that a properly executed certificate of title was the exclusive
method of establishing ownership of an automobile.5 6 In Gaddy, the named
insured under the policy had purchased a used car from an automobile
salesman who was the owner of the car, but who did not possess the
certificate of title at the time of sale. When the insured's son was involved in
an accident with plaintiff, the insurance company denied coverage.57 The
51. D. REINMUTH & G. STONE, supra note 45, at 77.
52. In recent years, [the] Commissioner. . . has consistently refused to approve rate
increases asked for by the bureaus. Just as consistently, the insurance industry has
appealed and received court approval for the increases, but it has always been delayed
in implementing the rate by the amount of time necessary to complete the court action.
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1977, supra note 1, at 18.
The procedures under the new law designed to ensure prompt effectiveness of new rates
and plans are already being put to the test. On February 27, 1978, the Commissioner of
Insurance announced his disapproval of the new automobile insurance rates that had been filed
by the North Carolina Rate Bureau, see Adams, Auto Insurance Rate Hike Nixed, Raleigh,
N.C., News & Observer, Feb. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 1, and on March 12, 1978, the North Carolina
Rate Bureau announced that it would appeal the Commissioner's ruling to the court of appeals
and would put the new rates into effect pending the court's decision, see Powell, Insurer Appeal
Leads to Auto Rate Hikes, Raleigh, N.C., News & Observer, Mar. 13, 1978, at 1, col. I.
The 1977 General Assembly, recognizing the need for continued reevaluation of North
Carolina insurance law, adopted Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 1028, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1336,
which instructs the Legislative Research Commission to study the state's insurance laws,
"examining the effects of the 1977 General Assembly changes in the laws and anticipating other
insurance law issues to come before the 1979 General Assembly." The Commission is to report
to the 1979 General Assembly. As another means of ensuring reconsideration of North Carolina
insurance law, the final section of the new law provides that the law shall expire September 1,
1980. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 25, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119.
53. 32 N.C. App. 714, 233 S.E.2d 613 (1977).
54. Id. at 718, 233 S.E.2d at 615.
55. 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970).
56. Id. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524.
57. 32 N.C. App. at 715, 233 S.E.2d at 614.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
superior court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment,58 but the
court of appeals reversed, citing Hayes. 9 The Gaddy court found that,
within the terms of the policy, the vehicle was not "owned" because the
insured had no properly executed certificate of title, 6° but the car was also
not "non-owned" because it had been "furnished for the regular use of the
insured. "61
A standard automobile liability insurance policy 62 limits coverage to
the named insured and to various other individuals who are defined in terms
of their relationship with the named insured. Such a policy also limits
coverage to automobiles that are either "owned" or "non-owned" as
defined in the policy. An automobile that has been "furnished for regular
use" of the insured is excluded from the definition of "non-owned"
automobile, and, therefore, although the insured does not own it, it is not
"non-owned" under the terms of the policy. The purpose of excluding such
cars from coverage is to preclude a person, who has paid a premium to
insure only one car, from borrowing or leasing a car for regular use and
obtaining coverage for that car without paying an additional premium. 63 For
the same reason, policies place certain limitations on coverage for a newly
acquired car. Such a car is covered by an existing policy only if it replaces a
previously owned car or if the insured notifies the insurance company of the
acquisition during the policy period or within thirty days of the acquisi-
tion.
64
In Gaddy, however, the court did not give sufficient consideration to
the purpose such limitations are intended to serve. On the facts of Gaddy, it
would have been appropriate for the court to ignore the technical question of
ownership and to treat the car like any other newly acquired car, relying on
the terms of the policy that establish certain limitations on coverage of
newly acquired cars. This would have exposed the insurance company to no
risk beyond that which it would have faced under its coverage of any newly
acquired car. The court, however, relied on the certificate of title require-
ment established in Hayes. Although the denial of recovery to innocent
accident victims on such technical grounds is particularly unfortunate, the
court in Gaddy was bound to follow the precedent of Hayes. Consequently,
58. Id.
59. 32 N.C. App. at 716, 233 S.E.2d at 614.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 716-17, 233 S.E.2d at 614-15.
62. See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 10, app. H, at 662 (Family Combination Automobile
Policy Form).
63. Id. § 4.9(b), at 240.
64. See, e.g., id. app. H, at 662.
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legislative action will be necessary before the courts can take a more flexible
approach in such cases.
65
In DeBerry v. American Motorists Insurance Co. ,66 the court of
appeals considered whether direct physical impact between an automobile
and the insured is necessary in order for the insured to be able to recover
under a medical payments provision that covers injuries caused by accident
"through being struck by an automobile." 67 The DeBerry court cited as
controlling the decision reached in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Westchester Fire Insurance Co. ,68 in which the supreme court held that
direct contact with the automobile is not required when the victim is a
passenger in one car that is struck by another car. In Gant v. Provident Life
& Accident Insurance Co. ,69 a much earlier case that involved an injury
caused when a plank was thrown by the wheels of a car, the supreme court
had denied recovery, holding that direct contact was required. Although the
insurance company in DeBerry cited Gant and argued that there is a
distinction between "collision" and "thrown object" cases, the court of
appeals refused to recognize that distinction and held that Wachovia had
overruled Gant by implication. 70 Thus, the court of appeals, in not requiring
direct contact in DeBerry, aligned itself with the position of most juris-
dictions on this issue.71 The supreme court, however, has not spoken on the
issue, since the decision in Wachovia did not directly overrule Gant.
Whether thrown object cases are covered by the "struck by an automobile"
clause therefore remains an open question in North Carolina, and its resolu-
tion must await a decision by the supreme court directly addressed to the
problem.
65. For purposes of the joy-riding statute, the legislature has defined "owner" as "any
person with a property interest in the motor-propelled conveyance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
72.2(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977); see notes 87, 88 & 90 and text accompanying notes 87-90 infra.
Although the concept of "property interest" embodied in that statute is not fully clarified, it
probably does not require a "properly executed certificate of title"; use of a comparable
definition of ownership for purposes of automobile liability insurance could eliminate the
problem faced by the court in Gaddy.
66. 33 N.C. App. 639, 236 S.E.2d 380 (1977).
67. Id. at 640, 236 S.E.2d at 382. Plaintiff was injured when a third party drove a car into a
rope barrier, causing it to break and strike plaintiff.
68. 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970).
69. 197 N.C. 122, 147 S.E. 740 (1929).
70. 33 N.C. App. at 643, 645, 236 S.E.2d at 383-84.
71. See id. at 644, 236 S.E.2d at 384 and cases cited therein. See also Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d
962 (1970). The DeBerry court noted that since 1945 South Carolina has been the only state to
deny recovery on the ground that direct physical contact is required under the "struck by an
automobile" clause. 33 N.C. App. at 644, 236 S.E.2d at 384.
On another issue in DeBerry, however, the court followed a minority rule. Again relying on
Wachovia, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that recovery should be based on the combined
medical payments coverage for both of plaintiff's cars rather than on just the coverage for any
one car. See id. at 645-46, 236 S.E.2d at 385. A Florida court recently reached the same result.
See Chappelear v. Allstate Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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Two cases decided by the court of appeals involved construction of the
phrase "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the . . .
automobile." Although the cases shared some factual elements in that each
involved gunshot wounds, opposite results were reached. In Reliance Insur-
ance Co. v. Walker72 the court of appeals found that when a truck is
equipped with a permanently mounted gun rack, transportation of guns
constitutes a "use" of the truck. 73 The court considered this finding suffi-
cient to establish the causal relationship between the use and the related
injury74 necessary to bring the incident within the coverage of the policy.
Recovery was denied in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Knight,75 a case that also involved a gun, but under quite different circum-
stances. The insured and three others, in an apparent attempt to kidnap a
child, pursued and deliberately rammed a car in which the child was riding
with his father. Someone in the insured's car fired a gun into the other car,
and the child was struck by a bullet.76 After finding that the insurance
company was liable for the property damage to the rammed car that arose
from the insured's deliberate ramming, 77 the court rejected the claim that the
gunshots constituted an accident "arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use" of the automobile. 78 The court found no causal relationship between
the use of the car and the child's injury, rejecting defendant's attempt to
establish "but for" causation.
79
If "use" is construed to refer to "use as a vehicle," 80 denial of
rec6very in Knight might be justified on that ground, since a deliberately
inflicted gunshot wound is clearly not a "motoring risk." 8 Such a construc-
tion, however, would also compel a denial of recovery in Walker, as the
spontaneous firing of a gun in a rack in a parked truck is also not a
"motoring risk." Exactly what constitutes "use" of an automobile is a
much-litigated issue, and, as these decisions indicate, the results depend so
72. 33 N.C. App. 15, 234 S.E.2d 206, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 159, 236 S.E.2d 702 (1977).
73. Id. at 22, 234 S.E.2d at 211.
74. In Walker, a passenger was injured as he stood beside the truck when a rifle in the gun
rack discharged spontaneously. Id. at 17, 234 S.E.2d at 208.
75. 34 N.C. App. 96, 237 S.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 589, 239 S.E.2d 263 (1977).
76. Id. at 97, 237 S.E.2d at 343.
77. Id. at 98, 237 S.E.2d at 343-44 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C.
285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964) (even deliberate assault with automobile is accidental from victim's
point of view)).
78. Id. at 100, 237 S.E.2d at 344.
79. Id. at 100, 237 S.E.2d at 344-45. The court distinguished Walker on the ground that
Walker did not involve an intentional shooting and that there was no evidence in Knight that the
insured's car was used to transport guns. Id. at 99, 237 S.E.2d at 344.
80. Professor Keeton has suggested this as a "fair construction." R. KEnToN, supra note
10, § 5.2(b), at 275.
81. Professor Keeton refers to the "basic idea that the automobile policy is designed to
cover motoring risks." Id. (emphasis added).
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peculiarly on the facts of each case that it is difficult to formulate a unifying
principle for resolution of the issue.
82
C. Construction of Statutory Provisions
In Ford Marketing Corp. v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. ,83
the court of appeals considered the issue of what constitutes "lawful posses-
sion" of a vehicle for purposes of automobile liability coverage under the
omnibus clause. 84 Despite the definite inclination of the North Carolina
courts, as evidenced in previous cases, to expand the coverage of the
omnibus clause, 85 the court in Ford Marketing adopted a very restrictive
view of "lawful possession." In Ford Marketing, the owner of a truck
permitted his employee unrestricted, full-time use of the truck. The em-
ployee's son-in-law, who on a previous occasion had used the truck with the
employee's express permission, used the truck without express permission
and was involved in an accident. Although neither the owner nor his
employee objected to the son-in-law's use of the truck, the court found that
the son-in-law was not in lawful possession of the truck and, therefore,
under the terms of the omnibus clause, he was not an insured. 86 The court
determined that the son-in-law's use of the truck had been unlawful because
82. The interpretation of "use" is one of the insurance issues that, as Professor Keeton
declares, "illustrates the case-by-case difficulties of applying standards that involve an element
of evaluation as well as fact finding." Id. § 1.6, at 24. Seegenerally 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW § 4317 (rev. ed. 1962 & Supp. 1977); R. KEETON, supra note 10, 88 5.2(b) (especially
nn.2-4, discussing cases involving guns), 4.7(b) n.ll & 4.9(b) n.6.
83. 33 N.C. App. 297, 235 S.E.2d 82, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 253, 237 S.E.2d 535 (1977).
84. Automobile liability insurance policies are required to "insure the person named
therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle. . . with the express or
implied permission of such named insured, or any other persons in lawful possession." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
85. The issues of lawful possession and coverage under the omnibus clause have been
confronted in a series of recent cases in which the courts have interpreted omnibus clause
coverage in a progressively broader manner: Jernigan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16
N.C. App. 46, 190 S.E.2d 866 (1972) (permission, express or implied, is essential element of
lawful possession); Iowa Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 283 N.C. 309, 196 S.E.2d 243 (1973)
(permission is only one way to establish lawful possession, but second permittee is not within
coverage of omnibus clause when first permittee had been forbidden to lend car); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 25 N.C. App. 482, 214 S.E.2d 438 (1975) (permission from first
permittee, who was not prohibited from lending car, is sufficient to establish coverage under
the omnibus clause); and Packer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App. 365, 221 S.E.2d 707 (1976)
(plaintiff was in "lawful possession," although he did not have permission to use vehicle on
personal business). See generally R. KEETON, supra note 10, § 4.7(b)(2); Survey of Devel-
opments in North Carolina Law, 1976, supra note 41, at 1060-61.
86. 33 N.C. App. at 303, 235 S.E.2d at 85. The owner's liability policy extended coverage
to the owner and "any other person while using the pickup truck with [the owner's] permis-
sion." Id. at 299-300, 235 S.E.2d at 83-84. Recovery under this provision was not claimed on
appeal, however, as plaintiff did not appeal the trial court's determination that the son-in-law
had not had the owner's express or implied permission at the time of the accident. Id. at 300,
235 S.E.2d at 84.
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it was in violation of the joy-riding statute87 in effect at the time of the
incident, 8 which had provided that consent to use the vehicle could not be
implied from the owner's consent on a previous occasion.8 9 Since the son-
in-law's use of the truck under the circumstances was a misdemeanor, the
court was unwilling to find that he was in lawful possession for purposes of
liability insurance coverage; yet, in apparent recognition of the incongruity
of the result it was compelled to reach, the court invited the legislature to
review and remedy the situation.
90
Omnibus clauses constitute a major source of insurance litigation, in
part because they typically incorporate subjective standards such as "per-
mission. '"91 It has been suggested that in order to avoid the ambiguities
created by the "permission" concept the omnibus clause should be rewrit-
ten to "cover all persons using the designated automobile unless under
circumstances amounting to conversion. "92 In Ford Marketing, however,
the court rejected plaintiff's argument that, by providing coverage for "any
other person in lawful possession," the legislature intended to extend
coverage to any driver of the insured automobile except a thief. 93 The court
offered no support for its rejection of that argument, except to point to the
87. Any person who drives or otherwise takes and carries away a vehicle, not his
own without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent to temporarily deprive
said owner of his possession of such vehicle, without intent to steal the same, is guilty
of a misdemeanor. The consent of the owner of a vehicle to its taking or driving shall
not in any case be presumed or implied because of such owner's consent on a previous
occasion to the taking or driving of such vehicle by the same or different person.
Law of Mar. 23, 1937, ch. 407, § 69, 1937 N.C. Pub. Laws 819 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-105 (1965)) (repealed 1973), quoted in Ford Marketing, 33 N.C. App at 302, 235
S.E.2d at 85.
88. 33 N.C. App. at 302, 235 S.E.2d at 85. That law was later repealed and replaced by a
similar statute:
(a) A person is guilty of an offense under this section if, without the consent of
the owner, he takes, operates, or exercises control over. . . a motor vehicle . . . of
another.
(b) Consent may not be presumed or implied because of the consent of the
owner on a previous occasion. . . given to the person charged or to another person.
Law of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1330, § 38, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Sess. 1974 690 (formerly
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.2(a), (b) (Cum. Supp. 1975)) (repealed 1977). Prior to Ford
Marketing, this version was declared void for vagueness. See State v. Graham, 32 N.C. App.
601, 233 S.E.2d 615 (1977). Another version has since gone into effect. See note 90 infra.
89. See note 87 supra:
90. "If the legislature wishes to extend the owner's automobile liability insurance
coverage of 'any other person in lawful possession' to encompass the facts of this case, it will
have to adapt its criminal statutes to that intent." 33 N.C. App. at.303, 235 S.E.2d at 86. Before
the Ford Marketing opinion was filed, however, the legislature had already rewritten the statute
in an apparent response to State v. Graham, 32 N.C. App. 601, 233 S.E.2d 615 (1977). See note
88 supra. The current version reads in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of an offense under
this section if, without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful
possession, he takes or operates an aircraft, motorboat, motor vehicle, or other motor-pro-
pelled conveyance of another." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-72.2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
91. See R. KEETON, supra note 10, § 4.7(c), at 231.
92. Id. § 4.7(c), at 232.
93. 33 N.C. App. at 302, 235 S.E.2d at 85.
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language of the then applicable joy-riding statute. 94 In view of the fact that
the joy-riding statute has recently been amended, 95 it is apparent that the
North Carolina omnibus clause could now be interpreted to exclude only
"thieves" from its coverage. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however,
has refused to entertain an appeal of Ford Marketing,96 ,so a different
construction of the omnibus clause must await another case.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chantos ,'97 the supreme court
considered the scope of the statutorily authorized reimbursement clause9" in
an automobile liability insurance policy. This clause provides that the
insurer is entitled to reimbursement from the insured whenever the financial
responsibility laws obligate the insurer to make any payments not otherwise
required by the policy. Defendant, a second permittee who was in lawful
possession of the car, negligently caused a collision that seriously injured a
third party. The insurance company settled the victim's claim and obtained a
release discharging defendant from any further liability to the victim. 99 The
insurance company then claimed reimbursement from defendant on the
ground that coverage was extended to defendant solely by reason of the
omnibus clause100 and that the company was therefore entitled to reimburse-
ment under the terms of the statute and policy. 101 The court denied recovery
under the reimbursement clause on the ground that the insurance policy was
a contract between "the parties to the policy," not binding on a third party
such as defendant in Chantos who had not consented to be bound.102
Although such an agreement is authorized by statute, it is still "merely a
contractual agreement" and therefore subject to the general principles of
contract law. 103 The court finally noted that, while reimbursement could not
be had under the policy, it might be available on a theory of a contract of
indemnity implied in law. 1°4 Accordingly, the case was remanded for its
fourth trial. 105
94. Id.
95. See notes 88 & 90 supra.
96. Certiorari was denied. 293 N.C. 253, 237 S.E.2d 535 (1977).
97. 293 N.C. 431, 238 S.E.2d 597 (1977). This case has reached the appellate courts on two
previous occasions, 21 N.C. App. 129, 203 S.E.2d 421 (1974) (reversing trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant), and 25 N.C. App. 482, 214 S.E.2d 438, cert. denied,
287 N.C. 465, 215 S.E.2d 624 (1975) (again reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant). See note 85 supra.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(h) (1975).
99. 293 N.C. at 433, 238 S.E.2d at 600.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977), quoted in note 84 supra.
101. The insurance company later amended its complaint to allege that defendant had
sought coverage under the owner's policy. 293 N.C. at 434, 238 S.E.2d at 600.
102. Id. at 438, 238 S.E.2d at 602-03. The court rejected the company's contention that
defendant had sought the protection of the policy. Id. at 439, 238 S.E.2d at 603.
103. Id. at 438, 238 S.E.2d at 602.
104. Id. at 441-42, 238 S.E.2d at 605.
105. Id. at 446, 238 S.E.2d at 607; see note 97 supra.
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The court formulated the issue in Chantos as "whether an insurer may
have reimbursement from a stranger to the insurance contract whose negli-
gence caused the injuries and damages for which the insurer had paid as a
result of liability imposed by statute."16 Although the question did not arise
in Chantos, it is possible that a future case may present the question
whether, for purposes of the reimbursement clause, there is any distinction
between the "stranger" who is an additional insured under the policy and
the "stranger" who is a statutory insured under the omnibus clause, as in
Chantos.107 The validity of such a distinction is questionable, for it would
appear that even an additional insured has not consented to the contract and
would therefore not be bound by the reimbursement clause. Under the
principles applied in Chantos, therefore, the additional insured could be
required to reimburse the insurance company only on a theory of indemnity.
If the courts, however, are in fact willing to find liability on the indemnity




A. Prisoners' Constitutional Rights
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court decided two cases signifi-
cantly affecting the scope of prisoners' constitutional rights that arose from
North Carolina prisons. The issues presented by the cases, the degree to
which the constitution affords inmates the right of free speech and assembly
and the extent of a state's duty to provide legal assistance to prisoners,
required the Court to strike a balance between the competing interests of the
states in managing their correctional facilities and the prisoners in securing
new rights. The Court's resolution of these issues reaffirms that states have a
106. Id. at 439, 238 S.E.2d at 603.
107. The court of appeals has considered a case in which such a question might have been
raised. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Webb, 10 N.C. App. 672, 179 S.E.2d 803 (1971), defendant, an
additional insured under his wife's insurance policy, had intentionally injured a man while
driving his wife's car. After compensating the victim, the insurance company sought reimburse-
ment from the husband for damages paid and expenses. Although defendant was an additional
insured within the terms of the policy, the damages had been caused intentionally and thus were
not covered by the terms of the policy. However, since statutory provisions take precedence
over exceptions in the policy, the insurance company was required to pay. Id. at 673-74, 179
S.E.2d at 804-05. As defendant admitted that he was liable to the insurance company for the
damages and challenged only the claim for expenses, the court did not discuss the propriety of
claiming reimbursement from defendant and thus was not required to resolve the issue faced by
the supreme court in Chantos. Id. at 674, 179 S.E.2d at 805.
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constitutional obligation to provide certain basic services to prisoners while
recognizing the existence of important state interests that substantially limit
prisoners' first amendment rights.
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. ,I an organi-
zation of prison inmates2 brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, 3 section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,1 challenging regulations
promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correction that prevented
inmates from forming or operating a union5 as violations of the first and
fourteenth amendments. 6 The inmates alleged that no-solicitation and no-
meeting rules infringed their rights to engage in protected free speech,
association and assembly. 7 The correction officials countered that they were
willing to allow the prisoners' union to exist but that restrictions on solicita-
tion and assembly were necessary considering the state's substantial inter-
ests in maintaining security and order within the penal system.8 The United
States Supreme Court held that the bans on inmate solicitation and group
meetings were rationally related to the reasonable objectives of prison
1. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
2. The inmates' organization, self-denominated as the "Prisoners' Labor Union," was
formed for the purpose of working "legally and peacefully to alter or eliminate practices of the
Department of Correction which are thought to be in conflict with the just, constitutional and
social interests of all persons." North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F.
Supp. 937, 940 (E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). Despite its name, this organization
of prisoners could not operate as a true labor union pursuant to the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (Supp. V 1975), 409 F. Supp. at 940 n.l, because governmental
agencies, which the inmates would have to claim as employers, are exempted from coverage of
the Act. See Clark & Parker, The Labor Law Problems of the Prisoner, 28 RUTGERS L. REv.
840, 857-58 (1975); Comeau, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent
Proposal for the Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 963, 963 (1972). Further-
more, collective bargaining for inmates with respect to pay, hours of employment and other
terms and conditions of incarceration is illegal under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (1975). 433 U.S.
at 122 n. I. Collective bargaining by prison unions has been opposed primarily because correc-
tional officials fear that it would present a serious threat to prison authority. Note, Bargaining
in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation Between the Inmate and the Prison
Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 738-45 (1972).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
5. The regulations prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join the union,
barred all meetings of the union and prevented delivery of packets of union publications that
were mailed in bulk to prisoners for distribution. 433 U.S. at 121. The no-solicitation rule was
somewhat curious in light of the fact that prison officials did not attempt to ban membership but
only solicitation for membership; furthermore, there were no formal procedures for becoming a
member since "a prisoner apparently [could] become a member simply by considering himself a
member." Id. at 128-29.
6. Id. at 121.
7. Id.
8. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937, 941
(E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). Seealso Procunierv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,412-
13 (1974); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 549 (1st Cir. 1971); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178, 199 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231
(4th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1968); Carothers v. Follette, 314
F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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administration and therefore did not violate the prisoners' first amendment
rights.
9
Traditionally, federal courts have displayed a broad "hands-off" at-
titude toward problems of prison administration; 10 nevertheless, when a
prison regulation or practice offends fundamental constitutional guarantees,
federal courts have consistently discharged their duty to protect constitu-
tional rights. 11 In Procunier v. Martinez,12 the Court enunciated a two prong
test for determining whether a particular prison restriction constituted an
impermissible restraint on first amendment liberties: "First [prison
officials] must show that a regulation . . .furthers one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved."' 13 Justice Rehnquist, while paying lip service to the
Procunier standards, nevertheless announced substantial new restrictions on
inmates' rights of free expression in Jones that signal a significant retreat
from earlier positions taken by the Court in the area of prisoners' rights. The
first prong of the Procunier test, the "justifiable purposes" standard, has
been significantly diluted. Under the majority opinion in Jones, presumably
any restriction will be upheld so long as it is "consistent with the inmates'
status as prisoners''14 and with the "legitimate operational considerations
9. 433 U.S. at 121, 129.
10. Fox, The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners, 63 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 162, 162-64 (1972). Courts have justified their refusal to review prisoners' com-
plaints on the grounds that the judiciary is "ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problem of prison administration and reform." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974).
See also Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). Courts
have also justified the hands-off doctrine procedurally by citing the separation of powers of the
executive and judicial branches. See, e.g., United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th
Cir. 1965). See generally Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial Respon-
sibility, 53 ORE. L. REV. 29 (1973); Kaufman, Prison: The Judge's Dilemma, 41 FORDlAM L.
REV. 495 (1973); Singer, Bringing the Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and the
Eighth Amendment, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 650 (1970); Spaeth, The Courts' Responsibility for
Prison Reform, 16 VILL. L. REV. 1031 (1971); Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging
Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971).
11. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,405 (1974). See also ABA Joint Committee on the
Legal Status of Prisoners, Standards Relating to the Legal Status of Prisoners (Tent. Draft
1977), 14 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 417-20 (1977).
12. 416 U.S. 396 (1973).
13. Id. at 413.
14. 433 U.S. at 129. While the Court has noted that first amendment guarantees must be
"applied in light of the special characteristics of the. . . environment," Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), Justice Rehnquist emphasized the factor of the "in-
mates' status as prisoners" in analyzing the permissible scope of prison regulation of first
amendment rights: "[T]his Court has long recognized that '[lawful incarceration brings about
the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system.' " 433 U.S. at 125 (quoting Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). The Procunier Court, dealing with the first amendment rights of
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of the institution." 15 While in Procunier prison officials had the burden of
justifying the challenged regulation, Jones shifted the burden to the prison-
ers to show that the restricted activity was not inconsistent with legitimate
penological objectives. 16 Furthermore, the Court in Jones gave broad dis-
cretion to corrections officials to determine what restrictions are necessary,
revitalizing the old "hands-off" doctrine and holding that courts should
defer to the expertise of prison officials so long as their judgment is
"rational.' 1 7 The Court also found that the second prong of the Procunier
test, the "least drastic means" requirement, was satisfied in that the regula-
tions were "drafted no more broadly than they need be to meet the perceived
threat." 18 The Court's opinion has made this requirement more illusory than
real: although the permissible breadth of the restrictions is based on the
perceived threat, an evaluation of the validity of any threat to prison
discipline is now largely entrusted to the discretion of the prison adminis-
trators. 19 In the Jones case, it is difficult to conceive of a broader restriction
that would not ban inmate speech altogether; nevertheless, the Court found
the restrictions sufficiently narrow.
The Jones decision will probably have repercussions in several areas.
The Court's holding will undoubtedly have a severe chilling effect on
prisoners' efforts to organize groups that serve several beneficial purposes.
20
prisoners for the first time, however, rejected the notion that the prison context should have an
overriding significance: "[Wie reject any attempt to justify censorship of inmate correspond-
ence merely by reference to certain assumptions about the legal status of prisoners." 416 U.S.
at 409.
15. 433 U.S. at 130 (emphasis added). This language in the Court's opinion indicates a
shift away from the strict requirement that "the regulation or practice in question must further
an important or substantial governmental interest," Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, to
the more lenient standard that the restriction must be consistent with purposes of prison
administration, e.g., the security of prisoners and guards and the minimization of prison
administration expenses. See Fox, supra note 10, at 165; Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545,
548-50 (1st Cir. 1971).
16. The district court in Jones found: "There is not one scintilla of evidence to suggest
that the Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institutions." 409 F. Supp.
937, 944 (E.D.N.C. 1976). The Supreme Court held: "[T]he burden was not on [prison
administrators] to show affirmatively that the Union would be 'detrimental to proper penologic-
al objectives' " unless the inmates could produce "substantial evidence" that these beliefs
were unreasonable. 433 U.S. at 128 (quoting 409 F. Supp. at 944).
17. 433 U.S. at 132.
18. Id. at 133.
19. Justice Marshall in his dissent noted that the problems of running a school or a city
were also complex and difficult and that school principals and mayors possessed professional
expertise, yet in first amendment cases the Court did not defer to the judgment of such officials
simply because their judgment was rational. He further explained: "Because the prison ad-
ministrator's business is to maintain order, 'there inheres the danger that he may well be less
responsive than a court-part of an independent branch of government-to the constitutionally
protected interests in free expression.' " 433 U.S. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965)).
20. Inmate unions provide opportunities for prisoners to interact with each other and with
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The Court's emphasis on judicial deference to penological expertise will
discourage lower courts from finding violations of prisoners' constitutional
rights and will permit prison administrators to limit significantly the free
speech and assembly rights of inmates under the guise of preserving prison
discipline.
2 1
In Bounds v. Smith,22 three inmates of North Carolina prisons filed suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 198323 alleging that they had been denied access to the
courts in violation of the fourteenth amendment by the state's failure to
provide legal research facilities. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina found that the sole prison library in the
state was "severely inadequate" and ordered state authorities to devise a
plan to correct the deficiency. 24 In response, the North Carolina Department
of Correction proposed creation of seven libraries in prisons located
throughout the state as well as a plan to train inmates as research assistants
and typists to aid fellow prisoners. 25 The district court found the state's plan
adequate and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed. 26 The United States Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion for the
Court by Justice Marshall, who stated: "[T]he fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in
the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law."
27
The Supreme Court recognized as early as 1941 that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts. 28 Although this basic right of
access is now well established and prisoners are seeking post-conviction
relief in ever increasing numbers,2 9 the extent of a state's obligation in
the prison administration, thus providing an important step towards rehabilitation. Many
existing prison organizations are devoted to educational advancement, religious interests,
recreational activities and even the sale of inmate craft items. P. KEvE, PRISON LIFE AND
HUMAN WORTH 67-71 (1974); Fox, supra note 10, at 181.
21. See 433 U.S. at 141-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Fox, supra note 10, at 164.
22. 430 U.S. 817 (1977), affig 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1976).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
24. 430 U.S. at 818.
25. Id. at 819.
26. 538 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1976) (affirming district court's approval of state's plan with two
minor modifications pertaining to equality of access to legal research facilities between male
and female prisoners).
27. 430 U.S. at 828 (footnote omitted).
28. Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). The Court in ExparteHull invalidated a regulation
prohibiting state prisoners from filing habeas corpus petitions unless the petitions had been
drawn by a legal investigator for the parole board. Id. at 549.
29. In the decade between 1963 and 1973, prisoner petitions, including habeas corpus
actions, in the federal courts soared from 4,337 to 17,218. This represents a 400% increase
compared with a slightly more than 50% increase during the same period in all civil cases filed.
ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 11, at 421.
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assuring that prisoners have "meaningful access" to the courts is still a
subject of much litigation. 30 Supreme Court decisions in recent years have
gradually expanded the list of rights necessary for prisoners to have effective
access to courts for adjudication of their claims. 31 In Bounds the Court has
signalled a halt to this expansive trend by reaffirming its earlier position
32
and refusing to find that the right of meaningful access requires a state to
provide independent legal advisors for inmates.
33
State correctional officials opposed the establishment of prison law
libraries primarily on the ground that the right of a prisoner to bring a federal
habeas corpus or civil rights action is a federal statutory right rather than a
constitutional right; consequently, the duty of the state is merely negative: it
must not act in ways that interfere with the exercise of such federal rights.
34
Justice Marshall announced a "fundamental constitutional right of access to
the courts" 35 that not only proscribes overly restrictive prison regulations
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (states must provide trial records to
inmates unable to buy them); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (indigent prisioners must be
allowed to file appeals and habeas corpus petitions without payment of docket fees); Long v.
District Ct., 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (states must provide transcript of post conviction hearing);
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (states must provide habeas corpus transcript);
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (regulation prohibiting prisoners from assisting each
other with habeas corpus applications and other legal matters unconstitutional); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (regulations barring law students and paralegals from seeing
inmate clients unconstitutional); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (regulation prohibit-
ing jailhouse lawyers from assisting prisoners in civil rights actions unconstitutional). See
generally Alpert, Prisoners'Right of Access to the Courts: PlanningforLegalAid, 51 WASH. L.
REv. 653 (1976); Wedlock, The Emerging Rights of the Confined: Access to the Courts and
Counsel, 25 S.C.L. REV. 605 (1973); Note, The Expansion of a Prisoner's Right of Access to the
Courts, 1 CAPITAL U.L. REV. 192 (1972).
32. In Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971), aff'gpercuriam Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.
Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of a three judge court that
a state has an affirmative constitutional duty to furnish law libraries to prisoners or to provide
them with professional or quasi-professional legal assistance. The test to be used was whether
"indigent prisioners are given adequate means of obtaining the legal expertise necessary to
obtain judicial consideration of alleged grievances cognizable by the Courts." 319 F. Supp. at
112.
33. The inmates sought to require the state to set up an independent attorney's office to
provide prisoners with additional assistance. The Fourth Circuit, relying on Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600 (1974) (right of meaningful access to the courts does not require appointment of
counsel to file petitions for discretionary review in state courts), found that an independent
attorney's office was an alternative to providing adequate legal research facilities. 538 F.2d at
544. See also Kirby v. Ciccone, 491 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 1974).
34. 430 U.S. at 823. The State, relying on Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), which
struck down a regulation prohibiting prisoners from assisting each other with habeas corpus
applications and other legal matters, argued that as long as it permitted writ writers to function
and did not restrict inmate communication on legal matters, it had satisfied its constitutional
obligation and had no further obligation to spend state funds to implement affirmatively the
right of access. See also id. at 833-36. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35. 430 U.S. at 828. Justice Marshall's majority opinion, however, did not make the
source of this fundamental constitutional right clear. It stated that "habeas corpus and civil
rights actions are of 'fundamental importance. . . in our constitutional scheme' because they
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but also places affirmative obligations on the states to assure prisoners
meaningful access to the courts.36 The affirmative obligation placed on the
states requires only that correctional officials offer some form of basic
assistance to prisoners with legal problems; providing independent legal
advisors is an alternative method of meeting this obligation rather than an
additional requirement.
37
While the Court's decision is an important step toward facilitating
judicial review of prisoners' claims, full implementation of the right of a
prisoner to seek judicial relief would require the states to provide indepen-
dent legal advisors for inmates. 38 The Supreme Court has recognized the
need of prisoners for legal services in a number of contexts 39 but has
refrained from requiring states to provide counsel in prison matters largely
because of the concern that it would create an unreasonable financial burden
on the states and because alternative methods have been considered ade-
quate to satisfy the needs of prisoners for legal services. 4° There are,
however, many justifications for an expansive right to counsel for prison-
directly protect our most valued rights." Id. at 827 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
485 (1969)). The Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), held: "The right of access to
the courts. . . is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental
constitutional rights." Id. at 579.
36. Justice Marshall asserted that Supreme Court decisions had "consistently required
States to shoulder affirmative obligations,': but cited only cases requiring state expenditures for
indigent defendants at trial and in appeals as of right, not for prisoners making collateral attacks
on their convictions. 430 U.S. at 824-25 (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
37. Id. at 830-32.
38. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932), the Supreme Court stated: "The right
to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel." The ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners took the position that
any scheme for providing legal services to inmates should reflect the structure established for
making legal services available to free citizens. The Joint Committee concluded in standard
2.2(b): "Prisoners should be entitled to retain counsel or an advisor of their own choosing when
able to do so and, when indigent, to have legal assistance provided for them." ABA Joint
Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 11, at 426-29.
39. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40. ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 1I, at 427-28. See
also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (no
right to counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(states are not constitutionally obliged to provide counsel in all probation and parole revocation
proceedings but should do so when indigent probationer or parolee may have difficulty in
presenting his version of disputed facts).
North Carolina authorizes the expenditure of state funds for appointment of counsel in
some post-conviction proceedings for prisoners whose claims survive initial review by the
courts. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-451 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This statute, however, does not cover
appointment of counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings or state or federal civil rights
actions. 430 U.S. at 828 n.17. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (prisoner seeking
discretionary review is not denied meaningful access by failure of state to appoint counsel).
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ers. 41 A frequently cited justification is that the assurance of fairness and the
protection against arbitrary and erroneous decisions is essential to uphold
the integrity of the correctional system.42 The protection of constitutional
rights should not be unnecessarily restricted by the cost of implementation. 43
Furthermore, prisoners have a unique need for legal assistance that cannot
be adequately met merely by providing access to legal materials.' The
presence of counsel would also further legitimate state interests: lawyers
would be able to mediate many prisoner complaints or to convince an inmate
that a particular cause of action will be unsuccessful, thus saving valuable




In adopting the parole procedure changes recommended by the Crimi-
nal Code Commission, the 1977 General Assembly assured prison inmates
of periodic parole review while giving trial judges and prosecuting attorneys
more influence in the parole process. 46 The most significant changes from
present procedure are the time-served eligibility requirements47 and the
41. See ABA Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal
Services to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REV. 363 (1974); Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners'
Need for Legal Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493 (1970).
42. ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 11, at 427. See also
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
43. The ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners estimates that between 460
and 900 lawyers would be required to provide legal services to all inmates in the United States.
The ABA Correctional Economics Center estimates that the annual per prisoner cost of
providing this level of legal services would be $75. Such a program, if implemented, would raise
the total annual cost per inmate by less than 1.1%. ABA Joint Committee on the Legal Status of
Prisoners, supra note 11, at 428-29.
44. Confinement often precludes a prisoner from gathering the information necessary for
a successful lawsuit. Prison libraries rarely contain the facilities for adequate research of legal
issues. In addition, many prisoners are either illiterate or incapable of handling even simple
legal matters. Id. at 427.
45. 430 U.S. at 831. In a national survey, nearly 95% of state corrections officials
responding supported creation and expansion of prison legal services. Over 80% believed that
the furnishing of legal services would provide a safety valve for inmate grievances, reduce
inmate power structures, reduce tensions from unresolved legal problems and contribute to
rehabilitation by providing a positive experience with the legal system. Cardarelli & Finkel-
stein, Correctional Administrators Assess the Adequacy and Impact of Prison Legal Services
Programs in the United States, 65 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 91, 95-99 (1974). See
also Champagne & Haas, The Impact of Johnson v. Avery on Prison Administration, 43 TENN.
L. REV. 275, 295-99 (1976); Wexler, Counseling Convicts: The Lawyer's Role in Uncovering
Legitimate Claims, 11 ARIz. L. REv. 629 (1969).
46. The new parole provisions appear in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1371 to -1377 (Cum. Supp.
1977). These laws do not apply to persons sentenced before July 1, 1978. Law of June 23, 1977,
ch. 711, § 39, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 900. See NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL CODE COMMISSION,
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM AND REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 137-39
(1977).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
1978] 1107
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
permitting of appeal from a parole revocation.48 The due process require-
ments for parole revocation hearings, as set forth in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Brewer,49 have also been
codified with statutory time limits for holding such hearings. 50 On the whole
the new procedures attempt to prevent those paroles that impair the criminal
sentencing process while recognizing the prisoner's interest in an early
parole.
Until July 1978, when the legislature's changes went into effect, North
Carolina prisoners were eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of a
determinate sentence or one-fourth of the minimum of an indeterminate
sentence.51 Now, G.S. 15A-1371(a) makes a prisoner eligible for parole
consideration at any time unless his sentence includes a minimum term or he
is serving a term of life imprisonment. 52 In an effort to increase the
importance of a judge's minimum sentence, 53 a prisoner with a sentence that
includes a minimum term is eligible for parole only after serving that
minimum term or one-fifth of the maximum allowed by law, whichever is
less.54 This provision perhaps will ease the frustration that some trial judges
feel toward the parole process 55 by giving the trial judge some control over
when a prisoner might be released on parole. Previously, North Carolina
courts held this decision to be the sole responsibility of the Parole Commis-
sion.
56
Whereas the former North Carolifia provision concerning parole did not
specifically require that prisoners be considered for parole once they became
eligible, 57 newly enacted G.S. 15A-1371 (b) mandates that once a prisoner is
eligible for parole he must be considered at least once a year until parole is
48. Id. § 15A-1377.
49. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1376 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
51. Law of May 10, 1935, ch. 414, § 8, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 628 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1974)) (repealed 1977).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Under the former law a person serving a life sentence was eligible for parole after serving
20 years. Law of May 10, 1935, ch. 414, § 58, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 628 (formdrly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1974)) (repealed 1977). Section 15A-1371, however, has
no provision for parole from a determinate life sentence although a person serving an indetermi-
nate sentence with life as the maximum would be eligible for parole after 20 years or the length
of the minimum sentence, whichever is less.
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(a), Official Commentary (Cum. Supp. 1977).
54. Id. § 15A-1371(a).
55. See State v. Snowden, 26 N.C. App. 45, 215 S.E.2d 157 (1975) (trial judge imposes
unusually long sentences because of dissatisfaction with length of time offenders remain in
prison).
56. Id. at 48, 215 S.E.2d at 159.
57. Law of May 10, 1935, ch. 414, § 8, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 628 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58 (1974)) (repealed 1977).
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granted.5 8 Moreover, to assure that all the facts will be considered when
reviewing the eligibility of a prisoner who has served less than one-half of
his maximum sentence, the Parole Commission must now notify the district
attorney for the district where the prisoner was convicted.59 Upon notifica-
tion, the district attorney can ask the parole commission to conduct its
considerations publicly. 0 Although there is no indication that G.S. 15A-
1371(b) empowers the district attorney to present evidence against the
granting of parole, placing the process in the public view should serve to
intensify the Commission's scrutiny. 61
The new parole law affects not only the eligibility of the prisoner
seeking parole; the parolee facing the possibility of a parole revocation will
also find that his rights have changed significantly. Prior to 1975, North
Carolina courts held that upon revocation a parolee was not entitled to credit
the time spent on parole against his active sentence. 62 In 1975, the legisla-
ture passed an amendment to the general statutes that essentially overruled
these decisions aiid permitted parole time to be credited against an active
sentence. 63 Now, G.S. 15A-1373(d)(2) reflects a further change in the
legislature's position. Although the new parole law gives the parolee credit
against his active sentence for all time spent in custody as a result of any
revocation proceedings, 64 no credit is given for time spent on parole prior to
revocation. 65 Prior to 1977, when a parole revocation was based on the
commission of a new crime, the Parole Commission could in its discretion
direct that the unserved portion of the parolee's sentence be served at the end
of the new sentence. 66 Since this provision was not expressly carried over to
the new parole law, it is questionable whether the Commission still pos-
sesses this power. If the Commission does not have this power and the
unserved portion of the old sentence is served concurrently with any newly
imposed sentence, the provision preventing credit against an active sentence
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1371(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
59. Id.
60. Id. Section 15A-1371(d) codifies the only legitimate reasons for denying parole. See
id. § 1371(d), Official Commentary.
61. Under id. § 15A-1371(f), the prisoner who has been unable to qualify for parole must
be paroled 6 months prior to the end of his sentence. The former statute, Law of June 16, 1975,
ch. 618, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 736 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-60.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1975)) (repealed 1977), mandated parole 90 days prior to the expiration of a prisoner's
sentence.
62. State v. Davis, 19 N.C. App. 459, 199 S.E.2d 37 (1973).
63. Law of June 23, 1975, ch. 720, § 3, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 973 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-58.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975)) (amending Law of Feb. 3, 1953, ch. 17, § 7,
1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 12) (repealed 1977).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1373(d)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
65. Id. § 15A-1373, Official Commentary.
66. Law of May 10, 1935, ch. 414, § 12, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 628 (formerly codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-62 (1974)) (repealed 1977).
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for time spent on parole would only be crucial when no new crime has been
committed.67
Under a provision carried over from the former statute, 68 a parolee is
subject to arrest for a violation of a condition of parole69 only upon an order
of revocation from the Parole Commission. 70 In what appears to be a change
from present practice, 71 however, the new law permits the revocation
hearing to be held without first arresting the parolee. 72 Although the
parolee's due process rights are protected under the Parole Commission's
administrative regulations, 73 G.S. 15A-1376 is a codification of the due
process requirements of a parole revocation hearing as set forth in Morrissey
v. Brewer.74 As suggested by Morrissey,75 the new statute requires a
preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that a condition of parole has been violated. 76 The Parole Commission is not
required to order the arrest of a parolee before holding a revocation hear-
ing,77 but when a parolee is arrested for violating a condition of parole, the
new statute directs that the preliminary hearing be held within four working
days of the arrest. 78 If the hearing is not held within this time limit, the
parolee must be released on parole pending a hearing. 79 The final revocation
hearing must be held within forty-five days of the parolee's reconfine-
ment,80 thereby placing a definite time limit on Morrissey's requirement
that the hearing be held within a reasonable time.
81
67. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1373(d)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1977), when a term of parole
has been revoked, the parolee must be recommitted for the unserved portion of the maximum
term or six months, whichever is greater.
68. Law of May 10, 1955, ch. 867, § 6, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 815 (formerly codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-61.1 (1964)) (repealed 1977).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1374 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
70. Id. § 15A-1376(a).
71. See Clarke, Probation and Parole in North Carolina: Revocation Procedure and
Related Issues, 13 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 5, 60 (1977).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1376(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
73. N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 4F.0400 (1976).
74. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1376, Official Commentary (Cum.
Supp. 1977). In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Supreme Court said that counsel
should be provided if requested by the parolee facing the possibility of parole revocation-f.the
parolee has a timely and colorable claim that he is innocent of violating the conditions of parole
or that, even if he did violate parole, there are complex reasons why revocation is inapprop-
riate. Id. at 790. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-62.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) permits the appointment of
counsel for indigents at parole revocation hearings.
75. 408 U.S. at 485-87.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1376(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
77. See discussion in text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1376(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Morrissey requires the prelimi-
nary hearing to be held "as promptly as convenient after arrest." 408 U.S. at 485.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1376(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
80. Id. § 15A-1376(e).
81. 408 U.S. at 488.
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Under former North Carolina law, review of a parole revocation was
limited because there was no statutory provision for appeal82 and the Depart-
ment of Correction is exempt from review under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act.8 3 Although one federal court has allowed review of a Parole
Commission determination by means of habeas corpus, 84 and North Caro-
lina courts have reviewed laws affecting the power of the Parole Commis-
sion under the Declaratory Judgment Act,8 5 the concept of separation of
powers and the discretionary nature of parole revocation have for the most
part discouraged review of parole revocations.86 Therefore, G.S. 15A-1377
is perhaps one of the most important changes in the parole procedures from
the parolee's standpoint because it permits a parolee to appeal a parole
revocation under North Carolina's Administrative Procedures Act.8 7 The
standard of review of a discretionary act of the Parole Commission may not
be very demanding, but at least there is now the possibility of some review.




In Rauchfuss v. Rauchfusst the North Carolina Court of Appeals
confronted the issue whether a husband, by causing a mortgagee to reconvey
property to him individually that had previously been held in a tenancy by
the entirety, could terminate any interest of the wife in the property. The
subject property in Rauchfuss (land) had been conveyed to a corporation as
security for a loan, and the corporation agreed to reconvey the property to
the husband and wife upon payment of the loan.2 The husband paid off the
loan and the corporation reconveyed the property to him alone. The North
Carolina Court of Appeals held that the actions of the husband did not cut
82. See Clarke, supra note 71, at 69.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977) specifically exempts the Department of
Correction from review under the Act.
84. Howie v. Byrd, 396 F. Supp. 117 (W.D.N.C. 1975), rev'd mem., 532 F.2d 750 (4th Cir.
1976).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1969); see Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184
S.E.2d 259 (1971).
86. See Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 563-65, 184 S.E.2d 259, 265-66 (1971).
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1377 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
1. 33 N.C. App. 108, 234 S.E.2d 423 (1977).
2. Id. at 110-11, 234 S.E.2d at 425.
3. Id. at I 11, 234 S.E.2d at 425.
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off the interests of the wife and, using the resulting trust and constructive
trust devices, held that the wife was entitled to an undivided one-half
interest in the property.
4
In North Carolina a deed to a man and wife vests title in them as tenants
by the entirety, even though the man furnishes the entire consideration.5 The
law presumes that the husband intended a gift to the wife of her interest in
the property. 6 The land in question in Rauchfuss was purchased with funds
derived from the sale of entirety property; consequently, the wife was
deemed to have furnished some consideration for the property to support a
resulting trust in her favor.
7
The court of appeals also found the principles of a constructive trust
applicable.8 The court noted that it was not necessary to prove fraud to
imply such a trust; all that need be shown is that legal title had been
" 'obtained in violation, express or implied, of some duty owed to the one
who is equitably entitled [to the property].' "9 In order to find the existence
4. Id. at 113-16, 234 S.E.2d at 426-28.
5. See, e.g., Freeze v. Congleton, 276 N.C. 178, 171 S.E.2d 424 (1970); Combs v. Combs,
273 N.C. 462, 160 S.E.2d 308 (1968); Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960).
An estate by the entirety in personal property is not recognized in North Carolina. When land
held as a tenancy by the entirety is sold, the proceeds derived from the sale are personalty and
belong to the husband and wife as tenants in common. The wife's share remains her sole and
separate estate. N.C. CONST. art. X, § 4; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1976); Bowling v. Bowling,
252 N.C. at 531, 114 S.E.2d at 231.
6. Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 97 S.E.2d 222 (1957); Honeycutt ',. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955); Strange v. Sink, 27 N.C. App. 113, 218 S.E.2d 196
(1975). To rebut this presumption of a gift to the wife and to establish a resulting trust in favor
of the husband, the evidence must be clear, strong, cogent and convincing. Honeycutt v,
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. at 741, 89 S.E.2d at 604. Conversely, when a husband acquires
possession of the separate property of his wife, even if done with her consent, the transaction
does not raise the presumption of a gift from the wife to the husband; instead, he is deemed to
hold it in trust for her benefit. Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960); Dunn
v. Dunn, 242 N.C. 234,87 S.E.2d 308 (1955); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411,
130 S.E. 45 (1925).
7. 33 N.C. App. at 113, 234 S.E.2d at 426. A resulting trust arises by operation of law
when a person conveys property under circumstances that raise the inference that he does not
intend the taker to have both the legal and equitable title to the property. Strange v. Sink, 27
N.C. App. 113, 116, 218 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1975). A resulting trust differs from a constructive
trust in that it is primarily a means of effectuating the inferred intents of the parties rather than a
remedial device for frustrating an evil intent or the making of a restitution. 4A R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 590 (1977).
8. A constructive trust arises when a person holding title to property is subject to an
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he
were permitted to retain it. Tractor & Auto Supply Co. v. Fayetteville Tractor & Equip. Co., 2
N.C. App. 531, 542-44, 163 S.E.2d 510, 517-18 (1968). A common, indispensable element of
those cases in which a constructive trust is deemed to arise is the presence of fraud, the breach
of a duty or some other wrongdoing by the holder of the property. Wilson v. Crab Orchard Dev.
Co., 276 N.C. 198, 212, 171 S.E.2d 873, 882 (1970). See generally Lauerman, Constructive
Trusts and Restitutionary Liens in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv. 424 (1967); see also R.
POWELL, supra note 7, 593.
9. 33 N.C. App. at 113, 234 S.E.2d at 426 (quoting Colwell Elec. Co. v. Kale-Barnwell
Realty & Constr. Co., 267 N.C. 714, 719, 148 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1966)).
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of some duty, the court relied on several cases finding that the marital
relationship is one of utmost confidence and that any transaction between
the parties is held to a high standard of fairness. 10 From these cases the court
inferred a strict fiduciary duty on the part of the husband and found that his
actions had violated this duty, thus justifying the imposition of a construc-
tive trust on the property for the benefit of the wife.I1
The court's decision is significant for two reasons. First, the court has
substantially increased the importance of the "confidential relationship"
pertaining between a husband and wife as it affects legal acts between
parties. Previously, the concept had been invoked only in cases concerning
transactions between the husband and wife; usually some element of fraud
or overreaching was present. 12 The court's opinion in Rauchfuss expands
this concept to encompass transactions between the husband and a third
party. Second, the court has substantially lessened the burden of proof that
the wife must meet in order to obtain relief. Whereas the husband must
produce "clear, strong, cogent and convincing" proof, 13 the wife need only
show " 'the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair advantage.' "14
Although the court reached an equitable result in Rauchfuss, it did not need
to apply different burdens of proof in order to protect the wife's interest in
the property. 15 The idea that a wife is under the complete dominance of her
10. Id. at 114, 234 S.E.2d at 427 (citing, e.g., Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697
(1971); Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968)).
11. Id. at 115, 234 S.E.2d at 427.
12. E.g., Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 179 S.E.2d 697 (1971) (husband who induced
estranged wife to transfer corporate securities to him by threats and abuse violated his duty to
exercise utmost good faith in transaction and to disclose all material facts relating thereto);
Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968) (to be valid, separation agreement
between husband and wife must be untainted by fraud and entered into without coercion or
undue influence and with full knowledge of all material circumstances); Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C.
20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965) (husband who obtained money from his wife by orally promising to
convey her a one-half interest in his real property violated fiduciary relationship existing
between the parties).
13. See note 6 supra. See also Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 97 S.E.2d 222 (1957);
Shue v. Shue, 241 N.C. 65, 84 S.E.2d 302 (1954); Bowden v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d
289 (1954); Williams v. Williams, 231 N.C. 33, 56 S.E.2d 20 (1949).
14. 33 N.C. App. at 114, 234 S.E.2d at 427 (quoting Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 192, 179
S.E.2d 687, 704 (1971)).
15. The different standards of proof required by the Rauchfuss court are largely a result
of the unique nature of the marital relationship. Ordinarily in an action to establish a construc-
tive trust the fraud or inequitable conduct must be established by clear, strong and convincing
proof. Winner v. Winner, 222 N.C. 414, 23 S.E.2d 251 (1942) (holding that fraud, duress or
undue influence must be shown by clear, strong and convincing evidence to engraft construc-
tive trust on gift of money by parent to one of his children). See also Katz v. Katz, 121
N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Colwell Elec. Co. v. Kale-Barnwell Realty & Constr. Co., 267
N.C. 714, 148 S.E.2d 856 (1966); Carmichael v. Huggins, 221 S.C. 278,70 S.E.2d 223 (1952); R.
POWELL, supra note 7, 594, at 570. Nevertheless, the court of appeals in Rauchfuss justified
the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the wife on the grounds that because of their
marriage a "confidential relationship existed between the parties, and the law presumes fraud
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husband is no longer valid; both the husband and wife should be held to the




In Kritzer v. Town of Southern Pines,"8 the court of appeals interpreted
the statutory requirements for annexation of new territory by a munici-
pality. 19 The Town Council of Southern Pines adopted an oral resolution of
its intent to consider annexing "these areas," referring to certain lands
described in an annexation study20 and displayed on an accompanying
map. 21 After a public hearing on the subject, the Council voted to annex
in transactions when confidential relationships exist between the parties." 33 N.C. App. at 114,
234 S.E.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
16. The relation of husband and wife is usually treated as highly confidential and any
abuse of this relationship is recognized as adequate to support the imposition of a constructive
trust. The notion that the husband is the dominant party prevails in the vast majority of
jurisdictions, thus placing the burden on him to show that any transactions concerning the
parties are free from coercion, undue influence or overreaching and done with full knowledge
of all material circumstances. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Walter, 57 Cal. App. 3d 802, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 351 (1976); Bonarrigo v. Bonarrigo, 47 App. Div. 2d 642, 363 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1975); C.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482, at 133-38 (1960).
In other activity in 1977 relating to husband-wife transactions, the North Carolina General
Assembly implicitly recognized that the notion of a husband's dominance in the marital
relationship is no longer valid. The General Assembly passed Law of May 13, 1977, ch. 375, §§
1, 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 375 (repealing Law of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 193, § 27, 1871 N.C. Pub.
Laws 336 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-6 (1976)) and amending Law
of Feb. 12, 1872, ch. 193, § 28, 1871 N.C. Pub. Laws 337 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 52-10 (Supp. 1977))). Former § 52-6 required any contract of a wife with her husband
affecting the wife's real estate to be written and to be acknowledged by a certifying officer who
had made a private examination of the wife. This section was applicable to the wife's interest in
an estate by the entireties; an instrument purporting to convey the wife's interest without the
certificate required by statute was void. Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 N.C. 734, 89
S.E.2d 598 (1955); Davis v. Bass, 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924). The amendments to § 52-10
reverse this rule and provide that contracts between a husband and wife, including separation
agreements, are valid without consideration and even though no private examination of the wife
is conducted.
17. In 1977, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.11
(Cum. Supp. 1977), which prohibits the operation of more than one adult establishment in any
one building. This statute was recently declared unconstitutional by the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina in U.T., Inc. v. Edmisten, No. CC-77-0365
(W.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 1978) and by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina in Hart Book Store, Inc. v. Edmisten, No. 77-387-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 12,
1978)For a further discussion of these decisions and the constitutional status of this statute, see
this Survey, Constitutional Law: First Amendment.
18. 33 N.C. App. 152, 234 S.E.2d 648 (1977).
19. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-47, -49 (1976 & Supp. 1977). In Sellers v. City of
Asheville, 33 N.C. App. 544, 236 S.E.2d 283 (1977), the court of appeals declared that a city
must bear the cost of ascertaining with certainty the extent of its extraterritorial zoning
jurisdiction under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 (Supp. 1977), by defining with specificity the
boundaries of the allowed one mile extraterritorial zone in terms of geographical features
identifiable on the ground.
20. The study also included statements that sewer lines would be constructed within one
year of the effective date of annexation. 33 N.C. App. at 157, 234 S.E.2d at 651.
21. Id. at 153,234 S.E.2d at 649. Both the study and the map indicating the proposed areas
for annexation were before the Town Council when the resolution was adopted. Id.
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these areas, 22 and plaintiffs, owners or residents of property within the
annexed areas, appealed for review of the annexation ordinances, alleging
violations of G.S. 160A-49(a).23 The court of appeals, in interpreting the
statute, held that the resolution of notice of intent to consider annexation is
not required to be written. 24 In addition, it determined that the requisite
description of the boundaries of the proposed annexation areas in the
resolution was adequate in this instance,25 because of testimony before the
trial court that maps clearly outlining the specific boundaries were before the
Town Council when the resolution concerning "these areas" was offered
and adopted.26
This broad construction of G.S. 160A-49(a) facilitates the ability of a
municipality to commence the annexation process. Not only is the amount
of requisite paperwork reduced, but under this ruling a municipality's
governing board need only describe the proposed areas in its resolution of
intent to annex in the most general terms, provided it can prove it possessed
a clear understanding of the exact lands to which this description referred
when the resolution was adopted. Because this entire procedure is in reality
merely an internal board affair simply designed as a prelude to subsequent
stages of the annexation process, minimal formalities should suffice. As the
Kritzer court noted, the rights of affected landowners within the proposed
areas continue to be adequately protected by the specificity of description
required by G.S. 160A-49(b) 27 in the notice of public hearing on the
proposed annexation, 28 and by the prohibition upon the governing board's
22. Id. at 154, 234 S.E.2d at 650. Notice of the hearing was placed in a local newspaper
and contained a map of the areas and a metes and bounds description of the land proposed for
annexation. Id. at 153, 234 S.E.2d at 649.
23. Id. at 155, 234 S.E.2d at 650. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(a) (1976) provides in part:
"Any municipal governing board desiring to annex territory. . . shall first pass a resolution
stating the intent of the municipality to consider annexation. Such resolution shall describe the
boundaries of the area under consideration .... " Plaintiffs claimed that the resolution of
notice of intent to consider annexation must be written, and that the Town Council's resolution
did not provide an adequate description of the proposed areas for annexation. 33 N.C. App. at
155, 234 S.E.2d at 650-51. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-47(3)c
(1976) which requires the inclusion of a proposed timetable for construction of sewer lines in
the annexation plans. They maintained that the town's annexation study, which provided for
construction to begin within 12 months of the effective date of annexation, did not set forth a
sufficient timetable under the statute. The court of appeals rejected this argument, however,
based upon the rejection by the supreme court of a similar argument presented in Dunn v. City
of Charlotte, 284 N.C. 542, 201 S.E.2d 873 (1974). 33 N.C. App. at 156-57, 234 S.E.2d at 651.
24. 33 N.C. App. at 155, 234 S.E.2d at 650. The court relied solely upon the statutory
language in question.
25. The court reached this ruling even though the resolution did not expressly describe the
territories or incorporate a description by explicit reference. Id. at 156, 234 S.E.2d at 651.
26. Id.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(b) (1976).
28. 33 N.C. App. at 155, 234 S.E.2d at 651.
1978] 1115
1116 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56





The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Board of Transportation v.
Brown3t considered the admissibility of evidence of traffic noise in deter-
mining damages when land is taken for highway purposes. Eight of 52.2
acres owned by defendants were condemned and appropriated for the
construction of a controlled access highway. 32 In assessing damages,33 the
trial court refused to hear evidence relating to the diminution in value of
defendants' remaining land allegedly resulting from the traffic noise of the
highway to be built on their taken land.34 Relying upon two North Carolina
Supreme Court railroad eminent domain cases35 in which noise was con-
sidered in determining damage done to the remainder land, the court of
appeals held that noise may be considered as a contributing element of
damages to the remaining lands "only if it is demonstrably resultant from
the use of the particular lands taken.'"36 It further held, consistent with the
railroad cases, that defendants need not prove what damages were attribut-
able to the use of their taken land as opposed to the similar use of surround-
ing condemned land, when such damages were common to the entire
neighborhood. 37 ,
While this decision reaffirms the principle that noise is to be considered
as an element of damages in condemnation cases, it is important in extend-
ing such consideration to the exercise of eminent domain for purposes of
highway construction. The appropriation of land for railroad usage is rare in
29. Id. at 156, 234 S.E.2d at 651; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(e) (1976).
30. The North Carolina General Assembly enacted amendments to N.C. GEN. STAT. §
136-18 (Cum. Supp. 1977), that allow the Department of Transportation to condemn land to
improve state maintained secondary roads upon request by a county board of commissioners.
The power to condemn is triggered when owners of land abutting the property to be con-
demned, whose frontage totals at least 75% of the footage sought to be improved, petition the
appropriate board of commissioners to request the Department to exercise the power. Id. § 136-
18(26).
31. 34 N.C. App. 266, 237 S.E.2d 854, cert. granted, appeal dismissed, 293 N.C. 740, 241
S.E.2d 515 (1977) (No. 88 pc).
32. Id. at 267, 237 S.E.2d at 854.
33. The measure of damages when a portion of land is appropriated for highway purposes
is "the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract immediately prior to said
taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately after said taking." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 136-112(1) (1974).
34. 34 N.C. App. at 267, 237 S.E.2d at 855.
35. Id. at 269,237 S.E.2d at 856 (citing Raleigh, C. & S. Ry. v. Mecklenburg Mfg. Co., 169
N.C. 156, 85 S.E. 390 (1915); Carolina & Yadkin River R.R. v. Armfield, 167 N.C. 464, 83 S.E.
809 (1914)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 269-70, 237 S.E.2d at 856.
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an age in which automobile transportation dominates. It is significant as
well that the court did not restrict the admissibility of noise damage evidence
to those cases in which it can be apportioned to the use made of taken land,
since in many circumstances this places an impossible burden of proof upon
the owner of the taken and remaining lands.
38
In Orange Water & Sewer Authority v. Estate of Armstrong 39 the
court of appeals clarified the eminent domain rights of water and sewer
authorities created pursuant to Article I, Chapter 162A of the North Carolina
General Statutes. 40 Plaintiff, which provides water and sewer services to
several communities, decided it was necessary to construct a new dam and
reservoir on portions of defendants' property, but was prevented by defend-
ants from surveying the land.4 It was thus forced to obtain a temporary
injunction in order to obtain entry onto defendants' lands for those pur-
poses. 42 The court of appeals held that plaintiff, as a Chapter 162A authori-
ty, possessed the same eminent domain powers as cities and counties, but in
addition was required to obtain a certificate of authorization before begin-
ning an eminent domain action.43 In this situation, however, no certificate
was required since plaintiff was not involved in an eminent domain action,
44
but was merely protecting its right to enter and survey lands prior to
instituting an eminent domain proceeding.
45
The court's decision is of primary interest in defining the eminent
domain rights and powers of Chapter 162A water and sewer authorities,
particularly in light of the recent trend of decreased rainfall across the state
which might require prompt action by such authorities to procure needed
water supplies. 46 The result appears well founded as a pragmatic response to
38. Id.; see Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 488, 501-03 (1974).
39. 34 N.C. App. 162, 237 S.E.2d 486, cert. denied, 293 N.C. 593, 239 S.E.2d 265 (1977).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 162A-1 to -19 (1976); see note 43 infra.
41. 34 N.C. App. at 162, 237 S.E.2d at 487.
42. Id. at 162-63, 237 S.E.2d at 487.
43. Id. at 164, 237 S.E.2d at 488. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162A-6(10) (1976) empowers Chapter
162A authorities
to acquire in the name of the authority by. . .exercise of the right of eminent domain
in accordance with the General Statutes. . .which may be applicable to the exercise
of such powers by municipalities or counties, any lands or rights in land or water rights
in connection therewith. . . as it may deem necessary in connection with the acquisi-
tion, construction, reconstruction, improvement, extension, enlargement or operation
of any water system or sewer system ....
Id. The eminent domain powers and limitations of cities and towns are found in Article 11 of
Chapter 160A, id. §§ 160A-240 to -263 (1976); those of counties-are located in Article 8, Part 1 of
Chapter 153A, id. §§ 153A-158 to -177 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977). Id. § 162A-7(a) (1976) sets out
the requirement of a certificate of authorization.
44. 34 N.C. App. at 164, 237 S.E.2d at 488.
45. Id. This right is identical to the right granted to cities by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-263
(1976).
46. For statistical data evidencing the existence of such a trend, compare the figures for
rainfall for the years 1971-1977 presented in "Monthly Summarized Station and Divisional
19781 1117
1118 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
the exigencies faced by these authorities, for they would encounter con-
siderable difficulty in trying to precisely describe those lands they wish to
acquire in petitions for certificates to exercise eminent domain if they are
unable to inspect and survey the lands beforehand. 47
D. Surface Water Drainage
In Pendergrast v. Aiken,48 a downstream landowner placed a culvert in
a drainage ditch running through his property and then filled the ditch and
property with dirt. As a result, the stream that formerly coursed through the
ditch backed up several times during rainfalls and flooded a building on
plaintiff's land. Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging that under the "civil
law rule"4 9 any interference with the natural flow of surface waters50 was a
nuisance. 51 Defendant countered that under a "reasonable use rule" 52 he
Data" in CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA-NORTH CAROLINA, published by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration.
47. See 34 N.C. App. at 164, 237 S.E.2d at 488.
48. 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977).
49. The civil law rule forbids any interference, obstruction or diversion of the natural flow
of surface waters and subjects a landowner to liability when he alters the natural course of the
waters to the detriment of another. Id. at 208-09, 236 S.E.2d at 791-92; 5 R. CLARK, WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 452.1 (1972). See also Long & Long, Surface Waters and the Civil Law
Rule, 23 EMORY L.J. 1015 (1974). The civil law rule previously followed in North Carolina was
stated by the supreme court as follows:
The law confers on the owner of each upper estate an easement or servitude in the
lower estates for the drainage of surface water flowing in its natural course and
manner without obstruction or interruption by the owners of the lower estates to the
detriment or injury of the upper estates.
Midgett v. North Carolina State Hwy. Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 246, 132 S.E.2d 599,605 (1963).
See also Note, Disposition of Diffused Surface Waters in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. REV. 205
(1968). Various rationales have been advanced in support of the civil law rule. Some courts felt
that since there had to be some rule, the rule of nature was r qasonable and just. R. CLARK,
supra § 452.1, at 502. Others adopted it due to a belief that the common enemy rule, in use
previously in North Carolina and other jurisdictions, was inadequate and encouraged the use of
force. Id. § 452.1, at 503. Under the "common enemy rule" surface water is considered a
common enemy that each landowner may fight as he is able-no cause of action arises from any
interference or diversion of the natural flow of the water, even if such interference results in
damage to others. 293 N.C. at 207-208, 236 S.E.2d at 791; R. CLARK, supra § 451.1. See also
Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 421 (1958). The common enemy rule is based on two concepts: "(I) the
necessity for improving lands with the recognition that some injury results from even minor
improvements, and (2) philosophical preference for freedom of each landowner to deal with his
land essentially as he sees fit." R. CLARK, supra § 451.1, at 488 (footnotes omitted). The rule
has been criticized on the ground that in reality it does very little to promote improvement of the
land, Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RuTGERS L. REV. 621, 690 (1968), and that it
encourages contests of "might" between adjoining landowners seeking to protect their land,
Maloney & Plager, Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Bounty?, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 72
(1968).
50. Technically, water derived from rain, melting snow or springs is "diffused surface
water" and is distinguished from water travelling in a clearly defined channel or a "water-
course." 1 R. CLARK, supra note 49, § 52.1(A), at 302 (1967). While some courts have applied
different rules based on the classification of the water's origin, North Carolina has treated all
water the same under the heading "surface water." 293 N.C. at 206-07, 236 S.E.2d at 790.
51. 293 N.C. at 206, 236 S.E.2d at 790.
52. The reasonable use rule allows the landowner to develop his land even if such
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should not be subject to liability for making improvements on his property
unless his conduct was unreasonable. 53 Although the civil law rule prevailed
at the time suit was initiated,54 the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Pendergrast formally adopted the reasonable use rule with respect to surface
water drainage, finding it a more flexible and less confusing principle for
resolving disputes arising out of interferences with the natural flow of
surface water.
55
Virtually any use of land will affect the drainage and water flow of that
tract; consequently, the strict application of the civil law rule was found to
discourage the improvement and best utilization of land.5 6 The North Caroli-
na courts, while previously proclaiming adherence to the civil law rule, had
recognized numerous exceptions to its application. 57 In doing so the courts
sought to facilitate land development and to avoid hardship in individual
cases. 58 This practice, however, also resulted in a series of inconsistent
decisions on the rule creating much uncertainty in this area of the law.
59
The Pendergrast court's adoption of the reasonable use rule should
provide a flexible benchmark by which a landowner's conduct can be
judged.60 Shifting the focus of inquiry in a surface water drainage case from
concepts of property law to principles of tort law permits a landowner's
conduct to be judged according to a standard of reasonableness 6 1-a more
development alters the natural flow of surface waters and such alteration results in damage to
other landowners; liability is incurred only if the damage to others is found to be unreasonable.
rd. at 209-11, 236 S.E.2d at 792-93; R. CLARK, supra note 49, § 453.1. Including North Carolina,
at least ten states have adopted the reasonable use rule: Weinberg v. Northern Alas. Dev.
Corp., 384 P.2d 450 (Alas. 1963); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970);
Commonwealth, Dep't of Hwys. v. Baird, 444 S.W.2d 541 (Ky. 1969); Sachs v. Chiat, 281
Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968); Armstrong v. Francis Corp., 20 N.J. 320, 120 A.2d 4 (1956);
Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 236 S.E.2d 787 (1977); Jones v. Boeing Co., 153 N.W.2d
897 (N.D. 1967); Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 341 A.2d 735 (1975); Sanford v. University of
Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
Some states have modified the civil law rule so that it is almost indistinguishable from the
reasonable use rule. See, e.g,, Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396, 412 P.2d 529, 50 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1966).
53. See 293 N.C. at 209-11, 236 S.E.2d at 792-93.
54. Id. at 214, 236 S.E.2d at 795.
55. Id. at 215-16, 236 S.E.2d at 796.
56. Id. at 208, 236 S.E.2d at 791.
57. See, e.g., Lease Properties, Inc. v. Shingleton, 25 N.C. App. 287, 212 S.E.2d 683
(1975) (increased flow caused by paving portion of land does not give rise to liability); Magnolia
Apartments, Inc. v. Hanes, 8 N.C. App. 394, 174 S.E.2d 828 (1970) (natural water flow may be
increased but not diverted).
58. 293 N.C. at 212-15, 236 S.E.2d at 793-96; see, e.g., Yowman's v. City of Henderson-
ville, 175 N.C. 574, 96 S.E. 45 (1918).
59. 293 N.C. at 215-16, 236 S.E.2d at 796.
60. See R. CLARK, supra note 49, § 450.3. In addition to the belief that the rule of
reasonable use will not hamper land development, courts have listed other advantages, such as
a more equitable allocation of the cost of land improvements, accruing from application of the
rule. See Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 274, 341 A.2d 735, 741 (1975).
61. "These property concepts are rigid and absolute in nature and, while they are appro-
1119
1120 NORTH CAROLINA J'AW REVIEW [Vol. 56
appropriate measure by which to resolve conflicts over the proper use of
land in an increasingly industrialized and urbanized society. 62 Consequent-
ly, the determination of liability will require a careful comparison of the
benefits created by the challenged conduct with the harms alleged to result
from it. A claim for unreasonable interference with the flow of surface water
will hereafter take the form of a private nuisance action in which liability
will be established whenever the conduct of the landowner is intentional and
unreasonable or negligent. 63
E. Homestead Exemption
In The Seeman Printery, Inc. v. Schinhan,64 the court of appeals
reviewed the validity of the homestead exemption65 as it relates to sale under
execution on a debt. After execution issued on plaintiff's money judgment
against defendant, 66 defendant requested that his homestead be set aside in
accordance with G.S. 1-372,67 the homestead exemption provision, so that
he might receive the $1000 exemption from sale under execution of the
judgment afforded him by the North Carolina Constitution. 68 When the
sheriff and appraisers came to his house to lay off the homestead, defendant
selected the hallway adjacent to the front door, an area approximately 5 feet
by 15.4 feet, as his "homestead.''69 Defendant then filed objections to the
priate where the civil law doctrine is strictly applied, they serve as an impediment where it
becomes necessary to modify the doctrine to accommodate changing social and economic
needs." 293 N.C. at 215, 236 S.E.2d at 795-96. See also Kinyon & McClure (Interferences with
Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. REV. 891, 936-39 (1940); Comment, The Application of Surface
Water Rules in Urban Areas, 42 Mo. L. REV. 76 (1977).
62. 293 N.C. at 211, 236 S.E.2d at 793. But see Long & Long, supra note 49, at 1044-46.
63. 293 N.C. at 217, 236 S.E.2d at 797.
64. 34 N.C. App. 637, 239 S.E.2d 744 (1977).
65. N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 2(l) provides in part: "Every homestead and the dwellings and
buildings used therewith, to a value fixed by the General Assembly but not less than $1,000, to
be selected by the owner thereof. . ., shall be exempt from sale under execution or other final
process obtained on any debt." Id. art. X, § 2(3), (4) was amended by vote of the people at the
general election held on November 8, 1977, to eliminate references to females in the language of
the sections, thereby making them applicable to either gender.
66. Plaintiff had obtained a $5,900 judgment against defendant that was not appealed. 34
N.C. App. at 638, 239 S.E.2d at 745.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-372 (1969) provides in part: "The appraisers shall value the
homestead with its dwellings and buildings thereon, and lay off to the owner. . . such portion
as he selects not exceeding in value one thousand dollars . .. .
68. 34 N.C. App. at 638, 239 S.E.2d at 745; see note 65 supra. The $1000 valuation
limitation on the homestead exemption is set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-372, -386 (1969 &
Cum. Supp. 1977). This is the same amount that was established by the General Assembly in
1869. See Law of Apr. 7, 1869, ch. 137, §§ 3, 7, 1868 N.C. Pub. Laws 331.
69. 34 N.C. App. at 638, 239 S.E.2d at 745. The homestead allotment was valued at $1000.
It failed, however, to provide defendant with a means of ingress and egress from the public road
adjoining defendant's lot to the front door where the homestead began. In addition, the area
selected contained none of the facilities defendant would need to live comfortably and failed to
provide any access to them. Id. at 638-39, 239 S.E.2d at 745. Initially, defendant had chosen his
entire house with sufficient surrounding property to allow him to maintain it and to provide him
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$1000 limitation on his homestead, insisting that he should be allowed to
claim his homestead exemption in his entire house, regardless of its value.
70
The limitation was obsolete, the defendant claimed, arguing that in 1869,
when the figure was established, a $1000 homestead would have comprised
a 250 acre farm with a house and barn.
71
The court of appeals, however, rejected this contention and upheld the
lower court's determination that, under the North Carolina Constitution and
statutes, only a $1000 homestead could be set aside, whether or not this
permitted the exemption of only a portion of a dwelling. 72 While the
homestead exemption was changed in 1971 from language limiting it to
$1000 to language requiring it to be fixed by the General Assembly at not
less than $1000, the court noted that the legislature had not amended G. S. 1-
372 to increase the value of the homestead;73 it therefore refused to exercise
that power which, it declared, was exclusively granted to the legislature by
the North Carolina Constitution. 74 Though the court admitted its present
resolution of the problem was absurd,75 it maintained that its holding
protected the creditor's interest in obtaining execution of judgment while
preserving the debtor's constitutional right to a homestead.
76
Although the Schinhan court was correct in attempting not to compro-
mise the interests of either the judgment creditor or debtor, its response
with a means of access, but the sheriff had refused to make that allotment because the value of
the house and lot, $72,000, greatly exceeded the $1000 limitation. Id. at 638, 239 S.E.2d at 745.
70. Id. at 639, 642, 239 S.E.2d at 745, 747.
71. Id. at 639, 239 S.E.2d at 745-46. Other testimony submitted established that the value
of a dollar in 1868 was 170 times its value in 1976. Id.
72. Id. at 642, 239 S.E.2d at 747. The court cited as controlling authority an 1886 North
Carolina Supreme Court case, Campbell v. White, 95 N.C. 491 (1886), in which the court
declined to apply the homestead exemption to an entire house, even though the parties agreed
the house was indivisible. 34 N.C. App. at 642,239 S.E.2d at 747. The Schinhan court did note,
however, that under its holding based upon Campbell the purpose of the homestead exemption
could not be attained. Id. at 641,239 S.E.2d at 747. That purpose has been described as follows:
"The purpose of the homestead provision of the Constitution is to surround the family
home with certain protection against the demands of urgent creditors. It carries the
right of occupancy free from levy or sale under execution so long as the claimant may
live unless alienated or abandoned. It is the place of residence which the homesteader
may improve and make comfortable and where his family may be sheltered and live,
beyond the reach of those financial misfortunes which even the most prudent and
sagacious cannot always avoid."
Id. (citations omitted by the court) (quoting Williams v. Johnson, 230 N.C. 338, 343, 53 S.E.2d
277, 281 (1949)).
73. Id. at 641, 239 S.E.2d at 747. It appears, though, that the legislature's failure to amend
§ 1-372 may have been an oversight since the language of § 1-372, seq note 67 supra, still
incorporates the phrase "not exceeding in value one thousand dollars" that had been used in
the prior, superseded constitutional provision, N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 2 (1868, amended 1970),
but was deleted in the amended version. See note 65 supra.
74. 34 N.C. App. at 641-42, 239 S.E.2d at 747.
75. The court explained: "The debtor has his homestead in an area which is utterly useless
to him, while the value of his remaining property from which his creditor must seek to collect
his judgment has been substantially impaired." Id. at 644, 239 S.E.2d at 748.
76. Id. at 643, 239 S.E.2d at 748.
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nonetheless failed to protect either party77-plaintiff cannot in all likelihood
recover his judgment from a house that has no front door or hallway;
defendant cannot use his hallway homestead even if he has a means of
ingress and egress to it. Perhaps it is true, as the court suggests, that the
failure of the legislature to act "reflects a conscious determination that the
exemption is no longer as economically or socially desirable as it was once
thought to be." '78 The powerlessness of the court to resolve the ludicrous
situation with which it was presented, however, emphasizes the need for the
appropriate entity to act in some manner. The failure of the legislature to
evaluate the purposes of the homestead exemption during the last 110 years
has resulted in this predicament-it should not remain unresponsive in the
near future.
F. Landlord-Tenant
The North Carolina General Assembly passed two major pieces of
legislation in 1977 relating to landlord-tenant law. 79 The first Act amended
Chapter 42 of the General Statutes by adding an Article 5 entitled "Residen-
tial Rental Agreements. "80 This Article defines the rights and obligations of
the landlord8l and of the tenant82 with respect to the maintenance of a rental
unit in North Carolina. In addition, it sets out the remedies, and the
limitations thereon, available to either party upon the violation of a right, or
the failure to perform an obligation, under the article.
83
The other major new Act regulates the handling of tenant security
deposits in rental units.84 Article 6 of Chapter 42 now requires the landlord
77. The court was willing to concede this point. Id. at 644, 239 S.E.2d at 748.
78. Id. at 642, 239 S.E.2d at 747.
79. In addition the legislature made it illegal for a landlord or his agent to refuse to rent or
sell premises to a visually handicapped person because he has a guide dog. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
168-7 (Supp. 1977).
80. See id. §§ 42-38 to -44. Article 5 is more fully discussed and analyzed in Fillette, North
Carolina's Residential Rental Agreements Act: New Developments For Contract and Tort
Liability in Landlord-Tenant Relations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 785 (1978).
81. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1977).
82. Id. § 42-43.
83. Id. § 42-44.
84. Id. §§ 42-50 to -56. These sections comprise a new Article 6 entitled "Tenant Security
Deposit Act." This Act is somewhat similar to the California security deposit statute, CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1950.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1978), except that the California statute does not specificlly
require a trust arrangement for the holding of deposits and makes no provision for attorneys'
fees when tenants successfully sue for return of deposit funds. The New York statute, N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney 1978), differs from North Carolina's Act in that it makes
some provision for accumulated interest and administration expenses of the trust. The North
Carolina Act is more elaborate than its New York counterpart, though, in statutorily defining
the maximum amounts and permitted uses of security deposits and the remedies available for
breach of the Act. Colorado goes even further than North Carolina in deterring landlord
violations by allowing recovery of treble damages in deposit withholding suits, but fails to




to place security deposits in a trust account with a licensed and insured bank
or savings institution in North Carolina. 85 He must then notify the tenant
within thirty days after the lease has begun of the name and address of the
institution holding the deposit. 86 The permitted uses of security deposits are
restricted to those set forth in the article, 87 which also establishes limits on
the amounts that may be required for security deposits, computed in relation
to the length of the tenancy. 81 Upon termination of the tenancy, the deposit
may be applied to those uses allowed under the article and, if not so applied,
must be refunded to the tenant.8 9 Finally, the article outlines the remedies a
tenant may pursue if the landlord fails to account for and refund the tenant's
deposit as required. 90 If willful noncompliance with the article is found by
the court, it may allow a reasonable attorney's fee to the attorney represent-
ing the prevailing party. 9 1
The passage of this Act should be applauded by consumer interests
across the state, for it represents the first attempt by the legislature to protect
the tenant in an area in which he was previously left to the landlord's
mercy. 92 However, the Act is imperfect in failing to make any provision for
any interest that might accumulate while security deposits are held in trust.
accounts in the event that these accounts are interest bearing. 93 The legisla-
ture should correct this omission so that landlords and tenants will know to
which party the accumulated interest should be credited or, if necessary,
apportioned when the tenancy ends. The Act is further weakened in failing
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-50 (Supp. 1977). The landlord has the option of furnishing a
bond from an insurance company licensed to do business in North Carolina. If the landlord
chooses, he may establish the trust account outside of North Carolina, but only if he provides
the tenant with an adequate bond. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 42-51. The deposits may be devoted to compensation for nonpayment of rent,
damage to the rental unit (other than normal wear and tear), nonfulfillment of the lease term,
liens due to unpaid bills by the tenant, rerenting costs following tenant breach or court costs
related to terminating a tenancy. Id. The withholding of amounts for damages attributable to
normal wear and tear or of amounts that exceed actual damages is prohibited by id. § 42-52.
88. Id. § 42-51.
89. Id. § 42-52. The landlord must compile an itemized list of any damage for which any of
the deposit is retained and mail this to the tenant with the balance of the deposit within 30 days
after the tenancy has terminated. Id.
90. The tenant can institute civil action to require an accounting and recovery of the
deposit, and may recover damages resulting from noncompliance by the landlord. Id. § 42-55.
91. Id.
92. As there was no common or statutory law with respect to security deposits in North
Carolina prior to this statute's enactment, the only protection afforded tenants in this area was
what they could acquire in arms-length bargaining with landlords over rental lease agreements.
Because most large apartment owners use a prewritten and typed lease form, many tenants
were forced to accept provisions relating to security deposits in order to rent apartments.
93. It is unclear from the wording of the statute whether or not trust accounts will or may
be interest bearing. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-50, -52 (Supp. 1977). This should be clarified by
amendment as well.
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to provide for attorneys' fees in all events if the tenant prevails against the
landlord-a tenant may gain nothing if he successfully sues for his deposit
but willful noncompliance is not found, for in all likelihood he may then be
forced to turn the regained deposit over to his attorney as payment for his
services.
94
In the major case in this area, Usher v. Waters Insurance & Realty
Co. ,9 the United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina materially advanced tenant rights by declaring North Carolina's
summary ejectment statutes96 unconstitutional. 97 Plaintiff, ordered to leave
her apartment by a magistrate's judgment obtained by defendant under the
state's summary ejectment proceedings, 98 was unable to stay the eviction
pending appeal99 because she could not raise the requisite three months' rent
appeal bond. 100 The federal court ruled that this bond requirement, together
with other North Carolina summary ejectment statutes, 10 1 denied tenants
"access to jury trial and place[d] an unconstitutionally discriminatory bur-
den upon less-than-affluent tenant-appellants . . . in violation of the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution." 102
94. For a comparison of the North Carolina legislation with the comparable statutes of
other jurisdictions, see note 84 supra.
95. 438 F. Supp. 1215 (W.D.N.C. 1977). For discussion of the constitutional issues raised
in this case, see this Survey, Constitutional Law: Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-32 (1976) (allows additional damages of double rent in summary
ejectment suits); id. § 42-34(b) (requires posting of bond in amount equal to at least three
months' rent in order to stay summary ejectment while on appeal); N.C.R. Civ. P. 62(a)
(excepts summary ejectment cases from automatic ten day stay of execution of judgment).
97. 438 F. Supp. at 1220-21.
98. Id. at 1216. Plaintiff had lived in her apartment only a week before being sent a notice
to vacate; her rent was not in arrears. Defendant allegedly sent the notice because plaintiff gave
a Idud party that disturbed the neighbors. Plaintiff maintained the eviction notice was motivated
by her entertainment of black persons. Id.
99. Such an appeal is a matter of right under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-228 t -229 (1969).
100. 438 F. Supp. at 1216: Plaintiff did try to stay the eviction by tendering one month's
rent, but the clerk of court found it insufficient. Plaintiff then filed suit in federal district court
and obtained a preliminary injunction restraining her eviction until the court could address the
constitutional issues. Id.
101. See note 96 supra.
102. 438 F. Supp. at 1218. The court concluded that since no jury trial is allowed in
magistrate's court where the eviction order was obtained, tenant-appellants could not receive a
jury trial unless they could put up the three months' rent bond. Id.
The court found discrimination because the statute requires a sizable bond of tenant-
appellants that is not required of appellants in any other case. In addition, the court examined
procedures in title dispute suits in which losers are not subject to the same strict bond
arrangements pending appeal, even though the winning party's interests are identical to those of
a landlord in summary ejectment cases-the regaining of possession of the property or premises
in question. Id. at 1219. The court also reviewed other statutes that allow stays of execution
upon the posting of appeal bonds, but considered the requisite amounts established therein to
bear some rational relation to potential costs incurred by the appellee should he prevail. Id. at
1217; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-289, -292 (1969); id. § 7A-227 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.C.R.
Civ. P. 62(c). The court could find no rational basis for the rigid bond requirements imposed in
summary ejectment cases. 438 F. Supp. at 1218-19.
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Under this decision, tenant-appellants must be treated in the same
manner as all other appellants with respect to the amount required to be
posted as bond on appeal as well as with regard to all other requirements for
maintaining appeal. Differentiation in the requirements for appeal will be
permitted only if some legitimate state interest can be served thereby. 103 The
impact of this decision, then, should be widespread. Tenants who hereafter
become subject to summary ejectment proceedings and who wish to appeal
will not be penalized as before if they are able to pay each month's rent only
as it becomes due. In this way, they will not be foreclosed at the outset from
raising valid defenses to an eviction at a jury trial.
G. Recovery of Historical Documents
In State v. West,' 04 a case of first impression, the North Carolina
Supreme Court confronted the issue whether a state can recover historical
documents that once belonged to the state without compensating those
individuals who had since acquired them. In 1767 and 1768, William
Hooper, who later signed the Declaration of Independence on behalf of
North Carolina, signed two bills of indictment as attorney for King George
III. 10 5 Defendant, a private collector of manuscripts of historical signifi-
cance, acquired the documents at an auction sale in 1974,15 but the next
year the State instituted a civil suit to recover their possession. The supreme
court declared the State to be the rightful owner of the bills,l1 7 thereby
dealing a severe blow to private individuals and institutions engaged in the
collection and preservation of historical documents.
The court began its discussion by declaring that the relative merits of
private collectors as compared with public archivists was a policy question
best left to the legislature; its sole concern in the case was with the property
rights of the State in the documents. 108 The court then reasoned that the State
was entitled to the documents based on the premise that once a private paper
103. The court made it clear that it could think of no reasonable state purpose that would
justify statutes treating tenant-appellants more strictly than other appellants, particularly in
light of the lesser requirements demanded of title dispute litigant-appellants. 438 F. Supp. at
1218-19.
104. 293 N.C. 18, 235 S.E.2d 150 (1977).
105. Id. at 20, 235 S.E.2d at 151.
106. Id. at 21, 235 S.E.2d at 151-52.
107. Id. at 32, 235 S.E.2d at 158.
108. Id. at 25, 235 S.E.2d at 154. The court, however, failed to note in its opinion that the
legislature has already set forth a broader policy with respect to such documents. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 121-4(13) (1974) provides in part:
The Department of Cultural Resources shall have the following powers and duties:
(13) To promote and encourage throughout the State knowledge and apprecia-
tion of North Carolina history and heritage by encouraging the people of the State to
engage in the preservation and care of archives, historical manuscripts, museum
items, and other historical materials . . ..
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becomes a "court record," the title becomes vested in the sovereign. t09 The
fact that a particular document is removed or stolen from the records does
not divest the sovereign of title,' 10 nor would the fact that a custodian had
intentionally discarded it.111 A change of sovereignty transfers but does not
alter the right of the former sovereign to his official property. 1 2 A
sovereign's right to recover possession of property is likewise not barred by
the passage of time, however great. 113 Furthermore, the court held that the
bona fides of the person taking possession of the documents is immaterial
and does not confer good title upon the taker or any subsequent purchasers;
in fact, such a purchaser, regardless of his good faith, is now to be
considered a converter liable to the true owner. 114
State v. West represents the first time a court has dealt with the issue of
a state's right to recover public documents of historical import, 115 and the
decision permits this State to recover such documents from private collec-
tors merely by showing that the papers are "court records.-'116 The majori-
109. 293 N.C. at 26, 235 S.E.2d at 155.
110. Id. at27, 235 S.E.2d at 155.
111. Id. at 30, 235 S.E.2d at 157. Defendant argued that in all likelihood these documents
had been thrown away by the clerk of the superior court during the Revolutionary War and that
this constituted an abandonment. The court rejected this contention, stating that an essential
element of abandonment is intent of the owner to relinquish the article permanently. Id.; see,
e.g., Botkin v. Kickapoo, Inc., 211 Kan. 107, 505 P.2d 749 (1973); Oxford Orphanage v.
Kittrell, 223 N.C. 427, 27 S.E.2d 133 (1943); St. Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N.C. 126, 56
S.E. 688 (1907). The court reasoned that even if the clerk had intentionally discarded the
documents, this would not constitute abandonment because he was only the custodian and not
the owner. 293 N.C. at 30-31, 235 S.E.2d at 157. Under the court's formulation, it is unusually
difficult to prove that a private party would be entitled to state documents, since such proof
would require a showing that (in this case) either King George III or the State of North Carolina
intended to abandon its court records.
112. 293 N.C. at 28, 235 S.E.2d at 156; see United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
414, 435 (1873) ("[T]he conqueror, by the completion of his conquest, becomes the absolute
owner of the property conquered from the enemy, nation or State.").
113. 293 N.C. at 27, 235 S.E.2d at 155. The court also found that no statute of limitations
ran against the State in this type of action. Id. at 24-25, 235 S.E.2d at 154.
114. Id. at 31, 235 S.E.2d at 158.
115. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Duke University at 1, State v. West, 293 N.C. 18, 235
S.E.2d 150 (1977). There exist only a handful of reported cases dealing with recovery. See First
Trust Co. v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 146 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Minn. 1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d
686 (8th Cir. 1958); Victor De La 0 v. Acoma, I N.M. (Gild, C. ed.) 226 (1857); People v. Peck,
138 N.Y. 386, 34 N.E. 347, 22 N.Y.S. 576 (1893); Mayor of New York v. Lent, 51 Barb. 19
(App. Div. 1868); Manning v. Anderson Galleries, Inc., 130 Misc. 131, 222 N.Y.S. 572 (Sup. Ct.
1927).
116. The North Carolina Court of Appeals had held the State to a much higher burden of
proof, finding that "the state must (a) prove the indictments were required by law to be
permanently retained; (b) overcome the presumption that public officials have properly per-
formed their duty; and (c) prove that the indictments were in a public archive and were stolen or
otherwise improperly removed." State v. West, 31 N.C. App. 431, 437, 229 S.E.2d 826, 829
(1976). The court of appeals nevertheless went on to find that the State had met this burden. Id.
at 437-44, 229 S.E.2d 829-33. The supreme court gave no reason for its adoption of a much more
lenient standard.
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ty, however, fails to make clear whether its opinion covers any "public
document" 117 or only "court records. ' '118
An important consideration underlying the court's decision in West
was its concern that, should the court decide the case any differently, the
State would be able to recover stolen archives only by purchasing them. 119
The court's apprehension in this respect caused it to disregard those im-
portant policy considerations that would have dictated a more equitable
result. The State should not be permitted to reassert a right of ownership to
the prejudice of those who in the interim have come into the possession of
historical papers in complete good faith and for value. The court's holding,
so harmful to the interests of the antiquarian, appears particularly ironic in
light of the fact that a large number of historical documents remain in
existence solely because of the efforts of private collectors. °20 It is likely
that, as a result of this case, many historically valuable documents that
would otherwise be available to the public will now be secretly held by
private collectors in order to avoid the obligation under West to surrender
them to the state.
EUGENE F. DAUCHERT, JR.
SUSIE SPRUILL SIMPSON
117. See, e.g., Rehling v. Carr, 295 Ala. 336, 330 So. 2d 423 (1976) (reports of state
toxicologist are state records); City Council v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. App. 2d 68, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1962) (records not required by law to be kept can still be public records); Nero v.
Hyland, 136 N.J. Super. 537, 347 A.2d 29 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
118. Technically, the court's opinion would apply only to court records: "[Tihese docu-
ments, being bills of indictment, bear upon their face notice to all the world that they were part
of the court records of the Colony of North Carolina and, therefore, the property of the State."
293 N.C. at 31, 235 S.E.2d at 158.
119. The supreme court asserted its belief that the bills of indictment had been "intention-
ally removed from the clerk's office in more recent times, when discovered by one who was
aware of their intrinsic value." Id. at 31, 235 S.E.2d at 157.
120. See id. at 33, 235 S.E.2d at 158-59 (Copeland, J., dissenting).
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XII. TAXATION'
A. Property Tax-Tax Sales2
The North Carolina Supreme Court examined significant local tax
issues in Henderson County v. Osteen.3 Execution on a judgment docketed
in favor of Henderson County for nonpayment of real property taxes had
been issued five days after the listed owner's death. The property was sold at
a sheriff's sale one month after execution. The trial court found that the
administrator and heirs of the deceased, defendants in Osteen, received no
notice of the sale. Furthermore, no evidence was presented showing that
notice had been mailed to the deceased. The trial court granted defendants'
motion to set aside the sale, basing its decision on Flynn v. Rumley4 which
prohibits sale of land under an execution issued after the judgment debtor's
death. 5 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, distin-
guishing Flynn v. Rumley on the ground that the earlier case precluded
execution of an in personam judgment and held that this prohibition had no
applicability to the G.S. 105-3756 in rem proceeding involved in Osteen .7
The court of appeals also stated that, even assuming that notice of the
execution sale had not been mailed to the listed owner, the sale would not
have been invalid.8 Likewise, the court held that the lack of notice to the
heirs of the deceased owner did not invalidate the sale, stating that "the
I. Minor tax cases recently decided include: Broadwell Realty Corp. v. Coble, 291 N.C.
608, 231 S.E.2d 656 (1977) (cash-basis taxpayer reporting income under installment method may
not deduct deferred state and federal income tax liabilities from franchise tax base); and Arnold
v. Varnum, 34 N.C. App. 22, 237 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 293 N.C. 740,241
S.E.2d 513 (1977) (county board of commissioners may levy tax to support hospital in unincor-
porated township).
For a concise discussion of all 1977 legislative changes in North Carolina tax laws, see J.
BRANNON, NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATION 1977, at 245-61, 303-05 (1977). For additional discus-
sion of property tax legislation, see Campbell & Ferrell, 1977 Legislation Affecting Property
Tax and Privilege License Adminstration, PROP. TAX BULL., July 14, 1977, at 1 (Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
2. For a slightly dated discussion of tax-collection enforcement in North Carolina and in
other states, see H. LEwIs & R. BYRD, IN REM TAX FORECLOSURES (1959). For a more recent
general discussion of North Carolina property tax, see H. LEwis, THE PROPERTY TAX IN NORTH
CAROLINA: AN INTRODUCTION (rev. ed. 1975).
3. 292 N.C. 692, 235 S.E.2d 166 (1977), rev'g 28 N.C. App. 542, 221 S.E.2d 903 (1976).
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in this case is discussed in Survey of Devel-
opments in North Carolina Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REV. 895, 1087 (1977).
4. 212 N.C. 25, 192 S.E. 868 (1937).
5. 28 N.C. App. 542, 545, 221 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1976).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-375 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (in rem statutory procedure for
foreclosure of a property tax lien).
7. 28 N.C. App. 542, 549, 221 S.E.2d 903, 907 (1976).
8. Id. at 549-52, 221 S.E.2d at 907-09. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-348 (1972)
(notice to taxpayer of legal tax enforcement proceedings conclusively presumed); id. § 105-
394(9) (failure to serve taxpayer with notice of tax sale constitutes harmless irregularity with
regard to validity of sale).
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County is not required to shoulder the intolerable burden of directly notify-
ing the heirs of a listing taxpayer who died prior to issuance of execution." 9
The supreme court reversed. Speaking through Justice Lake, the court
agreed that foreclosure of a tax lien and execution under G.S. 105-375 is an
exception to the general rule that land may not be sold under an execution
issued after the death of the judgment debtor.10 The court also agreed that
requiring the county "[to] determine, at its peril, that the listing taxpayer
still lives and still owns the land, or if he does not, to give such notice to his
administrator, heirs, or transferee" would be intolerably burdensome and
would make the G.S. 105-375 procedure "completely impracticable." 11
The court held, however, that notice by registered or certified mail to the
listed owner under G.S. 105-375 is necessary to satisfy the due process
requirements of both the North Carolina Constitution' 2 and the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 13 Accordingly, the court held
that G.S. 105-394(9), 14 which validates tax sales when notice has not been
given to the listed owner, was unconstitutional.15 The court remanded the
case to the trial court to determine whether notice of the sale had actually
been mailed to the deceased. 16
The supreme court's pragmatic holding on the notice issue in Osteen
reasonably accommodates unavoidable administrative constraints yet re-
quires notice calculated to apprise the taxpayer of the tax sale's pendency in
most cases. 17 Even in an anomalous case like Osteen, notice by mail
addressed to the deceased should be sufficient for an alert administrator or
close relatives. Notice requirements for tax sale proceedings have not been
stringent historically.' 8 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has often
held notice by publication to be sufficient for in rem proceedings.19 The
Court has required notice by mail in more recent cases involving in rem
proceedings, 2 0 however, and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Osteen
9. 28 N.C. App. 542, 551, 221 S.E.2d 903, 908-09 (1976).
10. 292 N.C. at 706, 235 S.E.2d at 175.
11. Id. at 708, 235 S.E.2d at 176.
12. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
13. 292 N.C. at 708, 235 S.E.2d at 176; see U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-394(9) (1972); see note 8 supra.
15. 292 N.C. at 708, 235 S.E.2d at 176.
16. Id. at 711, 235 S.E.2d at 178.
17. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
18. See Note, Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 159, 161 (1976).
Notice by publication in tax foreclosure cases has been justified on three grounds: (1) the in rem
nature of the proceedings; (2) the landowner's imputed knowledge that the state will take action
to collect the taxes by selling the land if necessary; and (3) the landowner's presumed care and
vigilance with regard to matters concerning his or her real estate. Id. See also Note, The
Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings, 84 YALE L.J. 1505 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Winona & Saint Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526 (1895).
20. See, e.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
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demonstrated that it was more responsive to this trend than the high courts of
some other states that have adjudicated similar tax sale cases.
21
The supreme court's refusal to apply the Flynn v. Rumley rule in
Osteen may seem less commendable but is consistent with the notion that
the county should not be forced to follow procedures that would render the
statutorily provided foreclosure method impracticable. The court discussed
a sound policy reason for applying the rule to some judgments in rem-to
protect the deceased's estate from wasteful sale of property worth far more
than the amount of the debt. 22 Nevertheless, the court stated that an action to
foreclose a tax lien pursuant to the G.S. 105-37423 quasi-mortgage method
of foreclosing a tax lien-the only method of tax lien foreclosure provided
in the General Statutes besides G.S. 105-375-had been held valid despite
the listed owner's death prior to foreclosure, 24 and found no basis for
distinguishing between G.S. 105-374 and G.S. 105-375.25 The court's
reasoning with regard to this issue, at first glance, thus seems to elevate
symmetry over sound policy. The prohibition of tax sales after the death of
the listed owner, however, would force the county to determine whether the
taxpayer still lives before it could proceed to foreclosure. The court sought
to avoid this administrative burden in holding that notice did not have to be
given to the listed owner's administrator and heirs. Furthermore, the harsh-
ness of the holding should be mitigated to a great extent by the court's ruling
that notice by mail to the listed owner is required under G.S. 105-375.
Wasteful tax sales may be prevented by timely payment of the delinquent
taxes by the deceased's administrator or relatives.
26
B. Refunds
It is a well-established rule that taxes paid to release the taxpayer from
duress may be recovered. 27 However, voluntary payment of a tax, even one
that is imposed under an unconstitutional law, generally does not give the
21. See, e.g., Botens v. Aronauer, 32 N.Y.2d 243, 298 N.E.2d 73, 344 N.Y.S.2d 892,
appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1059 (1973); Marlowe v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, 541
S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1976).
22. 292 N.C. at 705, 235 S.E.2d at 174.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-374 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
24. See Guilford County v. Estates Administration, Inc., 213 N.C. 763, 197 S.E. 535
(1938).
25. 292 N.C. at 705, 235 S.E.2d at 175.
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-375(g) (1972).
27. See Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (threats of advertisement
and sale); Sneed v. Shaffer Oil & Ref. Co., 35 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1929) (threat of civil penalties
for nonpayment); Tyler v. Dane County, 289 F. 843 (W.D. Wis. 1923) (transfer of property
withheld); Manufacturer's Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kansas City, 330 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1959) (threat of
criminal penalties for nonpayment).
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taxpayer the right to a refund.2 8 Legislation in some states permits the refund
of taxes under certain circumstances whether payment was voluntary or
not.29 In Coca-Cola Co. v. Coble, 0 the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that G.S. 105-266.1 ,31 a statute providing a procedure by which a taxpayer
may recover taxes that are "excessive or incorrect," ' 32 does not permit the
refund of taxes unconstitutionally levied, but voluntarily paid.
Prior to 1974, North Carolina excluded rponresident distributors and
dealers from a cheaper soft drink tax available to residents.3 3 1 'his exclusion
was held to be discriminatory and an undue burden on interstate commerce
in Richmond Food Stores v. Jones .34 Coca-Cola, a nonresident distributor,
applied for a refund under section 105-266.1 of the portion of soft "drink
taxes it had paid in excess of the amount it would have paid under the tax
available to residents. After the Secretary of Revenue's denial of this claim,
the trial court found for Coca-Cola and entered judgment granting the
refund.3 5 The court of appeals reversed, and its decision was affirmed by the
supreme court.
The supreme court held that "G.S. 105-266.1, by its express terms,
confers no authority on the Secretary to refund taxes which, at the time they
were collected, were unlawful but not erroneous or incorrect. ",36 The court
stated that the appropriate remedy lay under G.S. 105-267, 37 which permits
suits for the refund of invalid taxes.38 The court rejected Coca-Cola's
argument that payment of the soft drink taxes was involuntary since nonpay-
ment would have triggered civil and criminal sanctions.3 9 Coca-Cola could
28. See C. & J. Michel Brewing Co. v. State, 19 S.D. 302, 103 N.W. 40 (1905).
29. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 195.106(l) (Harrison Cum. Supp. 1977) (overpayment,
payment when no tax due, adjudication of no liability, erroneous payment).
30. 293 N.C. 565, 238 S.E.2d 780, aff'g 33 N.C. App. 124, 234 S.E.2d 477 (1977).
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-266.1(1972). This statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any taxpayer may apply to the Secretary of Revenue for refund of tax or
additional tax paid by him at any time within three years after the date set by the
statute for filing of the return or. . .within six months from the date of payment of
such tax or additional tax, whichever is later. The Secretary shall grant a hearing
thereon, and if upon such hearing he shall determine that the tax is excessive or




33. 293 N.C. at 565-66, 238 S.E.2d at 781.
34. 22 N.C. App. 272, 206 S.E.2d 346 (1974). The Secretary of Revenue did not seek
review of this decision. 293 N.C. at 566, 238 S.E.2d at 781.
35. 293 N.C. at 566-67, 238 S.E.2d at 782.
36. Id. at 568, 238 S.E.2d at 783 (emphasis by the court).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
38. 293 N.C. at 569, 238 S.E.2d at 783. The court noted that the statute of limitations
under § 105-267 is shorter than that applied under § 105-266.1 and that Coca-Cola had failed to
demand a refund within the requisite time under the former. Id.
39. Id. at 569, 238 S.E.2d at 783. But cf. State ex rel. S.S. Kresge Co. v. Howard, 357 Mo.
302, 208 S.W.2d 247 (1947) (distinguishable due to absence of general statute allowing recovery
of illegal tax).
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have protected its rights, the court stated, by paying the taxes and pursuing
the section 105-267 remedy.' The court also rejected Coca-Cola's argu-
ment that the payments were involuntary because of the necessity of
commencing a civil lawsuit to recover them.41 Apprehension of the difficul-
ty and expense necessary to challenge a tax, the court held, does not
constitute duress.
42
The supreme court's interpretation of section 105-266.1 is a useful
gloss on that statute but fails to provide a clear indication of whether it
permits refund of "erroneous or incorrect" taxes-incorrect due to an error
in calculation by the taxpayer, for example-remitted voluntarily. The
language of the statute itself does not seem to make the refund contingent
upon involuntary payment in the first instance, and there is some authority
supporting the proposition that section 105-266.1 provides for unconditional
refund of excessive taxes paid by mistake. 43 The court of appeals, however,
seemed to hold in its review of Coca-Cola that the statute is not broad
enough to permit recovery of taxes paid voluntarily and even stated that it is
a "procedural statute": "It does not set out when a taxpayer is entitled to a
refund but only the steps by which a refund may be received. '"44 The
supreme court's review of this seemingly incorrect interpretation of G.S.
105-266.1 would have been a valuable addition to its Coca-Cola opinion.
C. Tax Measures To Encourage Energy Conservation
45
Legislation is pending in Congress that would provide federal income
tax credits for such energy conservation measures as the installation of storm
windows, insulation and solar heating or cooling systems. 46 The North
Carolina General Assembly enacted a diversified package of statutes in 1977
with the same purpose: to provide tax incentives for energy conservation.
The General Assembly passed one bill providing favorable property tax
assessments for buildings with solar heating or cooling systems in accord-
ance with schedules of value for buildings equipped with conventional
systems, declaring that "no additional value shall be assigned for the
difference in cost between a solar heating or cooling system and a conven-
40. 293 N.C. at 569, 238 S.E.2d at 783.
41. Id. at 570, 238 S.E.2d at 784.
42. Id.
43. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Clayton, 266 N.C. 687, 147 S.E.2d 195 (1966)
(refund of taxes paid due to bookkeeping error upheld).
44. 33 N.C. App. 124, 129, 234 S.E.2d 477, 481, aff'd, 293 N.C. 565, 238 S.E.2d 780
(1977).
45. For a discussion of several energy conservation tax measures, see Landis, The Impact
of the Income Tax Laws on the Energy Crisis: Oil and Congress Don't Mix, 64 CALIF. L. Rnv.
1040 (1976).




tional system . ... -47 The General Assembly also passed the Energy
Conservation Act of 1977 (ECA).48 The ECA includes provisions for tax
credits against state taxes on both personal and corporate income for the
installation and equipment cost of solar hot water, heating or cooling
equipment. 49 The credits are limited to 25% of the cost and may not in any
case exceed $1000 on any single building or family unit. 50 The ECA also
includes provisions for credits against state income taxes for installation of
insulation, storm windows and storm doors in buildings constructed and
occupied prior to January 1, 1977 .51 These credits will be available for
improvements made during the period from January 1, 1977, through
December 31, 1978, will be limited to 25% of cost and may not exceed $100
on any single building or family dwelling unit.
52
The ECA's insulation credit will be the most significant facet of this tax
incentive package for most taxpayers. The alert homeowner may gain
valuable tax benefits not only from the ECA credit but also from any
available federal tax credit if Congress enacts one of the proposed energy tax
bills.53 These boons to taxpayers and the insulation industry should result in
substantial fuel savings. 54 There is also evidence, however, that such credits
may not produce the desired results in the near future, "[f]or even though
the consumer demand is there, the insulation clearly is not." 5 5 Shortages of
insulating materials have been reported since the early months of 1977,56
and due to increased demand and scarce supply, the advisability of the tax
credits has been questioned: "[T]he shortages are unlikely to ease
soon. . . .Tax incentives, desirable as they may be in theory, will only
feed a demand that cannot immediately be supplied . . . . - Other prob-
lems, by-products of overheated demand, such as price-gouging and shoddy
installation, have also been identified.5 In addition, there is the danger that
some insulation materials now being marketed may be carcinogenic.5 9 The
47. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 965, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1289 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 105-277(g) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
48. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 792, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1038 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. chs. 105, 143, 143A, 143B (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
49. Id. §§ 3,4.
50. Id.
51. Id. §§ 5,6.
52. Id.
53. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
54. It has been estimated that proposed federal residential insulation and solar and wind
tax credits should result in savings equivalent to 250,000 to 310,000 barrels of natural gas and oil
per day in 1985. See H.R. REP. No. 496, pt. III, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1977).
55. Insulation: A Boom Too Soon, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 1977, at 68, 63.
56. Sales Heat Up for Home Insulation, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 28, 1977, at 31, 31-32.
57. Running Out of Insulation, TIME, Nov. 14, 1977, at 81, 81.
58. See Insulation: A Boom Too Soon, supra note 55.
59. Id.
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General Assembly, aware of the risk posed by low quality workmanship,
enacted legislation requiring state and local cooperation in regulating the
installation of insulating materials. 6° The tax credit, nevertheless, may cause
more problems than it solves.
D. Taxation of Property in Foreign Trade Zones
A foreign trade zone is an enclosed and policed area operated as a
public utility where foreign and domestic merchandise-without being sub-
ject to United States customs laws-may be stored, sold, exhibited, treated
or repacked prior to being exported or sent into the customs territory of the
United States. 61 The reason for establishing foreign trade zones has been
explained as follows:
The purpose of a foreign trade zone is to encourage and
expedite that part of . . . foreign trade which the government
wishes to be free from restrictions necessitated by customs duties.
More specifically, it aims to foster the dealing in foreign goods that
are imported, not for domestic consumption, but for re-export to
foreign markets and for conditioning and combining with domestic
products previous to export. . . . Customs duties or tariffs hinder
the free flow of goods in international commerce, and the function
of a foreign trade zone is to eliminate these hindrances to
commerce .... 62
The General Assembly in 1976 passed enabling legislation for the
establishment of foreign trade zones in North Carolina. 63 Under this foreign
trade zone law as originally enacted, property located in North Carolina
zones was subject to ad valorem taxes.64 The constitutionality of this tax
provision was questioned on import-export clause 65 and commerce clause
66
grounds; 67 however, it was eliminated by the General Assembly in 1977.68
60. Law of June 23, 1977, ch. 703, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 846.
61. See Singer, Foreign-Trade Zones: A Means by Which the Businessman May Avoid the
Impact of Duties, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 89, 97-98 (1967) and sources cited therein.
62. D. Morris, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of North Carolina to Tax Goods
Located in a Foreign Trade Zone 3 (1977) (unpublished paper) (copy on file in office of North
Carolina Law Review) (footnote omitted).
63. Law of May 14, 1976, ch. 983, § 132, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1976, at 56
(codified at N.C. GEIN. STAT. § 55C-I to -4 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). For a discussion of the federal
foreign trade zone law and North Carolina law as originally enacted, see Ferrell, 1976Legisla-
tion: Foreign Trade Zone, PRop. TAX BULL., June 24, 1976, at I (Institute of Government,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); Fogel, Foreign Trade Zones: An Opportunity for
North Carolina, 2 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (1977).
64. See Law of May 14, 1976, ch. 983, § 132, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1976, at 56
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55C-1 to -4 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
66. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67. See Fogel, supra note 63, at 12 (import-export clause); D. Morris, supra note 62, at 25-
36 (import-export clause, commerce clause).
68. Law of June 28, 1977, ch. 782, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1026 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55C-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
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In addition, tangible personal property produced in the United States for
exportation or imported from outside the United States and held in a North
Carolina foreign trade zone has now been classified as property free from
the ad valorem tax.
69
The 1977 amendments should prove to be economically sound mea-
sures. 70 If a foreign trade zone were established in North Carolina, the no-
tax classification would certainly provide additional incentive for interna-
tional trade within that zone. No such zone has been established to date,
however, and there are no immediate prospects for the establishment of
any. 71 The main disincentive appears to be the monumental undertaking
involved in completing the federal application for foreign trade zone
status.
72
E. Benefits Under Pension Plans
Legislation was enacted by the General Assembly changing provisions
in the state's tax laws to allow taxpayers the same advantages for retirement
plan contributions and benefits that are currently available under federal tax
laws. 73 The new law provides a state income tax deduction for contributions
by an individual for the benefit of himself or of his spouse made to
individual retirement accounts, annuities or bonds if these contributions are
also deductible under the federal income tax. 74 It further provides that
benefits paid under such plans are exempt from the state inheritance tax if
they may be excluded from the decedent's gross estate under the federal
estate tax.
75
Such changes coordinating state tax provisions with their federal
counterparts seem well-advised. Closer coordination could simplify tax
calculations for North Carolina taxpayers and give them full advantage
under state tax law of tax benefits now available under the federal tax code.
There remains the potential for even further coordination of state and federal
tax provisions, however. A deduction for unreimbursed medical expenses,
for example, is provided under both the federal income tax 76 and the state
income tax. 77 The state tax deduction, however, is subject to a 5% floor-
69. Id. § 2 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-275(23) (Cum. Supp. 1977)).
70. See Fogel, supra note 63, at 12.
71. Telephone interview with Hunter A. Poole, Assistant Director, International Division,
North Carolina Department of Commerce (Jan. 20, 1978).
72. Id.
73. Law of July 1, 1977, ch. 900, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1225 (codified in scattered sections
of N.C. GEN. STAT. Ch. 105 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). For a discussion of the relevant federal tax
-provisions, see S. GOLDBERG, PENSION PLANS UNDER ERISA (1976).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141 (Cum. Supp. 1977); seeJ. BRANNON, supra note 1, at 304.
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-3 (Cum. Supp. 1977); see J. BRANNON, supra note 1, at 304.
76. I.R.C. § 213(a)(1).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(11)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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unreimbursed medical expenses exceeding 5% of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income are deductible-while the federal deduction is subject to a 3%
floor. Thus, a taxpayer and his or her dependents would have to incur
greater medical expenses to trigger the state tax deduction. In light of such
continuing disparities, the General Assembly should consider further syn-
chronizing the tax benefits available under the state and federal tax codes
during the next legislative session.
WILLIAM JOSEPH AuSTIN, JR.
XIII. TORTS
A. False Arrest
In a case of first impression, Robinson v. City of Winston-Salem,' the
court of appeals considered the issue of the civil liability of a police officer
for false arrest when the officer, acting under a valid arrest warrant,
mistakenly arrested the wrong person. The court adopted the position of a
majority of jurisdictions, holding that an officer arresting the wrong person
is liable only if he failed to use reasonable care in determining the identity of
the person named in the warrant.
2
Defendant police officers in Robinson had an arrest warrant for one
Bernard Jackson. An informant allegedly told the officers that Jackson lived
at plaintiff Clarence Bernard Robinson's address. When the officers arrived
at that address, however, they were informed that only Clarence Bernard
Robinson lived there. Nevertheless, Clarence Robinson was arrested and
held in jail overnight, even though it was learned prior to his incarceration
that he was the wrong person.' Robinson subsequently brought suit alleging
false arrest.
4
The only North Carolina authority available to guide the court, the
supreme court's decision in Melton v. Rickman,5 suggests that strict liability
should be imposed on an officer for false arrest. Under Melton, the only
showing necessary to establish liability for false arrest or imprisonment is
1. 34 N.C. App. 401, 238 S.E.2d 628 (1977).
2. Id. at 406-07, 238 S.E.2d at 631. See also Manos, Police Liability for False Arrest or
Imprisonment, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. Rev. 415 (1967).
3. 34 N.C. App. at 403-04, 238 S.E.2d at 629-30. There was a dispute as to whether an
SBI agent had identified a photograph of plaintiff and, later, plaintiff himself as the person from
whom the drug purchase was made. Id.
4. Id. at 402-03, 238 S.E.2d at 629.
5. 225 N.C. 700, 36 S.E.2d 276 (1945).
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"the deprivation of one's liberty without legal process." 6 The Robinson
court did not consider this statement binding, however, since Melton in-
volved a charge of abuse of criminal process rather than a charge of false
arrest.7 In rejecting the strict liability approach,' the Robinson court adopted
the view that liability should result only from failure to use reasonable
diligence properly to determine that the person arrested is the person de-
scribed in the warrant. 9 The court's test thus allows for exculpation when the
officer acts in good faith. 10 Good faith, however, is not to be construed as
the absence of malice, but rather as affirmative due diligence. 
1
An approach to liability for false arrest not considered by the court is
that proposed by the American Law Institute. 12 The Restatement (Second) of
Torts suggests that an arrest with a warrant is privileged only when the
person arrested is adequately described or named in the warrant and is in
fact the person intended by the warrant or reasonably believed to be so.
13
The accompanying commentary explains that if one is arrested who is not
named or described adequately in the warrant, the arrest is not privileged
regardless of the reasonableness of the mistake of identity unless the person
arrested is knowingly responsible for the mistake.14 This test apparently
allows for exculpation of the officer when the name or description in the
warrant is close to that of the person arrested, but not when, as in Robinson,
there is nothing in the warrant to prompt the officer's mistake. The Restate-
ment position gives greater weight to the individual's interest in liberty as
opposed to the conflicting interest of society in effective law enforcement
than the position adopted by Robihson.15 Perhaps the Restatement's test
6. Id. at 703, 36 S.E.2d at 277-78.
7. 34 N.C. App. at 406, 238 S.E.2d at 631. Melton tangentially alluded to the nature of a
false arrest charge in discussing the elements of abuse of process. 225 N.C. at 703, 36 S.E.2d at
277-78. Thus the Melton discussion was obiter dictum rightly nonbinding on the Robinson
court.
8. 34 N.C. App. at 406-07, 238 S.E.2d at 631.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 407, 238 S.E.2d at 631.
11. Id. (citing Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 490, 54 S.E. 1022, 1024 (1906)). Blocker
articulates the good faith test as follows:
Good faith will protect the officer. Personal spite or a reckless disregard of the rights
of others would amount to bad faith. But the officer may not be animated by spite; his
conduct may not be reckless, and still bad faith may exist. Good faith implies due
diligence. Good faith may be negatived by evidence of negligence. The failure to
exercise ordinary care in a transaction like the one under construction is inconsistent
with good faith.
126 Ga. at 490, 54 S.E. at 1024.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 125 (1965).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 128, Comment on Subsection l(a).
15. See Manos, supra note 2, at 418. The court's expressed fear in Robinson is that if a
strict liability standard were imposed, police officers would be extremely reluctant to serve
warrants in cases of even minimal doubt. 34 N.C. App. at 406, 238 S.E.2d at 631.
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would go further in promoting effective law enforcement than the good faith
test because it would foster efforts to generate and follow closely adequate
warrants. Provided that the due diligence standard established in Robinson
is properly applied,.however, the court's adopted position with respect to
false arrest based on mistaken identity will provide an adequate safeguard
for the individual's interest in liberty.
B. False Returns
In Rollins v. Gibson16 the state supreme court expanded the scope of a
sheriff's liability for a false return, overruling prior case law holding that
the G.S. 162-1417 penalty for a false return applied to process issued in civil
cases only.18 The statute prescribes a $500 penalty for such a return, one-
half of which goes to the aggrieved party and one-half to the person who
brings suit. This provision also allows for further action for damages by the
party aggrieved. 19
When assigned to deliver a subpoena to plaintiff in Rollins requiring
his appearance in court for a traffic offense, defendant-sheriff in Rollins
later returned the subpoena to the court marked, "after due and diligent
search Raymond Rollins not to be found in Guilford County."20 Plaintiff
was never notified of the date of his trial and was taken into custody when he
did not appear for trial.21 Plaintiff brought suit against the sheriff pursuant to
section 162-1422 and showed at trial that he had been available during the
period the sheriff held the subpoena. 23 Thus, the jury found a false return by
the sheriff and awarded plaintiff $500 in damages.
24
Addressing the issue whether section 162-14 applies to returns in
criminal as well as civil proceedings, 25 the Rollins court faulted Martin v.
16. 293 N.C. 73, 235 S.E.2d 159 (1977).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-14 (1976).
18. 293 N.C. at 82, 235 S.E.2d at 165.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-14 (1976) provides:
Every sheriff . . . shall execute and make due return of all writs and other
process to him legally issued ....
For every false return, the sheriff shall forfeit and 'pay five hundred dollars
($500.00), one moiety thereof to the party aggrieved and the other to him that will sue
for the same, and moreover be further liable to the action of the party aggrieved, for
damages.
20. 293 N.C. at 74, 235 S.E.2d at 160. The sheriff testified that he had no personal
knowledge of an attempt to deliver the subpoena, but that he believed his deputy followed
procedures that involved attempting to deliver the subpoena two or three times. Id.
21. Id. at 75, 235 S.E.2d at 161.
22. See text of statute note 19 supra.
23. 293 N.C. at 75, 235 S.E.2d at 161.
24. Id. at 76, 235 S.E.2d at 161.
25. The court first considered whether the allegation in the return of "due and diligent
search" could render the return false. Reviewing past decisions, the court determined that if the
underlying facts from which a false inference is made in the return are omitted, the return is
false for purposes of § 162-14. Id. at 79, 235 S.E.2d at 163. Compare Lemit v. Freeman, 29
1138 [Vol. 56
TORTS
Martin,26 an 1858 supreme court case which limited the provision's sanc-
tions to civil returns, as a misconstruction of statutory language. 27 Martin,
in analyzing the statute's distribution of damages clause: "one moiety to the
party aggrieved," 28 concluded that "party" was intended to mean a person
rather than the sovereign. Thus, only in a civil action would there be an
opposing party commanding the subject of the return's presence in court. In
a criminal process, the state would be the initiator; therefore, the court
reasoned, there would be no "party aggrieved." 29 In overruling Martin and
applying the statute to criminal proceeding returns as well, Rollins deter-
mined that the Martin court had overlooked the fact that the action for a
false return can be brought by someone other than the party aggrieved. 30
Thus, the court in Rollins suggested that the statute's beginning, general
reference to "all writs and other process" was not limited by the later
language of the statute as Martin had stated. 3
1
Rollins, however, did not confront other facets of Martin's analysis of
the statutory language. The Martin court noted that since a process to arrest
one charged with an offense against the state was to be executed without
N.C. (7 Ired.) 317 (1847) (a return marked "too late to hand to execute in time" held false), with
Lemit v. Mooring, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 312 (1848) (return with same language where date upon
which sheriff received writ was truthfully given held not false). See also Tomlinson v. Long, 53
N.C. (8 Jones) 469 (1862); Hassell v. Lathem, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 465 (1860). If the underlying
facts are given truthfully, the return is not false even though incorrect inferences are drawn. 293
N.C. at 79, 235 S.E.2d at 163. Thus, the Rollins court, in finding a bare allegation of "due and
diligent search" unaccompanied by further facts to be a proper basis for a charge of false
return, concluded that Tomlinson v. Long, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 469 (1862) was controlling. 293
N.C. at 80, 235 S.E.2d at 164. In Tomlinson, the return was endorsed "not to be found in my
county." 53 N.C. (8 Jones) at 470. The evidence showed that plaintiff had been at home during
the time the subpoena was held by the sheriff. The court there noted that "if the sheriff desires
to avoid the heavy penalty of the statute for a false return, he should, in all cases of doubt,
return the facts, and not merely his conclusions." Id. at 471-72.
26. 50 N.C. (5 Jones) 349 (1858).
27. 293 N.C. at 82, 235 S.E.2d at 165.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-14 (1976).
29. 50 N.C. (5 Jones) at 351. This interpretation of the statute's language is difficult to
understand. Although typically an amercement (fine) against a sheriff is brought by a plaintiff
"aggrieved" by a sheriff's failure to execute a judgment received in a prior action, see, e.g.,
Brogden Produce Co. v. Stanley, 267 N.C. 608, 148 S.E.2d 689 (1966), or by a sheriff's failure
to properly serve a summons to the party being sued, see, e.g., Bell v. Wycoff, 131 N.C. 245,42
S.E. 608 (1902), the party aggrieved may be the party sued in the prior action, see, e.g., Harrell
v. Warren, 100 N.C. 216, 6 S.E. 777 (1888). Thus, it would seem that when a criminal process is
involved, a defendant could just as easily be the "party aggrieved" as could the State. The
Rollins court instead based its reading of the statute on the fact that the action can be brought
by "anyone who will sue, whether or not that person is the party aggrieved," 293 N.C. at 82,
235 S.E.2d at 165, thereby avoiding the question whether a criminal defendant can be a "party
aggrieved."
30. 293 N.C. at 82, 235 S.E.2d at 165. The $500 penalty assessed against a sheriff for a
false return is designated to be paid "one moiety thereof to the party aggrieved and the other to
him that will sue for the same. ... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-14 (1976) (emphasis added).
31. 293 N.C. at 82, 235 S.E.2d at 165.
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reference to the time of its delivery, the language "where such process shall
be delivered to him twenty days before the sitting of the court to which the
same is returnable" could not apply to a criminal process.32 Further, a
statute enacted in 1850 that applied when Martin was decided provided
penalties analogous to those in section 162-14 for returns in criminal
proceedings. 33 Certainly such a statute would have been a superfluity had
G.S. 162-14 been intended to apply to criminal proceeding returns as well.
The Rollins court, in addition to its reevaluation of the language of the
provision, pointed out that the supreme court's decision in State v. Berry
34
actually initiated the abrogation of the dichotomy existing in the remedies
available for defective returns of process in civil and criminal actions. Berry
held that the language of G.S. 14-242, 35 traditionally held applicable only to
returns of criminal process, also applied to returns of civil process.
36
Certainly the language of G.S. 14-242 is more susceptible to such a
construction than is the language of G.S. 162-14. G.S. 14-242 contains no
limiting language similar to that interpreted by the Martin court to restrict
G.S. 162-14 to civil processes.
37
Since G.S. 14-242 and G.S. 162-14 are the only two provisions dealing
with false returns, one offering a civil and one a criminal remedy, the logical
result, reached by the Rollins court, is that each should be applicable to both
returns of civil and criminal process. It is doubtful, however, that an
accurate historical appraisal of G.S. 162-14 would justify such a construc-
tion.
32. 50 N.C. (5 Jones) at 351.
33. Law of Jan. 28, 1851, ch. 57, § 1, 1850-51 N.C. Laws 127 (formerly codified at N.C.
REV. CODE ch. 35, § 10 (Moore & Biggs 1855)) (repealed). The statute read in pertinent part as
follows:
§ 10. Every sheriff shall indorse on all process and subpoenas issuing in criminal cases,
whether for the State or defendant, the day when such process and subpoenas come to
hand, and also the day of their execution; and on failure of any sheriff to perform
either of said duties, he shall forfeit and pay the sum of ten dollars for every case of
neglect to be recovered for the use of the State in the same manner as forfeitures are
recovered against sheriffs by parties in civil suits, for failure to make due return of
process delivered to them.
34. 169 N.C. 371, 85 S.E. 387 (1915).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-242 (1969). The statute reads:
If any sheriff, constable, or other officer,. . . refuse or neglect to return any precept,
notice or process to him tendered or delivered, which it is his duty to execute or make
a false return thereon, he shall forfeit and pay to anyone who will sue for the same one
hundred dollars and shall moreover be guilty of a misdemeanor.
36. 169 N.C. at 372, 85 S.E. at 388. The original decision that the provision applied only to
returns of criminal process was seemingly premised on the placement of the provision in the
chapter of the statutes entitled "Crimes and Punishments." Harrell v. Warren, 100 N.C. 264
(1888). The Berry court observed that since the provision is a criminal statute and creates a
criminal offense, it is properly included in the section regardless of its application to both civil
and criminal returns. 169 N.C. at 372, 85 S.E. at 388.
37. The statute makes a sheriff liable for a false return of "any precept, notice, or process
to him delivered." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-242 (1969). Nothing in the later language of the statute
in any way limits this language as to indicate that it applies only to criminal process.
TORTS 1141
C. Wrongful Death
In enacting the 197338 and 196939 amendments to North Carolina's
wrongful death statute, the General Assembly created an unusually liberal
vehicle for recovery of damages. 4° Christenbury v. Hedrick," a 1977 court
of appeals decision, presented one of the first interpretations of the scope of
the damages recoverable under the statute in relation to other forms of
recovery existing prior to the amendments. The court of appeals concluded
that a parent is barred from any individual action for personal injury for the
tortious death of her child since all possible elements of the parent's injury
are included within the terms of the statute. Therefore the action must be
brought under the wrongful death statute by the personal representative of
the deceased. 42
38. Law of Apr. 12, 1973, ch. 1329, § 3, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 629 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1976)). Section 28A-18-2(a) provides in part:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of
another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action
for damages, therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, and
his or their personal representatives or collectors, shall be liable to an action for
damages, to be brought by the personal representative or collector of the decedent;
and this notwithstanding the death, and although the wrongful act, neglect or default,
causing the death, amounts in law to a felony. The amount recovered in such action is
not liable to be applied as assets, in the payment of debts or legacies, except as to
burial expenses of the deceased, and reasonable hospital and medical expenses not
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) incident to the injury resulting in death ....
39. Law of Apr. 14, 1969, ch. 215, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-18-2(b) (1976)). Section 28A-18-2(b) provides in part:
(b) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the injury re-
sulting in death;
(2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;
(3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;
(4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive
the damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation for the
loss of the reasonably expected:
a. Net income of the decedent,
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether
voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages re-
covered,
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of
the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered;
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he sur-
vived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the dece-
dent through maliciousness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross negligence;
(6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds.
40. See Lauerman, The 1969 Amendments to the North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute,
6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 211, 234 (1970). The North Carolina statute places no limit on
the damages recoverable. Moreover the statute is unusual in specifying numerous types of harm
for which damages are recoverable. A comparison with other state statutes reveals the
comparative liberality of the North Carolina law with respect to the inclusion of such elements.
Finally the statute allows for nominal and punitive damages, a relatively atypical provision. Id.
at 232-34.
41. 32 N.C. App. 708, 234 S.E.2d 3 (1977).
42. Id. at 712-13, 234 S.E.2d at 5.
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In Christenbury, plaintiff-mother brought suit in her individual capac-
ity against the administrator of her husband's estate for damages stemming
from the death of her two minor children in an automobile collision caused
by her husband's negligence.43 The court of appeals, affirming the trial
court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim, held that each of the elements of the
recovery sought by plaintiff was included within the terms of the wrongful
death provision and therefore the action for such damages must be brought
by the personal representative of the decedent. 44
Plaintiff's argument hinged largely on a 1969 case, Crawford v. Hud-
sona5 in which the court of appeals had decided a similar question im-
mediately prior to the effective date of the amendments to the statute. In
Crawford the court allowed the father of a deceased son to bring an action in
his individual capacity for funeral expenses and loss of services during
minority despite the father's previous institution of an action for wrongful
death as administrator of his son's estate. 46 Since funeral expenses were not
an element to be considered in determining recovery in a wrongful death
action under the old statute, 47 the Crawford court viewed the claim for those
expenses as a separate personal injury action by the one responsible for the
expenses. 48 Crawford, however, also allowed a claim in the independent
43. Id. at 709, 234 S.E.2d at 3. Plaintiff specifically sought recovery of ambulance,
medical, funeral and burial expenses, and the value of the children's lives to plaintiff including
net income during minority, protection, care and assistance of the decedents, and their society,
companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice. Id. at 709, 234 S.E.2d at 4.
44. Id. at 712, 234 S.E.2d at 5. Plaintiff had earlier brought an action as administrator of
the estates of her children. The action was dismissed, apparently on the basis of Skinner v.
Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 189 S.E.2d 230 (1972) (administrator of an unemancipated child has no
action against administrator of child's father for wrongful death from father's ordinary negli-
gence). The court of appeals in Christenbury noted that prior to that dismissal the legislature
had enacted Law of June 19, 1975, ch. 685, § 1, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 911 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1977)), abolishing parent-child immunity in motor vehicle
cases. 32 N.C. App. at 713, 234 S.E.2d at 6. Plaintiff did not appeal the decision. Id. at 709, 234
S.E.2d at 4. Plaintiff's claim as administrator was barred by the two-year wrongful death statute
at the time the present suit was brought.
45. 3 N.C. App. 555, 165 S.E.2d 557 (1969).
46. Id. at 557, 165 S.E.2d at 559.
47. See Lauerman, supra note 40, at 211. The forerunner of the present statute read: "The
plaintiff in such action may recover such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary injury resulting from such death." Law of Apr. 6, 1869, ch. 113, § 71, 1868-69 N.C.
Pub. Laws 276 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1966)) (repealed 1973).
Coverage of the act excluded burial, hospital and medical expenses of the decedent and
recovery for any harm other than pecuniary injury, for example, sentiment. Lauerman, supra
note 40, at 216; Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co., 283 N.C. 395, 415, 196 S.E.2d 789,
803 (1973). Funeral expenses were likewise nonrecoverable under the old survival statute, Law
of Apr. 16, 1869, ch. 113, § 70, 1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 276 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28-172 (1966)) (repealed 1973), on the theory that the decedent had no right to them
before his death. See McNeeley, The New North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute, 48 N.C.L.
REV. 594, 603 (1970).
48. 3 N.C. App. at 557, 165 S.E.2d at 559.
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action by the deceased's parent for recovery for the loss of the child's
services during the remaining period of minority, even though a separate
wrongful death action had already been brought. 49 The recovery for
"pecuniary injury" allowed under the pre-amendments wrongful death
statute50 would certainly compensate the deceased's parent for loss of these
services. 51 Thus Crawford assented to recovery for this injury under both
the wrongful death statute and in an individual action by the injured par-
ent. 52 The Christenbury court's summary dismissal of Crawford as a case
decided before the amendments did not deal adequately with Crawford's
allowance of dual claims, one under the statute and one in an independent
action by the parent.
In addressing plaintiff's claim, Christenbury considered each element
of the damages alleged in the individual action against the recovery allowed
by the new wrongful death act.53 Each was held to be included within the
terms of the statute. 54 The court questioned, however, whether the statute's
language allowed for recovery of loss of services between the time of the
injuries and the time of death.55 Recovery had been allowed a deceased's
49. Id. at 556, 165 S.E.2d at 558.
50. See note 47 supra. "Pecuniary injury" was defined as the present worth of the net
pecuniary value of the life of the deceased "ascertained by deducting the probable cost of his
own living and usual and ordinary expenses from his probable gross income which might be
expected to be derived from his own exertions based upon his life expectancy." Lauerman,
supra note 40, at 211 (citing Purnell v. Rockingham R.R., 190 N.C. 573, 575, 130 S.E. 313, 314
(1925)).
51. This recovery is strictly statutory. The common law allows no cause of action for loss
of services of a deceased child. Lauerman, supra note 40, at 220. The North Carolina statute,
before it was amended to allow recovery for "pecuniary injury," used the measure of loss to
the estate of the deceased rather than loss to beneficiaries. Comment, Wrongful Death Dam-
ages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402, 429-33 (1966). Nevertheless, since distribution of
the recovery is determined by the laws of intestate succession, the parents of a minor child
should receive compensation for injury for loss of services at minimum. Id. at 436.
52. Crawford, in essence, created a nonstatutory wrongful death recovery in contraven-
tion of the generally accepted common law. See Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808), in
which Lord Ellenborough stated that "in a civil court the death of a human being could not be
complained of as an injury"; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 901-02
(4th ed. 1971).
53. The damages allowed under § 28A-18-2, quoted in note 38 supra, in a suit brought by
the personal representative of the deceased include not only damages resulting from death, but
also those formerly allowed only under the survival statute. Law of Apr. 6, 1869, ch. 113, § 70,
1868-69 N.C. Pub. Laws 276. These damages include expenses for care and hospitalization
incident to the injury resulting in death and compensation for pain and suffering. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1976). See also Lauerman, supra note 40, at 227-28.
54. 32 N.C. App. at 712, 234 S.E.2d at 5. The court in conclusory terms stated that any
claim now encompassed by the wrongful death statute must be asserted under that statute. Id.
In so doing the court failed to recognize the nonstatutory right.
55. Id. The record was unclear as to whether the children died at the time of the accident.
Id. The common law aspect of this element of damages is a murky area of the law. North
Carolina has recognized a common law right in a parent to sue for damages for loss of services
and earnings of the child during minority when the child is injured by the negligence of another.
Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 125 at 888-
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parents for this injury at common law. 56 In addition, other jurisdictions have
found that this action is available to the parent even though he has an
additional action through a personal representative under a death statute.
5 7
The court correctly read the expanded coverage of the amendments as
including such damages. 58 The statute explicitly allows recovery for ex-
penses for care and hospitalization incident to the injury resulting in death
and compensation for pain and suffering.5 9 These injuries do not result from
death, but cease at death.6° Thus the statute should be read to include
damages stemming from the injury resulting in death as well as from the
death itself. Applying this rationale to the language of the statute, 61 recovery
should be included for compensation for monetary loss for the decedent's
injuries between time of injury and time of death. 62 This analysis, coupled
with the fact that legislative action with respect to the common law takes
precedence, 63 bolsters the court's conclusion that any recovery allowed a
parent under the common law for loss of services between injury and death
is included within the terms of the statute and therefore must be brought
under the statute.64
In finding that substantially all claims for loss related to an injury
caused by a tortfeasor's negligence must be brought under the wrongful
death statute rather than in an independent action, the Christenbury court
ignored the possibility of inequitable distribution that may occur under the
statute. Any recovery in the wrongful death action is distributed according
to the laws of intestate succession. 65 In Bowen v. Constructor's Equipment
Rental Co. 66 the North Carolina Supreme Court hypothesized a situation in
which those entitled to the wrongful death recovery under the intestate
succession statutes were ten nephews and nieces of the deceased, one of
whom was a close friend and companion who actually suffered the major
loss of support and services. The rather undesirable result was that this loss
89. The death of the child, however, seemingly cuts off recovery absent statutory authoriza-
tion. Id. § 127, at 901-02. But see Crawford v. Hudson, 3 N.C. App. 555, 165 S.E.2d 557 (1969).
56. Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
57. See Davis v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 53 Ark. 117, 13 S.W. 801 (1890).
58. 32 N.C. App. at 712, 234 S.E.2d at 5.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(1), (2) (1976); see Lauerman, supra note 40, at 227.
60. Lauerman, supra note 40, at 227. Recovery for these would be had from a personal
injury action brought under the survival statute. Id.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(b)(4) (1976), quoted in note 39 supra.
62. Accord, Forsyth County v. Barneycastle, 18 N.C. App. 513,516, 197 S.E.2d 576,578,
cert. denied, 283 N.C. 752, 198 S.E.2d 722 (1973).
63. Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 210 F. Supp. 844 (W.D.N.C. 1962),
aff'd, 323 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1963).
64. 32 N.C. App. at 712, 234 S.E.2d at 5.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1976), quoted in note 38 supra.
66. 283 N.C. 395, 196 S.E.2d 789 (1973).
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of services was considered in the recovery, but distribution was made
among the ten equally. 67 Implementation of the Christenbury holding al-
lows for the same troublesome distribution problem. The court's interpreta-
tion of the language of the statute is, however, supported by the possibility
of double recovery against the defendant tortfeasor should independent
actions for loss of services to a parent be allowed as well as recovery under
the wrongful death statute.
D. Family Purpose Doctrine
The "family purpose doctrine" is generally acknowledged as a misap-
plication of the principles of agency 68 and consequently has been rejected in
at least thirty-two jurisdictions. 69 Nevertheless, the North Carolina Supreme
Court recently broadened this doctrine of imputed negligence, holding in
Williams v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. 70 that its ambit extends to the use
of motorcycles on private property. As traditionally applied, the family
purpose doctrine holds the owner of a vehicle who supplies that vehicle to
his family for their use and enjoyment liable for the negligence of his family
members in using the vehicle for family purposes. 71 In extending the
doctrine 72 beyond its traditional application, the court failed to give ade-
quate weight to the doctrine's faulty conceptual basis, focusing instead on
the social policy underlying the doctrine. 7
3
The Williams suit originated when a fourteen-year-old boy rode his
father's motorcycle across a neighbor's yard, striking and seriously injuring
the neighbor's three-year-old child. The father had furnished the motorcycle
to the son for his use and enjoyment. 74 The injured child's father brought
suit against the motorcyclist's father, alleging imputed negligence under the
family purpose doctrine.75 The court of appeals held the doctrine inapplica-
ble in such a situation noting that the legislature was the proper forum for
any extension of the doctrine. 76 The supreme court permitted plaintiff to
67. Id. at 422, 196 S.E.2d at 807.
68. See W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 73, at 485-86.
69. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1966).
70. 292 N.C. 416, 233 S.E.2d 589 (1977).
71. Id. at 419-20, 233 S.E.2d at 592.
72. North Carolina case law had limited the doctrine to the use of motor vehicles operating
on public highways. Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961). See notes 78-82
and accompanying text infra.
73. 292 N.C. at 421-22, 233 S.E.2d at 593.
74. Id. at 417-18, 233 S.E.2d at 590.
75. Id. at 418, 233 S.E.2d at 590-91.
76. 30 N.C. App. 18, 226 S.E.2d 210 (1976). The court of appeals decision relied heavily
on Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961), discussed in notes 78-81 and
accompanying text infra. The court thus limited judicial application of the doctrine to its
original purpose and scope and declared that any extension to include other than motor vehicles
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recover, however, holding that the fact that the vehicle was a motorcycle
rather than a car and was operated on private property rather than on a public
street was insufficient to take the case outside of the doctrine."
In so extending the family purpose doctrine, the court sidestepped the
policy expressed in its earlier decision in Grindstaff v. Watts78 of tightly
confining the doctrine in the absence of legislative action to "motor vehicles
operating on public highways. " 79 The Grindstaff court characterized the
doctrine as an "anomaly in the law" 80 that unduly stretched the principle of
respondeat superior. Noting the reluctance of other jurisdictions to extend
the doctrine's scope, the court then expressed a fear that any extension
would precipitate a rush to extend the doctrine to other instrumentalities and
factual situations, thus creating undue uncertainty in agency law. 81 The
Williams court chose to deemphasize the analytical problems of the doctrine
and the Grindstaff fear of unbridled extension. Williams avoided conflict
with Grindstaff by construing the latter case's limitation of the doctrine to
the use of motor vehicles operating on public highways as describing the
nature of the vehicle to which the doctrine was applicable, rather than the
particular use of the vehicle giving rise to the complaint.8 2 This strained
construction, however, clearly runs counter to the strong presumption ex-
pressed in Grindstaff against any judicial expansion of the doctrine.
The supreme court defended its narrow construction of Grindstaff by
asserting the value of the social policy behind the doctrine.8 3 Critics of the
in public vehicular areas should come from the legislature. 30 N.C. App. at 24, 226 S.E.2d at
213.
77. 292 N.C. at 421, 233 S.E.2d at 593.
78. 254 N.C. 568, 119 S.E.2d 784 (1961).
79. The Grindstaff opinion stated:
[I]n the absence of legislative action, this Court is not disposed to extend the family
purpose doctrine in North Carolina to instrumentalities other than motor vehicles
operating on public highways. Should the principles of respondeat superior be further
relaxed, great uncertainty will exist in the field of agency and there will be an
immediate clamor to extend the doctrine to still other instrumentalities to meet the
exigencies of particular cases.
Id. at 574, 119 S.E.2d at 789 (citations omitted). Grindstaff held that the family purpose
doctrine did not apply to negligence cases arising out of the operation of motorboats. Id.
80. Id. at 571, 119 S.E.2d at 787.
81. Id. at 572-74, 119 S.E.2d at 788-89.
82. 292 N.C. at 421, 233 S.E.2d at 592.
83. The court drew attention to the following policy considerations articulated in Grind-
staff:
The family purpose doctrine "came into being as an instrument of social policy to
afford great protection for the rapidly growing number of motorists in the United
States." Perhaps nothing has had so great an impact on the business and social life of
the country during the past half century as the advent and ever increasing use of
automobiles and trucks. It was probably inevitable that there should be an alarming
number of collisions and accidents resulting in injuries, suffering and economic loss.
This possibility justified the search of the courts for some device to impose a greater
degree of financial responsibility . . ..
Id. at 420, 233 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. at 572, 119 S.E.2d at 788)
(citation omitted)).
TORTS
family purpose doctrine, on the other hand, have found the policy considera-
tions outweighed by the faulty theoretical basis of the doctrine in the
principles of agency. The doctrine presupposes a master-servant or princi-
pal-agent relationship between the head of the family and the family mem-
bers-use for the pleasure and convenience of a family member serves the
business of the "master. '"84 Those opposed to the doctrine suggest that
consistency with the principles of agency would require, for example, that a
father be liable for his son's negligence only when the son is, in fact, in his
father's service and acting as his agent.
85
The Williams court cited Meinhardt v. Vaughan86 as an instance in
which the Tennessee Supreme Court applied the reasoning of the family
purpose doctrine to motorcycles. In Meinhardt, however, the Tennessee
court conceded the tenuous basis of the doctrine and predicated its decision
on the son's use of the motorcycle to get to school, a mission that the father
had a duty to perform. 87 Hence, in Meinhardt the principles of agency were
substantially fulfilled.
The court's narrow reading of Grindstaff was no doubt predicated in
large part on the subsequent overruling of Grindstaff by legislative enact-
ment declaring the family purpose doctrine applicable to motorboats. 8 The
legislature, however, is the proper forum for extension of the purview of a
doctrine that contorts established legal principles. The court should have
followed the judgment made in Grindstaff,89 allowing the legislature to
respond should it determine that policy considerations of increased possibili-
ty of recovery warrant extension of the family purpose doctrine to motorcy-
cles.
E. Governmental Immunity
In 1977 both the General Assembly and the court of appeals con-
sidered the scope of the doctrine of governmental immunity in North
Carolina in circumstances of substantial import. The legislature retrenched
84. Smith v. Callahan, 34 Del. 129, 133, 144 A. 46, 47 (1928).
85. Id. at 133-36, 144 A. at 47-48. The court in Smith explains the tenuousness of this
application of agency law by posing a hypothetical question. Suppose a son of the family has a
car that he allows members of the family to use. Is he to be liable for injuries resulting from his
father's negligent driving of the car? Logically this follows from the family purpose doctrine's
theory. Id. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 73, at 485-86.
86. 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929).
87. Id. at 278-79, 17 S.W.2d at 7.
88. Law of May 27, 1971, ch. 450, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 382 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 75A-10.1 (1975)), states: "The family purpose doctrine, as applicable in this State to tort
cases arising from the operation of motor vehicles, shall apply to tort cases arising from the
operation of motor boats and vessels as these terms are defined in this Chapter."
89. See note 79 supra.
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on the bar to tort recovery against the government by allowing recovery for
the negligent omissions of state employees. 90 Previously, only negligent
acts were actionable. 91 The court of appeals, on the other hand, broadened
the doctrine's effect in a case of first impression, upholding a claim of
immunity in the area of foster care services by declaring such services to be
governmental rather than proprietary in nature.
92
In amending North Carolina's Tort Claims Act, G.S. 143-291, 93 to
allow recovery for "negligence," 94 the legislature followed a national trend
toward narrowing the scope of governmental immunity. 95 The amendment
to the statute resolves obvious inequities resulting from characterization of
conduct by state agents as "negligent acts" or "negligent omissions." For
example, in Flynn v. Highway and Public Works Commission,96 plaintiff
filed a claim against the North Carolina Industrial Commission for wrongful
death. 97 The complaint alleged that the negligent acts of the Highway
Commission's employees in failing to repair a break or hole in the road
surface resulted in an automobile accident fatal to plaintiff's son.98 In
reviewing the claim the court noted that the Tort Claims Act required a
negligent act by a state employee while acting in the scope of his employ-
ment. 99 Thus, although the Highway Commission was charged with the
maintenance of the road in question, its failure to repair the hole was a
negligent omission and plaintiff was unable to recover for his injury. 100
90. Law of June 10, 1977, ch. 529, §§ 1, 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 627 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291) (effective July 1, 1979) substitutes "negligence" for "a negligent
act" in defining the scope of waiver of sovereign immunity.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Cum. Supp. 1977) reads in part as follows:
The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the
purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education,
the Department of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies
of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individu-
al claim arose as a result of a negligent act of any officer, employee, involuntary
servant or agent of the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment,
service, agency or authority, under circumstances where the State of North Carolina,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the laws of
North Carolina.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. Vaughn v. County of Durham, 34 N.C. App. 416, 240 S.E.2d 456 (1977), cert. denied,
294 N.C. 188, 241 S.E.2d 522 (1978).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
94. See notes 90 & 91 and accompanying text supra.
95. See W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 984-87.
96. 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).
97. The Industrial Commission is empowered to determine the validity of claims brought
under the Tort Claims Act. See note 91 supra.
98. 244 N.C. at 618, 94 S.E.2d at 571.
99. Id. at 620, 94 S.E.2d at 573.
100. Id. See also Ayscue v. Highway Comm'n, 270 N.C. 100, 153 S.E.2d 823 (1967) (failure
to remove gravel that had washed down into intersection resulted in decedent's death from
tractor accident; held not negligent act for purposes of Tort Claims Act).
TORTS
A similar situation arose in Mackey v. Highway Commission.1° 1 In
Mackey, plaintiff was again injured as a result of holes left by state
employees in the shoulder of a road after removal of some large posts.1
0 2
The court characterized the state's conduct as a negligent act, noting, "we
are not concerned with a failure by defendant to maintain the shoulders of
the highway in a safe condition for pedestrian travel; we are concerned here
with the act of an agent of the Commission in negligently creating a trap, or
pitfall, upon a shoulder of the highway which is apparently safe for pedestri-
an travel." 103
These two cases are clearly accurate applications of the act-omission
distinction. 0 4 In Mackey, there was an undertaking by.a state employee that
was absent in Flynn. 10 Both cases, however, are characterized by a negli-
gent failure to repair holes in the highway by a state agency charged with
that responsibility, resulting in injury to the interests of the respective
plaintiffs. The inequity of allowing recovery in the one instance and not in
the other has now been resolved by the amendment to G.S. 143-291.106
The court of appeals reaffirmed the doctrine of governmental immunity
in a case of first impression, Vaughn v. County of Durham,I17 holding that
the placement of children in foster homes by the Durham County Depart-
ment of Social Services was a governmental function shielded from tort
liability by governmental immunity.' 08 Plaintiff in Vaughn kept foster
children for the Department of Social Services. Employees of the Depart-
ment, knowing that plaintiff intended to become pregnant, placed a child in
the home who was a known carrier of cytomegalic inclusion disease. When
the disease infects pregnant mothers it often causes defects in their unborn
fetuses. 1°9 Plaintiff became pregnant, contracted the disease and had an
abortion. 110 She brought suit alleging negligence by the Department and its
employees."I'
Traditionally a municipal corporation is not protected by governmental
immunity when it is performing a proprietary as opposed to a governmental
101. 4 N.C. App. 630, 167 S.E.2d 524 (1969).
102. Id. at 631, 167 S.E.2d at 525.
103. Id. at 634, 167 S.E.2d at 526.
104. W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 56, at 338-40.
105. An omission to repair a gas pipe has been regarded as a negligent distribution of gas.
Id. Thus, the negligence in Mackey could have been characterized as negligent maintenance of
the highway.
106. Law of June 10, 1977, ch. 529, §§ 1, 2, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 627 (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291); see note 90 supra.
107. 34 N.C. App. 416, 240 S.E.2d 456 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C. 185, 241 S.E.2d 522
(1978).
108. Id. at 418, 240 S.E.2d at 458.
109. Id. at 416, 240 S.E.2d at 457.
110. Id. at 416-17, 240 S.E.2d at 457.
111. Id.
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function. 11 2 The supreme court outlined several tests to be applied in
determining whether an activity is proprietary or governmental, including
whether a monetary charge is made for the service, 113 whether the activity
has historically been performed by the government or by private corpora-
tions,1 14 whether there is statutory authorization for the activity, 15 and
" 'whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of
special corporate benefit, or pecuniary profit.' "116 In applying these tests to
the facts of Vaughn, the court noted that there is no charge for foster
placement; 117 the General Assembly appropriates funds for the service.
Moreover, the court cited the North Carolina Constitution's mandate of state
care "for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan"" 8 as refuting plain-
tiff's argument that, historically, religious, charitable or other private in-
stitutions have provided foster care.119 The court concluded that placement
of children in foster homes by the county is a governmental function. 120
The court properly characterized the foster care placement of children
as a governmental function. Although the distinction between the public and
corporate functions of a governmental entity is a difficult one to make, 121
North Carolina has viewed the presence or absence of pecuniary benefit
derived from the service as a crucial inquiry. 122 On this basis, the court in
Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hospital, Inc. 123 determined that the operation
of a public hospital by a county for pecuniary benefit is a proprietary
function for which there is no governmental immunity. As no charge is
made for foster care services the presumption is strong that this is a
governmental rather than a proprietary activity.
The court's conclusion that the function of caring for homeless children
is historically a government function is less sound. The Sides court noted
112. Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972); Metz v. City
of Asheville, 150 N.C. 748, 64 S.E. 881 (1909).
113. Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., 287 N.C. 14,22-23,213 S.E.2d 297,302-03 (1975).
114. Id. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303.
115. See Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N.C. 134, 52 S.E.2d 371, rehearing denied, 230
N.C. 759,535 S.E.2d 313 (1949). The court in Rhodes noted that statutory authorization was not
determinative of the question whether a particular activity is proprietary or governmental. Id.
at 137-38, 52 S.E.2d 373-74. The Vaughn court, however, suggested that the statutory basis for
the activity is a factor to be considered in the totality of circumstances. 34 N.C. App. at 420, 240
S.E.2d at 459.
116. Vaughn v. County of Durham, 34 N.C. App. at 420, 240 S.E.2d at 459 (quoting
McCombs v. City of Asheboro, 6 N.C. App. 234, 241, 170 S.E.2d 169, 174 (1969)).
117. Id.
118. N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
119. 34 N.C. App. at 419, 240 S.E.2d at 458-59.
120. Id. at 418, 240 S.E.2d at 458.
121. See W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 979.
122. See, e.g., Sides v. Cabarrus Memorial Hosp., Inc., 287 N.C. 14, 24, 213 S.E.2d 297,
303 (1975).
123. 287 N.C. 14, 213 S.E.2d 297 (1975).
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examples of functions traditionally governmental 24 concluding that "it
appears that all of the activities held to be governmental functions by this
Court are those historically performed by the government, and which are not
ordinarily engaged in by private corporations." 125 Arguably, providing for
orphans or children needing homes has been the focus of activity of many
private institutions such as churches to at least as great an extent as the
government.
A different characterization of foster care activities might result from
application of another test for determining whether a function is governmen-
tal-a test articulated in McQuillan's treatise, Municipal Corporations.
126
McQuillan suggests that governmental duties are those that are public with
respect to the state in general and in which the municipal corporation serves
as the agent of the state. Corporate duties, on the other hand, are private,
providing the local necessities of local citizens. 127 Different results arise
from this test depending on whether the county Department of Social
Services is viewed as serving the local citizenry or the state at large. Despite
the flexibility that this more general test would provide in finding a function
proprietary, in North Carolina the Sides requirement of some monetary
charge attached to proprietary functions is of preeminent importance. 
128
The Vaughn court acknowledged the policy considerations in favor of
abolishing governmental immunity. 129 These factors had been outlined in
Smith v. State ,130 a 1976 North Carolina Supreme Court decision that
abolished governmental immunity in breach of contract actions. Grounds for
abrogation in that case included the notions that the injury-causing activity
of a public enterprise should be counted as an activity cost of the enterprise,
that injuries caused by government activities should be paid for by those
reaping the benefits of the government's activities rather than the victim,
and that since taxpayers reap the rewards of the government, they should
124. Id. at 23,213 S.E.2d at 303 (citing, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81
S.E.2d 150 (1954) (erection of jails); Hamilton v. Town of Hamlet, 238 N.C. 741,78 S.E.2d 770
(1953) (installation and maintenance of traffic lights); Howland v. City of Asheville, 174 N.C.
749, 94 S.E. 524 (1917) (furnishing water for extinguishing fires)).
125. 287 N.C. at 23, 213 S.E.2d at 303.
126. E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (rev. 3d ed. 1977). The test is
articulated as follows:
What are governmental powers and duties, and what are corporate duties, is not
subject to precise definition further than to say this: The powers and duties of
municipal corporations are of two-fold character; the one public as regards the state at
large, insofar as they are its agents in government; the other private insofar as they
provide the local necessities and conveniences for their own citizens.
18 id. § 53.29, at 227.
127. See note 126 supra.
128. 287 N.C. at 22-23, 213 S.E.2d at 302-03.
129. 34 N.C. App. at 420-21, 240 S.E.2d at 459.
130. 289 N.C. 303, 222 S.E.2d 412 (1976).
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pay the costs. 131 Nonetheless, despite the concession that sovereign immuni-
ty has been decried in various quarters, 132 the court considered itself bound
by the supreme court's refusal in Steelman v. City of New Bern133 to
abrogate the doctrine judicially. 134
The difficulty with the position of the court of appeals in Vaughan and
the supreme court in Steelman in leaving the solution to the immunity
problem to the legislature is that the legislature has failed to act comprehen-
sively. The 1977 amendment to the Tort Claims Act, abolishing the act-
omission distinction, is a prime example of the piecemeal approach used by
state legislatures to cut inroads into the doctrine. 135 Judicial inroads into the
scope of the doctrine, on the other hand, might provide the proper catalyst




XIV. WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
A. Wills
North Carolina courts have often been required to decide whether a
residuary clause in a will effectively exercises a general power of appoint-
131. Id. at 313, 222 S.E.2d at 419. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 52, § 131, at 978.
132. See, e.g., Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972),
which states:
[]e recognize merit in the modern tendency to restrict rather than to extend the
application of governmental immunity. This trend is based, inter alia, on the large
expansion of municipal activities, the availability of liability insurance, and the plain
injustice of denying relief to an individual injured by the wrongdoing of a municipality.
A corollary to the tendency of modem authorities to restrict rather than to extend the
application of governmental immunity is the rule that in cases of doubtful liability
application of the rule should be resolved against the municipality.
Id. at 529-30, 186 S.E.2d at 908. See generally Comment, The Role of the Courts in Abolishing
Governmental Immunity, 1964 DUKE L.J. 888.
133. 279 N.C. 589, 184 S.E.2d 239 (1971). The court suggested that any repeal of the
doctrine should come from the legislature.
134. 34 N.C. App. at 420, 240 S.E.2d at 459.
135. The court in Steelman noted that a bill was introduced in the General Assembly to
abolish governmental immunity in its entirety, but that this bill was defeated. 279 N.C. at 594-
95, 184 S.E.2d at 242-43. In N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-435 (1974) the legislature partially removed
governmental immunity:
Purchase of liability insurance. . . waives the county's governmental immunity,
to the extent of insurance coverage, for any act or omission occurring in the exercise
of a governmental function. By entering into an insurance contract with the county, an
insurer waives any defense based upon the governmental immunity of the county.
136. There is some indication that when courts abrogate governmental immunity in specific
areas, legislatures are prompted to consider more comprehensive solutions to the problem. See
Comment, supra note 132, at 895 n.15, 900.
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
ment held by the testator at his death.1 The legislature has established, in
G.S. 31-43,2 a presumption that a general devise in a will exercises any
general power of appointment held by a decedent unless an intent to the
contrary appears "by the will." 3 In Planter's National Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States,4 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina was required to decide under this statute whether a residuary
devise effectively exercised a power of appointment, thus allowing a larger
estate tax marital deduction. In so doing, the court was required to decide
what evidence of intent could be admitted to determine the effect of the
residuary clause in question.
Decedent executed her will in 1949 which, in pertinent part, provided
that " '[a]ll the rest and residue of my estate . . . I give . . . to my
husband . . . and my adopted sons . . . in the proportion of one-third to
each.' "5 In 1959 decedent established a trust that conditioned the receipt by
the husband of a share in the trust estate upon his surviving until their
youngest son reached the age of thirty, or if neither son reached thirty,
surviving the last one living. 6 Decedent retained the power to change
beneficiaries and to alter the disposition of her property by her will. 7 The
Internal Revenue Service claimed that the interest given to decedent's
husband under the trust was terminable under section 2056 of the Internal
Revenue Code8 and thus did not qualify for the marital deduction. The
administrator's position, upheld by the district court, was that the trust gave
decedent a general power of appointment9 over the trust property that was
1. E.g., Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N.C. 484, 46 S.E.2d 463 (1948); Walsh v. Friedman,
219 N.C. 151, 13 S.E.2d 250 (1941); Johnson v. Knight, 117 N.C. 122, 23 S.E. 92 (1895).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-43 (1976) provides:
A general devise of the real estate of the testator. . . shall be construed to include any
real estate . . . which he may have power to appoint in any manner he may think
proper; and shall operate as an execution of such power, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the will; and in like manner a bequest of the personal estate of the
testator. . . shall be construed to include any personal estate. . . which he may have
power to appoint in any manner he may think proper, and shall operate as an execution
of such power, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.
3. Id.
4. 425 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
5. Id. at 1180-81.
6. Id. at 1181.
7. Id.
8. I.R.C. § 2056 allows a marital deduction for any interest in property passing to a
surviving spouse provided that this interest does not include certain life estates or certain
terminable interests. The marital deduction is limited to the greater of 50% of the adjusted gross
estate or $250,000.
9. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that § 31-43 only applies to general
powers of appointment. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 267 N.C. 173, 148 S.E.2d 41
(1966).
In Planter's, the IRS argued that the provision in the trust was not a general power of
appointment because "the power could not be exercised in favor of her husband and sons who
were already the beneficiaries under the trust instrument." 425 F.Supp. at 1182. Thus, it was
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exercised by her will and that, therefore, the property passed outright to her
husband under the will. 10 Thus the court allowed the marital deduction. "
In reaching this result, the court was faced with the issue whether G.S.
31-43 limits the expression of a contrary intent to the will itself or whether
extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show the intent of the testator.
12
North Carolina state courts have not yet confronted this question, but courts
in other jurisdictions, construing statutes comparable to G.S. 31-43, have
required an intent to not exercise the power to appear on the face of the
will. 13 In this respect the court in Planter's noted a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 14 construing Pennsylvania law
in which plaintiff alleged that a residuary clause did not exercise a power of
appointment because the devisees under this clause were the ones who
would take if this power were not exercised.15 The Third Circuit held that
decedent's intent could only be determined from the will itself; extrinsic
evidence could not be used.' 6 The Planter's court concluded in similar
fashion that extrinsic evidence of a contrary intent is prohibited by G.S. 31-
43; a contrary intent may only be expressed or implied in the will itself.
17
Decedent's will, therefore, effectively exercised the power of appointment
granted by the subsequent trust instrument.
18
The approach taken by the Planter's court provides a sound rule for the
construction of a will under these circumstances. Limiting the evidence of
intent to the will itself should lessen cbnflict over will dispositions. Yet this
type of controversy could be avoided if drafters were more precise in their
work. Had a codicil to the will been drawn after the creation of the trust,
specifically referring to the power of appointment granted in that trust, no
question could have been raised about decedent's intent. Use of such a
precaution could be especially crucial in situations similar to that presented
in Planter's, wherein extrinsic evidence would apparently indicate an intent
to not exercise the power of appointment in the will. 19
contended, the provisions of § 31-43 would not apply. The court held, however, that the power
to "alter the disposition of her property" did not restrict her right to dispose of the property in
any manner she wished and was, therefore, a general power of appointment. Id.
10. 425 F. Supp. at 1181.
11. Id. at 1183.
12. Id. at 1182.
13. E.g., In re Deane's Will, 4 N.Y.2d 326, 151 N.E.2d 184, 175 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1958);
Lederer v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 182 Md. 422, 35 A.2d 166 (1943); United States Trust Co.
v. Winchester, 277 Ky. 434, 126 S.W.2d 814 (1939).
14. Keating v. Mayer, 236 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1956).
15. Id. at 480.
16. Id. at 481.
17. 425 F. Supp. at 1183.
18. Id.
19. The court in Planter's noted that several provisions in the trust instrument were
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In legislative action, the North Carolina General Assembly provided in
G.S. 31-11.6 that an attested will may be made self-proved by the acknow-
ledgment of the testator and by affidavits of the witnesses.2" These state-
immediately nullified upon execution by the existing will and would therefore indicate that the
trustor intended the trust property to pass outside of the will. Id. at 1182. The court stated that
the suit was necessary because the estate planner neglected to revise an estate plan to meet the
requirements of the marital deduction tax provisions that became controlling several years
later. Id. at 1184.
The issue whether a power of appointment had been effectively exercised was also
addressed by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in First Union Nat'l Bank v. Moss, 32 N.C.
App. 499, 233 S.E.2d 88, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 728, 235 S.E.2d 783 (1977). The husband's will
gave his wife a testamentary power of appointment and required that this power be specifically
referred to in her will. Id. at 501, 233 S.E.2d at 90. Her will devised, in the event she survived
her husband, all the residue of her estate "'including any property. . . over which I have or
may have any power of appointment.'" Id. at 502, 233 S.E. 2d at 91. In holding that this
provision complied with the specificity requirement in the husband's will, the court looked to
extrinsic evidence such as the fact that the wills were executed on the same day with the same
witnesses. The court felt that it was not necessary to consider § 31-43 as it found the require-
ment in the husband's will reflected an intent only to avoid "an inadvertent disposition of the
appointed property." Id. at 507, 233 S.E.2d at 94. Once again, careful drafting of the wife's will
would have avoided any controversy over the exercise of this power-such as an inclusion of a
term providing for a devise of the residue of the estate "including any property over which I
have any power of appointment, especially that power of appointment given to me in item five
of my husband's will executed on January 12, 1972."
The court of appeals in In re Grady, 33 N.C. App. 477, 235 S.E.2d 425 (1977), applied the
Rule in Shelley's Case to find a fee simple ownership in a devisee who received real property
for life with the remainder to go to her" 'estate in Fee Simple.' "Id. at 478, 235 S.E.2d at 427.
The court found that this devise could be either a testamentary power of appointment or a
limitation to intestate succession. In either case, the life tenant was still vested with a fee simple
estate. If the provision is construed as a testamentary power of appointment, the life tenant's
deed of the property extinguished her power. As the will contained no residuary clause, the
remainder passed to her heirs and their interest merged with the life tenant's to create a fee
simple. Id. at 480-81, 235 S.E.2d at 428-29. If the provision is construed to require the property
to pass under intestate succession, the remainder to the heirs again merges with the life estate to
create a fee simple. Id. at 482, 235 S.E.2d at 429.
The surviving spouse was the subject of legislative action and several judicial decisions.
The North Carolina General Assembly proposed, and the voters approved, a constitutional
amendment that allows a surviving spouse of either sex to assert the homestead exemption
instead of allowing only the wife to take advantage of the exemption. N.C. CoiNsT. art. X, § 2(3)
(giving effect to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-389 (Cum. Supp. 1977)). The court of appeals maintained
the North Carolina principle of not requiring an election by the surviving spouse. See, e.g.,
Breece v. Breece, 270 N.C. 605, 155 S.E.2d 65 (1967); North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Barbee,
260 N.C. 106, 131 S.E.2d 666 (1963). In Lambeth v. Fowler, 33 N.C. App. 596, 235 S.E.2d 914
(1977), the court found that the testator's devise of "my" land, which actually was owned by
the testator and his wife as tenants by the entirety, was a mistake. Thus the widow was not
required to elect between the devise under the will and her survivorship interest in the land held
by the entirety. Id. at 599, 235 S.E.2d at 917.
The court of appeals also ruled on several cases concerning the right of a surviving spouse
to dissent from a will. In Phillips v. Phillips, 34 N.C. App. 428, 238 S.E.2d 790 (1977), cert.
granted, 294 N.E. 183, 241, S.E.2d 518 (1978), the court for the first time held that the net estate
is to be used in computing the intestate share of the surviving spouse, as required by N.C. GEM.
STAT. § 29-14 (1976), to determine the spouse's right to dissent pursuant to id. § 30-1(a). In In re
Estate of Cox, 32 N.C. App. 765, 233 S.E.2d 926, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 729, 235 S.E.2d 783
(1977), the court held that a dissent must be filed within six months after letters testamentary
have been issued, as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (1976), but the spouse need not
establish the right to dissent prior to this filing.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-11.6 (Supp. 1977). Prior to this enactment, wills could not be
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ments must be made in front of an "officer authorized to administer oaths
under the laws of this State," 21 and may be made at the time the will is
executed or any time thereafter. This provision, in conjunction with G.S.
31-18.1,22 which regulates the manner of probate of attested written wills,
allows probate of a will without the testimony of the attesting witnesses if it
has been self-proved. 23 As a result, delays resulting from the deaths of
attesting witnesses will be avoided.
B. Trusts
Quite often the situation arises in which a decedent, in his life insur-
ance policy, has named as beneficiary the "trustee to be named in my will."
In doing so, the testator intends to avoid probate administration of the policy
proceeds 24 but this is often not the result of his efforts. Some courts have
upheld these provisions,' but others have required that the proceeds pass
through the estate. 26 To avoid the latter result, several states have enacted
statutes that uphold the effectiveness of this type of provision27 and, in the
newly revised trust act, the North Carolina General Assembly has now
provided for this type of estate plan in G.S. 36A-100(c).2 8
In analyzing the effect of this statute, a helpful comparison can be
probated without the testimony of the attesting witnesses or other competent evidence. Id. §
31-18.1(a)(1) to (3) (Supp. 1977).
21. Id. § 31-11.6.
22. Id. § 31-18.1.
23. Id. § 31-18.1(a)(4).
24. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE LAW OF TRUSTS 48 (1975).
25. E.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 886 (8th Cir. 1943);
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 266 (1st Cir. 1938).
26. See, e.g., Pavy v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 135 Ind. App. 647, 195 N.E.2d 862
(1964); Frost v. Frost, 202 Mass. 100, 88 N.E. 446 (1909).
27. E.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 83-7-7 (1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.64 (1976);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.452 (Supp. 1976).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-100(c) (Supp. 1977) provides:
A person having the right to designate the beneficiary under a life insurance policy
• . . may designate as such beneficiary a trustee named or to be named in his will
whether or not the will is in existence at the time of the designation. The proceeds
received by the trustee shall be held and disposed of as part of the trust estate under
the terms of the will as they exist at the death of the testator. If no qualified trustee
makes claim to the proceeds within six months after the death of the decedent or if
within that period it is established that no trustee can qualify to receive the proceeds,
payments shall be made to the personal representative of the estate of the person
making the designation unless it is otherwise provided by an alternative designation or
by the policy or plan. The proceeds received by the trustee shall not be subject to
claims against the estate of the decedent or to inheritance taxes to any greater extent
than if the proceeds were payable directly to the beneficiary or beneficiaries named in
the trust. The proceeds may be commingled with any other assets which may properly
become part of such trust, but the proceeds shall not become part of the decedent's
estate for purposes of trust administration unless the will of the decedent expressly so
provides.
The same rules govern annuities "or other payment described in Section 2039(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954." Id. § 36A-100(d).
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drawn between the testamentary trust approved under the new act and a
pour-over trust.29 In a pour-over trust, the testator devises property by his
will to an inter vivos insurance trust established prior to the will execution. 30
Both types of trusts avoid probate administration of the insurance proceeds
and allow these proceeds, plus other probate assets, to be administered in
one trust.31 Under the new law, however, use of the testamentary trust will
be subject to additional requirements, such as the filing of inventories and
annual accounts. 32 Furthermore, the value of the proceeds of the policy may
be included in the estate for estate tax purposes since the testator has
essentially retained the right to change the beneficiary; 33 the testator may
alter the trust provisions in his will anytime prior to his death. In addition, if
the designated trustee of a testamentary trust is unable to qualify and no
alternative disposition of the funds is provided in the policy, the proceeds
will vest in the personal representative. 34 Apparently these funds would then
become subject to estate administration, thus defeating the purpose of the
beneficiary designation.
The testamentary trust nevertheless provides some benefits that may be
useful in a particular estate plan. In both a pour-over trust and a testamentary
trust the testator can exercise more control over the use of the funds by
having the policy proceeds paid to the trustee rather than to the ultimate
beneficiaries. Yet by postponing establishment of the trust until he dies, the
expenses of an inter vivos trust can be avoided. 35 Since the proceeds
generally are not subject to probate administration, the use of the funds will
avoid potential administrative delay. 36 Furthermore, the proceeds cannot be
29. North Carolina allows a pour-over trust. Id. § 31-47 (1976) provides:
A devise or bequest in a will. . . may be made in form or substance to the trustee of
any trust, including an existing testamentary trust, if established in writing prior to the
execution of such will. Such devise or bequest shall not be invalid because the trust is
amendable or revocable or both by the settlor or any other person or persons; nor
because the trust instrument or any amendment thereto was not executed in the
manner required for wills, nor because the trust was amended after execution of the
will. Unless the will provides otherwise, such devise or bequest shall operate to
dispose of property under the terms of the trust as they appear in writing at the
testator's death and the property shall not be deemed held under a testamentary trust.
An entire revocation of the trust prior to the testator's death shall invalidate the devise
or bequest.
30. 1 N. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 78, at
201 (1964).
31. P. HASKELL, supra note 24, at 49.
32. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-107 (Supp. 1977).
33.. I.R.C. § 2042(2). Under the pour-over trust, however, if the testator releases all
powers over the policy and the trust instrument, the proceeds may not be taxable to his estate.
See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 9.15, at 212
(3d ed. 1974).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-100(c) (Supp. 1977).
35. P. HASKELL, supra note 24, at 49.
36. Haskell, Testamentary Trustee as Insurance Beneficiary: An Estate Planning Gim-
mick, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 566, 566 (1966).
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diverted to pay estate expenses such as executor's fees, 37 and, as provided in
G.S. 36A-100(c), the policy proceeds will not be subject to claims against
the estate. 38 These claims would include not only those of creditors39 but
also those of a dissenting spouse claiming a forced share.40 Thus, pursuant
to G.S. 30-1,41 the right of a surviving spouse to dissent will not be based on
the insurance proceeds and, if the surviving spouse does dissent, that spouse
may not receive any part of these proceeds.42 These aspects of the new act
make the designation of a testamentary trustee as beneficiary of an insurance
policy a potentially attractive technique for estate planners.
4 3
C. Fiduciaries
1. The Prudent Fiduciary
In 1977 the North Carolina legislature effected substantial revisions in
the laws affecting fiduciaries-trustees, executors, administrators and guard-
ians. In general, these alterations have diminished the restrictions imposed
upon the fiduciary. For example, the bond requirements for personal repre-
sentatives and guardians have been reduced44 as have the provisions pro-
hibiting self-dealing by trustees. 45 One major revision, more drastic in
37. Id.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-I00(c) (Supp. 1977), quoted in note 28 supra.
39. In an unrelated enactment, the legislature proposed, and the voters approved, a
constitutional amendment that allows a person to insure his life for the benefit of his family and
establishes that the proceeds will pass free of claims of the insured's or the insured's estate's
creditors. N.C. CONST. art. X, § 5 (giving effect to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-205 (Supp. 1977)).
40. Haskell, supra note 36, at 567.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1976).
42. Id.
43. During 1977, the General Assembly also amended the perpetual care trust provisions
to specifically require a corporate trustee and to establish the trustee's qualifications. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 65-60.1, -61, -64, -70 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The North Carolina Court of Appeals
dealt with the construction of a resulting trust in Cline v. Cline, 34 N.C. App. 495, 238 S.E.2d
673 (1977), cert. granted, 294 N.C. 182, 241 S.E.2d 517 (1978) (No. 112 PC). Plaintiff sought to
establish a resulting trust in land that she had farmed with her husband for 25 years prior to their
divorce. The land was owned by the husband's parents until his father's death. Plaintiff and her
husband agreed to work the farm in exchange for the deed to the land but the deed was recorded
in the husband's name only. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding
of a resulting trust inasmuch as plaintiff had advanced consideration for the farm equal to that
advanced by her husband. Nevertheless, a new trial was ordered as the jury was not instructed
to find that this consideration was advanced prior to the passing of legal title, as required by
prior case law. In Rauchfuss v. Rauchfuss, 33 N.C. App. 108, 234 S.E.2d 423 (1977), the court
of appeals also found a resulting trust in favor of a wife when a husband caused a mortgagee to
reconvey property, previously held by the entirety, to him individually. For a further discussion
of this case, see this Survey, Property: Deeds.
44. N.C. GEM. STAT. H9 28A-8-1.1, 33-13.2 (Supp. 1977) provide that in computing the
bond for guardians and personal representatives, money deposited in a bank or savings and loan
institution that cannot be withdrawn without court authorization may, in the court's discretion,
not be included. Section 28A-8-1 eliminates the bond requirement for personal representatives
under certain enumerated circumstances. Id. § 28A-8-1.
45. Under the new trust act, trustees may loan funds to a trust, id. § 36A-64, may loan
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theory than in fact, repeals the legal list statutes for investments by
fiduciaries, 46 and enacts in its stead a prudent man standard.
47
Newly enacted G.S. 36A-2 provides that in carrying out his duties as
custodian of another's property, " a fiduciary shall observe the standard of
judgment and care under the circumstances then prevailing, which an
ordinarily prudent man of discretion and intelligence, who is a fiduciary of
the property of others, would observe as such fiduciary. "48 This new statute
thus establishes a standard by which the courts may judge the validity of
investments made by fiduciaries. Nevertheless, the trust instrument under
which the fiduciary acts is still the controlling factor in setting the permissi-
ble investments standards for the trustee.
49
The prudent man rule originated in the venerable Massachusetts case of
Harvard College v. Amory, 50 in which the court stated:
All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the
permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested.
5 1
This judicial standard has been codified by the majority of states52 with
several variations,5 3 and is to be distinguished from the legal list standard,
which allows the trustee to invest only in those investments that are au-
thorized by statute.5 4 The prudent man rule not only allows the fiduciary
more flexibility but also eliminates the necessity for constant amendment of
the legal lists to reflect the proper investments of the time.
5 5
Prior to the enactment of G.S. 36A-2, North Carolina was a permissive
list state. 56 The legal lists set out in the repealed statutes were not binding on
funds of one trust to another, id. § 36A-65, and may sell assets of one trust to another if the
trust instruments so authorize, id. § 36A-68.
46. Law of June 8, 1977, ch. 502, § 1, '1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 583 (repealing chapter 36 of
the North Carolina General Statutes, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-1 to -4.1 (1976)).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-2 (Supp. 1977).
48. Id. This statute applies to guardians, personal representatives, collectors, trustees and
others. Id. § 36A-1.
49. Id. § 36A-3.
50. 26 Mass. 446, 9 Pick. 454 (1830).
51. Id. at 469, 9 Pick. at 461.
52. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 106, at 389 (5th ed.
1973).
53. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2261 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
45-88 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.125 (West 1947). See generally P.
HASKELL, supra note 24, at 109 (discussion of the various types of fiduciary standards
currently in effect).
54. P. HASKELL, supra note 24, at 109.
55. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 52, § 106, at 388.
56. Markham, Trust Investments in North Carolina, 14 N.C.L. REv. 160, 164 (1936).
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the trustee but could be considered as a guide. 57 Thus the trustee could
invest outside of these legal lists but was still obliged to invest prudently.
5 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the question of these
investment standards in Sheets v. .G. Flynt Tobacco Co.59 in which wards,
having reached their majority, sued for revocation of an investment made by
their guardian. The court stated that there was no statutory authority for the
investment in question but that a guardian is generally authorized to invest in
order to benefit the ward.6° In so investing, the guardian was held to a
standard of diligence and good faith by the court, citing Harvard College .61
Thus, prior to the enactment of G.S. 36A-2, North Carolina fiduciaries were
required to invest with due diligence and in good faith whether or not their
investments were within the legal lists.62 As North Carolina was thus a
permissive list state, the move to a prudent man standard does not present a
major change in the standard of care imposed upon fiduciaries. 61 It is
interesting to note, however, that the standard set in G.S. 36A-2 is that of a
"prudent fiduciary,'' 64 a seemingly more conservative standard than that
imposed by other states, which have defined the standard as that of a prudent
man investing in his own affairs. 65 Whether this distinction will signifi-
cantly affect the courts' future construction of the new prudent fiduciary
standard remains to be seen.
66
57. Id.
58. P. HASKELL, supra note 24, at 109.
59. 195 N.C. 149, 141 S.E.2d 355 (1928).
60. Id. at 152, 141 S.E.2d at 357.
61. Id.
62. Legal lists were of considerable importance in that the trustee would be "prima facie
protected" from charges of breach of trust if he invested in these authorized securities.
Markham, supra note 56, at 165.
63. Courts in other jurisdictions have been faced with the question of what standard to
apply to an investment made after a change in the law governing such investments. In In re
Flynn's Estate, 205 Okla. 311, 237 P.2d 903 (1951), the trust was executed prior to the adoption
of the prudent man standard. In applying that standard to the investment, the court held that
"[u]nless a trustor specifically restricts the power of his trustee in investing trust funds the
trustee is governed by the law in force at the time the investment is made." Id. at 313,237 P.2d
at 905; accord, Goodridge v. National Bank of Commerce, 200 Va. 511, 106 S.E.2d 598 (1959).
64. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
65. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2261(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978); OR. REv. STAT. §
128.057 (1977); VA. CODE § 26-45.1 (1973).
66. The new trust statute also eliminates the requirement that all beneficiaries be nonresi-
dents before removal of trust funds from the state is permitted, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-13
(Supp. 1977), and provides for statutory removal of trustees for misfeasance, id. § 36A-35.
In unrelated action, the General Assembly provided that an executor or trustee may make
distributions without regard to the income tax basis of the property for federal tax purposes. Id.
§ 28A-22.8. This provision takes on special significance due to the new carryover basis
provisions incorporated within I.R.C. § 1023.
The legislature also amended the provisions requiring notice to creditors of the decedent to
allow personal notice by mail. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-14-3 (Supp. 1977). This amendment as
originally proposed, made the mailing of notices obligatory. Law of May 27, 1977, ch.' 446, §
1(m), 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 484. The provision was apparently made permissive to avoid
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2. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees
The North Carolina Supreme Court for the first time expressly stated
the circumstances under which an unsuccessful executor can be compen-
sated for attorneys' fees pursuant to G.S. 6-21(2)67 which allows costs to be
awarded in actions to determine the rights and duties of parties under a will.
In re Moore68 presented the issue whether a nominated executor whose
letters testamentary were denied was entitled to attorneys' fees for his
charges of breach of duty for failure to notify by mail. Law of June 29, 1977, ch. 798, § 1, 1977
N.C. Sess. Laws 798 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-14-3 (Supp. 1977)). The effect of
receiving notice by mail is to bar the creditor's claim under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-19-3 (Supp.
1977). If the creditor is not notified by mail, then he "may be paid from any undistributed assets
of the estate." Id. § 28A-14-3. However, the legislature has left unresolved the question
whether this provision will allow creditors to seek recovery from distributees of the assets of
the estate. Section 28A-19-3 specifically bars recovery against "the estate, the personal repre-
sentative, the collector, the heirs, and the devisees" unless the claim is presented within the
requisite time period. Id. § 28A-19-3. Section 28A-14-3 is not so specific in barring such
recovery based on alleged lack of notice, yet it is doubtful that the legislature intended the
creditor to have unlimited recovery. This interpretation would constitute a major departure
from the policy codified in § 28A-19-3 of limiting creditors' rights of recovery.
The liability of funds in a joint banking account for the debts of a deceased joint tenant was
expanded to include the year's allowance to the surviving spouse, funeral expenses and
administrative expenses. Id. § 41-2.1(b)(3). In further action, the legislature provided that a
guardian may now make an anatomical gift of the ward's body prior to the latter's death. Id. §
90-220.2(b)(5), (6) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Eligibility for custodianship of minors was expanded to
include a spouse of a brother, sister, aunt or uncle. Id. § 33-68(11) (Supp. 1977). See also id. §
33-74.
The North Carolina courts also considered a suit for revocation of letters testamentary
because of alleged misconduct by the executors and a suit to revoke an unauthorized convey-
ance by a trustee. In In re Taylor, 293 N.C. 511, 238 S.E.2d 774 (1977), a widow claimed that the
administrator of her husband's estate was unduly harrassing her by, among other things,
charging her rent for use of the land and house. Her principal evidence was a letter from the
administrator's attorney to her own which, though possibly excessive in its demands, failed to
establish a case of misconduct and, in fact, demonstrated an intent on the part of the adminis-
trator to fulfill his duties. Id. at 520, 238 S.E.2d at 779. The Taylor court also held that a
tenancy in common estate received by the administrator under the will was not sufficient to
constitute a conflict of interest that would hinder the administration of the estate. Id. at 521-22,
238 S.E.2d at 780.
In Moore v. Smith, 33 N.C. App. 275, 235 S.E.2d 102 (1977), the court of appeals held that
an income beneficiary, who was also the trustee, could not make a gift of property to the
defendant unless the conveyance was necessary for the support and maintenance of the income
beneficiary and in the interest of the trust estate. Although the defendant had cared for the
income beneficiary for eight years, the court held that the conveyance was not necessary for
the beneficiary's support and revoked the deed.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-21 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part:
Costs in the following matters shall be taxed against either party, or apportioned
among the parties, in the discretion of the Court:
(2) daveats to wills and any action or proceeding which may require the
construction of any will or trust agreement, or fix the rights and duties of parties
thereunder . ...
The word "costs" as the same appears and is used in this section shall be
construed to include reasonable attorneys' fees . . ..
68. 292 N.C. 58, 231 S.E.2d 849 (1977).
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unsuccessful litigation seeking approval of his nomination. The probated
will named the nominee as executor. The widow, in her petition for probate,
requested that a sale of stock made by the decedent be rescinded and that the
letters testamentary be denied because of a supposed conflict of interest
between the nominee and defendant in the rescission suit.69 In reviewing the
petition the court of appeals found that the alleged conflict of interest existed
as a matter of law and, therefore, affirmed the trial court's denial of letters
testamentary.70 After this suit, the nominee successfully requested the trial
court to grant recovery for attorneys' fees incurred in litigation concerning
the letters testamentary.
71
Although the court of appeals found that the award of these fees to the
nominee was not authorized by G.S. 6-21(2),72 the supreme court disagreed,
holding that an executor named in a will is a party within the intent of G.S.
6-21(2). 73 Although the court felt that the testator's wishes as to who should
serve as executor was sufficient to bring the nominee within the ambit of
G.S. 6-21(2), the suit must also be beneficial to the interests of the estate to
serve as a basis for reimbursement of fees engendered by the nominee in his
attempt to secure his appointment. 74 The court found that the claim of this
nominee was not asserted in good faith, and thus was not beneficial to the
estate, because as a matter of law he was disqualified to serve as executor. 75
In reaching this result, the court stated:
[I]t is quite clear (1) that [the trial judge] should not award costs and
attorneys' fees to an executor-designate whose claim for appoint-
ment is rejected unless the claim was reasonable, made in good
fatih, and prima facie in the interest of the estate; and (2) that the
judge has no discretion to tax costs against an estate when the
nominated executor was disqualified to act as a matter of law.' 6
Other courts have agreed that fees for litigating the right to letters testamen-
tary will not be allowed unless the suit was in the interest of the estate. 77 This
approach is prompted to some degree by the fear that a person in seeking the
69. Id. at 60, 231 S.E.2d at 851.
70. In re Moore, 25 N.C. App. 36, 212 S.E.2d 184, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 259,214 S.E.2d
430 (1975).
71. 292 N.C. at 63, 231 S.E.2d at 853.
72. 29 N.C. App. 589, 225 S.E.2d 125 (1976), discussed in 55 N.C.L. REV. 1109, 1113
(1977).
73. 292 N.C. at 66, 231 S.E.2d at 854.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 67, 231 S.E.2d at 855.
77. See In re Estate of Morinini, 252 Cal. App. 2d 805, 60 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1967); In re
Estate of Baumgartner, 274 Minn. 337, 144 N.W.2d 574 (1966) (citing Annot., 90 A.L.R. 101
(1934)); 31 AM. JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 542 (1967). Contra, Hamilton v. Nunn,
247 Ky. 715, 57 S.W.2d 655 (1933).
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office of executor may be acting solely for his own pecuniary benefit. 7 Any
costs incurred in such litigation will ultimately be assessed against the heirs
if the estate must bear this expense; therefore, their interest in ensuring that
such suits are ultimately for the benefit of the estate is considerable.
79
Prior to Moore, North Carolina courts had only addressed the question
of awarding fees when the interest of the estate was at stake in cases in
which the validity of a will was contested.80 Accordingly, the decision in
Moore enhances the significance of G.S. 6-21(2) by applying it to nominees
seeking issuance of letters testamentary. If recovery of attorneys' fees in
these suits were excluded from coverage by G.S. 6-21(2) and therefore
barred, nominated executors might be hesitant to bring suit even though "'
such action would be in the interests of the estate. As this litigation is now
covered by this statute, the merits of the suit and the interests sought to be
established will control the award of fees. Thus, prior to instigating action,
nominees should consider not only their own benefit but also the benefit to
the estate to be gained by such action. In so doing, the standard established
in Moore-that any such suit should be reasonable, undertaken in good




During 1977 the North Carolina Supreme Court established the circum-
stances under which property will escheat to the state when the intestate
decedent leaves heirs. In Newlin v. Gill,82 decedent's closest surviving
78. Annot., supra note 77, at 102.
79. Id. at 102-03.
80. In the supreme court case of In re Will of Slade, 214 N.C. 361, 199 S.E. 290 (1938),
several heirs filed an unsuccessful caveat to the will. The trial court, in allowing attorneys' fees,
found that their suit was in good faith and in the interests of the estate. Id. at 362, 199 S.E. at
290. Also, in Mariner v. Bateman, 4 N.C. (Term) 350 (1816), the court held that costs should be
awarded to an executor for unsuccessfully contesting probate of a second will because the
executor was fulfilling the duties of his office. Id. at 351. But see Overman v. Lanier, 157 N.C.
544, 73 S.E. 192 (1911) (court denied attorneys' fees, finding use of attorney not for benefit of
estate).
81. In other legislative action, the General Assembly provided for statutory compensation
for trustees, including compensation for legal services rendered by a fiduciary who is also an
attorney. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-51, -52 (Supp. 1977). Section 32-51 authorizes the clerk of
court to
allow counsel fees to an attorney serving as a fiduciary or trustee (in addition to the
compensation allowed him as a fiduciary or trustee) where such attorney in behalf of
the trust or fiduciary relationship renders professional services, as an attorney, which
are beyond the ordinary routine of management and of a type which would reasonably
justify the retention of legal counsel by any fiduciary or trustee not himself licensed to
practice law.
Id. § 32-51. This provision apparently overrides the prior judicial ruling denying attorneys' fees
to an attorney fiduciary in any amount beyond his compensation as fiduciary. Lightner v.
Boone, 221 N.C. 78, 19 S.E.2d 144 (1942).
82. 293 N.C. 348, 237 S.E.2d 819 (1977).
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relative was a grandson of decedent's great-grandparents, an heir in the fifth
degree. 3 Other heirs, also descending from these great-grandparents, were
of the sixth degree. The administrator brought an action for declaratory
judgment to determine who would receive the proceeds of the estate-the
heirs or the state. The court held that these heirs were not within the limits of
succession established by statute and thus the estate escheated to the state. 84
G.S. 29-1285 provides that intestates' estates shall escheat to the state if
there is no surviving spouse86 and no person entitled to inherit pursuant to
G.S. 29-15.87 Those persons entitled to take under G.S. 29-15 do not
include lineal descendants of decedents' great-grandparents. 88 G.S. 29-789
limits the right of succession to persons within five degrees of kinship.
Nevertheless, if there is no one within this degree, collateral succession is
"unlimited" to prevent any property from escheating to the estate. 90 The
Newlin court was thus required to determine whether the legislature, in
enacting G.S. 29-7, intended to limit collateral succession to only those
persons (or their lineal descendants) named in G.S. 29-15 or to allow
unlimited collateral succession, even through a great-grandparent, to avoid
escheat. 91 The court noted that the legislative purpose in enacting the
intestate succession provisions was to allow inheritance by close relatives,
known to the decedent, who would be included in the decedent's will had he
written one. 92 Had the legislature intended to allow any collateral relative to
inherit, the escheat provisions in G.S. 29-12 would not have been enacted. 93
Moreover, the court held that G.S. 29-7 does not extend succession rights to
collateral relatives beyond those named in G.S. 29-15. 94 Thus, the court
construed G.S. 29-7 as limiting collateral succession to those persons who
are within five degrees of kinship and are descendants of the decendent's
parents or grandparents. Unlimited succession to avoid escheat is still
83. Provisions for computing degrees of lineal and collateral kinships are provided in N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 104A-1 (1972).
84. 293 N.C. at 352, 237 S.E.2d at 822.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-12 (1976).
86. The surviving spouse takes under id. § 29-14.
87. Id. § 29-15. This section allows only the lineal descendants; parents, brothers and
sisters and their lineal descendants; uncles and aunts and their lineal descendants; and grandpa-
rents and their lineal descendants to inherit from intestates.
88. See note 87 supra.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-7 (1976) provides:
There shall be no right of succession by collateral kin who are more than five degrees
of kinship removed from an intestate; provided that if there is no collateral relative
within the five degrees of kinship referred to herein, then collateral succession shall be
unlimited to prevent any property from eseheating.
90. Id.
91. 293 N.C. at 351-52, 237 S.E.2d at 821-22.
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limited to those persons descending from the parents or grandparents of the
decedent. 95
Some states have provisions that limit collateral succession to the issue
of the decedent's grandparents; thus the state takes if there are no such
issue.96 The Kansas statute governing intestate succession, for example, is
similar to the North Carolina provisions in that Kansas limits collateral
succession to heirs within the sixth degree. 97 If there are no heirs within this
degree, the estate will escheat. 98 Nevertheless, Kansas does not limit the
common ancestor and thus lineal descendants of the decedent's great great-
grandparents could inherit. 99 Apparently the statutory construction problem
that the court faced in Newlin has not been addressed by any other authority.
Although G.S. 29-7 does not specifically refer to G.S. 29-15 for
determining collateral kin, the court's construction of G.S. 29-7 provides a
rational resolution. of the issue arising from this statutory imprecision. Had
the court found that the legislature intended to provide for unlimited succes-
sion, G.S. 29-12 would have been effectively nullified. The decision
reached in Newlin, however, may be overruled by the legislature. Prior to
this decision, a bill was introduced in the North Carolina legislature to
amend G.S. 29-15 to extend inheritance rights to collateral kin traced
through a common ancestor as far removed as the decedent's great great-
grandfather.100 If this amendment were adopted, the court's contention that
the intestate succession provisions were intended to provide only for those
persons close to the decedent would be effectively refuted.101
MARY ANN DIXON HOGUE
95. Id.
96. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 97 (2d ed. 1953); see, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 112.045, .055 (1977). The Uniform Probate Code allows tracing of collateral kin only
through the decedent's grandparents. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (4th ed. 1975). It does
not, however, limit the degrees within which the heirs must be in order to inherit. Id. In the
event there are no takers under this section, and no surviving spouse, the estate will escheat.
Id. § 2-105.
97. KAN. STAT. § 59-509 (1976).
98. Id. § 59-514; see Brown, Intestate Succession in Kansas, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 284, 298-
301 (1969). This statute does allow heirs of the decedent's last spouse to inherit if there are no
other heirs. KAN. STAT. § 59-514 (1976).
99. Brown, supra note 98, at 295.
100. H. 176, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1977 Sess.; see INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY
OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, DAILY BULLETIN 121 (1977).
101. The North Carolina legislature did act to alter the intestate succession provisions for
illegitimate decedents to reflect the provision of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-19(1), 19(c) (1976 &
Supp. 1977) that allows fathers who have admitted paternity to inherit from their illegitimate
child. Any person who acknowledges paternity is to be regarded as a parent for determining
whether the intestate is survived by one or more parents. Id. §§ 29-21, -22 (Supp. 1977). The
legislature also amended § 29-19(b)(2) to require that the father acknowledge himself as the
father during the lifetime of the child as well as during his own in order to inherit from his
illegitimate offspring. id. § 29-19(b)(2).
1978] 1165
1166 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
XV. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
A. Compensable Injuries
1. By Accident, Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment
Recovery under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act'
requires a showing by the claimant that the injury sustained resulted from an
accident arising out of and in the scope of employment. 2 An "accident" is
generally considered to be "an unlooked for and untoward event which is
not expected or designed by the injured employee" 3 or "a result produced
by a fortuitous cause." 4 In addition, in situations resulting in such injuries
as ruptured or slipped discs an accident "must involve more than merely
carrying on the usual and customary duties in the usual way";5 there must
instead be "the interruption of the work routine and the introduction thereby
of unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences. "6
The qualifying phrase "arising out of" refers to the origin or causal
connection of an accident to the employment, while "in the course of"
indicates the time, place and circumstances of an accident. 7 In Gallimore v.
Marilyn's Shoes,8 the North Carolina Supreme Court considered whether
the kidnapping, robbery and subsequent murder of an employee upon
leaving work "arose out of" her employment.9 Decedent was employed by
defendant at a mall location where she sold merchandise, made sales reports
and prepared bank deposits. 10 She was kidnapped when she arrived at her
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -100 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
2. See id. § 97-2(6) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
3. Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (1962).
4. Id.; see, e.g., Kennedy v. Martin Marietta Chems. Sodyeco Div., 34 N.C. App. 177,
237 S.E.2d 542 (1977) (death of employee from heart attack brought on by diminished oxygen
supply in chemical tank in which he was welding held to constitute compensable death by
accident).
5. Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. at 429, 124 S.E.2d at 111.
6. Id.; see, e.g., Key v. Wagner Woodcraft, Inc., 33 N.C. App. 310, 235 S.E.2d 254
(1977) (injury of machine operator working primarily with finished lumber who suffered
ruptured disc while lifting heavy unfinished lumber upon foreman's request held to be
compensable accident).
7. See, e.g., Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976);
Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972).
8. 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977).
9. The court had no trouble affirming the court of appeals' finding that the assault upon
the employee was an accident for purposes of compensation as it was unexpected and without
design on her part. Id. at 402, 233 S.E.2d at 531. The more difficult issue for the court was
whether it "arose out of" or "in the course of" employment.
10. Id. at 400, 233 S.E.2d at 530. Although decedent's mother testified that she had
accompanied her daughter to a "Branch Bank" in the mall in order for decedent to make
deposits, there was no evidence that decedent ever made bank deposits for defendant unless
accompanied by the manager or assistant manager. Id. at 400-01, 233 S.E.2d at 530.
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automobile in the mall lot after leaving work for the day, robbed of money
in her purse and later shot and killed."
In holding that the death did not arise out of her employment, the court
relied primarily upon the fact that decedent was not carrying money belong-
ing to her employer. 12 It applied the test "whether the injury is a natural and
probable consequence of the nature of the employment" 13 and concluded
that decedent's risk of being robbed and abducted was not affected by her
employment, but was "essentially one common to the neighborhood..
which could happen to anyone who patronizes a shopping mall." 14
This decision comports with the general principle that injuries received
by employees when traveling to or from the place of employment do not
usually arise out of and in the course of employment.1 5 It thus represents a
sound policy approach to the construction of the Act by limiting recovery to
those situations in which risk of injury is caused or heightened by the
employment relationship. In Strickland v. King, 16 however, the state su-
preme court, in dealing with a corollary of the principle applied in Galli-
more, reached a less clear result.
Plaintiffs in Strickland instituted civil suits to recover for personal
injuries allegedly received in an automobile accident. 17 Plaintiffs were
passengers in a car driven by a coemployee that collided with another
coworker's car when leaving work at the end of the day shift. 18 The accident
occurred about a mile and a half from the work site on a two-lane, paved
road owned and maintained by their employer. 19 The question whether
plaintiffs' injuries, received while leaving the place of employment, arose
out of and in the course of employment was important because, if they were,
11. Id. at 401, 233 S.E.2d at 530-31. The individual accused of the robbery and murder,
who later pleaded guilty to second degree murder, testified that a friend informed him that
decedent carried large sums of money, although not identifying these sums as belonging to
defendant, and that she had only a regular handbag when abducted. Id.
12. Id. at 405, 233 S.E.2d at 533. There was nothing that could have caused the murderer
to believe she was carrying money; for example, she did not have a deposit bag. In addition,
there was no evidence that decedent ever deposited defendant's money alone or that the
murderer believed her to carry defendant's money. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
13. 292 N.C. at 404, 233 S.E.2d at 532-33.
14. Id. at 405, 233 S.E.2d at 533.
15. One exception arises when the employer furnishes the means of transportation as part
of the employment contract. See Whittington v. A.J. Schnierson & Sons, Inc., 255 N.C. 724,
122 S.E.2d 724 (1961); Smith v. City of Gastonia, 216 N.C. 517, 5 S.E.2d 540 (1939). Another
exception applies when going to or leaving the workplace on premises owned or maintained by
the employer. See Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 128 S.E.2d 570 (1962); text
accompanying notes 16-23 infra.
16. 293 N.C. 731, 239 S.E.2d 243, rev'g 32 N.C. App. 222, 231 S.E.2d 193 (1977).
17. Id. at 732, 239 S.E.2d at 243.
18. Id. at 732, 239 S.E.2d at 243-44.
19. Id. at 732-33, 239 S.E.2d at 244. This road was the only means of ingress and egress
from the employer's parking lot to the public highway. Id. at 732, 239 S.E.2d at 244.
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plaintiffs could not maintain their common law actions against their co-
employees. 20 By holding that the Workmen's Compensation Act had no
application to the case, the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed suits
against the coemployees to continue and reversed the decisions of both
courts below.
2 1
The court read very narrowly the rule that injuries received by an
employee while going to or from the place of employment on premises
owned or controlled by the employer are usually considered to have arisen
out of and in the course of employment 22 in order to exempt this case from
the Act. It found four distinguishing factors in the circumstances in this
case: the road differed insignificantly from a public highway; the risks
employees were exposed to on this road were not materially different from
those encountered on a public highway; the accident occurred substantially
far away from the work site; and the coemployees were not conducting their
employer's business by the carpool arrangement. 23 The weight the court
gave these various factors is not clear. It is thus uncertain where it will draw
the line in similar cases in the future. Moreover, perhaps an unstated reason
behind the court's decision was the existence of a third party, the co-
employees, to bear the cost of the injury allegedly caused by that party,
coupled with a dissatisfaction with the broad application of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to employee injuries occurring within the travel zone of
the place of employment. If there had been no third party to bear the cost of
the injury in this instance, the court's decision might have resulted in a
denial of recovery to plaintiffs as workmen's compensation would have
been the only possible source of recovery. It thus may be questionable
whether the supreme court would reach the outcome of this case in similar
circumstances in which no alternate method of compensation exists.
2. Intoxication Forfeiture
The court of appeals decision in Inscoe v. DeRose Industries, Inc. 24
was affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1977,25 but a new rule
20. The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act limits a covered employee's reme-
dy against his employer or those conducting the employer's business to compensation under the
Act. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-9, -10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). When an employee is injured by
the negligence of a fellow employee and the injuries are deemed to arise out of and in the course
of employment, the injured employee cannot sue the coworker in a tort action under § 97-9.
Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 137 S.E.2d 806 (1964); Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727 69
S.E.2d 6 (1952).
21. 293 N.C. at 734, 239 S.E.2d at 245.
22. See Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226,231-33,128 S.E.2d 570, 574-75 (1962).
23. 293 N.C. at 734, 239 S.E.2d at 245.
24. 30 N.C. App. 1, 226 S.E.2d 201 (1976); see Survey of Developments in North Carolina
Law, 1976, 55 N.C.L. REv. 895, 1122-23 (1977).
25. 292 N.C. 210, 232 S.E.2d 449 (1977). In Inscoe, plaintiff was en route to finish a job
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established by the lower court's interpretation of the "occasioned by"
language of former G.S. 97-1226 was relegated to a position of mere dictum.
The court of appeals, in awarding compensation, had held that in order for
intoxication to preclude recovery, it must be the sole proximate cause of an
employee's accidental injuries. 27 The supreme court left this holding intact,
but reduced its precedential value by finding it unnecessary to reach the
issue in order to decide the case.28
The supreme court instead based its decision upon the role of the courts
in reviewing the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission in any
given case. 29 Under G.S. 97-86, the Commission's findings are conclusive
on appeal when supported by competent evidence, 30 " 'even though the
record may support a contrary finding of fact.' ",31 After analyzing the
evidence before the Commission, the supreme court concluded that, while
the facts supported a finding for either party, the evidence reasonably
supported the finding that the accident was not occasioned by plaintiff's
intoxication, whether as the sole or a proximate cause.32 Therefore, it found
no reason to reach the meaning of the "occasioned by" language.
A 1975 amendment to the intoxication forfeiture provision replaced the
words "occasioned by" with the language "proximately caused by."
33
While the "occasioned by" language no longer exists, the court of appeals'
decision is still important because its construction of that phrase could apply
with equal force to the "proximately caused by" language of the amended
provision. The supreme court never expressly rejected that interpretation of
the statutory language, even though it criticized the court of appeals for
when his vehicle was struck by an oncoming vehicle traveling at a high rate of ipeed. Id. at 212,
232 S.E.2d at 450. Both plaintiff and the driver of the other vehicle were arrested for driving
under the influence of intoxicating beverages. Id. at 212-13, 232 S.E.2d at 450-51.
26. The court of appeals dealt with the meaning of the intoxication forfeiture provision,
which provided that "[n]o compensation shall be payable if the injury or death was occasioned
by the intoxication of the employee." Law of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, § 13, 1929 N.C. Pub.
Laws 117 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1972)) (amended 1975) (emphasis
added).
27. 30 N.C. App. at 8, 226 S.E.2d at 205.
28. 292 N.C. at 215, 232 S.E.2d at 452.
29. Id. at 215-18, 232 S.E.2d at 452-53.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (Cum. Supp. 1977); see Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292
N.C. 399, 233 S.E.2d 529 (1977). The court in Inscoe further explained: "'The court does not
have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court's
duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to
support the finding.'" 292 N.C. at 215, 232 S.E.2d at 452 (quoting Anderson v. Lincoln Constr.
Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)).
31. 292 N.C. at 215, 232 S.E.2d at 452 (quoting Rice v. Thomasville Chair Co., 238 N.C.
121, 124, 76 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1953)).
32. Id. at 218, 232 S.E.2d at 453-54.
33. "No compensation shall be payable if the injury or death of the employee was
proximately caused by:. . . [h]is intoxication . N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (Cum. Supp.
1977) (emphasis added).
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deciding the case on that basis.34 The lower court opinion remains as an
expression of that court's acceptance of a liberal reading of G.S. 97-12, 35
whether it contains the former "occasioned by" or the present "proximately
caused by" language.
B. Application of the Act
The North Carolina Court of Appeals broadened the application of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to dependent minor children in Caldwell v.
Marsh Realty Co. 36 Decedent-employee died from an accident on the job
within the scope of coverage of the Act; the only issue was the length of
time his two dependent children would receive death benefits.37 An interpre-
tation of a 1974 amendment to G.S. 97-38(3) 38 was required for resolution
of the case. The wording and punctuation of the amendment created the
difficulty in its meaning and the conflicting interpretations. Plaintiffs main-
tained that the provision allowed continuation of death benefits after the
statutorily established 400 weeks to the dependent children until each
reached eighteen years of age. 39 Defendants argued that the language of the
amendment provided for benefits to continue to the dependent children
beyond 400 weeks until each reached eighteen only if a disabled, unremar-
ried widow or widower existed. 40
The court of appeals, relying upon the legislative history of the amend-
ment, held that under G.S. 97-38, payments to dependent children could
continue until eighteen years of age without the existence of a disabled,
unremarried widow or widower.41 By holding that dependent minor children
should be treated as an independent class of recipients of workmen's
34. 292 N.C. at 215, 232 S.E.2d at 452.
35. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1976, supra note 24, at 1123 &
n.56.
36. 32 N.C. App. 676, 233 S.E.2d 594, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 728, 235 S.E.2d 782 (1977).
37. Id. at 676-77, 233 S.E.2d at 594-95.
38. The 1974 amendment provides:
Compensation payments due on account of death shall be paid for a period of 400
weeks from the date of the death of the employee; provided, however, after said 400-
week period in case of a widow or widower who is unable to support herself or himself
because of physical or mental disability as of the date of death of the employee,
compensation payments shall continue during her or his lifetime or until remarriage
and compensation payments due a dependent child shall be continued until such child
reaches the age of 18.
Law of Apr. 12, 1974, ch. 1308, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, 2d Sess. 1974, at 609 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-38 (Cum. Supp. 1977)) (emphasis added).
39. 32 N.C. App. at 678, 233 S.E.2d at 596.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 679-81, 233 S.E.2d at 596-98. The definition of widower in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-2(15) (Cum. Supp. 1977) was amended last year to bring it into line with the broader
definition of its female counterpart, the widow, in id. § 97-2(14) (1972). Section 97-2(15) now
reads: "The term 'widower" includes only the decedent's husband living with or dependent for
support upon her at the time of her death or living apart forjustifiable cause orby reason of her
desertion at such time." Id. § 97-2(15) (emphasis added).
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compensation death benefits, the court has rendered a sound policy deci-
sion. It has recognized that all dependent children under eighteen experi-
ence some economic deprivation from the death of a parent independent of
the loss suffered by the surviving parent. Therefore, rather than creating
arbitrary distinctions among these children by basing recovery upon the
status or circumstances of their surviving parent, the court has allowed
members of each class who have been harmed by an employee's death to be
compensated separately.
C. Amount42 and Items of Recovery
In Thompson v. Frank IX& Sons, 43 the court of appeals considered for
the first time the meaning of "hand" under G.S. 97-31(12). 44 Claimant had
received a fracture of both bones in his left forearm while at work, requiring
surgery that left scarring. 45 Defendants agreed to pay claimant permanent
partial disability for twenty-five percent loss of the use of his left hand.
46
Thereafter, claimant filed for additional compensation for disfigurement due
to the surgical scars on his forearm.47
The meaning of "hand" was important because if the hand encom-
passed all parts of the arm below the elbow joint, claimant would have been
foreclosed from receiving additional compensation for disfigurement to his
"hand" as he had already received disability benefits for it.48 The court,
42. In 1977 the legislature amended three statutory subsections to increase the amounts of
compensation available under each. The monetary awards for serious facial or head disfigure-
ment, serious bodily disfigurement, and loss of or permanent injury to important organs or parts
of the body were raised in each instance to $10,000. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(21), (22), (24)
(Cum. Supp. 1977). In addition, the General Assembly augmented the funding of the Second
Injury Fund, administered by the Industrial Commission, by doubling the maximum assess-
ments the Commission might make against an employer or its insurance carrier when injuries
resulting in partial disabilities occur on the employer's premises. Id. § 97-40.1. In the case of the
loss, or loss of use, of minor body members from which permanent partial disability occurs, the
maximum assessment is now $50.00; when a 50% or more loss or loss of use of a major body
member occurs, the assessment is now $200. Id.
43. 33 N.C. App. 350, 235 S.E.2d 250 (1977).
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(12) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
45. 33 N.C. App. at 350, 235 S.E.2d at 251.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 351, 235 S.E.2d at 251.
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (Cum. Supp. 1977), which allows compensation to be
paid for disability resulting from loss or loss of use of various members of the body according to
the schedule provided therein and makes such payment "in lieu of all other compensation,
including disfigurement." Id. This provision presents the only bar to recovery for both disabili-
ty and disfigurement of the same part of the body. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION LAW § 58.31 (1976) in which it is contended that:
Apart from special statutory restrictions or other special circumstances, there is
no reason why loss of use and disfigurement of the same member should not both be
recognized. Interference with presumed future earning capacity, which is the justifica-
tion for a disfigurement award, may or may not accompany a schedule loss- there is no
reason to suppose that any allowance was made for it in the original schedules, since
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upon examining definitions of "hand" from other jurisdictions, concluded
that the common and ordinary meaning of "hand" was the "fingers and
thumb, the hand proper and the wrist" 49 and on this basis allowed recovery
for the disfigurement.
As North Carolina disallows compensation for loss of use and dis-
figurement of the same member, definitions given the various members
become more significant. The adoption of narrow, less exclusive meanings
results in a broader application of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
disfigurement claims accompanying disability compensation. In addition, it
provides for easy and certain computation of payments in disability cases,




1. Jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission
In Spivey v. Oakley's General Contractors,5' the court of appeals held
that the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to determine whether an
employer's workmen's compensation policy had been properly cancelled,
even though the employer and the employee had settled the claim in issue.
5 2
Defendant insurance company had disclaimed liability for employee's injury
because of the alleged cancellation of the policy for nonpayment of premium
prior to the accident; the claim was then settled by the employer and the
employee.
5 3
Although many commissions are not allowed jurisdiction when the
employee's rights are not in issue54 as was the case here, the court
concluded that the North Carolina Industrial Commission should have juris-
diction in this situation. In so doing, it relied upon previous supreme court
decisions granting the Commission jurisdiction in other circumstances when
they were calculated on loss of function, in many instances at a time when disfigure-
ment had not yet been recognized as having a place in workmen's compensation. If
such interference does accompany the schedule loss, it is appropriate to make allow-
ance for it. The presence of such presumed interference will depend on many vari-
ables, particularly the nature of the work ....
49. 33 N.C. App. at 355, 235 S.E.2d at 253.
50. The legislature extended the length of time in which a party may appeal the decision of
a hearing commissioner to the full Commission from seven to fifteen days, and also provided
that the chairman of the Commission could designate a deputy commissioner to replace a
commissioner on the review of any case. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-85 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Out-of-
state attorneys are now allowed; in the discretion of the Commission, to practice before the
Commission. Id. § 84-4.1.
51. 32 N.C. App. 488, 232 S.E.2d 454 (1977).
52. Id. at 491, 232 S.E.2d at 456.
53. Id. at 489, 232 S.E.2d at 454-55.
54. See 4 A. LARSON, supra note 48, § 92.40.
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employees' rights were not challenged.55 The court's decision appears
logically sound because the Commission would have had jurisdiction over
the policy cancellation issue had no settlement occurred. 56 Determination of
the issue was thus within the Commission's expertise. The court's decision
will allow the fullest use of this expertise in regulating the overall
framework of workmen's compensation.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals examined the limited jurisdiction
of the Commission in third party recovery suits57 in Williams v. Insurance
Repair Specialists, Inc. 58 Insurance Repair Specialists (employer), Reliance
Insurance Company (its compensation carrier) and an employee's widow
filed a written admission of liability for benefits and the agreed compensa-
tion award with the Commission. 59 Subsequently, having been notified by
Reliance of its subrogation right to any wrongful death settlement proceeds,
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (the third-party tortfeasor's liability
carrier) settled the wrongful death claim with the employee's estate and paid
the settlement. 60 Reliance then petitioned the Commission for an order of
distribution of the settlement pursuant to G.S. 97-10.2,61 which would
require Liberty Mutual to pay to Reliance the amount of the compensation
award.62
The court of appeals held that the Commission had jurisdiction to issue
55. See, e.g., Moore v. Adams Elec. Co., 264 N.C. 667, 142 S.E.2d 659 (1965) (dispute
between employer and alleged carriers); Greene v. Spivey, 236 N.C. 435, 73 S.E.2d 488 (1952)
(dispute between employer and carrier); Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 8
N.C. App. 259, 174 S.E.2d 292 (1970) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-91 (1972) not limited solely to
questions arising out of employer-employee relationship or to determination of injured employ-
ee's rights).
56. 32 N.C. App. at 490, 232 S.E.2d at 455.
57. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1972). Third party recovery suits involve the situation
in which "the injury or death was caused under circumstances creating a liability in some
person other than the employer to pay damages therefor, such person. . . being. . . the 'third
party.'" Id. § 97-10.2(a). If the injured or deceased employee receives workmen's compensa-
tion benefits, and then successfully sues the third party in a tort action, any money received
from the third party is subject to a subrogation interest of the employer or the employer's
insurance carrier. Id. § 97-10.2(e)-(g).
58. 32 N.C. App. 235, 232 S.E.2d 5, cert. denied, 292 N.C. 735, 235 S.E.2d 789 (1977).
59. Id. at 236, 232 S.E.2d at 6.
60. Id. at 236-37, 232 S.E.2d at 6-7.
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1972); see note 57 supra.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(0(1) (1972) provides in part:
If the employer has filed a written admission of liability for benefits under this Chapter
with . . . the Industrial Commission, then any amount obtained by any person by
settlement with . . . the third party by reason of such injury or death shall be
disbursed by order of the Industrial Commission for the following purposes and in the
following order of priority:
c. Third to the reimbursement of the employer for all benefits by way of compen-
sation or medical treatment expense paid or to be paid by the employer under award of
the Industrial Commission.
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the distribution order under G.S. 97-10.2.63 It was not convinced by argu-
ments that the employee's widow had already spent her entire share of the
wrongful death settlement and that none of the payments could be recouped
because of her insolvency. 64 Nor did it feel that Liberty Mutual lacked
notice of Reliance's subrogation interest. 65 According to the court, the
preliminaries 66 to acquiring the G.S. 97-10.2 limited jurisdiction had been




The North Carolina General Assembly enacted a new statute in 1977
that allows the Commission to direct the payment of workmen's compensa-
tion awards in certain cases pending appeal to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. 68 This procedure can be followed in those situations in which the
Commission determines that "any part of the award appealed from is not
appealed by the issues raised by such appeal.''69 When all parties concede
the compensability of an employee's claim, the amount is undisputed, and
the only issue is which employers or carriers are liable, the Commission is
empowered to order payment to the employee while the case is on appeal.
70
The effects of this statute should be beneficial. Claimants will no
longer have to wait indefinitely for payments rightly forthcoming, but
delayed by other issues on appeal. Unfortunately, the language of the
statute, rather than mandating this outcome when the proper situation arises,
gives broad discretion to the Commission in directing such payments. In
order to conform to the overall statutory purpose of facilitating compensa-
tion, this discretion should generally be exercised in favor of immediate
payment.
SUSIE SPRUILL SIMPSON
63. 32 N.C. App. at 242, 232 S.E.2d at 9.
64. Id. at 240-41, 232 S.E.2d at 9.
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In addition, when the only issue on appeal is the amount of the average weekly wage, the
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reimbursed by the party ultimately held liable. Id. The Commission has the authority to order
this same result with respect to the other provisions of Chapter 97 as well. Id. § 97-86.1(d).
1174 [Vol. 56
